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Foreword
The idea to design and prepare a scientific monograph on public admi-
nistration reforms (PAR) and public governance, particularly dedicated to 
the Eastern European counties and their development after accession to the 
European Union (EU), was born in September 2015 in Vilnius. Namely, My-
kolas Romeris University organized a conference on this topic in order to ce-
lebrate 25th anniversary of Lithuania‘s Restoration of Independence. During 
the respective conference in-depth discussions have been led acknowledging 
the need to scientifically analyze this field by marking key convergent charac-
teristics of countries involved, particularly taking into account that there is 
hardly any available literature in English to mark the progress in this region 
respectively. At that time, we have also developed a notion of the EEU-11, i.e. 
a region of post-communist and post-socialist EU Member States (See more 
in Part C).  
The book hence represents an effort to conceptualize the content and 
dimensions of the Eastern European (EE) region post-communist / socialist 
transformation upon the role and results of PAR as a “success story”. The ge-
neral research question that we addressed has been based on an assumption 
of radical change in public governance in respective countries due to their 
Europeanization. Simultaneously, we have envisaged that: A) PAR are facing 
so called implementation gap in general, B) there are crucial differences in 
individual (groups of) countries (e.g. among Baltic countries, Visegrad (V4) 
or former Austrian-Hungarian or Yugoslavian countries, etc.). Especially 
with regard to governance convergence towards the EU standards and among 
each other as well as different trajectories of divergence as the homogenizing 
effects of communism have faded and construct a more relevant and contem-
porary theory of PAR that could replace the outdated notion of one-size-fits-
all post-communist / EE transformation theory. 
Our aims by developing and publishing this monograph are therefore:
•	 to provide comparative analysis of PAR in the 11 new EU member 
states (joined in 2004, 2007 and 2013) in the period of 1990-2016 ba-
sed on scientific research and harmonized profile enabling optimal 
objective comparisons;
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•	 to enhance interdisciplinary public administration (PA) related rese-
arch and its dissemination;
•	 to analyze selected subtopics within PAR in terms of main aims, prio-
ritized activities and level of realization, in particular: 
 Ŝ public governance models and trends in political-administrative 
decision-making, and accountability of PA incorporated;
 Ŝ functions and organization of public administration (in the bro-
adest sense), local self-government, delegation of authority (e.g. 
regulatory agencies), public-private partnerships and similar in-
cluded;
 Ŝ civil service system based on integrity and ethics;
 Ŝ work processes with special emphasis on administrative procedu-
res modernization and transparency in terms of good administra-
tion;
•	 to scientifically, comparatively and empirically define key differen-
ces and characteristic of the new EU member states, i.e. the EEU-11, 
addressing among others non/compliance to western European mo-
dels and practices and ongoing post-socialist processes;
•	 to detect main con- and divergences among individual countries in 
this region;
•	 to transfer current research results through a comprehensive literature 
review of academic publications in (only or mainly) native languages 
of the EEU-11;
•	 to enable knowledge transfer from theory to practice in the region to 
policy makers;
•	 to establish and enhance the role of publishers as key developers of PA 
studies at the European level. 
The initiative has been accepted by a joint venture of two publishing 
houses, namely University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Administration, and My-
kolas Romeris University. Such a co-operation represents one of the aims that 
we strived for, in terms of a more close collaboration between the countries in 
our region to enable exchange of best practices, and thus to learn from each 
other.
we have invited distinguished national scholars in the field to prepare a 
profile of their country in this respect, following a joint outline. Unfortunate-
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ly, Estonian and Czech colleagues could not respond in due time but we have 
managed to gather nine national reports that we believe serve the purpose. All 
contributions have been subjected to a full review, conducted by four revie-
wers of different expertise (political science, law, economics, management), 
aiming to cover as much disciplinary specifics as possible but simultaneously 
focus on interdisciplinary holistic study. 
Finally, in editors’ capacity, we would especially like to thank to all 
experts involved in this initiative for their collaboration, efforts and patien-
ce within the coordination process. Besides the authors drafting the country 
profiles, special thanks go to the reviewers, Prof. dr. Harald koht, and assoc. 
prof. dr. Aleksander Aristovnik, assoc. prof. dr. Ieva Deviatnikovaitė and as-
soc. prof. dr. Mirko Pečarič. Moreover, we would like to acknowledge contri-
bution of both publishing houses and their representatives for their profes-
sional support.
Ljubljana, Vilnius, January 2017
Polonca kovač and Mantas Bileišis
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1. Public Administration Reforms in the                      
EEU – Introduction
Michiel S. de Vries
Political institutions can change overnight. Illustrative is the fall of the 
Berlin wall in November 1989, by which the people from then called Eastern 
germany were offered the exit option to escape from the communist regime. 
within a couple of years, the political regime in the whole region of Central 
Europe changed from belonging to the Communist bloc towards moving to 
the western bloc in which democracy and the free market ideology became 
dominant. 
However, the governmental, administrative and societal institutions that 
until then influenced the norms, beliefs and actions of individuals and or-
ganizations still had to be reformed and this process continues until today. 
This includes creation of new governance models, organization of the public 
administration, reform of administrative procedures, development of a civil 
service, process of decentralization and agencification. The process pointed 
to several interesting issues, for instance, that what is normally seen as most 
difficult, changing the constitution proved to be the easiest part of the whole 
reform process. One would have expected that other reforms would evolve as 
smoothly because a huge amount of money was released by the affluent world 
(IMF, world Bank, EU etc.) to provide international technical assistance in 
order to make the reforms work, and the new western partners offered an in-
teresting incentive that if the reforms would work out and go in the direction 
desired by these countries and international organizations, the Central Eu-
ropean countries could become member of the European Union, which was 
judged at the time to be very profitable. The EU also provided a strategic 
goal for the needed reforms, the model of the European Administrative Space 
(EAS). The idea of EAS was launched when the Central European countries 
applied for EU membership in the 1990s. One of the criteria for the potential 
Member States  was that they should have sufficient national administrative 
capacities to comply with the acquis (Trondal & Peters, 2013: 303, see also 
Trondal, J., & Jeppesen, L., 2006).
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It was in the 1980s and 1990s that institutional standards to promote 
this idea emerged. Scholars point to the advisory role of EIPA and SIgMA. 
Others see the catalytic effect of the actual emergence of local twinning pro-
jects, cross-border regions, and the emergence of the Schengen area, the area 
without borders within the European Union, on the need for effective enfor-
cement of the Union Law through the EAS (Beck, 2015). Still others point to 
the decisive impact of the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993, defining whether a 
country is eligible to join the European Union; the Madrid Treaty, introdu-
cing the need for adjustment of administrative and judicial structures so as 
to be able to transpose the EU Law and effectively implement it; the Luxem-
bourg Treaty of 1997, pointing to the need for strengthening institutions; and 
the Helsinki Treaty of 1999, with the explicit obligation of candidate coun-
tries to share the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the 
treaties (Torma, 2011). The standard-setting organization at that moment, 
SIgMA, rightly pointed out in 1998: “[I]t is clear that the EAS is now begin-
ning to emerge” (SIgMA 1998: 15). 
At the time, the “future” accession provided an incentive for a huge 
number of reforms in the CEE-countries. The expanding acquis, with its 
requirements limiting institutional discretion and thus having a profound 
impact on national administrative styles and structures, made sure that not 
only the CEE countries, but also the existing Member States were affected 
(knill, 2001: 214). This influence varied over different policies, dependent on 
the basic pattern by which the European policies exerted influence on natio-
nal administrative styles and structures, and according to the extent to which 
such needed compliance was in line with national administrations’ beliefs 
and preferences (knill, 2001: 227). However, overall, an Europeanization of 
national administrations was said to have taken place, making Matei and Ma-
tei conclude in 2008: It “appears as the closure for a large process that implies 
convergence, Europeanization and administrative dynamics” (2008: 46).
Also theoretically one would expect a smooth and rapidly progressing 
process, as institutions are seen as endogenous, that is, that “their form and 
their functioning depend on the conditions under which they emerge and 
endure” (Douglas North, 1980, 1990, Przeworski, 2004: 527). Since the con-
ditions had changed dramatically in Central Europe, there was a necessity 
that administrative and societal institutions would adapt to the new situation 
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swiftly. 
From a rationalist and functionalist perspective, availability of a strategic 
goal – the model of the EAS and the necessity to reform – needed adaptation 
to the new conditions,  desirability to reform – the incentive to become the 
EU members, opportunities created through the availability of resources and 
technical assistance to make the reform happen international resources relea-
sed to make it feasible, and technical assistance offered, all result in the same 
expectation, namely that the institutional structure existing in all Central Eu-
ropean countries in all its dimensions would quickly change and converge to 
the western model. 
However, this rationalist and functionalist approach neglects the limita-
tions and inhibitors to such institutional reforms. The best-known inhibitor 
is posed by the so-called path-dependences. “Institutions are the rules of the 
game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction” (North, 1990: 3) and often have a life of their own 
in that it is difficult, if not impossible, to initiate radical changes in the ins-
titution or to eliminate it. As Mahoney (2000: 507) argued, “path dependen-
ce characterizes specifically those historical sequences in which contingent 
events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deter-
ministic properties“. when more and complementary institutions are set up, 
as is usual in societies, it becomes costly to radically change them or to aban-
don them because changing one institution can have serious implications for 
other institutions. Often, there are “configurations of complementary institu-
tions in which the performance of each is affected by the existence of others” 
(cf. de Vries, 2016: 47; Pierson, 2000: 78). Being subject to a communist regi-
me for 45 years had created a system of such complementary institutions in 
Central Europe and a legacy that would be easily overcomed by the reforms. 
In Central Europe, such path dependences were strengthened by factors at 
the macro-, meso- and micro-level. At the micro-level the legacy remained 
visible because individual public administrators who were already in function 
in the previous regime with all their norms, beliefs and values and inclina-
tions to act in ways acquired in the previous regime, were given the opportu-
nity to stay in function under the new regime, resulting in the conservation 
of those norms, values and beliefs within the administrative apparatus. At 
the meso-level, path dependencies are seen in the legalistic traditions being 
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still dominant in many Central European countries. One of the reasons for 
this is that, although the EAS requested more efficiency, it also promoted the 
conservation of that already existing legalism through the bureaucratic pro-
cedures it imposed by requiring the Central European countries to adopt the 
acquis communautaire of the EU.
At the macro-level, institutional arrangements at the national level, are not 
just decided upon and changed because of the emergence of a new regime and 
on rationalist and functionalist reasoning, but remain subjected to the basics of 
politics, that is, power and interests. People in power, irrespective of the regi-
me-type, will always be hesitant to renounce that power and will be irrespecti-
ve of the regime-type have a keen eye after their own interests. This conforms 
to the theory of Hall and Taylor (1996: 938) and Steinmo (1992) who explain 
institutional resilience by the actions of the coalitions in power, trying to pre-
serve their prerogatives and avoid reforms that would diminish their power or 
would counter their interests. This predominance of power and interests is seen 
in processes of decentralization; processes to change the position of national 
banks, for instance, processes to increase transparency, etc. (cf. de Vries, 2000).
The above results question what has really happened to the administra-
tive institutions in Central Europe during its transformation and how public 
administrative reforms are perceived, conceptualized and implemented, and 
if this could resulted in additions to the currently dominant theories about pu-
blic administration reform. It is not a question that can be answered through 
a general, rather abstract overview of the developments, but needs in-depth 
analyses pointing out the communalities and differences in the approaches in 
different countries. That is the topic of this book and is being investigated for 
the Central European countries. 
Vainius Smalskys, Andrius Stasiukynas, Jurgita Domeikienė, Mantas Bi-
leišis investigate the reforms in Lithuania and point out that such reforms in 
Lithuania were challenging for the governments trying, on the one hand, to 
be the darling of the EU in complying swiftly to its requirements, but on the 
other hand losing sight of the interests of its citizens, and hardly reforming its 
administration in so far as it is not required by the EU.
Maris Pukis, Inesa Voroncuka and Olga Starineca argue for Latvia that 
the reforms were accompanied by huge conflicts between the stakeholders, 
and again that as far as the EU legislation was concerned the reforms went 
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rather smoothly, but regarding the domestic reforms, conflicts of interest and 
political considerations were dominant. This resulted in reforms that at times 
went back and forth, dependent on the distribution of power and the discre-
tion allowed to the public administration. 
Mariusz w. Sienkiewicz and Stanisław Michałowski investigate the re-
forms that have occurred in Poland, and note that all these reforms failed to 
meet the citizens’ interests, and that the achievement of all objectives of the 
reforms can be disputed.
Juraj Nemec, Beata Mikusova Merickova, Maria Murray Svidronova, 
and Peter Pisar set forth the reforms in Slovakia, andalthough certain reforms 
were effective, the overall system is still overpoliticized and the reforms un-
controlled, not modeled according to a rational design, and having hardly any 
benefits for the population.
györgy gajduschek, Tamás M. Horváth and károly Jugovits argue for 
Hungary by stating that the reforms lacked a coherent strategic vision and 
political support, and emerged out of contradictory reform models as Poland 
went back and forth dependent on the dominant political coalition in power. 
Polonca kovač and Primož Pevcin argue for Slovenia by stating that 
although there are radical changes of previous governance approaches visible 
due to internal incentives and the Europeanization process there always have 
been and still are implementation gaps, and that it all depends on political 
consensus rather than technical and operational measures to improve on this. 
For Croatia, that although in the light of the EU membership many re-
forms were intitiated, as analyzed by Ivan koprić, the size of its public sector, 
history, administrative tradition, and other administrative particularities in 
combination with the existence of a number of influential trade unions who 
follow the internal bureaucratic resistance to reforms, inhibited in-depth pu-
blic administration reforms. 
Călin Emilian Hințea and Tudor Cristian Țiclău highlight the reforms 
in Romania, and observe that despite, or perhaps due to all the reforms that 
have been initiated during the last 25 years and are still ongoing in the field 
of legislation, intergovernmental relations, human resource management and 
financial management, the predictability and coherence of the civil service is 
still severely lacking, the managerial performance has not improved, that one 
cannot yet speak of a rational use of public resources, and finally, that the popu-
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lation did not profit from the reforms.
Tatyana Tomova and Simeon Petrov present the reforms in Bulgaria that 
were hardly following a coherent strategic plan. Instead, they point out that 
Bulgaria witnesses a strong fragmentation in the field of strategic planning 
and a huge number of strategic documents. what strategy to follow seems 
to depend on the international and supranational commitments of the State, 
which are a result of financial dependence (International Monetary Fund), 
donor programs (world Bank, EU), or the voluntary inclusion in general po-
litical and normative space (EU).
All this implies there was no common conceptual model underlying the 
reforms that took place in Central Europe. Reforms were initiated only if they 
were really needed based on external pressure, but not out of a coherent re-
form model, such as New Public Management, New Public governance, Va-
lue Based governance, New Public Administration, and the like. Certainly, 
such models were referred to with the purpose to give the intended reforms 
some credibility and legitimacy, but they did not present the basis out of 
which one could understand the outcomes of the reforms. 
From the perspective of public administration as a discipline, the findings 
that reforms in Central Europe were not based thereon and also were hardly 
done on behalf of the interests of the population, but rather on the interests of 
administrators and politicians, is on the one hand weird, but at the same time 
very interesting. It makes one inquisitive in the answer to the question whether 
there is any convergence to the western model, whether all the reforms are 
just temporary instead of structural and whether the return to the central state 
model as is happening in Hungary could also be possible in other Central Eu-
ropean countries if the EU fails to deliver on its promises. As all the authors in 
this book argue, most of the reforms in Central Europe were were conducted 
seemingly reluctantly. The consequence is that all these reforms are far from 
stable and structural and can easily be reversed if their payoff fails to materia-
lize (cf. Sobis & De Vries, 2014). This is already seen in some way in Hungary 
and Poland, but could also become reality in other Central European states.   
This makes the investigation of institutional change and its driving forces 
not only interesting from a scholarly perspective, but also from the perspecti-
ve of a concerned citizen, who was pleased to see the EU expand, but has to 
reconsider the dangers thereof possibly emerging in the near future.
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2. Public Administration Reforms in Eastern Europe: 
Naïve Cultural Following, Hesitant Europeanization, 
or Search for Genuine Changes?
Ivan Koprić
2.1. Introduction
Administrative reform is a common issue in administrative and political 
science. Comparative analyses of administrative reforms seem to be an im-
portant source of information necessary for experiential learning. Although 
national specificities are unavoidable, international comparison should fol-
low a standardized analytical path in order to produce and offer useful know-
ledge. 
Comparative approach to administrative reform in the former socialist 
countries of Eastern Europe (i.e. Central, East, and South-East Europe) has 
been running against several problems of theoretical significance. The first 
one is a general problem with comparative approach in public administration 
studies based on the complexity of contemporary public administrations, 
different goals of their change, various possible developmental paths, varia-
tions of institutional and other arrangements in providing public services in 
different countries, etc. The second problem arises from defining administra-
tive reform and classifying the particular national reform paths into a smaller 
number of administrative reform types to make them comparable with those 
in other countries. The third problem lies in identifying what transition me-
ans in different contexts, and what it means in the specific case of Eastern Eu-
ropean countries whose recent history was marked by the socialist type of so-
cial experiment because all of them are (still) seen as the transition countries. 
Eastern European transition countries have chosen the European Union 
accession path. Although their accession tracks have not been the same, and 
the harmonization with European standards has not been performed at the 
same time and in the same manner, there is a body of administrative insti-
tutions and standards commonly accepted by various countries in order to 
boost their administrative capacity necessary for the EU accession. After for-
mally joining the EU, these countries have continued to converge, to a degree, 
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on the simple basis that their everyday functioning takes place within the 
European Administrative Space (See EAS in: koprić, 2014; 2012 for more 
detail). This type of administrative convergence serves as a mitigating factor 
of comparative analysis as well as a general endeavor of these countries’ tran-
sition towards the model of democratic liberal state.   
2.2. Catching and Analyzing Administrative Reforms
Choosing the monumental multi-layered project of transforming pre-
vious single-party system to democratic multi-party system, with a privati-
zation of former state or quasi-social ownership, and design of free market 
economy the transition countries were brought to the emerging task of deep 
reform of state machinery. Further tasks, such as the accession to the Coun-
cil of Europe, NATO, the European Union, and some other European and 
international organizations additionally stressed the urgency of public admi-
nistration reform. However, there are limited capacities of society to accept 
changes, logic of path dependency, bureaucratic resistances, and all other 
sorts of complications accompanying reform efforts. Because of these coun-
terforces, administrative reforms can be slow, formal, and shallow. Political 
elites faced with multiple efficacy pressures tend to proclaim almost every 
single legislative change to be an administrative reform.    
This opens a problem of defining the administrative reform. Is there only 
one, continuous and constant reform or many of them? Is every change a 
reform, regardless of its effects? which effects count, short-term and easi-
ly visible outputs or long-term and barely observable deep cultural impacts? 
Does the term administrative reform convey only positive connotations or 
can it just as easily acquire a negative meaning? who is competent to pro-
claim which reform consequences and impacts are positive or negative, i.e. 
who evaluates their results and proclaims their success? 
These are not new concerns and considerations. As Caiden pointed out, 
administrative reform is “the artificial inducement of administrative trans-
formation against resistance” (Caiden, 1969/2009: 1). Differentiating between 
societal changers, societal revolutionaries, and societal reformers (ibid., p. 5) 
he also gave a good indication for discernment of the three types of changes 
in public administrations (and societies), according to their width, depth, and 
intensity. 
36 Public AdministrAtion reforms in eAstern euroPeAn union member stAtes 
Post-Accession convergence And divergence
Only deeper administrative changes that bring about more significant 
institutional innovations into the administrative system of a country may 
be called reforms. They usually trigger resistance, because of their impacts 
on the power structure. Other smaller adaptations of administrative functi-
oning, new laws and regulations, periodic reorganizations of public admi-
nistrative bodies, changes in the civil service system, and other incremental 
administrative modifications can be of some importance, at least on a daily 
basis. These incremental changes are the grains of sand that sediment on the 
much larger beaches of administrative landscape.
The change of power structure is not the only political dimension of 
administrative reforms. They are designed and managed on the basis of spe-
cific value orientations distillated through the political processes participa-
ted by political actors, citizens and general public. Moreover, their commen-
cement and pace are decided, directed and influenced by the political bo-
dies and processes, although with a significant influence of administrative 
theory, doctrines, and professionals. That is why the administrative reform 
is also considered as “a political process designed to adjust the relationships 
between a bureaucracy and other elements in a society, or within bureaucra-
cy itself ” (Montgomery, 1967: 1).
Administrative changes can be defined as an administrative reform 
only if, as pointed out by Caiden, they end in certain improvements of a pu-
blic administration. Value choice made within the decision-making process 
about an administrative reform sets the base for its evaluation. Evaluation of 
the reform success depends on the assessment of a degree to which the re-
form contributes to the established goals and values that stand behind them. 
If it contributes in an acceptable manner and to an acceptable degree, the 
improvement necessary for each administrative reform has probably been 
achieved and the reform may be treated as a success. 
However, the success and degree of a reform’s efficacy may not be self-
evident, even when the value base is known. Because of that, further, more 
precise and attentive evaluation exercise is needed. The success of an admi-
nistrative reform may be evaluated by using the standards of evaluation 
studies, especially those rooted in the logic of program theory evaluation 
(Rogers et al., 2000; Sharpe, 2011). A complete and precise reconstruction of 
all the elements of reform program theory is, in the majority of cases, almost 
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impossible because they are vaguely defined, complicated and implemented 
in complex circumstances (comp. Rogers, 2008), and accompanied by only 
broadly defined and scarce success indicators. Such situations call for a pro-
found and perspicacious theoretical analysis.
Establishing success or failure in achieving the official reform goals is 
but first analytical task. It is widely recognized that administrative reforms 
are frequently unsuccessful or, to be more optimistic, only moderately su-
ccessful. Yet administrative changes do occur. Both success and failure are 
to be ascribed to politics and public administration. knowing the reasons 
requires a huge effort put in the research of a complex machinery of the 
political and administrative systems in their relevant environments. Be that 
as it may, we can count not only on official results, but also on unintended 
side effects of administrative reforms, such as changing of administrative 
and political rhetoric, strengthening or weakening of the system legitimacy, 
introducing variety into routines of organizational life, etc. (March & Olsen, 
1989; Czarniawska-Joerges, 1989). It seems important for administrative re-
form analysis to take into account not only the ‘hard’ and officially expected 
results, but also such soft, unexpected results, which may – at first glance 
– be treated as side effects, but whose role in long-term administrative chan-
ges is far from being unimportant.
It is well known that different countries answer similar challenges from 
complex domestic and international circumstances in a different manner. 
Hence, they choose different strategies of administrative reform.1 According 
to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2001; 2003), there are four main reform strategies: 
to maintain, modernize, marketize, or minimize. Maintaining means to pre-
serve and incrementally improve or upgrade the classical, weberian model 
of public administration as a rational, well-organized mechanism with pro-
fessionalism, impartiality, legality, and standardized bureaucratic procedu-
res. Modernizing means to make more fundamental changes in structures 
and functioning of public administration (autonomous agencies, output 
budgeting, employment contracts, etc.). Marketization introduces market 
1  National public administrations are not unified actors who have one and only will, and 
who can choose only one pace of development. Real picture shows that in every gover-
nance system there are many actors with various reform concepts. The main reform 
orientation is, thus, an approximation derived from the reform mainstream. 
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principles and mechanisms in public administrations (internal market, com-
petition, real prices, etc.). Minimizing is oriented towards shrinking the pu-
blic sector by means of privatization, civil (voluntary) sector involvement, etc. 
This classification, which has become widely accepted, may serve as a useful 
tool for in-depth analysis of administrative reform in a country as well as 
for a comparative analysis of administrative reforms in a group of countries, 
Eastern Europe included. 
2.3. Comparative Analysis of Contemporary Public Administrations 
and Their Reforms: Towards a Composite Theoretical Frame 
This monograph is devoted to improving understanding, research, and 
interpretations of public administration reforms in national settings as well 
as to comparing administrative reforms in those post-socialist Eastern Eu-
ropean countries, which have become the European Union member states. 
The composite theoretical frame seems appropriate for such a great task. 
The system theory and organization theory as well as the neo-institutional 
theory may serve as the fundamentals of such frame. They warn and orient 
the analysis toward many important issues of contemporary administrative 
systems:
 − Complexity, structure, and components of administrative systems, 
and their interdependencies,  
 − Changing tasks and purposes, 
 − Inclusion or exclusion of private and non-profit subjects, citizens, 
and small primary communities in the provision of public tasks,
 − Opposite developmental processes, such as concentration and 
deconcentration, centralization and decentralization, widening pu-
blic sector and privatization, strengthening and loosing hierarchical 
ties and means of internal administrative coordination, etc.,
 − Adaptation of public administrations to dominant actors and influ-
ences from wider environment, and possibilities of national public 
administrations to influence broader processes, 
 − Consolidation and stabilization of administrative systems in their 
societal contexts, different ways of achieving institutional appropria-
teness, and paths of stabilization, etc.      
Post-socialist transition can be considered a complex systemic trans-
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formation, different from previous democratic transitions in South-wes-
tern Europe (Portugal, Spain), Latin America, and other parts of the world. 
The span of transition processes is the main difference, since previous tran-
sitions were oriented towards democratization, while post-socialist one is 
more complex and comprehensive, a systemic one, tackling almost every 
aspect of social life (Stark & Bruszt, 1998; Marčetić, 2005). The transition 
theory thus calls for an analysis of many relevant contextual variables of 
administrative reforms in Eastern European countries and puts a perspecti-
ve to dynamic processes of overall transition. In addition, it warns about the 
importance of analyzing design, building, and development of new admi-
nistrative, political and other societal institutions, which were not part of 
the previous, socialist regime.  
The neo-institutional theory is a logical complement to the transition 
theory. It directs research to pay attention to values, expectations, regu-
lations, and norms, phases in the institution building, critical junctures, 
convergence and divergence in the institutional development, path depen-
dency, sedimentation in institutional development of public administra-
tion, etc. (Peters, 1999).     
The first step in a more detailed design of the composite theoretical 
frame on previously established grounds should be focused on systemic 
and structural considerations. Contemporary public administrations, tho-
se in Eastern European countries included, are becoming more and more 
complex, and function in increasingly complex and dynamic environments. 
National public administrations are characterized by numerous new tasks, 
functions, goals, subjects, organizations, and arrangements with other sec-
tors (private, civil, and non-formal). More and more complex knowledge, 
skills, abilities and competences of public servants are needed for accepta-
ble (quality) level of public services delivered to citizens, businesses, com-
munities, and society as a whole. 
Apart from public administration, the other sectors, civil and private, are 
also involved in providing certain public services. Innovative and complex 
financial, legal, directing, supervising, communicating and coordinating ties 
and mechanisms have been established in such new public sectors. It might 
seem that public administration, captured in manifold relations with the pri-
vate and civil sectors, loses its boundaries and its distinctive identity. 
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Public administration can be seen as a system composed of nume-
rous administrative organizations. These organizations function as the ele-
ments of three main public administration subfields with various purposes, 
i.e. state (national) administration, territorial self-government, and public 
services. State administration, consisting mainly of classic administrative 
organizations like ministries, supports elected politicians in designing and 
implementing strategic and vital public policies. Territorial self-government 
at both local and regional level serves as a counter-balance to central state 
power, contributes to democracy standards, serves to local and regional com-
munities, promotes and supports local and regional development, etc. Public 
services (services of general interest in the new European terms) provide ser-
vices to citizens, users and consumers that are of public interest.2 
For decades, general tasks of the whole public sector have been diffe-
rentiating, broadening and cumulating. The development of modern, pro-
fessional state administration began with simple, yet strategic tasks, such as 
to ensure the stability of state power and regulate basic societal processes. 
Subsequent differentiation has led to the tasks of providing services of pu-
blic interest to users, preventing and helping people in cases of social and 
other risks (poverty, unemployment, illnesses, etc.), preserving natural and 
social environment, and ensuring infrastructure for economic and social 
development, etc. 
The relations within and between these subfields are not constant. Incre-
asing dynamics can be identified in that regard. Concentration or deconcen-
tration can take place within state administration; centralization or decentra-
lization are the processes that can occur in relations between the central state 
and administration, on one side, and local and regional governments, on the 
other. State administrations concentrate, under policy of the lean state, on their 
“core-businesses” (public policies, legal drafting, authoritative decision-making 
in concrete cases, inspections). Territorial self-government increasingly devo-
tes to promoting and supporting sustainable local and regional development. 
Regionalization is a process that might harm either central or local powers or 
can upgrade the capacity of the whole public sector of a country. Liberalization 
and privatization are generally connected with providing services of general 
2  There are two groups of such services, services of general economic interest, with 
network industries as the main group, and non-economic services of general interest. 
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interest – the opposite processes can also be seen in certain cases. Privatization 
or etatization indicate tensions between the public and private sectors, etc.
All parts of public administration are involved in wider regional and 
global processes. Some of them are more formal, connected with formal in-
tegrations (for example, the European Union, NATO, the world Trade Or-
ganization, the OECD, etc.), while others are predominantly informal, like 
spreading influential administrative doctrines, neo-liberalism, or economic 
globalization. Public administrations are changing during such complex en-
vironmental challenges. The changes are connected with organization and 
structure, ways of functioning, legal regulation, personnel, relations with po-
litics and citizens, and other significant dimensions. 
In Europe, there is an especially significant influence of the European 
Union (EU) and, to a lesser degree, of the Council of Europe (CoE) and some 
other actors on administrative changes in the member states and accessing 
countries (comp. kuhlmann & wollmann, 2014; Himsworth, 2015; koprić, 
2014a). Such an influence is more intense with regard to transition countries 
than to consolidated western democracies, because accession process is inf-
luenced by the EU conditionality. 
globally and regionally induced administrative changes do not mean 
simple adaptations of national bureaucracies to external pressures. Certain 
pieces of national administrative traditions can upgrade the new and cons-
tantly evolving European administrative standards. This is the case with the 
Ombudsman and open access to public sector information (Scandinavian tra-
dition), traditional regulation of general administrative procedure (Austrian, 
i.e. Central European tradition), and other governance institutions. Building 
on that, one can speak about interdependencies of national administrative 
traditions and global, European and regional administrative standards and 
governance practices (comp. koprić, 2012). Certainly, interdependencies can 
be observed in many other respects. 
If everything mentioned is true in general, the notions of task environ-
ment complexity, environment complexity and technical (inter)dependen-
ce, borrowed from organizational theory, can help administrative science to 
perform a better and more productive analysis of such noticeable technical 
complexity in public administration of a country, objective complexity of its 
environment, including temporal complexity (kiel & Seldon, 1998), and de-
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pendence of public administration on complex environment (See, for exam-
ple, Anderson, 1999; Dooley & Van de Ven, 1999; etc.). 
However, one question still remains unresolved. where does such task 
environment complexity stem from, having in mind public administra-
tions? In an attempt to answer it, a notion of values, legitimate interests, 
norms, and expectations based on them should be mentioned again. An 
analysis of both instrumental and value rationalities (Dong, 2015) is ne-
cessary for understanding and interpreting administrative reforms. The 
contemporary world is characterized by previously unthinkable value com-
plexity. Numerous grounds and causes are inbuilt in their complexity and 
almost constant differentiation, but their enumeration is not relevant to the 
present discussion. New values are developing constantly. Public adminis-
tration has been changing, trying to respond to this great and frequently 
inconclusive value pressure. 
Although values and expectations are many and diverse, they are, in 
sum, the integrating point of a governance system. Values are crystallized 
through political processes of interests and amalgamation of ideologies. Be-
cause public administration should gain overall legitimacy in its social mi-
lieu, it has to adapt to complex value orientations and expectations. If public 
administration respects a specific mixture of values in a specific field, citi-
zens will tend to say that it functions in the public interest. Such importance 
of values gives us a focal point and basis for further analyses.  
Be that what it may, contemporary public administration is not a simple 
value area with only one value dimension (kickert, 2001). Citizens and the 
broader public expect public administration to respect and realize not less 
than five groups of values: political (democratic), legal, social, economic, and 
ecological. Values might compete with each other. In various sectors of pu-
blic administration there are specific mixtures of relevant values. It is not the 
same situation in social work or the transport sector, finances or local self-
government. Furthermore, in continental Europe the stress is traditionally on 
political, legal, and social values – there is the fatherland of greek democracy 
and Roman law. Opposite, Anglo-Saxon zones are characterized by the stress 
on economic values and pragmatism. During the modern era, dominant va-
lue orientation has changed from political (democratic) and legal to social, 
economic, and ecological. Although such a general picture cannot be very 
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helpful in analyzing the value situation in a country at a particular time, it can 
warn us about possible value frame, its importance and effects. 
The notion of values has been strongly stressed by the neo-institutional 
theory. Values, and expectations derived from values, are the elements of 
institutions. Institutions are social structures composed of interconnected 
and coherent expectations stabilized in time, in a certain social commu-
nity, which regulate interpersonal relations or establish the authority of a 
community, and emerge through habitualization (repeated use), or a more 
direct and explicit set-up (comp. Pusić, 1989: 182-184). An institution is 
characterized by stability and steadiness, and tends to repeatedly orient, 
steer and channel human behavior. In other words, an institution has nor-
mative content and importance, and people do not accept changing their 
expectations if they are disappointed. In normative institutionalism (Peters, 
1999) a task of identifying values, norms, regulations and other normative 
phenomena that frame the public sector is very important for the analysis 
of public institutions. 
From older doctrines, such as cameralism in continental Europe, to 
the new public management, from the new public administration in the 
USA (the Minnowbrook perspective) to good governance, administrative 
doctrines have significantly influenced administrative development. An 
administrative doctrine is a system of ideas about desirable ways of opera-
ting and a set of prescriptions about good practices grounded on dominant 
values and systematized experiences, comprising standards with regard to 
organization, functioning, regulation, management, and reform of public 
administration. Administrative doctrines are themselves influenced by so-
cial, economic, political, demographic, and other societal circumstances. 
Contemporary administrative development is characterized by two 
main and very influential administrative doctrines – the new public ma-
nagement (NPM) and good governance, although it seems that Eastern 
Europe is in search of its genuine doctrine that would adequately mirror 
its particular circumstances. Thus, for example, Randma-Liiv pleads for 
appropriateness of neo-weberian state (NwS) as the normative model or 
doctrine (2008/9). In sum, expectedly and justifiably, influences, which 
administrative doctrines produce in transition countries, have continuously 
attracted resounding scientific interest in Eastern European countries. 
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2.4. Basic Research Implications
Although there is little doubt about the usefulness of comparative 
approach in researching public administrations, many texts address the pro-
blems of comparative analyses (Hopkin, 2002; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2001; 
Jreisat, 1999; etc.). It is important to build a reasonably firm frame for com-
parative analysis based on the relevant theoretical postulates and built from 
relevant concepts suitable for comparison. A list of more practical issues, 
themes, and moments has to be developed, encompassing the whole ran-
ge, from structural and functional to cultural and environmental issues. Not 
only reform programs and regulations but also results of administrative re-
forms, their outputs, outcomes, long-term impacts and side effects have to be 
taken into account so we would be able to perform an in-depth comparison 
(comp. kuhlmann & wollmann, 2014). However, having in mind specific 
value situations, different developmental paths, and many different influen-
ces, an attentive analysis of national idiosyncratic specificities has to get an 
adequate place. 
Comparative analysis is not a new approach in post-socialist countries. 
There are many publications which compare the particular components, 
elements or issues of administrative systems in these countries, such as lo-
cal self-government, regionalization, performance management, influential 
doctrines, civil service systems, influence of economic and fiscal crises on 
public administrations, public management, etc. (Vintar et al., 2013; kattel 
et al., 2011; Bouckaert et al., 2008; Coombes & Vass, 2007; etc.). The books 
about national paths have been published. A number of papers inspect cer-
tain issues of interest for comparative analysis, but in a limited number of 
Eastern European countries, even in only one country, employing a case stu-
dy approach. There is an ever-growing body of published work, research and 
project results, and other types of sources for quality comparative analysis. 
Official and semi-official reports of national and international bodies and 
organizations also contain a lot of data on public administration reforms in 
Eastern Europe.   
what is specific to this monograph is the span of countries, since only 
the new EU member states from Central, East and South-Eastern Europe 
have been included. Other post-socialist transition countries are not analy-
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zed. Apart from the constrained territorial coverage, the approach is syste-
mic, as all parts and components of public administration have been taken 
into account. Structural, functional, cultural and environmental issues have 
been included, as well as history, tradition, developmental paths, trends, 
and influential doctrines. Methodologically, the comparison is based on in-
depth and firm data based on national analyses.   
A thorough and systemic comparative analysis of public administration 
reforms in new Eastern EU member states may help answering whether this 
part of the European Union is characterized by naïve cultural following, he-
sitating Europeanization or deliberate search for genuine changes. 
One of the conclusions based on the results of current research is that 
the changes of administrative systems of the EU member states, especially 
those in Eastern Europe that are a component of the EU integration, fos-
ter comparative public administration research Europe-wide (kuhlmann & 
wollmann, 2014). 
Some of the most distinct administrative changes identified by previous 
comparative analyses are:
 − Centralization of national public administrations which have become 
increasingly integrated networks of multi-level governance,  
 − Mushrooming of public agencies, especially at the national level, with 
increasing role of independent regulators,  
 − Strengthening the position of the executive, and diminishing the role 
of national parliaments,
 − Redistribution of power at the ministerial level in favor of the minis-
tries of finance, 
 − New tendency towards regionalization and strengthening of other 
institutions dealing with the implementation of regional policy and 
regional development,
 − Narrowing local competencies and reducing the autonomy of local 
governments, 
 − Increasing the role of private and non-governmental providers of pu-
blic services, 
 − A new quest for more intensive citizen participation with increasing 
efforts to make public administrations more transparent and open, 
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 − Attempts to foster strategic planning, design sound policy processes, 
and initiate data-driven evaluations, 
 − Efforts to develop modern, professional civil service, and promote pu-
blic administration education that fits that end, 
 − Setting anti-corruption institutions and new ethic infrastructure of 
civil service, etc. 
It is not easy to identify the real causes and sources of such changes, but 
it is undeniable that they have been parallel with the EU accession process, 
and that at least a part of them has been facilitated by the EU and, in general, 
western technical assistance. There are numerous bitter assessments of that 
assistance, and many more bitter experiences in Eastern Europe (Sobis & de 
Vries, 2009; Nemec, 2008). what can be generally concluded is that western 
standards, concepts and recommendations for Eastern Europe are far from 
unequivocal, and that the attempts to foster one-sided model based on the 
new public management do not really fit the circumstances of Eastern Eu-
ropean countries. Such a situation not only opens the possibility, but also 
asks for the development of genuine domestic responses to mammoth gover-
nance challenges. If they are still based on dwindling ideas, thus producing 
muddled governance (koprić, 2012), it is not a definite argument against the 
possibility of finding appropriate solutions. 
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3. Public Sector Reforms in Lithuania Since 1990
Vainius Smalskys, Mantas Bileišis, Jurgita Domeikienė, Andrius Stasiukynas
3.1. Introduction
This chapter covers several aspects of public administration reforms in 
Lithuania: (i) constitutional context, (ii) formation and developments at the 
central administration level, (iii) regional and local governance reforms, or in 
many instances their lack thereof, and (iv) development of the civil service. 
These, in our opinion, were the key areas where dynamic change took place, 
or a lot of effort was made on behalf of reformers to bring about change. But 
what is more telling, perhaps, is that over recent years the focus of the political 
elites has shifted away from public administration in general. Public adminis-
tration and civil service are treated as if they were given, and onlyfew attempts 
yielded the reforms. But this is primarily not for lack of trying and initiati-
ve on behalf of civil servants, as much as it is a result of a hung parliament 
that has now lasted for 4 parliamentary terms. In this context, comprehensive 
reforms present more risks that opportunities as far as the deputies on the 
floor of parliament are concerned. In our section we offer a short overview 
of crucial initiatives to change the key elements of public governance that 
have never really materialized beyond academic and informal discussions, 
such as government-wide guidelines or regulation on administrative process, 
standards of ethics, clear distinction between public administration and other 
public agencies, as well as that of civil servants and public employees. These 
are the questions that produce the proverbial ‘implementation gaps’, because 
they leave far too much discretion to various actors to skew initial reform 
ideas, and discourage such reforms on behalf of political leadership.
In the early 1990s, the Baltic states started their post-communist trans-
formation with a statehood formation, which apparently offered the oppor-
tunity for a radical break with the previous system of governance. However, 
many of the governance practices did persist. It is worth noting that the three 
Baltic states were constituent republics of the Soviet Union, and as such 
had an extensive administrative system completed with prototypes of the 
parliament (the Supreme Soviets of the Soviet Union), and a full ministeri-
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al structure. And the people who staffed these structures in many instances 
had a possibility to remain in the public administrations of the independent 
states. This is especially true for Lithuania, where the Communist Party was 
mostly composed from ethnic Lithuanians, and managed to successfully ma-
neuver to dissociate itself from the party structures of the Soviet Union just 
prior to independence. Although, as elsewhere in the region, communism 
was seen as imposed from outside and foreign to statehood itself, the fact is 
that the Lithuanian Communist Party successfully rebranded and positioned 
itself as partakers in the independence movement, a mass layoff of adminis-
trative staff never materialized. In fact, in many instances the transition to the 
market economy was taken advantage of by the people closely aligned with 
both the communist party and communist administration of the Republic. 
And this further reduced the possibility for radical administrative reform.
The situation changed towards the second half of the 1990s, when the 
EU membership perspective became a reality, and the political and economic 
elites built a consensus on advancing the agenda of joining the EU. The years 
between 1995 and 2000, arguably have seen the greatest pace and substance of 
governance reform which included the stabilization in the way municipalities 
are organized, a major central government structure overhaul (including a 
ministerial reform), emergence of the process of agencification, creation of 
framework legal regulation in the form of civil service laws and public admi-
nistration laws. It may be argued that later editions to the practice of Lithu-
anian governance just prior to the EU accession, such as the program budge-
ting and strategic planning, have had substantially less effect on the workings 
of public governance.
Over the quarter of the century, the economy of Lithuania has seen 
unprecedented economic growth out of the collapse of the economy in the 
early 1990s, which outperformed most of its neighbors, and this goes a long 
way in claiming that the institutional setup of the countries’ governance is 
fit to meet the contemporary challenges. Lithuania has managed to surpass 
over the past two decades all neighboring countries in terms of economic 
output. However, several notable instances of failure in governance may jeo-
pardize most of the achievements reached to date. Namely, (i) inefficiency, or 
lack altogether of a meaningful regional development policy, (ii) great econo-
mic disparities that have since 2004 led to the migration of a large number of 
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citizens to countries abroad. In fact, the process of emigration has been so 
dramatic that Lithuania as a EU member state with the youngest population 
became the fastest depopulating member state by 2013 (Sipaviečienė & Stan-
kūnienė, 2013). The youth bulge that existed in 2004, and all the economic 
achievements that were reached while it still made an impact on the economy 
in the late 2000s was lost due to the global financial crisis of 2008-2010. Li-
thuania suffered one of the largest economic declines worldwide, and had to 
undergo a radical fiscal consolidation (Nakrošis & Vilpišauskas, 2015). 
The global financial crisis of 2008-2010 in Lithuania gave rise to a go-
vernment with the most ambitious public administration reform plan over 
the entire 25-year period. However, it has largely failed to achieve its goals. 
Although only some leeway was made, the hope for comprehensive reforms 
did not materialize. In addition, this informs our key thesis about the Li-
thuanian public governance – its constitutional setup does not allow a com-
prehensive reform after they were conducted in the late 1990s by the cons-
truction of the EU-compatible administrative mechanisms. we believe that 
the primary reason for this inability to implement the comprehensive reform 
is due to complex checks and balances of the decision making mechanisms 
regulated by the constitution, and a powerful business lobby that had its say 
in the process of the formation of the current public administration system 
and whose interests remain most salient within the political process (Norkus, 
2012). However, all this is not to say that an incremental process of adminis-
trative change is not occurring. Lithuania is fully committed to the EU and 
best practices and recommendations are keenly adopted. 
3.2. Early Developments: A Very Stringent Constitutional Setup
Lithuania was the first country to leave the Soviet Union by a democratic 
parliamentary vote, which included both a union-wide and constituent repu-
blic election. The February 1990 elections, which were the first democratic 
elections under the gorbachev’s Perestroika and Glasnost initiatives, resulted 
in the victory of Sąjūdis, a pro-independence movement active under Glasnost 
reforms for over 2 years before. The manifesto of Sąjūdis explicitly declared an 
intention to declare independence in case of electoral victory (Lietuvos Sąjūdis, 
2016). Similar political movements in Latvia and Estonia also won elections, 
however, they did not follow through with the declarations of independence 
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until one and a half years later in the wake of August Putsch in 1991 in Moscow. 
This early movement on declaring independence had lasting effects on 
the governance structure of the country and the paths its administrative re-
forms took. In a decision just prior to the 1990 election, the Lithuanian Com-
munist Party made an important declaration – that the Lithuanian Commu-
nist Party would legally become a separate entity apart from the Soviet Union 
Communist Party (genzelis, 2004). In the election, the Communists attained 
a 1/3 representation. Their vote for or against the independence could have 
made the difference between a crackdown and attempts at a peaceful negotia-
tion with the authorities of the Soviet Union. 
The decision to declare independence within a month of the election was 
made because the Soviet constitution of 1979 had provisions, which allowed 
constituent republics to one-sidedly declare independence. However, the first 
post-election Soviet Union Supreme Soviet session agenda (scheduled for late 
March 1990) included the constitutional amendments that would have closed 
this possibility. On March 11, 1990, Lithuanian Supreme Soviet (immediately 
renamed itself to the Reconstituent Seimas), almost unanimously, with the 
communist MP’s support voted in favor of independence.  
This unanimity in the independence vote had a price in terms of public 
administration reform. The soviet administrative structures of Lithuania re-
mained largely unchanged immediately after its independence. The first two 
years of independence were not favorable for the reform, because of the pre-
carious situation of the country’s statehood being occupied by over 130,000 
soviet troops, and later, in the wake of August Putsch, Sąjūdis parliamentary 
faction fragmented in the face of its loss of raison d’etre. Various factions of 
Sąjūdis became proto-political parties of the modern political system, inclu-
ding the Social Democrats, conservatives, and liberals. The fragmentation 
produced a protracted post-August 1991 parliamentary stalemate. It was 
agreed to break it by calling for an early election, which would coincide with 
a referendum on the new constitution in late 1992.3 It is within that context of 
drafting that the constitution included a variety of safeguards, which created 
3  The 1990-1992 period was regulated by the Temporary Main Law (Lith. Laikinasis pa-
grindinis įstatymas) approved by the parliament on the day of independence and is, in 
most respects, not regulating public administration, and allowing most administrative 
processes to continue onwards from the Soviet times.
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a complex decision-making and staff assignment procedures to the executive, 
but also retained the Soviet-era mixed proportional and majoritarian par-
liamentary election model. Both of these features of the constitution work 
made the Lithuanian governance system increasingly hard to reform, as the 
parliamentary majorities since 2000 have in all instances been coalitions, and 
all comprehensive reforms need to pass through 3 to 4 autonomous decision-
making institutions.
The Lithuanian constitution was drafted in the context of a broken par-
liament, and this is the primary cause for including an extensive number of 
so-called checks and balances, which mean that comprehensive reforms are 
hard to come by. The constitutional court has ruled on presidential, parliamen-
tary, and government interaction on several occasions, and in 1998 stated that 
Lithuania is a parliamentary republic with certain features of presidentialism 
(LRkT, 1998). In essence, this means that the President can actively participa-
te or block policy processes that originate in the interaction between the go-
vernment and parliament. The President also has extensive powers to assign 
ministers; and the Prime Minister (PM) has no possibility to relieve ministers 
without the President’s, or Parliament’s consent. At the ministerial level, this 
is further complicated by the fact that individual ministers are responsible to 
the parliament personally for policy of their respective ministry, meaning that 
they have the possibility and often the motivation to block or stall policy for-
mulation at the cabinet level, and the PM or other ministers may not be able 
to do much about it, especially when this relates to junior coalition partner 
ministers. The fact that Lithuania has a partly majoritarian system of elections, 
which consistently fails to produce one-party governments, the reforms that 
are either comprehensive or controversial are next to impossible to initiate (Bi-
leišis, 2012a). 
3.3. Developments in Central Administration
In the first decade of Lithuania’s independence the political vision of 
post-1990 Lithuania as a ‘western’ country was a key element of the con-
sensus of the political elite. Moreover, the post-EU accession carried on this 
legacy in the context of diligent compliance to the EU standards (Maniokas, 
2009). However, the capacity to realize this vision and understanding what it 
entails in terms of developing public governance was initially lacking. Only 
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the adoption of the Constitution in late 1992 and coinciding general election 
allowed the beginning of public governance modernization in earnest. In 
1994, a ministry called “Ministry of governance Reforms and Municipa-
lities” was set up, and its main task was developing and implementing go-
vernance modernization, decentralization and other policies in the context 
of public administration reform. This ministry was liquidated in 2000 with 
most of its staff being integrated into the Ministry of Interior with two de-
partments: Regional Policy and Public governance Policy being the main 
public administration reform policy structures to this day. Other two ele-
ments of public administration reform ecosystem are the center of govern-
ment – the government Office and the Civil Service Department under the 
government. Several other ministries, such as the Ministry of Economy and 
Ministry of Finance, play a role in steering policy goal setting. 
The Ministry of governance Reforms and Municipalities at the outset 
formulated three key public administration modernization areas: (i) sim-
plifying the administrative process, (ii) making public administration more 
accessible to citizens, and (iii) creating real administrative responsibility me-
chanisms (Rokickienė, 1999). These areas were seen as particularly lacking 
with respect to Lithuania’s EU accession process, a formal bid submitted in 
late 1995. 
An important factor for reforms was also the fact that the parliamentary 
terms of 1992−1996 and 1996−2000 did not need a coalition. The pendu-
lum election phenomenon, which occurred throughout the decade, brought 
the ex-communists to power.4 In addition, during the parliamentary term 
of 1996−2000 the Conservatives party – party that emerged from the largest 
faction of Sąjudis held the parliamentary majority. During the 1992−1996 
reform, the focus was on reforming the territorial administrative setup of the 
country, while no comprehensive reform at the central level of administra-
tion was taken. It was the 1996−2000 reform, that the PM and the President 
were keen on radical shift in terms of governance that consisted of the most 
profound series of central government reform, including an overhaul of the 
ministerial system, development of Civil Service and Public Administration 
laws both passed in 1999. It was the passing of the Public Administration 
4  At that time known as the Democratic Labor Party of Lithuania (Lith. Lietuvos demo-
kratinė darbo partija, LDDP).
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Law that cemented the reforms of prior three years into a governance system 
that has been changing only incrementally since.     
In the process of development of the Public Administration Law, there was 
no clear vision of which countries should be taken as examples for the system. 
The United kingdom, Norway, and Finland became the prototypes that were 
taken into consideration primarily for the preparation of the law (Rokickienė, 
1999). In the Lithuanian public administration discourse, the division between 
Anglo-Saxon and continental administrative systems is persistent, and Nordic 
countries are often perceived as being closer to the Anglo-Saxon model. This 
perception is based on the fact that Nordic and English-speaking countries em-
braced New Public Management (NPM) reforms much more than those in the 
continent. Although the EU accession did raise requirements for administra-
tive capacity which were closer to the standards of weberian bureaucracy, the 
Lithuania’s policy was also strongly affected by NPM-style recommendations 
of the IMF (guogis, 2014). Mostly this was due to the need for fiscal consoli-
dation and for purposes of boosting competitiveness as the Lithuania’s public 
finances suffered three major economic downturns: (i) immediately after in-
dependence, (ii) during the Russia’s sovereign debt crisis of 1998, and (iii) the 
2008 global financial crisis. However, these policies produced a serious social 
inequality which now threatens future growth prospects (IMF, 2016).
There is some controversy over the outcomes of economic policy re-
forms that were made possible through the creation of NPM-style adminis-
trative system, focused on economic growth and catering to businesses and 
investors (Norkus, 2012), as it produced one of the most successful econo-
mic performances not only in the region, but worldwide, yet is characterized 
by a large income inequality and low salaries, and exceedingly small propor-
tion of the Public Sector relative to gDP within the European context. In 
addition, some studies suggest that the Lithuanian reform path (differently 
from that of Estonia), never espoused the NPM’s rhetoric and was never 
reflected by the political elites as a clear policy goal.5 In a way, these reforms 
were seldom comprehensive and were imposed by the IMF requirement, EU 
accession process, or business lobby. 
5  with some exceptions considered, most noteably the two governments under PM An-
drius kubilius in 1999−2000, and 2008−2012. These governments did explicitly formu-
late their reform agenda by using the NPM rhetoric.
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The government under PM gediminas Vagnorius of 1996−1999 coin-
cided with the election of a diaspora representative Valdas Adamkus as its 
president. Both have consistently expressed their attitude that the Lithuania‘s 
institutions did not transform together with independence and kept soviet-
style practices in place long after they were relevant and argued for radical 
administrative reforms. The two-year period between 1997 and 1999, when 
the leaders agreed on the need of administrative reform and together pus-
hed for it, coupled with a parliamentary majority and created the necessary 
conditions favorable for radical reform. This movement was also spurred 
by the fact that in 1997 Lithuania was listed as a country not eligible for 
initial enlargement (together with Romania and Bulgaria), and building pu-
blic support for greater reform. These conditions are the only instance that 
allowed radical reforms to occur. It is not for lack of trying but rather the 
institutional setup of the country that has created severe problems for com-
prehensive reform, as evidenced by the developments in the wake of 2008 
global financial crisis. 
The period between 2000 and 2008 was characterized by a rapid econo-
mic growth and only minor reforms, such as introduction of strategic plan-
ning. However, this did not become a tool for policy making as much as a fis-
cal policy instrument (Bileišis, 2012a) important for the use of EU structural 
funding. It was the global financial crisis, coupled with a housing bubble in 
the Baltic States, which resulted in double-digit recession in all three coun-
tries that drew attention to governance mechanisms that allowed this to oc-
cur. Several key issues were identified by research in the past years as needing 
policy-makers attention and reform efforts: agencification, low return on in-
vestment made by the state-owned companies, unclear criteria for awarding 
the status of civil servants, and disparities in regional development.
Martinaitis and Nakrošis (2011) have demonstrated that Lithuania has 
undergone a very rapid process of agencification with varying results. Ho-
wever, several important negative outcomes are evident: smaller agencies 
cannot mobilize enough resources even for most basic innovations, or staff 
training, many of the agencies have unclear status as to their responsibility, 
and there is no registry at the level of central administration to monitor the 
process. Many of the agencies may be registered as service providers when, 
in fact, they may perform public administration with limited oversight.
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However, during the parliamentary term of 2008−2012 the government 
underwent a major overhaul at the level of central government. The legal 
basis for the central government is laid down in the Constitution of the 
Republic of Lithuania and in the Law on the government. According to 
this law, the government is responsible for coordinating the activities of 
ministries and agencies as well as the activities in the scope of the strategic 
plans of the government, such as the strategy for national development. To 
improve the management of state institutions, the government approved 
the concept for the Improvement of the Executive Power System in 2009. 
Improvement directions of an executive power system were oriented to mo-
dernize particular systems: government agencies, ministries, state agencies 
under the ministries, territorial management, public institutions, and sta-
te-owned enterprises. An attention was paid to the performance improve-
ment of government institutions −their status and role in the formulation 
and implementation of state policies were defined more clearly, more ro-
bust relationships with ministries were established, and their organization 
principles were unified. It also set out the criteria for the establishment of 
ministries and defined their purpose more clearly. In order to improve the 
system of state agencies under the ministries their competences were pu-
rified, clearer public administration authorization procedure was establis-
hed, and their organization principles were unified. However, the central 
government has experienced stalling, if not a reversal of this reform during 
the tenure of the government of the 2012-2016 parliamentary term. 
State-owned enterprises pay a disproportionately small amount of divi-
dends to the state budget in the context of the EU. There are serious doubts 
that these companies make investments, since they are inefficient, not focu-
sed on returns, or even corrupt. However, the 2008−2012 government’s at-
tempt to create an incorporated enterprise tasked with management and 
oversight of all state-owned enterprises failed as some of the coalition par-
tners did not approve of this model (Jurkonis, 2012).
with regard to both agencification and investments few attempts were 
made to address these shortcomings. Nevertheless, there was a lot activity 
with regard to the development of civil service and municipal reform in 
Lithuania, albeit it was similarly plagued by lack of consensus for compre-
hensive reforms.
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3.4. Developments in Regional Policy and Municipal Administration
3.4.1. Early Years
One element of gorbachev’s Perestroika was greater autonomy given to 
the constituent Soviet Republics to organize their governance, and in Lithu-
ania, this took advantageprior to the declaration of independence. In Fe-
bruary 1990, a Law on Local Self-government was passed. However, this 
document did not meet the many of the European standards of good gover-
nance: there was no clear distinction between local and central government 
functions outlined, and also the law foresaw a two-level municipal system 
with no clear distinction of functions at that level either (Lazdynas, 2005). 
Moreover, the territorial-administrative division was not reviewed, and the 
division formed in 1963 still forms the basis of contemporary Lithuanian 
municipal system (Atrauskas & Bileišis, 2013). The problem with the 1963 
territorial-administrative reform is that it does not fit the pattern of territori-
al-administrative divisions elsewhere in Europe, with lower-level municipa-
lities having in many cases under 1,000 residents while the mean size of the 
higher-level non-urban municipalities is near 50,000 residents. This system 
was not workable at the lower level, but instead of its review, its municipal 
status was abolished and these areas became territorial-administrative units 
with municipal offices (elderships). 
Municipalities in Lithuania have few powers and discretions. On the one 
hand, this is seen as a negative feature of the Lithuanian governance system 
(VDU, 2016), especially in a sense that it has created great developmental dis-
parities between Vilnius and the rest of the country. This has led to straining of 
public services systems in the capital and overcapacity in the rest of the coun-
try which burdens municipal budgets, and is difficult to abridge due to the 
political salience of laying off highly educated staff in smaller municipalities. 
At the outset of independence, municipal councils elected mayors who 
were heads of administration. However, very quickly and in contradiction to 
the idea of separation of powers, amendments to the Law on Municipalities 
were made, which integrated the position of the chairperson of the council 
and mayor. In 2002, the Constitutional court ruled this to be unconstitutio-
nal, and an amendment to the Law on Municipalities was made to create the 
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position of Director of Administration, appointed by the Mayor (who remai-
ned the head of the council) (Astrauskas, 2006). However, there are many 
doubts if directors of administrations have sufficient independence from ma-
yors for the municipal governance to be considered to conform to democratic 
standards of separation of powers.
3.4.2. Debates on Different Levels of Regional and Municipal 
Administrations
By 1994, it was understood that first level municipalities cannot mobilize 
resources to conduct effective activity, and they were abolished. Meanwhile, 
at the higher level of administrative territorial division debates on having re-
gions emerged. The result was the division of 56 Lithuanian municipalities 
into 10 counties (Žilinskas, 1999). However, rather than having a municipal 
status they became a mechanism of deconcentrating central government. The 
logic behind their creation was to implement reforms (such as land reform 
and land restitution) regarding which there were doubts about the municipal 
capacities. Another argument for the establishment of counties was the need 
to offer services of the central government geographicaly closer to citizens 
living outside Vilnius. Nevertheless, the county administrations were not 
seen as efficient, as many of the government agencies would have their own 
network of offices, and the advent of ICT in government made the whole con-
cept obsolete. with the land reform having ended, county administrations 
were one of the most notable victims of 2008−2010 crisis austerity measures. 
In parallel to counties, starting in the early 2000s, a debate on new regi-
ons that would correspond to NUTS II requirements began. Primarily, this 
was driven by a New Politics parties: Law and Justice and New Alliance, and in 
2000, parliamentary elections started the era of coalition governance. These 
two parties managed to hold the coalition just for six months. After falling 
out with each other, the New Alliance created a coalition with the Social De-
mocrats (which emerged as a major party when it merged with the LDDP, and 
the Lithuanian communist leader of late 1980s, and the President between 
1993 and 1997 became the Prime Minister). 
However, it was Law and Justice in their election manifesto that planned 
to create four administrative regions based on ethnographic of Lithuania.
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At the time, Lithuania could have formed four NUTS6 II regions, but 
accidentally, the Soviet-era planning foresaw five major cities as regional cen-
ters; and the attempts to identify which four should become regional centers 
failed, therefore Lithuania entered the EU as a single NUTS II region. 
During the economic crisis, and the abolition of county administrations, 
the idea of NUTS II regionalization emerged again (Žilinskas, 2009). Again, 
no agreement could be reached, as by then the depopulation allowed only 
three regions, any municipality near Vilnius that would be included in the 
Vilnius region would probably lose access to the EU structural funding, while 
Vilnius on its own is too small to form a NUTS II region. It was only in 2015 
when projections showed that due to Vilnius’ economic prominence the enti-
re country might lose access to the EU structural fund, a decision to form two 
NUTS II regions was taken, it included Vilnius County (also a NUTS III; the 
only county having more than 800,000 residents) and the remaining territory. 
Once again, as in so many other areas of public governance, the reform focus 
is on incremental change to adapt to the challenges posed by outside forces.
Regional governance reform in 2009 was limited. The County Manage-
ment Reform,7 despite its fancy title, was in practice a liquidation of county 
bureaus. The aim was to use the state budget funds more effectively i.e. to 
reduce administrative burden and bureaucracy, and to bring public services 
closer to the people via their transfer to the jurisdiction of municipalities. 
Tasks and functions of the county governors’ offices in many instances dupli-
cated functions of central or local public management institutions and were 
eliminated altogether.
3.4.3. Moderate Municipal Reform 
In 2000, it was becoming clear that the 56 municipalities of the county, 
based on territorial-administrative division of 1963 sorely stuck out in the re-
gional context of EU integrating states, and several reform steps were underta-
ken. A moderate attempt to reform was undertaken with a possibility opened 
in the Law of Territorial Administrative Units given several geographic criteria. 
6  NUTS – Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics, an EU regionalization instrument.
7  County offices were deconcentrated central government units. Counties remain a reference for statisti-
cal purposes representing NUTS III level but no administrative structures are imposed on them. None-
theless, some of the central agencies still organize their territorial units along the lines of counties.
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According to that regulation, at the time nearly 40 territories could form new 
municipalities. A consultation was conducted with the residents. However, the 
outcome concluded that the residents of only five territories decided that mu-
nicipalities are needed. In addition, another four territories had their bounda-
ries changed; these included three areas which had a status of city municipality, 
which was awkward because these were very small municipalities that had a 
special resort status in the soviet territorial-administrative division. As a result, 
Lithuania still maintains a system of districts (Lith. rajonas from Russ. tras-
lation. rayon). The reform has affected 10 territories that have the status of mu-
nicipality (Lith. savivaldybė), 43 district municipalities (Lith. rajono savivaldy-
bė), and seven cities (Lith. miesto savivaldybė) (Astrauskas, 2011). However, 
this classification is of little material impact in the administrative sense as they 
all need to comply with a single law, which is especially problematic because 
the smallest municipality has 200 times fewer residents than the largest. There 
are speculations that these disparities need to be addressed with a more nuan-
ced regulation, yet no practical steps have been taken to that account.
In term of administrative reform in the municipalities, a similar mo-
derate incremental change is the norm. The period between 1997 and 1999 
was characterized by increasing the administrative power of the mayor by 
allowing him/her to employ advisors and other immediate staff on his own 
account. On the other hand, in 2000, the elders of the territorial sub-units of 
municipalities (those that were 1st level municipalities prior to 1995) became 
career civil servants. However, the national parliamentary realities starting 
in 2000 affected municipalities in a similar manner. In most municipalities, 
coalition rule became the norm, and mayoral power was in decline. This was 
countered by multiple initiatives to change the mayor status, primarily with 
regard to direct election, and possibly making mayors head of the executive. 
These debates lasted far more than a decade, and in 2014, an amendment to 
the law was passed which created the direct mayoral election but kept mayor 
status as chair of the council. This raised questions of governability of muni-
cipalities in cases when mayors are not part of the ruling coalition.
The issue of elderships, especially after the elders became career civil ser-
vants, is also a contentious issue with some proposing to liquidate the institu-
tion altogether, while other proposing a return to some municipal status. In 
2008, a compromise regulation was adopted. The localities in elderships can 
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now elect seniūnaičiai − members of the community that form a board at the 
eldership, and discuss and identify areas of action for the elder. However, this 
board is purely advisory, and cannot affect the elders or municipal actions in 
any imperative form. 
In 2012, the Council of Europe and Local Self-government Congress 
adopted a recommendation No. 321 for Lithuania to identify the key areas 
where local self-government needs reform: 
 − Sub-optimal competencies of municipalities,
 − Insufficient funding,
 − Lack of competency on the part municipal servants
 − Low level of community involvement into municipal affairs (CoE, 
2012).
Reforms aiming at remedying these shortcomings are not underway, ho-
wever, one bright spot is among the larger municipalities, namely Vilnius and 
klaipėda, which due to their large size and a tradition of right wing, Mayors 
had used the of the “Dawn” and “Sunset” recommendation commissions es-
tablished in 2000 by the outgoing Conservative government to modernize 
their internal processes. These cities are regularly cited as livable, competitive 
municipalities with best services (guogis & gudelis, 2003). Nevertheless, the 
capacity to apply modern public management methods is severely lacking 
in smaller municipalities due to both financial reasons and the difficulty of 
attracting capable personnel. 
In conclusion, the absence of territorial-administrative reform at the 
outset of independence has proved to have a lasting legacy on municipal de-
velopment. On the other hand, the urban policies of the Soviet period make 
it problematic to create regions of the NUTS II level, and administrative 
structures of the NUTS III did not find their function either. Lithuania does 
suffer from an absence of meaningful regional policy and reform, while the 
single level municipal system that exists is severely lacking autonomy and 
capacity to implement its mandates with the Law on Local Self-government, 
limiting reforms in the large cities and making next to impossible to achieve a 
minimum standard of good governance in the smaller municipalities. 
Occational political initiatives which advocated a differentiationof regu-
lation for municipalities of different size, or to introduce a second level of 
municipal administration have not been successful. As in other areas of PAR, 
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reforms are incremental and an outcome of not well-considered and reflected 
strategy, but imposed from − without the government − by either internatio-
nal actors or pressure groups. 
3.5. Civil Service
Civil service developments followed a similar pattern as reforms of cen-
tral government, with substantive changes occurring only after Lithuania’s 
bid to join the EU, period of Presidential and Prime Ministerial concord, and 
perceived Lithuania as lagging in the integration process between 1997 and 
1999. In the period preceding the Law on Civil Service only one attempt at 
modernization was undertaken, and that was the 1995 valdininkai8 Law. Ne-
vertheless, this Law was merely an attempt to harmonize the regulation of 
civil service with the democratic constitutional provisions, which the Soviet 
era regulation was incompatible with. Other than that, the Law did not have 
any ambition to modernize the civil service. In fact, it can argued that in most 
areas of public governance the capacity to develop relevant reform visions 
was painfully lacking, and there was a large gap of understanding of how mo-
dern western democracies operate (Masiulis, 2007).
In Lithuanian literature on Civil Service, typically three stages are identi-
fied: (i) pre-Valdininkai Law, (ii) under the Valdininkai Law, and (iii) post-1999 
development of the current civil service system within the framework of the 
Law on Civil Service. It also can be claimed that a fourth stage is underway as 
civil service has been identified as needing further strengthening and depoliti-
cization (Meyer-Sahling & Nakrošis 2014). In 2010, the department was trans-
formed into an agency under the government of Lithuania, previously being 
an agency under the Ministry of Interior. with this shift a several editions for a 
new law on Civil Service were drafted and submitted to the parliament, howe-
ver, the parliament had failed to pass any of these over a period of four years. 
Between 1990 and 1995, the key focus of political principles was loyalty 
of civil servants, and a large degree of politicization plagued the system. Ho-
wever, the effect on the replacement of servants was limited, as Sąjūdis could 
8  Lith. Valdininkas is a direct translation from Russian term of beauraucrat -  chinovnik. 
This term is linguisticaly concidered inaproptrirate as it implies governing, rather than 
serving the public. Yet, this term is firmly set within the public discourse when critici-
zing government officials.
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not organize large-scale reorganization before 1999, and later the LDDP go-
vernment was mostly aligned with the civil service due to the close nature of 
relationships between the Communist Party and the Administrative system 
in the nomenklatura9 model.
The first stage of civil service reform began with the adoption of the Law 
on government in 1990 which included some provisions on personnel policy 
of institutions within the executive. However, this regulation was abstract and 
did little to affect the practices of recruitment, which was conducted by indi-
vidual institutions based on internal guidelines (Minkevičius & Ivanauskienė, 
2007). with the country’s statehood in question for more than one and a half 
year after the declaration of independence, the primary concern of the govern-
ment was the loyalty of civil servants assured by ad hoc measures. In addition, 
it was only the LDDP government which came to power after the adoption of 
the Constitution that included a program provision to regulate the civil service. 
By 1995, the Valdininkai Law was finally passed (Juralevičienė, 2005) and 
the second phase of the development of civil service began. The Valdininkai 
Law was not a radical break from the Soviet system in a sense that it regulated 
not only the civil servants engaged in public administration but also public 
service provider professions. Hence, this period is better characterized as a 
public service (rather than a narrower civil service) period of Lithuania’s pu-
blic sector human resource (HR) policy (Smalskys & Minkevičius, 2013). On 
the other hand, the law identified two levels of the service: A level was referred 
to as political appointees, and B level was referred to as servants. The B level 
public servants were categorized into Corps of service by profession (medics, 
police officers, judges, valdininkai). Although the Law provided professions 
of public service provision a similar legal status, the Law mostly focused on 
regulating HR procedures of the valdininkai (civil servants), leaving large dis-
cretion to organizations that employed personnel from other corps. 
The law included some contemporary HR management elements never 
9  The Soviet Communist Party structure duplicated the administrative structure of the 
state, and there was a large overlap between the two which means that all of the soviet 
bureaucracy was, in western terms, politicized. And the LDDP were the direct inheritors 
of the Communist party, while at the point of independence, the majority of the servants 
were appointed through the Nomenklatura model. And this was very different from the 
other two Baltic States, where Communist parties were in large part Soviet era imigrants, 
and did not qualify for citizentship, and consequently, a right to serve in civil service. 
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before seen in Lithuania: civil servant assessment (at the time called attes-
tation, Lith. atestavimas), provisions for harmonizing the HR management 
across the public sector, data bank of civil servants, training of civil servants. 
The main institution tasked with creating the overall HR management system 
was the Ministry of governance Reforms and Municipalities which created 
regulation on recruitment and examination of candidates, set qualification 
standards, such as age, experience, education, personal traits. 
However, the passing of the Valdininkai Law coincided with the Lithu-
ania’s bid to join the EU, and the missions of OECD SIgMA immediately in-
dicated that the Law is not up to standard and would need amendment − the 
Law was seen as too complex, with plentiful loopholes, and training provisions 
were not implemented (Cordona, 2008). Furthermore, the Law was referred 
to the Constitution court immediately after the 1996 election, and parts of it 
were declared unconstitutional and had to be changed. In 1997, with the inter-
national PHARE program aid a government project Administrative Reform of 
Lithuania (Lith. Lietuvos administracinė reforma) was started. One of its goals 
was the creation of an EU-compatible Law on Civil Service. The program lau-
nched discussions about which model of civil service would best suit Lithu-
ania’s needs (Adomonis, 1999). Despite the recognition that the NPM-style 
position system may be more flexible, it was considered at the time that the 
civil service should be more insulated from the general labor market to ensure 
stability and loyalty to the government in the face of low capacities of the state 
to resist corrupt influences and politicization, hence the civil service mostly 
adhered to the principle career system (Minkevičius & Ivanauskienė, 2007).
In 1999, the Law on Civil Service was passed. It regulated the civil service 
in the strict sense, with only civilian servants implementing administrative 
functions being awarded the status of civil servants. The uniformed (statutory) 
services were by then regulated by several specialized statutes which included 
necessary HR provisions (border guard, police, military, etc.). The new Law 
applied to the statutory services only insofar as the statutes did not regula-
te relevant aspects of the service. The professional corps were also no longer 
regulated, and the public service provision professions were regulated by the 
general labor code, making no distinction to employment in the private sector.
The Law on Civil Service was amended dozens of times since its adoption 
in 1999. And since 2012, there is an academic consensus that a new compre-
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hensive reform is needed. However, the fact remains that attempts to pass a 
new edition of the law are frustrated by political impasse. The underlying prin-
ciples of the Law on Civil Service have in most part remained intact since 1999 
but an incremental movement towards greater control of recruitment, and in 
parallel, the introduction of principles of the position model can be cited. 
The Law identified four types of civil servants: political appointees, ca-
reer civil servants, statutory civil servants, and replacement civil servants for 
temporary openings. And the main aim of the regulation for civil servants 
was the creation of a meritocracy in the civil service, and also greater mobility 
across institutions. This − it was hoped − could build capacity of institutions 
despite the recruitment to higher positions excluding much of the labor force 
(Adomonis, 1999). The new law also harmonized the remuneration system, 
introducing 20 salary categories and set bonus regulations and limits. 
The Law was criticized at the outset for its restrictive effect on recrui-
tment which was perceived as risking greater corruption, rather than redu-
cing it through loopholes that allowed unfair examination. This was attemp-
ted to be remedied with new amendments (most notably in 2002).
The 2002 Amendment listed social guarantees, clarified remuneration 
framework, and more importantly, included explicit listing of civil service 
values as imperative guidelines for HR practice: political neutrality, efficiency, 
publicity and transparency, quality of service provision, and responsibility for 
decisions taken. Also the experience requirement for certain positions was 
removed, although PA institutions still have the right to include it in the job 
opening qualifications requirements, and often exercise that right.
Another major changes in 2002 included the creation of a civil service 
agency − the Department of Civil Service under the Ministry of Interior which 
was tasked with overseeing the implementation of the civil service regulation 
and also several cross-cutting functions, the need for which was apparent in the 
hope of attaining the original goals of the civil service law (Smalskys & Minke-
vičius 2013). The 2002 Amendment did not raise any major policy goals, but 
was rather an attempt to remove unforeseen shortcomings of the original 1999 
edition. The European Commission Progress Report for 2002 has indicated 
that the Lithuanian civil service complies with the accession standards but also 
cautioned that the system is still highly sensitive to political shifts and could 
be deconstructed (CEC, 2002). The EC report – praising the achievements and 
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cautioning for the future – was a watershed moment for civil service reform. 
No radical reforms were undertaken since. The existing system offers a large 
degree of discretion to public administration institutions with regard to deci-
ding which members of the staff can be awarded the status of a civil servant.
But the practice that emerged over the years indicates that a restricted number 
of personnel would hold such a status in any given organization: personnel 
engaged in policy formulation, coordination, and oversight, drafting of regu-
lation and contracts on behalf of PA organizations, budget funded project and 
program coordinators, and those making decisions on implementation of po-
licy and the application of regulation in particular cases (Šarmavičius, 2005).
The shock of the economic crisis spurred the new right wing government 
into action. The governance reform became the core element of the govern-
ment program. The governments answer to the crisis was to attempt the im-
plementation of a comprehensive NPM-style reforms. The civil service was 
at the core of this initiative (Lith. Valstybės valdymo tobulinimo komisijos 
2009−2012 m. veiklos ataskaita). A greater shift towards a position model was 
envisaged but the crisis meant that planning for a new governance system 
needed to coincide with immediate measures to appease fiscal pressures.   
During the period of 2008−2012, a process of cuts in the number of public 
administration agencies and numbers of civil service was underway. The deci-
sions were primarily in reaction to budgetary cuts, and were mostly made at the 
ministerial levels. The government office conducted assessments of efficiency 
using the methodology functional analysis (Lith.Valstybės valdymo tobulinimo 
komisijos 2009−2012 m. veiklos ataskaita). The goal of these assessment was 
to develop policy-relevant criteria for the identification of areas of cuts. These 
were in some instances used to abridge public administration organizations of 
unnecessary functions, and reduce the numbers of staff but ministries exercised 
significant discretion in the way they acted upon the results of assessments.  
The main philosophy of the 2008−2012 civil service reform was the crea-
tion of an individualized system of assessment which would then lead to indi-
vidualized remuneration and training. Leadership skills of managers were also 
identified as a key focus of the reform (Pivoras, 2012). Systems of organizational 
management which would allow a management-by-objectives style aligning the 
individual civil servants competencies and job results to attain strategic goals of 
the organization were also envisaged (Rimkutė & kirstukaitė, 2011). 
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Several initiatives were incorporated within the existing framework of 
the Law on Civil Service, such as annual civil servant assessment by the ma-
nager, and individual civil servants action plan. However, the position model 
was criticized in the academia as it was ill-fitted to the uncooperative com-
partmentalized and highly legalized modes of action of the Lithuanian public 
administration, and which would need to change first (kasiulis & Pivoras, 
2012). The new edition of the Law on Civil Service did not receive a parlia-
mentary majority vote and was returned for review in 2012, already under a 
different government. In the wake of parliamentary elections of 2012 a new 
coalition headed by the social democrats was formed and its program did not 
include any major changes or ambitions to the governance system. Nonethe-
less, it also did not roll back the changes that were put in place and looked 
favorable, albeit in a watered down form of initiated reforms by the previous 
government. within the civil service this was an attempted introduction of a 
competency-based model in the civil service which did not deconstruct the 
existing status of civil servants, but would allow better HR management in all 
respects. It is recognized that a low salary base of many civil servants does not 
create sufficient incentives for most qualified staff, and robust social guaran-
tees need to be in place in order to retain and build administrative capacity.
By 2016, the Department of Civil Service developed a civil service com-
petency model, and drafted a new edition of the law again submitted to the 
parliament. It included: 
 − Competency-based horizontal HR management system across PA ins-
titutions;
 − Distinction between general competencies, leadership competencies, 
and special competencies is made. All civil servants would need to 
meet a certain standard of general competences, and managers – a 
certain standard of leadership competencies. Special competencies 
would be set by professional requirements of a specific job opening 
and would be contested in open examinations;
 − Unified registry of civil servants, and also other potential candidates 
that have gone through competency testing would be held, and used 
for purposes of recruitment, training mobility across agencies, and 
performance assessment;
 − Civil servant category system would be simplified to a list of job title: 
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specialist, senior specialist, etc., which would ensure baseline remune-
ration, while the salary would significantly depend on competencies 
and performance assessment;
 − Harmonization of competency requirement for similar positions in 
different public administration organization would be implemented 
(VTD, 2013).
The new competency model of HR management would entail significant 
changes in the remuneration system, the outcomes of which are hard to pre-
dict whether they would attain the called for change in the PA culture (Rus-
teika & Diržytė, 2014). The outcomes of other PA reforms in this regard are 
not encouraging in the sense that other elements of Lithuania’s public admi-
nistration reform have shown that at the administrative level it is difficult 
to overcome the stringent institutional tension at the political level to build 
networks of cooperation for policy implementation. The compartmentalizing 
of Public administration starts at the government and ministry level, and 
even such cross-cutting initiatives as the civil service competency model are 
unlikely to do the trick. Substantial bottom-up initiatives are likely needed on 
behalf of leading civil servants themselves to create these networks through 
associated action as the political system is not permissive for accommodating 
these goals at the moment.
3.6. Sector Wide Public Administration Reforms
In this section, we will cover several transversal developments that have 
taken place, or often more tellingly, have not. The topic of administrative over-
sight has been a central area of administrative reform throughout the 1990s, 
and the strategic planning in 2000s, while since 2000, the digitization of go-
vernment both in terms of the process of administration and public service 
delivery has come to the fore. On the other hand, there are several areas of 
public administration which have received hardly any attention on behalf of 
governing poltical elites: ethical conduct, setting clear administrative proce-
dures, and clear criteria for which public service employees should and should 
not to be awarded the status of civil servants, as well as which agencies should 
and should not be awarded the status of institutions of public administration. 
we believe that the three factors of (i) absence of integrated code of ethical 
conduct for public sector employees and civil servants, (ii) the fact that in
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Figure 3.1: Dynamics in the Number of Lithuanian Agencies, 1990−2012
Source: Nakrošis & Bankauskaitė-grigaliūnienė, 2015, cit. analysis of the 
LAOC data. 10
situtions can alter the status of their employees with little or no grounding 
and oversight, and (iii) that there is substantial room to setup public agencies 
outside of the realm of general regulation of public administration, deserve a 
separate discussion.  
Four major developments in administrative oversight in the 1990s can be 
listed: (i) creation of the national audit office, (ii) creation of the ombudsman’s 
institution, (iii) passing of the law on public administration, and (iv) creation 
of administrative courts. The National Audit Office (Lith. Valstybės kontrolė, 
lit. State Control) is regulated by the Constitution, but already by the mid-
1990s, it moved away from being an institution of budgetary expenses review 
to the institution responsible for conducting financial and performance audits 
of the entire public sector. This institution is accountable to the parliament, 
and has a very large measure of discretion to conduct planned audits but also 
to implement audits on request of institutions themselves, including perfor-
mance audits of strategic plans and programs which cover several policy areas.
10  The difference in the number of agencies as defined by Nakrošis & Bankauskaitė-grigaliūnie-
nė, 2015 from those cited from Open data of Civil Service of Lithuania in Figure 2 is caused 
by the fact that Nakrošis & Bankauskaitė-grigaliūnienė, 2015 applied a stricter test to the 
definition of an agency, than merely the legal status of „institution of public administration“.
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Figure 3.2: The Number of National and Municipal PA Institutions between 
2010 and 2016 
Source: Open Data of Civil Service of Lithuania.
In 1994, the parliament adopted the Law of Ombudsmen. Lithuania has 
two ombudsmen overseeing national and local government institutions but 
both of them are serviced by the same institution. This institution received 
roughly 1,800 complains annually between 2012 and 2014, about ¾ were 
complains filed against national government officials, and ¼ against local 
self-government officials. The institution would investigate about ⅓ of com-
plains, and  another ⅓ would be mediated between the conflicting parties, 
and majority of remaining complains would be reffered to other institutions. 
Between 35% and 40& of complaints in total were recognized as valid.11 Om-
budsmen have become an important consulting institution to the parliament 
with regard to developing new regulations in trying to resolve occurring 
conflicts between government institutions and citizens (Pranevičienė, 2002). 
11  Note: (1) Another 30% are resolved in good will with the mediation of the institu-
tion. Therefore, the ratio of recognition of validity of complains which are not resolved 
peacefully is around 50%, or around 600 cases annually. (2) These data are cited from 
the 2015 Annual Report of of the activities of the seimas ombudsmen's office of the Re-
public of Lithuania. This and other reports are available at: http://www.lrski.lt/lt/seimo-
kontrolieriu-veikla/metines-seimo-kontrolieriu-veiklos-ataskaitos.html [2016-09-10].
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But there is no research available on what impact this interaction has for 
future conflicts.   
The passing of the Law on Public Administration in 1999 was another 
noteable moment of the development of public administration in Lithuania. 
The Law identifies the category of public sector organizations which are 
granted powers of public administration: “The system of entities of public 
administration shall mean entities of public administration which are re-
lated to each other by subordination and coordination relations and have 
been granted the powers in accordance with the procedure laid down by 
this Law to engage in public administration” (VIII-1234, 1999; citing amen-
dmend XII-511, 2013). This Law limits the establishment of ‘public adminis-
tration’ institutions without the approval of the parliament, except in matters 
of EU regulation. In fact, the EU accession has been the key force behing the 
explosion of agencies, both in Lithuania and the rest of the region (Nakrošis 
& Bankauskaitė-grigaliūnienė, 2015; see Figure 3.1). The registry for these 
institutions in 2016 has identified 597 agencies, and 772 in 2010 (the earliest 
year covered by the registry; see Figures 3.2 and 3.3). However, the overall 
number of civil servants has kept incrementally growing over the same pe-
riod but the overall number of employees (including statutatory and civil 
servants) remains realtivelly stable at around 80,000, i.e. under 4% of the 
labor force (see Figure 3.4 for a breakdown of civil servants, Table 3.1 for the 
numbers of civil servants). One important sidenote with regard to the Lithu-
anian public sector is its incredible feminization of the career civil service. 
In 2016, women constitute 76% of all career civil servants, and that ratio has 
not been changing since 2000. However, only 37% of heads of institutions, 
and 40% of the statutatory servants are women.
An important stage in the development of public administration star-
ted in 2004 when the government approved Public Administration Deve-
lopment Strategy (2004−2010). It was the first strategic document for public 
administration modernization and its further development. This strategy set 
out objectives to create a transparent, effective public administration system 
based on new technologies and oriented to results and appropriate service. 
Five areas were identified for the improvement: central government, territo-
rial central government, local government, administrative capacity (HRM), 
and e-government. A subsequent strategy: Public Management Improvement 
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Figure 3.3: The Number of Employees in National and Municipal PA Institu-
tions between 2010 and 2016
Source: Open Data of Civil Service of Lithuania.
Programme for 2012−2020 aims at improving key public management 
processes, such as designing, planning, and implementing public policies. It sta-
tes the goals “to enhance openness of the public governance processes and to en-
courage society to take an active part in them; provide good quality administra-
tive and public services; strengthen the capacities of strategic thinking in public 
administration institutions; and improve the management of their activities.”
Much of the development of public governance was incremental and 
initiated on behalf of civil servants themselves (Nakrošis, 2011). The laws on 
civil service and public administration were not comprehensively reviewed 
and this is a key characteristic of PARs which tend to be bottom-up with 
civil servants advancing new developments in agencies that have greater au-
tonomy. And those in most cases turn out to be the agencies that conducted 
their activities in policy areas directly related to the EU regulation. Nakro-
šis & Martinaitis (2011) and Nakrošis & Bankauskaitė-grigaliūnienė (2015) 
corroborate this generalization to some extent. However, as is the case with 
the institution of the ombudsman research of how the networks of civil ser-
vants impact the practices and outcomes of public administration need to be 
substantially developed.
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Table 3.1: The Number of Employees in Public Administration Institutions 
2010-2016
Year
Employees 
without the 
status of civil 
servants
Civil 
servants
Statutoty 
civil
 servants
Political 
confidence 
civil 
servants
Heads of 
institu-
tions
Total12
2010 21 992 26 063 5 236 841 434 54 566
2011 21 421 25 756 4 991 852 337 53 357
2012 21 064 26 348 5 013 666 369 53 460
2013 20 922 26 938 5 139 891 332 54 222
2014 20 833 27 302 5 153 894 322 54 504
2015 20 358 27 311 5 118 913 321 54 021
2016 19 565 27 603 5 035 921 311 53 435
Source: Open data of Civil Service of Lithuania.
Administrative courts, a system of 5 regional and one Supreme Adminis-
trative Court are a key feature of Lithuania’s public administration. These have 
become a vey important source of driving the harmonization of administra-
tive practice. Nonetheless, this feature of Lithuania’s governance may also be 
criticized from the point of view of veto points. As we remarked above, the 
institutional setup at the level of political decision-making creates severe im-
passes for reforms as it is. The fact that the judiciary also has specialized ins-
titutions to tackle intra-government conflicts does allow the political elites to 
slip easily of the hook, and not pursue the reforms when needed, as the courts 
through the issuance of Buletins on Court Decision practice the application 
of various regulation. In the context of absence of strong associations of the 
civil service professionals the bottom-up model of reforms is the only one 
available, and is thus severely hampered. Nonetheless, the Supreme Admi-
nistrative Court has created a dynamic legal doctrine which is continually 
updated not only based on the practice of the courts but also on research on 
the subject of administrative process. As new research comes out, the court is 
willing to amend its practice.13   
12   The number is lower compared to Rekašienė (2014) since the Open Data of Civil Service Portal do 
not collect data on statutatory service, institutions which do not report to the Department of Civil 
Service. In 2014, the overall number of statutatory civils servants was around 23,000 (VTD, 2014).
13   Research that is expressly part of the doctrine is available at the website of the Supreme 
Administrative Court at: http://www.lvat.lt/lt/administracine-doktrina.html [2016-09-10]. 
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Figure 3.4: Civil Service Relative to the Lithuanian Population and Labor 
Market in 2013
Source: Rekašienė (2014).
Strategic planning became a key element of public administration just 
before Lithuania’s accession to the EU in 2002 (government Regulation No. 
827). However, the tools of strategic planning were mostly a tool of budgetary 
oversight for Ministry of Finances. The 15th Cabinet substantially amended the 
regulation on strategic planning in 2009. The new regulation gave substanti-
ally greater powers to the center of government, renamed the Office of Prime 
Minister during the tenure of the 15th Cabinet14. Based on this new regulation, 
a long-term strategic plan “Lithuania 2030” was developed (Parliament Regu-
lation No. XI−2015, 2012). This strategy forms the tip of the integrated hierar-
chy of strategic plans at the national level. This created the context in which the 
National Development Strategy (government Regulation No. 1482, 2012), en-
compassing the entirety of the EU structural support for period of 2014−2019 
was developed with reference to the goals of “Lithuania 2030”. Yet, the success 
of strategic planning to create substantial effects on the overall outcomes of 
governance requires a large degree of interinstitutional cooperation, which in 
coalition governments is always hard to come by (Bileišis, 2012b). A major 
share of attention with regard to public administration modernization in stra-
tegic planning of Lithuania as far as public administration is concerned is the 
digitization of public governance. Lithuania is seeing an explosion of creation 
14   A decision reversed by the 16th Cabinet. 
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of new online tools for public service delivery, consultation, etc. Yet, the system 
integration is one part where this was lacking. As a means of mitigating this, 
in 2003, the government passed Regulation No. 418, setting the standards for 
the websites of public administration institutions. This Regulation includes 
the provisions which alow the Information Society Development Committee 
under the Ministry of Transport and Communications to regulate technical 
standards of administrative and civil services run as an “umbrella’ portal, the 
e-government gateway15 for various online services. 
The developments that we overviewed in this section lack several impor-
tant elements, which we believe, are crucial for successful process of public 
administration reforms: Law of Public Administration provides a very vague 
definition of public administration, identifying five activities that qualify as 
public administration:
 − Administrative decision-making,
 − Control of implementation of laws and administrative decisions,
 − Provision administrative services,
 − Administration of public services,
 − Internal administration of public administration institutions (Supre-
me Administrative Court Bulletin No. 30, 2016). 
The main criteria for becoming a public administration institution are 
procedural − the awarding of the status of public administration institution 
(Supreme Administrative Court Bulletin No. 30, 2016). Although another 
important criterion is the passing of normative administrative acts, there is a 
very large number of public sectors that may be conducting public adminis-
tration in substance but are not recognized as such, and employees of these 
organizations are not civil servants. Hence, this creates a major blind spot in 
the system of administrative oversight of Lithuania. 
The civil service in this regard is particularly interesting because civil serv-
ants are present in a great majority of public administration institutions. Howe-
ver, the number of civil servants is roughly matched to the number of statutato-
ry servants as well as employees that do not hold the status of civil servants but 
work in public administration organizations. In addition, public administration 
institutions are not limited to the executive: courts and agencies accountable to 
15   The address of the portal is: https://www.epaslaugos.lt/portal/en [2016-09-10].
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the parliament also have that status. All things considered, this means that the-
re is a messy overlap between the civil service and branches of the government 
where the civil service does not include the entirety of the executive but has an 
impact on judiciary and legislative branches. The entirety of what we have said 
in describing the complex institutional hurdles for public administration re-
forms in Lithuania create loopholes that are a cause of constant attention by the 
media, and negatively affect the attitudes of citizens towards the government. It 
has been argued that public administration ought to be legaly defined entirely 
within the executive (Bakaveckas, 2001). In this case, a more lenient initiative 
of public administration reform would be possible as these reforms would not 
need to stand the test of compliance to the principle of separation of powers as 
they would need to do now and face strong lobbys of respective institutions.  
The aspect of codes of ethics is the final topic in this chapter, and there 
is little to say on its behalf. Lithuania has over dozens of institutional ethical 
codes, and the 2002 Rules on Civil Servants Ethics (government Regulation 
No. 968). However, the latter lack oversight and are rather a guideline, outli-
ning and specifying eight principles:
 − Respect of citizens and state,
 − Justice, 
 − Selflesness,
 − Desency,
 − Objectivity,
 − Responcibility,
 − Publicity (Author’s note – transparency), 
 − Exemplary conduct.
The absence of any enforcement mechanisms make this document (not 
reviewed for nearly 15 years) more of a guideline for conduct (Palidauskaitė, 
2010). The relevance of this document is furthermore limited by the fact that 
both Law on Public Administration and Law on Civil Service outline similar 
lists of principles which clearly refer to ethics in public administration.
The Law on Public Administration outlines the following principles of 
„public administration“:
 − Supremacy of law (Author’s note – rule of law),
 − Objectivity,
 − Proportionality,
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 − Absence of abuse of power,
 − Institutional assistance,
 − Efficiency,
 − Subsidiarity,
 − “One-desk” (Author’s note – onestop shop),
 − Equality,
 − Transparency, 
 − Responsibility for the adopted decisions,
 − Novelty and openness to change.
And the Law on Civil Service:
 − Rule of law,
 − Equality,
 − Political neutrality,
 − Transparency,
 − Career.
The shortcomming of regulations for ethical conduct in a more broader 
context may be understood by looking at how major issues with ethics in pu-
blic administration were dealt with in the 1990s. Lithuania had not developed 
means of dealing with unethical or corrupt behaviors both in the 1920s and the 
1930s, and during the Soviet occupation as well. Palidauskaitė (2011) offer a 
broader look at the way how ethical behavior is enforced in Lithuania through 
a lense of analyzing ‚hard‘ regulation that addresses these issues (see Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2: Ethics Problems in Lithuanian government since 1918
1918−1940 1946−1989 1990−onwards
„Bureaucratism“ 
(Author’s note – 
Red tape)
Occurred on 
occasions
Not legally 
identified
Legally defined, subject to complaints 
to Ombudsmen
Conflict of 
interests
Limitation on 
having subordi-
nate realtives.
Not legally 
identified
Illegal, special regulation passed and 
the Agency of Chief Official Ethics 
Commission established
Bribing Occurred on 
occasion
Not legally 
identified
Illegal, special anti-corruption 
agency with right to conduct criminal 
investigations established (Special 
Investigations Service)
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Abuse of office Occurred on 
occasion
wide 
spread, blat, 
practice 
Illegal
Protectionism 
(Author’s note 
–  Clientelism)
Occurred on 
occasion
wide 
spread
The creation of the state of political 
confidence civil servants in the Law 
on Civil Service
Corruption Occurred on 
occasion, was 
defined as theft, 
waste of budget 
funds. Several 
systemic 
corruption 
cases are docu-
mented.
Not legally 
identified, 
most com-
mon form of 
– embezzle-
ment
Illegal, special anti-corruption 
agency with right to conduct criminal 
investigations established (Special 
Investigations Service). Numerous 
other institutions are also empowered 
to investigate such cases.
Source: Palidauskaitė, 2010.
3.7. Conclusion: In Pursuit of Efficiency?
The business idea of efficiency, by relating revenues to expenses, is pro-
blematic in the public sector. Naïve NPM-style attempts to plan for public 
investment with return calculations have never happened in Lithuania. But 
rhetorics calling for more refined attempts at creating efficient policy and 
administration has never ceased. Yet, a clear definition of how efficiency is 
understood in Lithuanian policy documents on reform does not exist. what 
this indicates is that one key ingredient is often missing in the entire reform 
calculus. This ingredient is clear understanding of policy goals – what they are. 
As government coalitions come and go, their administrative reforms pro-
ve to be only minor, extending only as much as they may appear useful for the 
election term. Major reforms are driven by goals which have a political con-
sensus across the board. Lithuania had three clear goals in the first 25 years of 
its independence: memberships of NATO, EU, and Eurozone. All of these were 
based on a broad political consensus, and all governments worked diligently 
to achieve these goals. Nevertheless, all these goals were related to Lithuania’s 
greater integration into other governance structures. Upon integration, Lithu-
ania continues to be a most loyal and diligent member of the institutions it 
joined, and readily accepts all reforms put forward. In this regard, Lithuania 
could run a campaign to claim the title of the darling of EU’s institutions. 
However, in the context of public administration reform, the EU (and even 
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more so NATO or ECB) does not impact the entirety of a Lithuania’s adminis-
trative system. Institutions and policies are still mostly a sovereign matter in 
the areas such as social security, education, health, decentralization, and so on. 
Lithuania manages to be attractive to foreign investors because it complies with 
their requests and demands but fails to be attractive to its own citizens, losing 
on average more than 1% population net to economic migration over the past 
10 years. In terms of emigration, poverty, and social stratification Lithuania is 
at a significant disadvantage in the EU (Nakrošis & Vilpišauskas, 2014). There 
has never been a consensus on these key domestic policy areas, and many of 
the administrative processes run on Soviet legacy institutional arrangements 
and practices. Even in cases when reforms are implemented, these reforms are 
half-measures, with reformers often not bothering to claim otherwise. 
Lithuania has demonstrated that it can deliver on reforms when there is a 
broad political support. But the institutional setup has proven that with regard 
to comprehensive public administration reform this support is seldom availa-
ble. Therefore, it is not so much a case of implementation gap as much as it is 
support and will-to-follow-through gap. Lithuanian constitutional setup al-
lows only narrow windows of general concord among the highest institution. 
On behalf of the public, the pursuit for public administration reform is also 
unlikely. Since 2004, Lithuania has lost its youth bulge to migration (Bileišis 
et al., 2015), the economic transformation has fragmented the society and 
created a large protest vote (Ramonaitė, 2014) which results in coalitions, and 
the small media market mostly focuses on the politics of the day. Lithuanian 
civil servants have no established associations or networks which could com-
municate their collective attitudes and opinions towards reforms both to the 
political elite and the public. Using the principle-agent theory terminology, 
this means that on behalf of the state there are no professional structures that 
could perform the role of a qualified principle in the state-society relations.  
Lithuania’s challenges with PAR are not exceptional, and the lack of com-
prehensive reform does not mean that there are no persistent social and eco-
nomic pressures which force to introduce reforms, albeit not as ambitious as 
an odd academic would want. If Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index 
(BTI) is to be believed, Lithuania comes top with regard to transformation 
achievement in 2015, and in 2016, being ranked 6th (or very good), despite 
the fact that this report also claims that policy-makers confine themselves to 
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minor changes (BTI, 2016). Therefore, it can be argued that Lithuania’s strin-
gent institutional system does limit its leadership in policy innovation and 
reform, rather it insulates it from major mistakes. Yet, what this also indicates 
that closing the gap of development between Eastern and western EU mem-
ber states needs a shift of paradigm in the way public administration is done; 
by simply adopting the best practices from outside the region is doomed to 
eternally falling behind, and serve as a periphery of the European project. In 
Lithuania at least, there is no evidence that the situation is likely to change.  
One particular reform deserves attention in this regard. Fiscal consolida-
tion of 2008−2010 was followed, in 2012, by the passing of Lithuania’s second 
long-term strategy colloquially referred to as ‘Lithuania 2030’ (Šiugždinienė, 
gaulė & Rauleckas, 2013). The design of this strategy is based on Lithuania’s 
standings in various international ratings and goals to move up in these stan-
dings. This idea can be considered as an optimal solution in the sense that 
a consensus that Lithuania needs to move up in various ranking is easy to 
come by. On the other hand, it is difficult to hold ministries accountable for 
achieving these goals because the methods of evaluation in the indexes are 
patchy, and do not cover the entirety of government activities. This means 
that deconstructing indicators to the level of individual agencies’ actions, 
which could contribute to Lithuania’s rise in many of these ratings, requires 
intense decision-maker engagement and adherence to the evidence-based de-
cision-making principle. To this end ‘Lithuania 2030’ was passed under a new 
edition of strategic planning guideline, also updated in 2012. As part of this 
strategic planning system, a comprehensive planning scheme has been creat-
ed which formally requires institutions to draw up their plans to correspond 
with ‘Lithuania 2030’ provisions. But the system lacks a clear monitoring sys-
tem to identify the correlation between budget allocations, institutional goal 
attainment, and their relation to the long-term national strategy. One of the 
strategic plans − one level bellow ‘Lithuania 2030’ is the program for the De-
velopment of Public Administration of 2012−2020. In essence, this document 
is supposed to be the public administration reform agenda of the country. If 
explicitly focuses on citizen empowerment. The analysis behind this program 
claims that citizen empowerment allows build trust, support, and gain effici-
ency in the government. However, how this empowerment can be attained 
and how it would affect country rankings is rather vague in the program. 
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It can be claimed that persistent issues outlined in the earlier program 
with regard to unclear accountability of agencies in many cases leave the ci-
tizen empowerment initiatives at the discretion of individual agencies. Em-
powerment in this regard is used similarly to efficiency − it is devout of clear 
definition and impossible to measure. The program’s key metric − achieving 
majority of citizens − would claim they trust public administration institutions 
is a good illustration. Sociological survey’s which measure trust show strong 
correlation to current events and basing the national long term strategy on 
such an indicator only creates confusion when evaluating it the strategy is a 
success. Strategic planning with these shortcomings still in earnest is not a 
forum for highly public policy debate and government accountability. Rather, 
it is an effective instrument of fiscal control. One important principle in the 
strategic planning is overlooked which could alter this with only minor re-
gulatory change − by ensuring that long-term strategic planning is done on a 
continuous basis with continuously extended planning horizon. Now, this is 
not being done, and public debates on long-term policy questions are not pro-
minent in Lithuania’s public life (Bileišis 2012b). In essence, many of the limi-
tations of strategic planning and performance assessment that have emerged 
in the early 2000s (Verheijen & Dobrolyubova, 2007) are still not remedied.  
In summary, Europeanization in Lithuania is the key driving force of re-
form in Lithuania (Nakrošis & Bankauskaitė-grigaliūnienė, 2015). It is the 
force that comes up against few institutional barriers. But the problem with 
Europeanization is that it is not all encompassing, and the elements of public 
administration that are not directly impacted by Europeanization lag behind 
in terms of modernization. Although Lihtuania has avoided the fate of Latini-
zation, as did the other post-communist EU state members, goetz’s idea (2001) 
of ‘islands’ of Europeanized administration still holds value when describing 
Lithuanian public administration. Post-communist transformation is well and 
truly over but it is not to say that it does not have a legacy. In fact, on the one 
hand, the reforms in the 1990s did not deconstruct many of the administrative 
setups that remained from the soviet period, and on the other hand, the drive to 
create safeguards against a possibility of return to dictatorship or foreign domi-
nation in a sense cornered Lithuania with inability to completely deconstruct 
obsolete and dysfunctional policy areas, or in many instances, implement com-
prehensive reforms that could give a boost to the development of the country.
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4. Public Administration Reforms in Latvia              
(1990–2016)
Māris Pūķis, Inesa Vorončuka, Olga Stariņeca
4.1. Introduction
The authors of this chapter present an overview of the public adminis-
tration reforms in Latvia from 1990 to 2016. The chapter consists of intro-
duction, six sections and conclusion. The aim of the study is to provide the 
characterization of the public administrative reforms from unusual angle for 
the local researchers. The authors’ focus on historical experience of Latvia 
in reformation of public administration with its impact on decision-makers. 
The interest groups of the reform process are emphasized and the analysis 
results are summarized by using stakeholders and their interests’ definition 
approach to describe the reforms of public governance model. Methodology 
for the interest groups of analysis is systematically applied to public adminis-
tration dynamics in Latvia for the first time. Finally, the authors divide the 
reform process according to the time periods, and characterize the features 
of public administration model developed, civil service development, organi-
zation of the public administration functions and the administrative process 
during each of these periods. 
 Latvia is a small European Union Member State on the eastern shores of 
the Baltic Sea that has less than 2 million inhabitants (CSP, 2016). Latvian pe-
ople were able to implement the national self-determination on this territory 
after the world war I. The first popularly elected legislature in Latvia was the 
Constitutional Assembly, the elections were held on April 17 and 18, 1920. 
Municipalities on the territory of Latvia have existed in various forms since 
the 8th century (Švābe, 1926). Efficiency of self-governments in the territory 
of Latvia was a compulsory condition according to the Peace Treaty for ger-
man occupation army to promote the declaration of Latvia’s independence 
(The Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 1918), which was implemented and their 
effectiveness had a condition. In case the condition would be executed, the 
german army of occupation had to promote the declaration of national in-
dependence.
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There existed full parliamentary and party democracy, but self-govern-
ment democracy continued up to the coup d’état in May 15, 1934. On Latvian 
territory, the totalitarian regimes were in power for 55 years which affects the 
power system up to the present day. Values and perceptions in the mind of 
people are changing more slowly than the ability to declare that a parliamen-
tary democracy has been acquired. 
In Latvia, the 1922 Constitution (Satversme in Latvian)  was implemen-
ted with minor amendments, namely, the human rights section was intro-
duced (it complements the international obligations of Latvia acceding to 
the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe, 1950), and 
some changes were made concerning the state institutions, mentioning also 
municipalities in several places. The new elements of the Constitutions inter-
pretation appeared at the beginning of the 1990s. 
In February 22, 1996, Latvia joined the European Charter of Local Self-
government. In 2004, Latvia became a member of the EU. Thus, the sovere-
ignty of the Republic of Latvia on human rights, self-governments and EU 
competence issues is limited by the international obligations of Latvia. 
Latvia has a parliamentary system with a single-chamber parliament, the 
Saeima, which has 100 deputies, who are elected by the citizens from five 
electoral districts (Latvia’s capital city Riga, kurzeme, Zemgale, Vidzeme, and 
Latgale). It is characterized by a proportional electoral system with exchange-
able sequence of candidates within a list. To enter the Saeima a political party 
or coalition of parties must receive at least 5% of the total number of votes 
cast in all five constituencies.
In Latvia, 119 local governmrents (110 municipalities and 9 cities) ope-
rate, and their election procedures coincide with the European election pro-
cedure. The self-government councils are elected like the national parliament, 
i.e. for a term of four years by proportional elections and exchangeable sequ-
ence of candidates, and by applying 5% election’s barrier. Municipalities with 
less than 5,000 people registered are allowed to form lists of candidates from 
voters’ association. The ruling coalition is led by the mayors, elected from the 
voters’ association lists in these municipalities, and this could be an evidence 
for the voter distrust in the interests of political parties, and development of 
small self-governments. 
There are five planning regions in Latvia (names coincide with the names 
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of the parliamentary electoral districts, but the boundaries are different). Po-
litical leadership of these planning regions is elected by the self-government 
deputies. Planning regions possess all the characteristics of public power and 
they are considered as the regional authorities established towards indirect 
elections. Planning regions are not as important as local authorities. Active 
and passive voting rights are owned by the citizens on all levels of elections 
in Latvia (self-government elections by both the EU Member States and the 
citizens of the Republic of Latvia). 
14.2% of residents of Latvia are non-citizens, 2.6% are citizens of other 
countries. Non-citizens do not have the right to vote, but they can work for 
self-government executive institutions. Any non-citizens’ discrimination in 
any form is prohibited in Latvia, and the state policy is focused on promotion 
of the voluntary acquisition of the citizenship. 
4.2. Historical Experience with Impact to Decision-makers
Since the Livonian Crusade, and being a part of the Swedish Empire, 
public administration in Latvia was based on the European traditions as the 
result of the following changes in administrative arrangement. Even after the 
incorporation into the Russian Empire, the government structure since Peter 
the great’s times was largely copied from the west.  
The influence of the traditional continental European type of bureaucra-
cy, which was dominating in the Baltic provinces of the Russian Empire in the 
late 19th and early 20th century, is still felt in Latvia. It is also important to 
note that the representatives of regional authorities and municipal deputies at 
that time were mainly Baltic germans, who had not broken their cultural and 
educational bond with germany. 
After gaining its independence, this model was modernized – took the 
form of democratic reforms in Russia after February 1917 under the impact 
of the weimar Republic’s constitutional model. An improved 1917 version of 
Russian city law with extended municipal rights was used in Latvia until 1930 
(Mucinieks, 1938), and the Russian Civil Code based on ancient Roman civil 
law until 1937. 
The authoritarian coup of karlis Ulmanis in 1934 and three occupations 
by the USSR in 1940 and 1944-1945 and by germany in 1941 had an impact 
on both today’s professors, and not to a less extent, politicians and officials 
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who, after 1990, had learned from the professors that were affected by the 
totalitarian ideology. 
Three guidelines of Ulmanis’ authoritarianism, i.e. leaderism, unity and 
nationalism increasingly influenced public thinking. They transformed into 
leadership, anti-pluralism and concern for the survival of the Latvian people, 
but the base of this line of thought was already laid out in the period of Ul-
manis’ dictatorship. 
The next administrations of bolsheviks and national-socialists differed 
from the Ulmanis’ dictatorship with one-party dominance (during Ulma-
nis’ regime the parties was eliminated, and the opponents were temporar-
ily placed in concentration camps), and turning into a mass terror. Further, 
following three subsequent occupations under Stalin’s and Hitler’s rule, the 
administrative systems were likewise based on fear and hierarchy. Public ad-
ministration was led from one center and the idea that the local government 
could have a different policy was not tolerated. 
In Soviet times, the situation was controlled by the Communist Party 
and security services. The power had technocratic features, i.e. the State plan, 
and tried to use all available management science achievements in order to 
ensure implementation of the party directives. Local administration mecha-
nisms were based on the executive committee system, i.e. management sec-
tor got spread up to the executive committee and the local administrative 
structures, i.e. bypassing the council. So-called “Councils of People’s Deputies” 
were created mainly for propaganda, and their real impact on administrative 
decisions was minimal. 
The totalitarian period has left the influence, which is not easy to force 
and which is gaining new impetus to influence the currently existing external 
factors. The USA once supported the idea of Russia’s unity, consequently, po-
wer vertical and media censorship were implemented. Russia came very close 
to the one-party system. Officials of the European Commission were trying 
to strengthen the unity of Europe, gradually more and more encroaching on 
solving of national and regional competence issues. Economists and lawyers 
in the Soviet Union though recognized the market economy and pluralism, 
however, truly sought to achieve uniformity, centralized planning, and unity. 
Characteristic values and way of thinking of the totalitarian system were 
transferred to the students, but young Latvian officials were trying to become 
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the best Europeans, so they would rather defend “the common interests” of 
the EU than defend the national ones in the best way possible. This promises 
a possibility of being promoted from the officials of Latvia to the EU ones. 
Theory and experience of other countries certainly impacted public 
administration in Latvia. From 1990 to 1993, the model of minimal public 
administration and decentralization was implemented in Latvia; the model 
was based, to a large extent, on contemporary educated people’s (scientists’, 
engineers’) understanding of democratic values. Equality of public service 
provider and recipient was recognized as a special value; in both cases, equ-
ality should be based on simple and mutually acceptable laws. As it could be 
assumed that a client does not probably read the laws, it is not necessary to 
produce it also for the officials. In the same time, monarchism as a theoretical 
doctrine was not widely known in Latvia then. However, decentralization, 
to a major extent, was a result of conditions (Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union nomenclature hoped to be firstly consolidated on the local elections, 
so an electoral arrangement chosen would be different from that in the majo-
rity of Central and Eastern European countries at that time). 
The reforms of the next period (1993-1998) were largely influenced by 
the Latvian diaspora. Latvian exiles, who were acquainted with the traditio-
nal elements of governance in germany, the USA, Australia and Canada, did 
not urge to take over the New Public Management (NPM), becoming fashio-
nable, but advised to go through all stages and begin with the development of 
the mandarin type bureaucracy.  
NPM was becoming fashionable / popular all around the world, there-
fore, it was used to reorganize political and administrative power during the 
reforms of 1998-2002, influence the foreign consultants, who won in com-
petitions, as well as impact the implementation of these administration ele-
ments. Re-inventing of government was the most popular option for the New 
Public Administration in Latvia (Osborn & gaebler, 1992). 
Latvia was also required to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria to be able to 
join the EU. It was necessary to prove both the fact that market economy is 
functioning in the candidate country and it will be able to cope with compe-
ting goods and services pressure on the market of the future member state and 
the fact that stable institutions are acting as a guarantee for rule of law, human 
and minority rights. It seemed that the best approach to these requirements 
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fulfilment was both converting and growing of bureaucratic structures, which 
led to the neo-weberianism concepts during the reforms of 2002 and 2008.  
The next period began with a fight against inflation encouraged by the 
International Monetary Fund and the European Commission (Pūķis, 2010), 
which was further transformed into the use of internal devaluation to fight 
the crisis. During this period, external influence played a significant role − 
Latvia was used as a testing zone looking for an option to save greece.  
4.3. Interest Groups with Influence on Reforms
Since 1990 significant processes of social economical transformations have 
been taking place in Latvia, and in every such process participated the interest 
groups being influential nationwide. The interest groups (both at regional, na-
tional and international level) position themselves more often, according to 
their endeavors, to obtain relative preferences within the process of reforms, 
and less often a competition among the political parties could be observed. 
In the majority of laws and institutional solutions of the public autho-
rities some benefits or harm to particular interest group may be observed, 
especially those that were actively lobbying for their interests in the course of 
drafting a policy or a law, and during the process of drafting and accepting 
regulations delegated to the Cabinet of Ministers. 
The ideal of the rational bureaucracy envisages a politically neutral go-
vernment. Such an ideal is not feasible due to numerous reasons, and there 
are no real reasons (except the tactical considerations of the competition of 
the parties) to enforce it.
Not only do the politicians accept the laws, but also the development 
guidelines. They are not altruistic and their activities demonstrate both per-
sonal and “public interests”. However, no one but the politicians possess the 
electoral mandate to express the interests of the society.
In Latvia, there are three levels of ‘societies’: (i) politicians elected to the 
EU Parliament and the ministers of all the member states who accept the laws 
and policy documents in name of mutual EU interests, (ii) deputies elected to 
the Saeima who act in the name of the national interests, and (iii) politicians 
of the local governments who act in the name of local interests. 
During the period 1990 to 2016, both the dominating interest groups 
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have changed and so have the interests. Sometimes these groups have su-
cceeded in achieving their goals at least partially, sometimes they have not. 
During the entire aforesaid period, a contest of opposite interests has been 
taking place. Politics has been an expression of contest. Public administration 
is always characterized by inertia that does not allow any rapid changes. Ho-
wever, the transformations influence both knowledge and interests.  
True interests of the groups are usually not named; they can be indirectly 
judged. The politicians seek to misinform the society, to a higher or lower 
rate, by putting forward other issues while bringing their true concerns to the 
forefront. 
The large interest groups in the society. Consolidation of interests may 
be established only in separate moments in history. In the early 1990s, the 
Latvian people could be perceived as a group of unified interests, and its main 
representative at that time was the Popular Front of Latvia (PFL). Also other 
national and democratic forces were co-operating with the PFL in rebuil-
ding the democratic state. All of the allies, at that moment especially, should 
mention the democratically disposed persons of other ethnical entities that 
supported Latvia in getting out of the sphere under the USSR influence. The 
main opposition to the nationally democratic process at that period was for-
med by the members of the Interfront and the supporters of the idea thereof, 
the majority of whom were colonists of the USSR era, officers of the USSR 
Army and their family members, and some parts of the nomenclature of the 
USSR era. This group could be characterized by a tendency to retain the state 
unity within the USSR territory, preserve the ideology, and alter ‘the memo-
ries of history’, and would not admit the real role the USSR played in the 
Second world war. Both groups were not capable of preserving their unifor-
mity, and the organizations representing them gradually vanished away.
Countries with their traditional interests in Latvia. Particularly Rus-
sia, the USA and germany should be mentioned as they were interested in 
several aspects of the Latvia situation: firstly, as the sphere of political influen-
ce, secondly, as the sphere of economic influence, and thirdly, as the potential 
ally in action of the external policy conducted by these countries. within the 
period of concern, especially Russia and the USA, were seeking to control the 
Latvian policy, and administrative reforms were the subject of their interest 
only as means of control. germany and Russia were also trying to gain the 
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economic control, especially over the energetics of Latvia. The direct influ-
ence was never openly declared, still it could be observed in the unveiled 
zeal of particular politicians to act in the interest of the superpowers. The-
se superpowers were mostly realizing their interests indirectly, including the 
mediation of non-governmental organizations and through the influence on 
the political parties.
Traditionally, also Sweden has interest in Latvia. Before the Russian in-
vasion a major part of the current territory of Latvia was included in Sweden; 
back then Riga was the biggest Swedish city. The Swedish banks came into 
Latvia along with other Scandinavian banks; Sweden paid special attention to 
their protection during the gait of the economic crisis 2008-2013.
The European Union bureaucrats. Similarly, to the States, also within 
the European Union the bureaucrats have become an independent power. In 
the EU only the European Commission is entitled to submit a draft law. The 
European Commission may also pass laws on its own, whereas their legal 
rank is of equal value with the ones accepted through the co-decision pro-
cedure of the European Parliament and the European Council. The Europe-
an Commissioners organize the procedure for making a political discussion. 
Although formally organization of public administration is the internal affair 
of every member state, the European Commission significantly impacts the 
processes. Formally, the European Commission is obliged to ensure that the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are observed (EU, 2012). In re-
ality, the officials in Brussels are developing a platform for enlarging their 
number, and thereby influencing the governments of the member states.
It should be taken in consideration that in numerous policy fields the in-
terests of different member states significantly differ, but the European Com-
mission seeks for the mean, supposedly good solution for all. Such a mean 
solution is not optimal particularly for any of 29 EU states. 
The groups of banks and insurers. The interests of the banks and the 
insurance companies in Latvia have merged. Initially, diverse rivalry existed 
among the banks before gradually two groups emerged: the Scandinavian 
banks and the banks linked to the Russian capital domestic banks, which 
were actively involved in lobbying for their interests, including financing the 
pre-election campaigns. The established system of banks and insurance com-
panies received a significant discount in the field of tax policy but, practically, 
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they were not financing the industry sector. Their profit interests were tar-
geted mainly at receiving advantages and introduction of mandatory state 
funded insurance for pensions and potentially – also for health. It was in the 
interests of banks to rule out any state influence over the capital market in 
case the state would still like to support the industry sector.  
Oligarchs in the political parties. within the people’s movement of Po-
pular Front of Latvia (PFL) a significant influence of the divisions was esta-
blished along with democratic procedure of decision taking – including active 
sectors’ committees. However, as it was discovered by a german sociologist 
Robert Michels (1915) some 100 years ago (according to the oligarchy iron 
law) every large democratic system develops bureaucracy first, and further 
the elite undertakes the leadership of the organization. Following the rapid 
period when a multi-party system was developed between 1992 and 1995, at 
the end of this period, a tendency of reforming the internal structure of the 
parties occurred (presidents of parties started co-opting half of the board, 
influence of the committees was decreasing, ruling decisions were transfer-
red to the respective fraction in the Saeima, etc.). In order to strengthen the 
power, short-term solutions were chosen seeking advantages in next elections 
(for instance a deformation of the proportional election system through in-
troduction of alterable lists, prohibitions in the laws of the political parties 
financing and pre-election financing that led to potential dependence of the 
political parties to the shadow economics, and likewise). 
The privatizers. Initially, privatization was the essential event of the 
transfer period which ensured irreversibility of the changes, so that the expe-
rience of centralized planned economics would be forgotten for good. The 
PFL had prospected ‘just’ privatization of certificates, which ultimately resul-
ted in acquiring of apartments or loss of the certificate value for those who 
already owned a home. In the first half of the 90s, an interest group develo-
ped, which decided to turn the privatization in favor of their own interests 
by developing a complicated system of legislation, stimulating the certificate 
market before real enterprises were there for sale against the certificates. It 
was continued by acquiring the majority stakes at the large state enterprises 
for the certificates obtained through the speculative operations. Finding the 
‘strategic investor’ for these enterprises was the subject of a contest. The do-
mestic privatizers impersonated to be foreigners (by registering in offshores) 
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and lobbied creating taxing advantaged to foreign investors. In Latvia, there 
still exist desirable enterprises of the national and local governments, there-
fore, the privatizers are lobbying laws to forbid the state or the local govern-
ments to conduct any business activities.
Denationalizers. At the very beginning of the independence period a 
date should have been determined to which the property restitution would 
have been applied. At the beginning of the wwII, after splitting Poland 
between the USSR and germany, the majority of the Baltic germans left La-
tvia. Denationalization was conducted in favor of those persons who over-
took these properties, especially in favor of the 1940 occupants. A powerful 
interest group named the Moscow Orthodox Church appeared that received 
as the properties of the Constantinople Orthodox Church in “restitution 
proceedings”. Later, it became essential that a beneficial would guarantee for 
those having succeeded in the denationalization process, thus the tenants of 
denationalized house ownership which were lobbied for.
Seekers of industry advantages. Next to the banks and insurers also 
other groups developed that were looking for advantages against other en-
trepreneurs in the field, or were trying to receive more favorable tax regime 
or a special support for the entire industry. Examples of such entrepreneurs 
were producers of renewable energy, owners of the large farm estates, orga-
nizers of gambling establishments, waste processors, and others in favor of 
whom legislation was lobbied to put other entrepreneurs and consumers at a 
disadvantage.
Seekers of regional advantages. Rivalry of the parties prior to the 
election stimulates splitting of the society. Having obtained the power, it is 
advantageous to facilitate consolidation of the society in order to fix the gains 
in the result of the elections. However, if the victory is not complete (in case 
of Latvia it became apparent when those coming to power in the local autho-
rities were not the same winning majority of the Saeima), the government 
is eager to provide support to one region against the others (for instance, by 
splitting the territory to prospective and non-prospective municipalities).
The  regional advantages showed themselves in organizing the processes 
of centralization and concentration, as Riga doctors’ endeavors to concentrate 
the health financing in Riga, and as closing the regional agencies during the 
crisis in favor of the ministries. 
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The lawyers of Latvia. In accordance with the public choice theory 
(Buchanan, 1960), lawyers as a professional group act in personal interests. 
Notwithstanding the basic function of the lawyers to apply the law for solving 
the life situations, they influence legislation processes in the status of experts; 
they themselves get elected to the legislation institutions and establish the 
case law in the Constitutional Court procedure. A significant role played by 
the lawyers themselves was to participate in the privatization process and 
draft ambiguous laws thereby aiding to achieve the private goals. The lawyers 
of the USSR era prepared their own replacement thereby by transferring par-
ticular values of the totalitarian period to the current legal system.
The bureaucrats of Latvia. In Latvia, alike other democracies, every new 
norm of law or the regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers enlarges the amount 
of the potential influence of the bureaucracy. The civil servants are gradually 
gaining confidence that without a total re-regulation and careful control of 
the independently developed norms the life would cease. Therefore, a certain 
alarm was caused by the decision made by the Cabinet of Ministers to develop 
‘small and effective governance’. In the further events the representatives of 
various ministries joined their efforts not to allow such statements regarding 
small governance put to question. 
The political parties of Latvia. In the multi-party system, rivalry among 
the political parties is an essential factor. At the period of concern a range 
of political force that used to constitute the government have completed a 
full cycle of development and already terminated (Popular Front of Latvia, 
Latvian way, People’s Party). Particularly significant influence on the state 
reforms, and the boarders being altered through the administrative territo-
rial reform, was exercised by the rivalry among the parties constituting the 
governing coalition.
The local governments in Latvia. Right after the Moscow coup of Au-
gust 1991, the initiative of PFL Latvian Association of Local and Regional go-
vernments (LALRg) was founded. On December 14 and 15 the foundation 
congress was organized where several decisions were made on the basis of 
determining development of powerful and united association (Pukis, 2010):
1. Only public entities – local authorities – as participants are allowed;
2. Voluntary entrance and seceding;
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3. Membership fee proportional to the non-earmarked budget income 
of the local authority;
4. Possibility to join also other associations to protect specific interests 
of the groups.
During the further development the minority guarantees were not allo-
wed to vote if more than a half of some type of the municipalities (prior to 
the Administrative territorial reform of 2009 there were 5 types) would deem 
such voting inacceptable. 
These conditions allowed developing a powerful organization that had 
its influence in all the stages of the public governance, and often impeded 
the endeavors of the central government to centralize its power and realize 
its reforms against the regional interests of Latvia. A stable system of formal 
consultations was developed that included submission to the Cabinet of Mi-
nisters drawn annual agreement and disagreement protocol along with the 
budget project (Pukis, 2010).
4.4. Reforms of Public Governance Model
The public governance models replaced one another in accordance with 
the political agenda that corresponded to the interests of those groups that 
were prevailing at the respective period. The interest groups that significant-
ly influenced the shape of the public governance are shown in Table 4.1. As 
the result of collaboration, confrontation and compromises of these interest 
groups the models of the public administration appropriate to the respective 
period were chosen (as shown in Table 4.2). 
The transitional period (1990–1993). The content of this period was 
a confrontation between the Latvian people (this was the only period when 
the interests of such a large group were brought forward) and the part of 
the inhabitants who wanted to prolong the period of occupation and assimi-
lation of the Latvians. The democratically disposed foreigners were the allies 
of the Latvian people. The reforms of 1990 and following were based on 1) 
democratization, 2) deoccupation, and 3) decolonization.
As the previous power had planned to won the local authority election 
first, and then exercise the obtained administrative resources at the parlia-
ment elections, the sequence of events turned out to be reverse in Latvia. The 
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idea of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union did not come true – PFL 
won the local authority election. That is why the previously mentioned three 
principles of reform may be added by the fourth one – decentralization. 
The victory in the following election of the Supreme Council did not 
provide control in the center. The USSR security services, USSR Army and 
structures of the Communist Party continued functioning – the situation 
could be described as diarchy. During the period of the central diarchy the 
properties, rights of decision and initially ½ of finances were handed to the 
local governments; and the democratic principles of rights were acting in pa-
rallel to the new legislation, thus the legislation of the USSR era was partly 
preserved. 
Table 4.1: Dominant groups and Their Interests during the Reform
Period Interest group Dominant interests of the group
1990–1993
Latvian people,
democratically minded 
foreigners
Restore the nation state and democracy, natio-
nalism and anti-communism.
Restore democracy, anti-communism.
Colonists, who wanted to 
preserve the Soviet Union
Save a united country from the former Soviet 
Union territory, defend the former and present 
communists and laudatory myths about com-
munism.
1993–1998
Economically active former 
participants of the Soviet 
nomenclature
Create national political elite, obtain political 
power and create hard transparent legislative 
environment to make it easier to hide at bene-
ficiary during the privatization process. Repla-
ce the civil service and make it a tool for the 
ruling elites’ interest implementation. Subtract 
power from the self-governments that was gi-
ven to them during the previous period. 
PFL and Latvian National 
Independence Movement 
members, who wanted to 
faster turn privatization to a 
personal benefit
Representatives of Latvian 
diaspora with economic 
interests in Latvia
Self-governments keep decentralization, achieve a clear division 
of functions between the state and the local 
governments.
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Period Interest group Dominant interests of the group
1998–2002
germany, the USA Add Latvia to the NATO and the EU.
Russian oligarchs, who are 
interested in Latvia
Repurchase nationalized or privatized property 
by obtaining a decisive influence in the sectors.
Latvian entrepreneurs – 
foreign capital importers
Improve legislative environment so as to make 
a reveal of the real beneficiaries impossible.
Russian security services Prepare the conditions for economic and poli-
tical destabilization.
International financial 
institutions
Develop national mandatory funded pension 
system, and compulsory health insurance system
Self-governments keep development funding from national me-
ans. Avoid forced merger of self-governments 
during the Administrative-territorial reform.
2002–2008
germany and Scandinavian 
businessmen with interests 
in Latvia
Speculate real estate, buy and sell businesses / 
enterprises.
Russian oligarchs, who are 
interested in market of Latvia 
Brussels bureaucrats Promote mobility (depopulation of Latvia).
International financial 
institutions
Maximize the state compulsory funded pensi-
on scheme as much as possible.
Latvian officials and 
politicians, who saw the 
continuation of a career in 
Brussels
Take the initiative for stricter rules which than 
the EU needs to implement in Latvia.
European super powers 
politicians
Slow down production development in La-
tvian.
Latvian lawyers Ensure the interests groups’ demands and high 
salary. 
Self-government Save existence of national investments. 
Decrease of spreading over-regulation (nor-
mativism).
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Period Interest group Dominant interests of the group
2008–2016
Banks that specialize in 
profit from unsafe lending
Obtain state funds, continue to withdraw the 
capital from Latvia, eliminate state-owned 
banks.
Domestic and foreign 
entrepreneurs, who want 
to earn by privatizing and 
reselling
Privatize profitable state and self-government 
enterprises that have not been privatized so far. 
Large farms owners Obtain state support to buy out the small agri-
cultural plots of land.
International financial 
capital representatives
Maintain and develop state mandatory funded 
pension system, and introduce a funded system 
of health insurance 
Achieve public support for bankrupting banks.
Ruling political parties Introduce censorship, control expenditures of 
self- governments. 
Self-government Maintain the autonomy of self-government 
personnel.
keep development support for the whole terri-
tory (all local governments) of Latvia.
withdraw country from the internal deva-
luation policy.
Source: own compilation.
Table 4.2: Features of Public Administration Model Developed during the Re-
form Periods
Years
Features of 
public adminis-
tration reform
Civil service 
development
Organization of 
functions
Administrati-
ve process
1990–1993
Model of mini-
mal administra-
tion.
Decentralization, 
democratization,
denationalization 
and
de-occupation.
Partial lustra-
tion. 
Legislation 
on the unified 
work in both 
public and 
private sector.
Liquidation of cen-
tralized planning.
Decentralization:
Fiscal, property, 
administrative, 
and staff autonomy 
of the self-govern-
ments.
Administrative 
disputes are 
being solved 
as a competi-
tion between 
persons and 
institutions (on 
behalf of the 
state or a self-
government) 
under the civil 
procedure.
105 Public AdministrAtion reforms in lAtviA (1990–2016)
Years
Features of 
public adminis-
tration reform
Civil service 
development
Organization of 
functions
Administrati-
ve process
1993–1998
Traditional mod-
el of bureaucracy 
with features 
of Max weber’s 
bureaucracy.
Phasing in-
troduction of 
normativism, 
increase of the 
laws in volume 
and a number 
of exceptional 
provisions. 
Politically neu-
tral career civil 
service, 12 
categories and 
compulsory 
exams, specific 
social protec-
tion, particular 
disciplinary 
process
without 
distinguish-
ing discredit 
of sufficient 
funding. 
Partial centraliza-
tion (capital, edu-
cation, health).
Proposals to 
implement a 
merger of self-
governments 
without decentral-
ization of power 
and finances that 
was declined by 
self-governments.
Administrative 
process typical 
for the conti-
nental Europe 
was introduced 
in institutions.
Civil process 
is continued 
in the court 
where the 
parties are 
competing.
1998–2002
Introduction of 
New Public Ad-
ministration ele-
ments (system of 
agencies, admin-
istrative contracts, 
management 
contracts, result, 
and customer-
oriented manage-
ment). 
Concentration 
of controlling 
and repressive 
structure,  and 
bureaucratization 
preconditions.
Decision on 
a large civil 
service.
Liquidation of 
the state civil 
service admin-
istration.
Instead of the 
career civil 
service, the 
civil service 
was opened 
(competition 
instead of 
exams). 
Sprit of the 
responsibilities 
(separating policy 
developers, policy 
decision-makers, 
policy implement-
ers, observers, 
controllers,  and 
punishments 
implementers).
Normativism 
and unsuccessful 
attempts to merge 
self-governments.
Preparation 
and adop-
tion of the  
Administrative 
Procedure Act 
by the parlia-
ment, whiche-
liminated the 
competition 
principle.
A specific 
disciplinary 
process for the 
public officials 
was intro-
duced.
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Years
Features of 
public adminis-
tration reform
Civil service 
development
Organization of 
functions
Administrati-
ve process
2002–2008
Legal nihilism 
in violation 
of norms of 
international 
contracts and 
conscious draft-
ing of controver-
sial laws.
Administrative-
territorial reform 
(ATR) distortion, 
giving up goals 
and reducing the 
reform to the 
merger.
Normativism as 
the means for 
“implementa-
tion of the EU 
requirements”.
A large, non-
motivated 
legally civil 
service was 
established.
Salaries of 
the civil 
servants did 
not increase 
almost for the 
entire period, 
although the 
wages in the 
economy mar-
ket increased 
three times. 
The State Admin-
istration Structure 
Act was imple-
mented, contrary 
to the international 
agreements of Lat-
via applied toyed to 
introduce a single 
hierarchical admin-
istration ignoring 
the global and EU 
commitments as 
well as existence of 
the regional and lo-
cal governments.
Permanent jobs 
were created due 
to a complex 
legislation, result-
ing in a potentially 
confusing division 
of competences.
The Ad-
ministrative 
Procedure Act 
was adopted, 
which did not 
presume the 
competition 
any more.
The institution 
used principles 
that were at-
tributed to the 
court.
Concentration 
of the minis-
tries’ and agen-
cies’ internal 
procedures.
2008-2016
Efforts to set up a 
minimal admin-
istration, whilst 
maintaining a 
high level of 
overregulation. 
Introduction of 
unified motiva-
tion system.
A struggle about 
privatized enter-
prises and land.
Shift of the pow-
er to the Council 
of Coalition.
One more civil 
service reform 
is prepared; its 
introduction 
was postponed 
due to the dis-
ability to agree 
on the level of 
concentration.
Repeated 
attempts of 
the self-
governments’ 
integration to 
the state civil 
service.
Local administra-
tive territorial 
reform, regional 
establishment is 
postponement ex-
pressing a negative 
attitude.
Legislative spatial 
division of 
perspective and 
non-perspective 
territories.
Concentration.
Bureaucracy of 
administrative 
process.
Discussions 
on introdu-
cing various 
disciplinary 
proceedings. 
Source: own compilation.
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The Republic of Latvia, alike the events in 1918, was derived from the 
local authorities. On April 21, 1990, in the Daugava Stadium a convention of 
all level deputies took place, which was dominated by the deputies of the local 
and regional governments who with more than 8000 votes against less than 
100 votes assigned the re-elected Supreme Council to declare the restoration 
of independence (Pukis, 2015). Based on the mandate given by the deputies of 
local authorities the Independence Declaration of May 4, 1990 was adopted. 
In order to realize transition from the totalitarian system of the centrali-
zed planned economics characteristic to the occupation regime, the following 
activities were conducted: 
a. Introduction of the national currency;
b. Communalization of the state properties;
c. Privatization against vouchers;
d. Restitution (return of the property and land to the owners at the date 
of the USSR occupation);
e. withdrawal of the occupation army;
f. Lustration (restriction of the political rights for the persons actively 
supporting the occupation regime);
g. Joining the international organizations and international agreements;
h. Supporting the local governments to eliminate the system of executi-
ve committees (vertical hierarchy was terminated);
i. Elimination of multi-layered budget (reaching financial autonomy of 
local authorities);
j. Preserving of several components of the totalitarian system, inclu-
ding only partial implementation of the principle of subsidiarity;
k. Partial implementation of the principle of minimal governance.
Simultaneously, the transition from a bipolar system to multipolar sys-
tem was taking place, the Latvian Popular Front was gradually losing its si-
gnificance, and the political parties that would participate in the 5th Saeima 
election were being created. 
The dominating domestic interest groups at this stage are shown in Table 
4.1. In Latvia, alike the Baltic and the Central Europe countries being under 
the influence by the USSR, mostly the external factors affected the result of 
the internal process – mainly the Moscow coup of August 1991 during which 
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the restoration of the orthodox communist regime failed.  
Overall, this period may be characterized as a model of minimum gover-
nance with high level of decentralization. This choice was determined by the 
proportion of forces and necessity to develop a new order from its beginning 
after 55 years of totalitarian regime. 
Pseudo-restoration (1993-1998). Restoration was formally content of 
that period in force of constitution (Satversme) and democratic order of repu-
blic proclaimed in 18 November of 1918. That purpose was only partly imple-
mented because the interests in 1993 were different from the interests in 1922. 
Change of the ruling political forces took place. Prior to the 5th Saeima 
elections a new political elite was emerging, a club principle was introducing 
itself. The leading force of the time being ‘The Latvian way’ grew out from the 
‘Club 21’. In the meantime, the historic politically influential organizations got 
their activities restored – the masons and the student fraternities. Participation 
in organizations, like the Rotary Club and the Lions Club, came into fashion. 
Being a member of a single club system made easier establishing coali-
tions and the development of elitism in the newly founded and restored po-
litical parties. As shown in Table 4.1, interest groups had a task determined 
– to ensure process through which the properties of the USSR period ended 
up in their hands as the private property. Opposite of the initial minimalism 
in the law and governance antipodal tasks moved forward. For this purpose, a 
different legislation and different public governance were needed. The Cons-
titutional Law and the Civil Law were reinstated in power, a new wording 
of the Cabinet of Ministers Structure Law was drawn, the initial version of 
which did not contain a detailed characterization of the governance referring 
the State Civil Service Law to be adopted soon (Saeima, 1994a), and became 
a tool of the public governance reform.
At the end of 1993, the Ministry for State Reforms was founded in the 
temporary regulation (the Cabinet of Ministers, 1993) of which the depar-
tments of local municipal reforms and government reforms were envisaged. 
It is worth mentioning that the local municipal reform is seen as the state 
reform in compliance with the USSR tradition. 
Essential elements for realization of the dominating interests were the 
Anticorruption Law (Saeima, 1995) and the Law on Financing of Political 
Organizations (Parties) (Saeima, 1995). The former provided a choice among 
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different models of combatting corruption trying to invent as high norma-
tivity as possible, and doubling several controlling institutions. Actually, 
such policy (even though this approach is popular within the majority of EU 
countries) leads to rapid growth of the potentially corruptible officials (Pukis, 
2004). The higher is the corruption level, the cheaper one can realize one’s pri-
vate interests which otherwise would be difficult to ground. The later deter-
mined a disproportionally small maximum amount of party financing in case 
of a separate official financing body. This norm was envisaged as a tactic tool 
for decreasing the rivals’ prospects in the following elections, but in fact, it 
strengthened the connection between the ruling elite and the shadow econo-
mics by stimulating various schemes of circumventing the law for providing 
finances for the activities of the political parties.
Overall, this period may be characterized as the model of traditional 
administration within the framework of which the centralization process was 
commenced by seeking return to the central power, and the competences that 
were given over to the local governments in the previous period. 
New Public Administration (1998-2002). As it is shown in Table 4.1, 
many interest groups were interested in the changes. Though the lawyers had 
carefully worked on legalizing the privatization before, the brand new elite 
was not fully confident that the privatized assets would not be taken away. 
Therefore, the privatized assets had to be sold and the obtained means had 
to be transferred offshores. The time had come to involve foreign investors to 
much wider extent; the entrepreneurs from Russia, the USA and Scandinavia 
started to understand their interests in Latvia more clearly. 
In order to substantiate these changes, such foreign statements were 
arranged that would facilitate the changes required by the local elite. Inclu-
ding – the principles of NPM that had become globally popular by then. An 
exceptional attention was paid to the external form of NPM – agencies were 
established, governance contracts were concluded with the agencies’ mana-
gers, and governance contracts were drafted by the civil servants. It made no 
obstruction to the spirit of NPM – by ejecting application of entrepreneur-
like methods within the public governance.
Introducing the elements of NPM was not the goal of the contemporarily 
ruling elite. Although at the moment the consultants from the New Zealand ac-
ted in Latvia, the most essential elements of the system were never introduced. 
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In parallel to this, Total Quality Control was introduced that facilitated burea-
ucratization of the system and delayed NPM introduction. The Administrative 
Procedure Law was adopted that envisaged a complicated system of adminis-
trative act, and made rapid and effective decision-making nearly impossible. 
However, the conclusive element for the temporality of NPM was the 
politicians’ disinclination to gather, summarize, analyze, and publish infor-
mation on the achieved results. In order to preserve the possibility to run 
the state or the municipality like an enterprise, it is essential that the success 
and failures are objectively assessed. Overall, the reasons of NPM failure in 
Latvia were similar to those in other countries where the NPM ideas were 
gradually losing their popularity. Another reason that made success of NPM 
barely impossible was the tendency to establish a single procedure that should 
have equally regarded different central government sectors and also local go-
vernments. It would have been of similar failure if all the private enterprises 
had been managed in the same manner by providing similar structures and 
equal procedures. This would mean that a small and a large enterprise, an 
enterprise both in the beginning of its lifecycle and in the end thereof; an en-
terprise in the stable market and at rapidly changing market conditions would 
be managed in exactly the same way. It is utterly obvious that in such case 
the productivity would decrease. However, a single procedure was proposed 
both by the economists who had been taught by the values of the centralized 
planning, and the European Commission which was also more interested in 
unification of the procedures than efficiency of the EU budget use.  
Joining NATO and the EU (2002-2008). As it is shown in Table 4.1, also 
during this period other interest groups moved to the forefront, and were see-
king to overtake or strengthen their influence. During this period, initiatives 
were lost by the long-term ruling party ‘The Latvian way’. At the end of the 
period, the life cycle of the People’s Party was approaching its termination. 
New political forces were being organized with a purpose of redistributing 
power and influence. 
It is also of importance, that the people’s expectations in the 1990s had 
not been achieved to a great extent. Therefore, by replacing the ruling parties 
and starting new reforms elite could sustain the balance and the social peace.
One of the preconditions for the new member states to join the EU was 
the capacity of enduring the pressure of goods, services, and capital from the 
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old member states after joining. This was the aspect wherein Latvia was prepa-
red worst of all. The haste was to be grounded by unwillingness to stay within 
the sphere of the Russian influence but such haste affected the well-being of 
the population. That was why Latvia was eager to demonstrate maximum di-
ligence in adoption of the legislation and fulfilment of various, sometimes for 
the Latvian circumstances, destructive requirements. 
So that even a bigger diligence of adoption of the legislation would be si-
mulated, it happened more than seldom that the laws of previous period were 
adopted under new titles, for instance – the Corruption Combatting Law (Sa-
eima, 1995) was renamed Law on Combating Conflict of Interests (Saeima, 
2002). However, fundamental changes were also introduced, especially this 
regards the Law on the State Administration Structure (Saeima, 2002). 
If the Administrative Procedure Law (Saeima, 2001) let the way for a 
sharp growth of normativism (overregulation), then the State Administration 
Structure Law (Saeima, 2002) marked a radical turn towards centralization. 
The harmful part of the State Administration Structure Law was featured in 
the title itself – instead of term ‘public administration’ a different term of ‘state 
administration’ was used in this law. And within this ‘state administration’ a 
joint hierarchy was postulated. Thus the grounds of an incorrect reading of 
the Article 58 of the Constitution were being employed (Pukis, 2010). 
Thereby the State Administration System Law ignores the shared sovere-
ignty that existed in Latvia long before in accordance with the international 
agreements of Latvia. During the gait of adopting the law certain compromise 
with the Latvian Association of Local and Regional governments (LALRg) 
has been reached by referring to the regulation of the subordination of the 
municipalities to ‘the Law of Self governments’, still the further course of 
events shows that the fighting centralists use State Administration System 
Law as a flag both against the fundamental rights of the local governments 
and the human rights.  
Overall, this period can be characterized by a term of Neo-weberianism. 
The values of the previous period have been rejected in order to give way to 
unlimited growth of the bureaucracy power.
Internal devaluation (2008-2016). The crisis was caused by the inter-
national financial institutions that wrongly suggested combating inflation 
(Pukis, 2010). The commencement of the world crisis Latvia faced being in 
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already burdensome economic situation when the Scandinavian banks had 
slowed down crediting of economics. Therefore, deciding in favor of even 
tougher austerity seemed to be a logic continuation of the started reforms. 
The old EU member states felt enticement to utter Latvia as a pilot project for 
possible solution of the greek problems. 
The International Monetary Foundation (IMF) and the European Com-
mission drove Latvia into debt quickly. within couple of years Latvia reached 
49% of the public debt compared to the gross domestic product started at 9%. 
The European Commission would not allow to use even the tiniest budget 
deficit for co-financing the EU funds absorption by forcing the government 
to sharply reduce the budget expenditure. As a result, the economic shrink 
in Latvia reached the extent never experienced in the world since the 1930s. 
In such circumstances the central government and local governments, 
unwillingly though, had to return to the minimum governance policy.
The core opponent to the government at this period was the LALRg that 
suggested performing more active measures of facilitating the economics, 
immediate absorption of the EU funds at accelerated amount, more rapid he-
ating of the domestic market and facilitating restructuring of the economics, 
putting productivity as the priority instead of the previous accent on the em-
ployment, rejection of such useless expenditures as financing of the mandato-
ry state-funded pensions. As the main directions of the public administration 
reform LALRg suggested decentralization and deconcentration, resignation 
of overregulation, and reduction of the number of civil servants along with 
reduction of the regulation provided by the law and the regulations of the 
Cabinet of Ministers. 
The ministers partly agreed upon these statements of position, still they 
could not bear the bureaucracy pressure. During the previous periods, the 
bureaucracy had already become an independent power as exercised both 
by the European Commission and the State Chancellery and the ministries. 
That was why the direction towards a small and effective state adminis-
tration was politically accepted along with intensification of the support for 
economics but the bureaucracy succeeded in compensating these decisions 
by centralizing and compensative measures as well as sabotaging the decisi-
ons taken by the Cabinet of Ministers. 
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while the rest of the population was experiencing decrease of wealth 
caused by the economic crisis, part of the nation elite was occupied with anot-
her matter – how by pleading the crisis to privatize those profitable state en-
terprises that were still owned by the state?
Due to the discords within the leading coalition, total privatization was 
unsuccessful. Also the matter of enhanced governance of the remaining state 
and municipal capital companies was being solved at the lowest pace possible 
and with recognizable difficulties. However, some decisions concerning pri-
vatization were successfully implemented, including the one for privatization 
the ‘Citadele’ bank thereby making Latvia dependent to the policy of forei-
gn (mostly Scandinavian) banks. Latvia lost its possibility of the government 
intervention in the case of crediting in Latvia slows down and the capital is 
placed abroad. 
In general, this period may be characterized by the tendency to return 
minimum governance along with disability to perform the needed reduction 
of regulation and decentralization.
4.5. Organization of PA Functions
The signature elements of organizing the functions include the follo-
wing: observing the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality in the re-
lationship among the private sector, the local governments, the state, and EU; 
observing the principle of the local government (Council of Europe, 1985), 
the public powers right to property and entrepreneurship; and tendencies of 
concentration or dispersion. In accordance with the aforesaid tendencies and 
the governance models (sometimes with some inertia) also the forms of go-
vernance building changed.  
The first period (1990–1993) model was featured by minimum state 
institution and decentralization. During this period the principle of subsidia-
rity was observed better than afterwards: communalization was the first stage 
of privatization and denationalization; core responsibilities for withdrawal of 
the Russian Army were entrusted to the local and regional governments. 
By 1993, autonomy of the local and regional governments was develo-
ping. The financial autonomy was being implemented in two stages: first, by 
abolishing multi-staged budgeting (since 1992 the local government budgets 
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had stopped being a component of the regional government budgets; and the 
regional budget had stopped being a component of the state budget); second, 
by introducing a stable income basis along with founding a stable financial 
equalization system (since the budget 1995). 
The administrative autonomy was established by eliminating the executive 
committees (since 1992 the ministries had no possibilities to release orders to 
the local government institutions or structural units, the local executive power 
was accountable to the local council only. The rights of local government to 
found institutions or enterprises to its own discretion were recognized. 
The local personnel autonomy was not disputed, the state was not no-
minating any local government officials, allowing agreeing over only several 
officials (for instance, school principals). 
In practical politics, a contest between the central power and the local 
governments was being played in terms of introducing a new judicial order, 
in certain cases, the voluntary initiatives brought forward by the local go-
vernments. Local and regional authorities outpaced similar decisions taken 
by the central government, i.e. the parliament or the Supreme Council, by 
months or years.
However, in this period the central bureaucracy was preparing itself for 
a revenge, and it ended up with centralization of Riga (1993-1994) and edu-
cation field (1993). At this stage already, those hoping to establish the ruling 
elite were striving to direct the property transformation matters in a favorable 
way. Therefore, the privatization process was signed into about 20 various 
laws, thus creating an unclear and contradictory environment. This process 
was assisted both by the lawyers (who were founding their prospects of good 
revenue in future) and by the privatizers-to-be.
The second period (1993–1998) model is characterized by deconcentra-
tion in the sectors. Every single ruling political force was developing its ‘own’ 
economy, concept of the state being an enterprise was gradually spreading, 
ministries were divided and governance functions were handed over to the 
state-owned enterprises).
During this period, every ministry was separately elaborating its own 
administration model. For instance, the Ministry of Transport developed 
small scale industry departments with a small number of the employees while 
the main analytical and administrative capacity was being concentrated in the 
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enterprises ruled by the ministry. Such a system allows reaching high efficien-
cy but it is subjected to the minister of the sector, and is not coordinated with 
the Cabinet of Ministers and other ministries. 
An interesting example of fragmentation and decentralization is pro-
vided by the health care organization of the time. The primary and secon-
dary health care systems in each region (26 units) were variously organized 
by the enterprises owned by the self-governments, and were called ‘sickness 
insurance funds’. Not only the differences in nuances were present but diffe-
rent health care organization systems were simultaneously tested in different 
territories. The regional self-governments were competing over the most su-
ccessful model. The tertiary health care systemwas organized by the Ministry 
of welfare according to single principles. 
The reforms of this period partially comply with the governance princi-
ples as set out by Max weber:
1. Arranging the functions of the officials and the institutions in accordance 
with certain restrictions (weber, 1947: 330):
One of the problems faced by the government during the reform was 
raised by the existence of powerful and independent local authorities. One 
possibility would be to recognize the administrative sovereignty (Council of 
Europe, 1985), the other – to perceive the local authority as a component of 
the state (thereby continuing the tradition of totalitarian state like during the 
period of kārlis Ulmanis’ authoritarianism and the periods of the german 
and the USSR occupation). 
weber does not link his bureaucracy theory to the doctrine of centrali-
zed state, since the bureaucracy is developed in favor of a cooperative group 
(state, local government, or large-scale private corporation). 
when discussing in the Saeima the 1994 Self-governments Law, a 
contest was taking place between those two concepts. The LALRg was offe-
ring to provide in a single part of the single law all the autonomous functions 
of local governments. Then any resident or entrepreneur would have the pos-
sibility to see an exclusive list of autonomous responsibilities of local govern-
ment. Being afraid of the continuous growth of the local government’s role, 
the legislators refused such a solution – a clear division of the state and the 
local authority’s functions was not achieved. 
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Also the opposite – a list of state functions was not elaborated, thereby 
the factual situation occurring was that the autonomous functions of local 
and regional governments were ‘partly acknowledged’ but the legal status of 
the rest (delegated by the state) was disputable.
2. Clearly defined bureaucratic  organization based on the hierarchy (weber, 
1947: 330)
This idea has never been fully implemented in Latvia as (except during 
the transition period), since only multi-party coalitions have been in po-
wer. In such a coalition the ministry that is run by a minister representing 
the party is used as an administrative resource within the rivalry among the 
coalition partners. Therefore, the competition over expanding one’s compe-
tencies cannot decrease.
Initially, also the power of the Prime Minister was rather conditional 
– basically he was no more than a chairman of the Cabinet meeting as the 
resources were governed by the sectorial ministerial bodies with a respective 
influence. Only later the coordination among the sectors was improving.
Two subjection forms were developed, i.e. subordination and supervisi-
on. As a compromise it was intended that the self-governments are subjected 
to a soft form of supervision that is embedded in the Self-governments Law 
(Saeima, 1994). 
Thereby the government was seeking to establish a ‘single hierarchic 
system’ that, in its substance, contradicted the European Charter of Local 
Self-government. 
During this period a formal negotiation system between the Cabinet of 
Ministers and the LALRg was established. The consultations were taking pla-
ce during entire year, and included negotiations with all the ministries and 
some crucial state agencies. Each session of such negotiations covered a wide 
range of matters, and resulted in signing about 20 negotiation protocols, in-
cluding the core matters of the further reforms in the state and the correspon-
ding sectors or industries. The procedure was concluded by the main docu-
ment – the annual Protocol of Agreement and Disagreement between the 
Cabinet of Ministers and the LALgR wherein the main statement of positions 
of the both parties on the essential matters of the budget and reforms as well 
as a range of positions upon which agreement had been reached.
At the end of this period an ample centralization of health care (1997) 
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was performed, and the direct regional election was eliminated (1997). Ho-
wever, the regional governments were not eliminated due to the resistance 
demonstrated by the local governments (Latvia got indirectly elected regional 
councils by the local government representatives). 
The third period (1998–2002) model demonstrated a wide esta-
blishment of agencies and a continuous privatization of the enterprises pre-
viously owned by the state and local government. Formally, the New Public 
governance (NPg) was introduced but the result measuring system that 
would have been needed for evaluating the performance of numerous agen-
cies was never developed.
Actually, many institutions of public governance (particularly those es-
tablished before in the form of state companies) conformed with the concept 
of the NPg to a greater extent than those developed in accordance with the 
Public Agencies Law (Saeima, 2001a). By needlessly providing for the public 
agencies the financial governance procedure equal to the direct authority go-
vernment institutions, whereas the very sense of these institutions was dimi-
nished. Notwithstanding the existence of numerous attributes of NPg, the 
Latvian public agencies turned out to be utterly inappropriate for an effective 
economic activity. 
Several functional audits (the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of 
Economics) were conducted purposing optimization of these institutions’ 
performance. In the end of the period the State Chancellery decided to take 
the initiative to coordinate different sectors and optimize the civil servant 
work. The Department of the Policy Coordination was founded to develop a 
single policy of state reforms.  
This period was characterized by the central government fighting against 
the cooperation amongst the local governments. The Law on the Administra-
tive Territorial Reform was adopted (Saeima, 1998) wherein, by the pressure 
performed by the LALRg, cooperation was deemed equal to uniting. Howe-
ver, the central government would not withstand and was devoting further 10 
years to conquering cooperation in any realm (Pukis, 2010).
The fourth period (2002–2008) model was characterized by a gradual 
elimination of the NPM components by addressing bureaucracy. within this 
period a sharp growth of controlling and repressive functions was being obser-
ved. The Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau was established, the 
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State Audit Office was becoming more active and working to a wider scope. 
The foreign-funded civil societies (NgOs) were interfering with the state 
and the local policy, including the NgOs such as Delna, Providus and others. 
A certain witch-hunt atmosphere was introduced within small-scale non-go-
vernmental organizations along with the state control structures giving lots of 
talks about different offences but no real evidence was usually gathered. Ho-
wever, in some cases of corruption also verdicts on the quality were achieved. 
Due to inertia, a wide range system of agencies and relevant legislation 
still existed in this period, which was composed of the laws and the regulations 
adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers so that the agencies would have something 
to do. Every ministry sought creating as many institutions as possible.
The endeavors to conduct a single policy of ministries were being conti-
nued. Every ministry alone was no longer allowed to improve its performan-
ce – it had to be done in a centralized manner under the leadership of the 
previously established Policy Coordination Department. Each ministry was 
required to elaborate a strategic plan for the respective ministry that was not a 
performance improvement plan for the institutions but were the development 
guidelines of the governed sub-sectors from the perspective of the correspon-
ding industries.
 During this period a compulsory administrative territorial reform was in-
tensely being prepared. The government was gradually refusing previously 
adopted principles of the reform:
1. In 2003, cooperation ceased being seen as a form of the local reforms 
(the cooperation methods widely employed in France and germany 
would not be allowed in Latvia);
2. In 2005, the section about establishing the regional self-governments 
was excluded from the law. The requirement of the subsidiarity prin-
ciple was also excluded along with it;
3. During the reform all the local government were visited numerous 
times, and several uniting scenarios were discussed by granting the 
state block grant to each local government voluntary uniting, a total 
of about 150 million euros were spent on achieving this goal).
The reaction of the society to the reform stayed negative. In all the sur-
veys performed in the period 1999–2009, the majority of the respondents 
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showed no support to the reform. The most of residents’ trust to local politi-
cians was given namely in the smallest rural and urban territories.
The fifth period (2008–2016) model has been characterized by further 
centralization and concentration, and by several attempts to reduce the state 
administration. 
IMF, when granting the loan to Latvia, was in exchange requiring structural 
reforms. For this purpose, the national Functional Audit Commission was es-
tablished (presided by the Head of the State Chancellery) which was supposed 
to manage the state administration minimizing procedure, and the Reform 
Management group (chaired by the Prime Minister) which was working on 
the single structural reform plan, and particularly – on the reduction of the 
budget expenditures. One of the authors of this chapter was representing the 
LALRg with the rights to vote in both structures of the reform management.
The direction of the institutional reforms was uniting the agencies or 
incorporating thereof into the composition of the ministries. This badly inf-
luenced the regions as the management of the industries was concentrated 
in Riga by sharply reducing employment in the regions. In the previous pe-
riods, an even allocation of governance institutions along the entire territory 
had been one of the most effective instruments of the regional support. As a 
result, the number of nearly 200 state agencies was reduced to some dozens. 
The local governments also had to decrease the amount of the services as 
their budget was radically cut. As the amount of the functions was not redu-
ced, there were attempts to transfer them to a shortened working week so that 
no functional unity would be lost.
In the process of ‘cutting’ the budget consultations with the social par-
tners were exercised. The Reform Management group was initially composed 
of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finances, one representative of the 
Saeima, and two representatives were sent by each of LALRg (Latvian asso-
ciation of local and regional governments), the Employers’ Confederation of 
Latvia, the Latvian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (employers), and 
the Free Trade Union Confederation of Latvia (employees). Regarding the 
matters to be examined also other ministers, the President of the Academy of 
Sciences and the representatives of the Alliance of Non-governmental Orga-
nizations were invited to the consultative meetings.
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The social partners were submitting their proposals in the extent to 
which the budget expenditures should have been decreased per the industries 
according to the priorities of the crisis period. A request to execute such a di-
vision was offered also to the parties represented in the Saeima but the parties 
avoided the political responsibility included. The proposals of the social par-
tners, after being discussed with and corrected by the government, provided 
the basis for cutting the expenses and minimizing the budget deficiency. Pur-
suant to these budget decisions the structures of the ministries were decreased 
as well.
In this period, following the initiative of the local governments, the mat-
ter of combating the normativism came into the political agenda. The State 
President (2012) also took the side of the local governments. However, the 
reaction on the part of the bureaucracy showed that the society was not ready 
for such a way of thinking. Although formally the ruling combat normativism 
was being fulfilled (plan was drafted and completed, reports were submitted), 
there has been no signs of a true wish to diminish the overregulation so far. 
It is not possible to create a smaller state administration if overregulation 
has not been diminished at first hand. Organizations like the State Revenue 
Service, the State Audit Office, the Competition Council, the Corruption Pre-
vention, the Combating Bureau and others are especially eager to increase the 
number of their employees and the amount of their functions. In parallel to 
this, a growing overregulation of the respective fields has been developing.
Following the local government election of 2009, the only institutions of 
some regional authority currently are the 5 planning regions. The planning 
regions have no more than some functions provided by the law but they still 
possess the main attributes of the regional government – an elected (even 
though indirectly through a two-step procedure) decision-making power, 
executive power is established by and accountable to the elected councils; 
rights to adopt normative acts of general nature, their own budget that they 
adopt on their own discretion, rights to issue administrative acts, boarders 
established by the law. The legal status of the planning regions is regulated by 
the Regional Development Law (Saeima, 2002).
Upon the reform concerned the number of the local governments has 
been reduced by five times compared to the number of the local govern-
ments in the beginning of the reform. Currently, there are 110 municipali-
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ties (local governments with attached rural territory) and 9 republic cities 
(local governments with no attached rural territory). The competencies of 
the local governments are the same, except for the city of Riga which has 
some additional specific functions of the capital. 
The functions of the regional governments were divided amongst the 
local governments and the planning regions (Pukis, 2015). In order to pre-
serve the illusions that some decisions may be taken in the cities and the 
parishes of the pre-reform period, the institutions of the municipal city 
and the municipal parish authority have been established. These authorities 
have been authorized to have less functions year by year, and they were 
made accountable to the local governments administration. 
The novelty of this period has been the aspirations of the central go-
vernments to split the local governments by opposing the interests of diffe-
rent local governments and acquiring some political dividends at the follo-
wing local or Saeima elections. On the grounds for such conduct the con-
cept of development centers has been employed. In the national planning 
documents, the local governments have been divided in several groups. 9 
republic cities have been presented with the higher status, thereby creating 
certain advantages for these governments in receiving the state investments 
(from the EU funds actually). 21 municipalities with the regional develo-
pment center (previous city as centre of post-reform municipality) have been 
presented with the intermediate status, and also these local governments 
have some advantages granted. Finally, 89 municipalities have been deemed 
non-perspective and to receive the state support to a much smaller extent.
The division into such categories is based on the political motives. 6 out 
of 9 republic cities are the receivers of the financial equalization fund. The 
remaining 3 receive funds according to the continuous income per capita, 
and pursuant to the execution of the budget for 2015 were placed as 4th, 
11th, and 18th on the list. 9 local governments of the first ten are formally 
– if according to the continuous income per capita – and supposedly non-
perspective ones. Real sustainability is opposite to that which is formally 
recognized by the central government.
However, having implemented the active policy of ‘divide and conqu-
er’, the leading coalition managed to compensate a total defeat in the local 
government election of 2013. It must be indicated that even though the Pe-
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ople’s Party was the main organizer of the administrative territorial reform 
at its final stage, it was dismissed from the Saeima in the following election 
and has eliminated itself by now. 
It must be also indicated that Latvia was not the only state where the 
crisis was employed by those backing centralization. Such tendencies could 
be observed in most EU countries. 
4.6. Civil Service
The content of the First period (1990–1993) was best complied by non-
existence of a special status of a civil servant. The USSR nomenclature was 
losing its powers, all the employees entered the labor market as being equal. 
Initially, neither the state nor local government executed massive redundan-
cies of the USSR nomenclature, save the active supporters who were actively 
positioning themselves as opponents of the Latvian national independence. 
Most of the professionals were preserved in the service. It regarded even 
the USSR era structures like State Security Office, the Police, courts, and the 
Prosecutor’s office. 
Along with eliminating of the executive committees and establishing 
the boards (the executive committees were actually subjected to the minis-
tries, the boards – only and exclusively to the council), specialists of non-
nomenclature ranks got involved in the local governmental work: teachers, 
scientists, doctors, engineers who invested their professional experience to 
complete the local authorities.
Although the culture of collegial decisions was being preserved, the in-
dividual responsibility of a state administration employee was growing at the 
time. There were no longer any restrictions to be a member of a political mo-
vement or a political party.
The reforms of the Second period (1993–1998) created the civil service 
that has been developing ever since. The reform conducted by the Ministry 
of the State Reforms in charge of Māris gailis was partially based on the Max 
weber’s principles like the following: 
1. Specialization in certain fields of competency and labor distribution 
(weber, 1947: 330): The initial reform was designed on the basis of 
universalization not specialization. A civil service of the ‘mandarin 
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type’ was developed that did not envisaged specialists of particular 
fields but universal experts of legislation and rules. The ministries 
also initially had a large number of functions that were subjected to 
no specialization in the beginning. As an exception should be regar-
ded any termination of reforms started in the previous periods (for 
instance, the Privatization Agency that was established in 1994 as a 
state-owned joint stock company right away). 
2. Separating the property rights of the resources used in the adminis-
tration from the property of the officials (weber, 1947: 330): Such an 
order did not need to be invented as it already existed through the 
entire occupation period. Also dependence of remuneration on the 
performance is to some extent linked to this choice. In general, the 
concept that the officials’ remuneration to be dependent on their per-
formance was rejected in Latvia.
3. System of the remuneration based on the ranking (weber, 1947: 331): 
The initial concept was to determine different remuneration for diffe-
rent ranks (which was done via adoption of the regulations issued by 
the Cabinet of Ministers), still the wish to develop the civil service 
ended up in a contradiction with the financial capacity of the sta-
te budget. The system of the remuneration according to the ranking 
was only partly realized as when adopting the recurrent state budgets, 
they were always short of means. An essential part was played by po-
pulism. In order to win the election, it was preferable to pretend that 
the remuneration to be received from the state is as low as possible. 
In Latvia, the salaries of the Prime Minister, ministers and the Saeima 
deputies have always been lower than in the neighboring countries. It 
also affected remuneration of the other state officials.
4. Assigning to the office and promotion along the gait of the carrier is 
supposedly based on the merits not on the prejudice or favor (weber, 
1947: 331, 333): Initially, a system was designed wherein promotion 
would have taken place once an individual would reached the next of 
13 stages (a civil servant candidate + 12 stages) – a carrier civil service 
was being designed. To perform evaluation and training two separate 
institutions were established: the State Civil Service Office and the 
State Administration School. 
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5. Civil service as the individual’s full time and lifetime occupation, a civil 
servant may retire from the service but his / hers dismissal is possible 
only due to a severe offence (weber, 1947: 333): The initial concept 
was designed in close compliance with this principle. Furthermore, 
in the Preventing Corruption Law (Saeima, 1995) the first restrictions 
for combined appointments were determined by being applied to the 
politicians, judges, and employees of the local governments as well. A 
term ‘state official’ was introduced which has a different meaning and 
sense in Latvia than in other countries. This term refers to a prohibi-
tion of the combined appointments.  
The prospected system was not fully introduced. when planning the 
state budget for developing the civil service, there was a money shortage. 
No examinations were introduced (except for the first time when the civil 
servant candidates were accepted). No further rankings were attributed. The 
envisaged package of social guarantees was not assured. The local and regio-
nal governments succeeded avoiding the civil service as the state civil service 
itself was financially undernourished. 
The regulations having the force of the law issued by the Cabinet of Minis-
ters upon the disciplinary liability of the civil servants were introduced during 
the break between the Saeima sessions (Cabinet of Ministers, 1994). Pursuant 
to these regulations, the actions of a civil servant (a civil servant candidate) 
are unlawful in case if his or her actions (action or inaction) contradict the 
legal norms, service instructions, or particular service orders. This decreased 
the personal responsibility while strengthened the role of a civil servant seen 
as a little screw in a joint mechanism. In the end of this period, the number 
of service employees was significantly decreasing as it was more profitable to 
enter the employment under a regular employment contract. 
During the Third period (1998–2002) inequality was developing. At a 
low basic salary scale the deputy heads of the departments, heads of divisions 
and departments, state secretaries and their deputies were exercising both the 
elaborations of the first period (the possibility to fulfil political positions in 
the councils of the companies owned by the state and the local government), 
and recently introduced management agreements (for performing a particu-
lar assignment) in accordance with the NPg procedure.
As the result, the remuneration of the senior officials normally exceeded 
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the ones of the Prime Minister and ministers, but the assistants and junior as-
sistants in terms of their remuneration were not far from the minimum wage 
in labor market. As no preconditions linked to the achieved results had been 
introduced in the system of governance, also the performance agreements 
were concluded rather formally. The employees would rather perceive them 
as a pay rise, not as real remuneration for the result of fulfilling which some 
essential changes or improvements should be achieved. In order to renovate 
the civil service to some extent, a campaign of inventory was performed in 
terms of redefining the positions of the civil servants. The personnel depar-
tments of the ministries were put to labor in order to find grounds how va-
rious positions could be incorporated into the civil service. 
During this period a discussion took place concerning the matter of the 
scope of the civil service. There was a proposition submitted to develop a 
small civil service of a high quality that would have included mainly the po-
sitions of managers, and may have been expanded over time along with the 
budget potential. There was also another concept under discussion envisa-
ging two levels, i.e. the elite civil service and the regular civil service. Howe-
ver, the choice was made in favor of a large and poorly motivated civil service.
During this period also a conceptual change took place – the carrier ci-
vil service was replaced with an open civil service. with such an open civil 
service a free movement of the employees from the private sector and their 
return to the private sector was made possible. This complied with the need 
for partial replacement of the civil servants, and also foreign investors needed 
some preferential procedures and potential of a higher yield in Latvia. 
Contrary to the traditional approach where the basic model was serving 
from the very bottom ranking so that, along with the term of service, the top 
rankings may be reached, in the open civil service it became possible to start 
by having a certain position in the private sector, then spent some time in 
the civil service position, then continue with a position in the private sector 
again, and so forth.
Bigger than ever, the attention was paid to the extent of specialization. 
If in the traditional model the basic skill had been participation in the gover-
nance process as precisely fulfilling the internal and external administrative 
acts, then in the open civil service much bigger weight was attributed to the 
specific knowledge of the field. 
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The system could have been introduced to a much wider extent if not for 
the split that had been occurred between the remuneration of the employees 
at similar positions in the private and public sectors. At the end of this period, 
the Law on Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (kNAB) was ela-
borated and adopted that introduced a new stage of quality as an instrument 
for combating the political (economic) opponents.
During the Fourth period (2002–2008) basically all the previously 
started processes were continuing even though a gradual deviation from the 
NPg principles was taking place year by year. After the amendments made to 
the Public Agency Law (Saeima, 2005), the performance agreements and the 
administrative agreements were terminated. The agencies would be further 
administered according to their strategies but no new administrative agree-
ments were concluded any more.
The work was being continued under stricter requirements to be applied 
to the civil servants simultaneously restricting any possibilities to motivate 
the employees. A new version of a more detailed Law on Disciplinary Liabi-
lity of State Civil Servants was adopted. It envisaged several types of offences, 
whereas the civil servants may have been punished if they would perform 
any actions against the procedure set in the normative acts – by violating 
not only external but also internal normative acts. As a disciplinary offence 
was nominated non-fulfilment of official duties, disclosure of an official se-
cret, or unauthorized disclosure of any other information; loss of, damage of 
property or loss of money; incorrect attitude towards a person; inappropriate 
and disrespectful behavior during the time period when official duties are not 
fulfilled; and non-conformity with political neutrality.
During this period the new kNAB commenced the witch hunt; su-
ccessful criminal matters were rarely instituted, and still announcements 
were often published that casted shadow over the state administration and 
the local governments. 
For the influence over the kNAB a rivalry occurred among the politi-
cal parties seeking the governance acting in their interests. At the time, the 
kNAB would be involved in internal intrigues and widen the corruption 
combating direction of its operations by focusing particularly at the conflicts 
of interests not corruption.
Endeavors to include the local governments into a single civil service 
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system occurred, despite the fact that the local governments succeeded in 
pertaining solidarity for the sake of autonomy of their personnel. 
During the Fifth period (2008-2016) the very idea of the civil servi-
ce has been discredited as at the beginning of the period, and too much of 
influence was handed over to the IMF and the European Commission. A 
structural reform has been imitated that actually turned out into mechanical 
pruning of the civil service. The reliance on the promises given by the public 
power has been lost. At the end of the period a way out from the situation, 
where no agreement seems possible due to a competition among the parties 
of the ruling coalition, was sought for. 
The world economic crisis made us look critically at the developed sys-
tem of the civil service on its own terms. Since 1993, there have been talks 
about a bigger stability as the reason for joining the civil service. Although a 
civil servant may have received remuneration that was for 20% lower than an 
employee at a similar level in the private sector, the former had a guaranteed 
employment and a higher social security. 
The conduct of the Latvian government utterly erased such hopes. when 
reacting at the IMF requirement to execute the structural reforms, the govern-
ment mechanically decreased the number of the civil servants instead of bur-
dening itself with restructuring the economics. It turned out that an employee 
of a private enterprise was more protected than a civil servant. This example 
was also often followed by the local governments in respect to their employees.
From January 1, 2010, the following articles were excluded from the Law 
on the State Civil Service: 1) allowances in case of injury of a civil servant and 
in case of death of a civil servant or his or her family member; 2) allowance 
in the case of birth of a child; 3) compensation to cover travel expenses; 4) 
allowance in connection with dismissal from a civil service position; 5) sup-
plement for the performance of additional duties; 6) supplement for the per-
formance of office duties under circumstances of increased work intensity; 
7) improving qualifications and covering training costs; 8) study leave. The 
respective regulation was moved to the Law on Remuneration of Officials 
and Employees of State and Local government (Saeima, 2010) where the pre-
viously available advantages were either excluded or essentially decreased.  
The law on a single remuneration that was adopted during this period 
has eliminated all the NPg methods in the personnel management. If the sta-
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te and the local government are managed like an enterprise, there must be the 
possibilities available for motivating the civil servants through more diverse 
ways that would have correlate with their input in achieving the goals of the 
respective organization (Vorončuka, 2003). The single remuneration law de-
termines that a bonus may be paid no more often that annually and no bigger 
that up to 75% of the monthly salary. Such a degree of motivation shows no 
proportionality to the significance of those matters often solved on the daily 
basis by the civil servants and the employees of the local governments. 
A new concept of the civil service was elaborated, and the new State Ser-
vice Law draft (Cabinet of Ministers, 2014) provided such qualities of ‘post-
bureaucratic civil service’: 
 − Equalizing the employment conditions for the civil servants and the 
state  administration employees by granting an essential role to the 
private sector   experience in development of the carrier and labor 
remuneration system;
 − The labor remuneration system gets linked to the work performance 
by a wide use of the performance assessment; 
 − Open competitions for any position;
 − Flexible employment conditions;              
 − Delegating the duties to direct supervisors.
The performance would have been assessed according to single princi-
ples applied both to the civil servants and the employees as well as mobility 
would have been assured (transfer in favor of the interests of the state). The 
envisaged model of a single employer gave an impression that one group of 
the ruling elite was trying to manipulate another. Therefore, implementation 
of such a model has been postponed for an unknown period, and the law 
draft was not promoted in the Saeima. 
4.7. Administrative Process and Procedures
The change of public administration models was accompanied by es-
sential transformations in the provisions of the administrative procedure. 
The administrative procedure is an essential component of the public admi-
nistration model; its shape is variable in compliance with the interests of 
those groups that are seeking their goals and are dominating the society at 
the time being. 
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During the First period (1990−1993) the administrative procedure was 
not formalized within the institution, and a democratic form of principles of 
the USSR era was observed (the content had changed by reinstated pluralism 
and completely cancelled the possibility of a single party dictate). In court, 
the administrative matters where considered on the competitive basis accor-
ding to the civil procedure. Initially, it was believed that the public power on 
the one hand and an individual on the other should be set as equal conditions 
– the same principles should be made clear to both, and the same documents 
should be available to both. The internal procedure in the institution was 
nothing but an auxiliary instrument to ensure balanced relationship between 
the public authority and the individual. 
At the beginning of the Second period (1993−1998) the Minister of 
Justice, Egils Levits, was trying to introduce a new administrative procedure 
according to the german model but he did not succeed in overcoming the 
resistance of an interest group of lawyers, therefore the administrative pro-
cedure was introduced only in the state and local institutions but in court 
the civil procedure was preserved. The Law on the Constitutional Court was 
adopted providing the examination procedure of the primary and secondary 
legislation by initially allowing submissions to a narrow range of applicants 
only. It was believed that the effective legislation was too contradictory but 
the capacity of the judges and the state administration employees was insuf-
ficient. The administrative procedure was divided into two parts, i.e. in the 
institutions it was operated ‘in a new way’ (Cabinet of Ministers, 1995) but in 
court ‘in the old manner’.
During the Third period (1998−2002) the new Administrative Pro-
cedure Law was adopted introducing a single bureaucratic order in court 
and in the institution; an individual who was competing against the local 
government and the state lost his or her ability to compete as potentially 
his/her opponent would be judged by a higher quality within a purposefully 
designed system of administrative courts. A shiftfrom the concept of rule 
of law to the concept of state of law was an important milestone during 
this period. In the lawyers’ communities, it is described as a rapprochement 
with a legal and institutional framework of Continental Europe contrary to 
British Commonwealth (westminster) system. It is essential to provide that 
the principle of proportionality was applied to the administrative procedure 
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only, not to designing institutions (Pūķis, 2010) – by naming this principle 
differently to the principle of the institution development and competency 
in the primary legislation of the EU. The right to proportionality was named 
‘the principle of commensuration’ (following the german terminology) but 
in the Latvian versions of the EU legislation was named ‘the principle of 
proportionality’ (following the English and French model). 
During the Fourth period (2002−2008) the hierarchy in relation to the 
administrative procedure was clarified, and it was recognized that in the local 
government there was no higher instance than the local government council 
and a higher status of the hierarchy after the council was reserved to the court 
(the ministry was supposed to be a higher instance only in case of delegated 
competencies). However, the bureaucrats of the ministries and even the mi-
nisters were seeking to violate this procedure.
During the previous period the adopted Administrative Procedure Law 
had prepared the grounds for a comprehensive bureaucratization. In the new 
version of the Administrative Procedure Law (Saeima, 2001) a provision was 
elaborated that provided the grounds for a continuous and stable growth in 
the number of lawyers. It followed from the provision that an administrative 
act should be drawn in writing and should have a mandatory substantiation 
by an external normative act. This norm provided a continuous escalation 
in the amount of the regulations issued by the Cabinet of Ministers and the 
binding regulations issued by the local governments thereby inducing a dy-
namically growing bureaucratization. 
The Law of the State Administration System that was adopted at the be-
ginning of this period also facilitated bureaucratization, concentration, and 
centralization. Significantly enough, among the basic principles of the state 
administration the principle of subsidiarity was at least mentioned opposite 
to the principle of proportionality that was not mentioned at all. This also 
conforms with the lack of understanding over the significance of this princi-
ple when trying to copy the procedures characteristic of the german system.
within this stage the matters of responsibilities of the civil servants and 
the institutions were clarified, and the procedure established how to diffe-
rentiate the responsibility of the state from the responsibility of the local go-
vernment – along with that it was also specified from which budget the com-
pensations would be paid in case of wrongful actions. As it had been purpo-
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sefully arranged that autonomous competency of the local governments was 
not separated from the competency delegated to the local governments by the 
state, then the court was still facing difficulties in separating those. From the 
existing legal nihilism barely any function of the local government was cor-
rectly provided in the law. Therefore, in case of doubts over the competency to 
which a particular offence serves, it would be paid from the state budget not 
from the one of the local government. 
During the Fifth period (2008−2016) the administrative procedure has 
not been changed but there have been ongoing discussions in two directions: 
1) how to develop the public services system (e-services, feasibility limits 
of a single supervision), and 2) whether certain controlling and repressive 
structures are entitled to establish a separate punishment system that has no 
connection to the administrative procedure.
The EU budget was applied to implement a project on the public servi-
ces. The main outcome of the project was a single classification of public ser-
vices involving both the services provided by the state and those provided by 
the local governments. The outcome has been used to complete the Latvian 
e-government portal www.latvija.lv. By developing these outcomes, a novel 
draft of the Law on the Public Services was prepared and supported both by 
the Cabinet of Ministers and the LALRg but is was blocked by an interest 
group of lawyers. The lawyers perceived wide introduction of e-services and 
simplification of the procedures as the direct threat to their interests.
Particular objections were raised by offer of the ‘silence – agreement’ 
principle: in case a public government institution has not replied to a propo-
sal, the proposal is agreed. In order to prevent any aspirations to diminish the 
administrative burden for the entrepreneurs and the population, the groups 
of lawyers and civil servants are referring to the norms of the State Adminis-
tration System Law (that was criticized by the local governments both during 
its drawing and afterwards) (Pūķis, 2010) that is facilitating centralization 
and concentration, and is not following the principle of proportionality. 
In order to foster their influence during this period the State Audit Office 
has been trying to acquire also the rights of the repressive structure. It has 
been offered to apply a norm to the civil servants and the employees of the lo-
cal government, so that an external controlling institution is entitled to apply 
punishments for the aforesaid employees contrary to the opinion of the direct 
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supervision and by interfering into the procedure of the personnel mana-
gement. The Competition Council has already acquired such a competency, 
now it is seeking rights to exercise double actions of other state institutions 
and assess whether it is profitable to establish capital societies owned by the 
state or by the local government. During the crisis, the Cabinet of Ministers 
decided to develop ‘a small and efficient’ administration. As in all the coun-
tries, the bureaucracy would not accept that, and has been working in order 
to make the word ‘small’ disappear from all the future state policy documents.
4.8. Conclusion
1. After 1990, the public administration reform in Latvia could be split 
to five stages. Each stage has its leading interest groups that have 
their own objectives. The form and scope of the public administrati-
ve reform on each stage was determined by the competition among 
groups’ interests. 
2. The first stage (1990−1993) could be characterized as the period of 
transition from the totalitarianism and centralized planned economy 
to pluralism and market economy. During this period, the interests 
of Latvian people were determinative. Model of minimal governance 
was chosen as the tool for achieving dominant objectives during this 
period (minimal legislation and minimal administrative structures); 
it was complemented with an extensive decentralization. A signifi-
cant part of the public power was transferred to the self-governments 
through fiscal, property, administrative, staff, and political decentra-
lization. The second stage (1993−1998) could be characterized as a 
pseudo-restoration, on this stage, the renewal of democratic and free 
public power constitution of the period (1918−1934) was declared. 
Newly developed national elite’s interest to multiply wealth by par-
ticipating in the process of privatization and denationalization was 
determinative in this stage. The national elite was developed from a 
part of the former activists of the Popular Front of Latvia, a part of the 
former nomenclature of the USSR time that was timely redirected, 
and a part of Latvian emigration diaspora that returned to mother-
land to participate in the assets redistribution and division. Traditio-
nal public administration model with features of Max weber’s burea-
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ucracy was chosen to achieve the dominant objectives of this period. 
The strategy of “state of law” development and over-regulation was 
chosen that allowed to make legal environment less clear and priva-
tization more successfully. In frames of the pseudo-restoration, there 
were attempts to implement centralization through the administra-
tive-territorial reform. Because of the self-governments’ resistance 
centralization was implemented only in the city of Riga where only 
one self-government instead of previous seven was established.  
3. The third stage (1998−2002) could be characterized as the New Public 
Management (NPM) period, when a list of the NPM elements were im-
plemented, and a part of related to NPM workpieces from the previous 
period was distorted. The interests of the “foreign investors” (from Rus-
sia and Scandinavia in particular) were determinant during this peri-
od. The investors beneficially repurchased properties and enterprises 
that had been privatized in the previous stages. Additionally, pre-es-
tablished political elite was interested in getting rid of the previously 
obtained properties and deploy the capital to offshore zones. In order 
to fulfil these tasks previous period bureaucrats should be partially re-
placed. At that time, the New Public Management Theory, a new global 
paradigm in public management, was chosen to fulfil the replacement. 
4. The fourth stage (2002−2008) could be characterized as a period of 
entering NATO and the EU, when public administration was stepping 
back in the development implementing features of the neo-weberia-
nism. This period was determined by the interests of the “old” EU 
member states and the American entrepreneurs in order to reallocate 
assets and powers/dominance. A change to reallocate the dominance 
to both political parties and civil servants was partly needed. Emphasis 
was placed on strengthening the repressive structures and its depen-
dence on the new ruling party’s impact (State Audit Office, Corruption 
Prevention and Combating Bureau, etc.). The fifth stage (2008−2016) 
could be characterized as a period of internal devaluation. The inter-
national financial groups and the “old” EU member states’ interests 
were determined on this stage. The mentioned parties were carrying 
on compensations from the taxpayers‘ money to banks and insurance 
companies, did not allow elimination of the state compulsory funded 
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pension, and trigged development of national economy. Latvia had 
become a proving ground for the greek rescue, and therefore the dee-
pest world financial crisis since 1930 was organized. The local political 
elite started a competition to privatize profitable enterprises owned by 
the state and self-governments during this period. Because of the fi-
nancial reduction, attitudes towards public administration and, partly, 
return of the minimal regulation model needed to be changed.  
5. The change of the public administration models was accompanied 
by significant changes in the organization of the functions. The mo-
del of the first period (1990−1993) corresponds to the minimal state 
institutions and decentralization. During this period, the principle of 
subsidiarity was implemented at its best, communalization was im-
plemented as the first stage of privatization and decentralization, and 
the main elements of the economic structural policy were entrusted to 
the self-governments. The model of the second period (1993−1998) 
corresponds to deconcentrating in the sectors, i.e. each allowing po-
litical force created its “own” administration, idea about the country 
as an enterprise was progressively spreading, ministries were divided 
among the parties, and administrative functions were transferred to 
the state-owned enterprises. At the end of the period, an ambitious 
centralization in health care was implemented as well as direct regi-
onal elections were cancelled. However, because of the self-govern-
ments’ resistance, elimination of the regional self-governments failed. 
The model of the third period (1998−2002) corresponds to a wide 
development of agencies, and continuation of the privatization of the 
state-owned and self-governments’ enterprises. The NPA was formally 
introduced but the performance assessment system that was needed 
to evaluate performance of the various agencies has not been created. 
6. Paradigm shift in public administration was accompanied by a signi-
ficant change in civil service. The first period (1990−1993) model best 
corresponded to the public servant status alignment to private emplo-
yee status, which made it possible to achieve both flexibility and high 
efficiency. During the second period (1993−1998), a traditional Man-
darin system (career civil service) was created and government unsu-
ccessfully tried to extend it to municipalities. Self-governments mana-
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ged to maintain the staff autonomy. Due to a lack of funds, the plans of 
the second period were only partially fulfilled. During the third period 
(1998−2002), a change of the concept of civil service was prepared, 
which better corresponded to the ideas of the New Public administra-
tion. Career civil service was replaced by an open civil service. A signi-
ficant and broad exchange was seen between public and private sectors, 
open competitive senior official selection was introduced. Conflict of 
interest restrictions was developed, which had a negative impact on 
the elements of the new policy. In the fourth period (2002−2008), the 
previously built system evolved by applying the civil service borrowed 
from the New Public Administration within the framework of neo-
weberianism model. Bureaucracy increased and became affected by 
overregulation and double control, which did not allow raising wages 
for a long time. In the fifth period (2008−2016), the organization of ci-
vil service procedures as set out by previous periods continued. During 
the period of internal devaluation, a unified system of remuneration 
was established, which was extended to the self-governments as well. 
This period is characterized by a high concentration of institutions, 
worsening the situation in the regions. A new State Service draft le-
gislation was developed, which further liberalized the open civil ser-
vice model. Political forces failed to find consensus on the new model. 
7. Shift in public administration models was accompanied by signifi-
cant changes how to ensure administrative process. Administrative 
process in the institution was not formalized during the first period 
(1990−1993), and a democratic form of the Soviet time principles was 
considered (content was changed by restoring pluralism, and comple-
tely abolishing the possibility of one-party dictation). Direct adminis-
trative cases were examined on competition basis in accordance with 
the civil procedure. During the second period (1993−1998), the Minis-
ter of Justice tried to introduce a new administrative process based on 
the german example, however he failed to overcome an interest group 
of lawyers’ resistance, therefore the administrative procedure was im-
plemented only in case of the state and the self-government institu-
tions, in case of the court, the civil procedure remained. The Law on 
the Constitutional Court was adopted that determined the procedure 
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of the examination of the primary and secondary legislation initially 
allowing only a narrow range of applicants to submit the claims. Du-
ring the third period (1998−2002), a new Administrative Procedure 
Law was adopted that presumed introduction of a single bureaucratic 
procedure for the institutions and the court. Those, who were litigating 
with the state or the self-governments, lost the opportunity to compe-
te at the same time potentially receiving highly qualified judges from 
the specially created system of the administrative court. In the fourth 
period (2002−2008), the hierarchy of administrative processes was de-
termined, and it was acknowledged that there was no higher instance of 
self-governments than a council of the self-governments, and the court 
had the privilege to participate in the examination on the next degree 
after the council (a ministry was considered as a higher authority only 
in case of the competence that was delegated by the state). However, 
bureaucrats of the ministries and even the ministers tried to violate this 
procedure. In the fifth period (2008−2016), the organization of admi-
nistrative procedures remained the same as in the previous periods. 
8. In case of Latvia, the external factors of public administration develo-
pment (membership in the EU, interests of Russia or the USA, impact of 
the international financial organizations) had the secondary meaning. 
It is important to emphasize that at least for the shared competences the 
principle of proportionality (minimization of the EU bureaucratic in-
volvement) was successfully maintained in the EU primary legislation. 
Domestic political needs were primary to the forms of public adminis-
tration organization, which were the tools for ensuring domestic inte-
rests. Various concepts of public administration like good governance, 
smart governance or corporative governance were applied to support 
domestic policy objectives. Transparency and anti-corruption concepts 
were mainly used for inter-party fights to compromise the political op-
ponents and emphasize the excellence of their own reputation. 
9. Normativism (over-regulation) and excessive promotion of burea-
ucratization characteristic for the EU were not able to respond flexi-
bly to the global processes, and did not contributed to the popularity 
of the methods. Hence, each country should seek ways to prevent the 
disadvantages that the EU public administration has.
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5. Public Administration in Poland: Reforms and 
Systemic-Organizational Issues
Mariusz W. Sienkiewicz, Stanisław Michałowski 
5.1. Introduction
we should support kasiński’s thesis (2011: 215-226) that modern con-
cepts of public administration are based on the concept of public service, rather 
than public authority and on the change of its fundamental role, which is to be 
not bureaucratic governance, but management which is based on completely 
different principles. Therefore, greater than ever importance is attributed to 
non-legal economic, political, organizational determinants of administration. 
In general, a new image of public administration is promoted in which its acti-
vities are only slightly determined by law, although it is still formally bound by 
the constitutional requirement to respect the generally binding rules. 
Another trend in the development of modern public administration is 
associated with the process of its Europeanization. This pertains primarily 
to the member states of the European Union and is partly linked to globali-
zation processes (kasiński, 2011: 215-226). It is determined by the acceptance 
of patterns of modernization shaped in non-European, especially Anglo-Sa-
xon, administrative systems. On the other hand, in the process of Europeani-
zation of administrative law and public administration there is an approach 
based on the assumption that administration modernization should be based 
mainly on European tradition and experience, and concepts and programs 
outside Europe can be used only to a limited extent. This pertains, for exam-
ple, to strengthening the principle of subsidiarity, primacy of the territorial 
system over the sectoral one, limits of discretional decisions, access to public 
information, network connections, horizontal rather than hierarchical, social 
dialogue and civic participation, and specific ethical standards in administra-
tion (kasiński, 2011: 215-226). 
It should be noted that the Polish public administration system is ge-
nerally based on the latter concept. This is caused by the necessity to reform 
public administration determined by process of European integration, ful-
fillment of the EU law requirements in various areas of administrative activi-
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ty, and acceptance of values and principles shared by the administrations in 
different member states (kasiński, 2011: 215-226). 
The restoration of the democratic system in 1989 in Poland triggered 
the reform activity in virtually all areas of socio-economic life (Lutrzykowski, 
2009: 10-25). One of important areas of these activities was public adminis-
tration, the shape in which reflects the socio-political system in the coun-
try. Thus, in the early 1990s the first stage of public administration reform 
in Poland began. The result was mainly visible in the introduction of local 
self-government at the municipal level, as the basic unit of major division of 
the state. This period initiated a process of reforming Polish public adminis-
tration, which has continued to the present day.
M. kulesza (2000: 1-2) rightly points out that „Poland is the only country 
of Central and Eastern Europe, in which today a successful and profound trans-
formation of the administrative system is already a fact belonging to history.“ 
This, of course, does not preclude the observation that we have many problems 
and difficulties with bureaucracy and other administrative pathologies, inclu-
ding corruption (the „normal,“ but also the political one), ignorance, arrogance, 
waste, etc. Nevertheless, these are just ordinary challenges always faced by poli-
tical and state elites, today in Poland as well as in other contemporary democra-
tic countries. The restoration of local self-government is considered one of the 
most important and most successful achievements of the Third Republic, thus 
perpetuating Polish sovereignty as a civil state. This achievement was accom-
plished primarily through deep transformations of the public administration 
system by means of introduction of a new legislation. The reforms broke three 
major monopolies of the totalitarian communist state: the political monopoly 
of a single party, the already mentioned principle of unified state power, and the 
principle of a single fund of state property. It was followed by decentralization 
of state administration and state finances. This has led to the profound recons-
truction of the public sector – including, in particular, the principles of political 
governance and the rules of organization, and delivery of key public services 
and administrative tasks (including – the police ones). This entails significant 
transformation in many areas of public life (kulesza, 2000: 1-2).
This chapter contains an analysis of the process of the public adminis-
tration reform in Poland. The attention is focused on the genesis of the for-
mation of public administration in respective periods of Polish statehood. It 
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also contains a presentation of systemic and organizational issues of public 
administration operation in the current era. The conducted analyses concern, 
in particular, the assumptions, objectives and principles of administrative re-
forms after 1989; the structure, organization and function of public adminis-
tration in Poland; public finance; analysis of the process of reforms of the civil 
service; manifestations and instruments related to the openness and transpa-
rency of public administration.
5.2. Theoretical Issues of the Public Administration Reform
A reform of public administration is a process involving a set of activities 
and instruments undertaken by government administration bodies, aimed 
at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the administration which, in 
consequence, is supposed to lead to an improved quality of life of a society 
(Sowiński, 2001: 227-236). A reform of public administration in a democra-
tic state should not be an end in itself because it frequently leads to the de-
centralization of administrative structures and their tasks and competences 
(wright, 1997: 551-558).
According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 2011), 
public administration reform can be very comprehensive and include process 
changes in areas, such as organizational structures, decentralization, person-
nel management, public finance, results-based management, regulatory re-
forms, etc. It can also refer to targeted reforms, such as the revision of civil 
service statute.
we can point to several types of a public administration reform. Jos C. 
N. Raadschelders (1994: 4) distinguished three main types: 1) structural 
reforms pertaining to changes in the existing organizational, administra-
tive, and public structure. They may take a form of territorial reforms, or 
functional reforms, pertaining to modification of the scope of tasks and 
competences. Structural reforms can be of a mixed nature, that is, both 
territorial and functional. The second type are reforms, the aim of which 
is to change the nature of relations and relationships between organizatio-
nal units within the public sector. They are connected primarily with rea-
lization of the principle of decentralization and de-concentration of tasks 
and competences. The third type of administrative reforms are the reforms 
of a system. They pertain to changes in public administration, taking place 
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in the framework of the transformation of the political system as a whole.
In turn, Vincent wright (1997: 551-558) distinguished, first of all, re-
forms undertaken as a result of the emergence of phenomena causing the 
pressure towards modernization of the political system associated, for exam-
ple, with the European integration. The other type he pointed to are reforms 
arising from the need to respond to emerging social or political events, such 
as for instance, the reorganization of public administration caused by, for 
example, the unification processes in germany.
Discussing the basis of classification of public administration reforms it 
is worth presenting the division made by Ryszard Herbut who distinguished 
the following types of reforms: 1) reforms connected with the market, which 
are characterized by the departure from the traditional model of administra-
tion based on hierarchical relationships, in favor of administration applying 
market principles; 2) participatory ones, whose goal is to expand the circle of 
actors involved in the decision-making process and providing them with the 
impact on service quality; 3) deregulatory reforms, which are associated with 
organizing administration as a separate sub-system (Rajca, 2010: 199-200).
Taking the above into account, we witnessed in Poland in the last de-
cades a so-called diversified system of administrative reforms. Between the 
years 1990 and 1998, „big macro reforms“ as well as structural and systemic 
reforms were carried out related to the creation of new territorial units and 
new administrative divisions and functions. In turn, during the 1990s, the 
reforms in individual areas of public administration were implemented, such 
as the civil service, administrative jurisdiction, public participation, instru-
ments of public management, or public finances.
5.3. Historical Context of Formation of Public                           
Administration in Poland 
Decentralization of state administration became one of the main objecti-
ves of the system transformation in Poland after 1989. It was assumed that it 
would lead to building civil society based on the principle of subsidiarity, i.e. 
the reconstruction of local government and broad activity of society. The con-
cept of self-governing municipalities was implemented very quickly, already 
in 1990, but the second stage of the reform assuming the introduction of self-
governing districts and provinces was quite difficult to achieve in the socio-
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political reality at that time. Districts and provinces appeared on the map of 
Poland only in 1998. This process will be shown in the following discussion. It 
should be noted, however, that a complex process of building public adminis-
tration in Poland has exerted a big influence on this process, just like the fate 
of the Polish nation, deprived of its statehood for 123 years, has been complex.
It is generally assumed that classical principles and institutions of public 
administration developed in the nineteenth century, and in the next century, 
they were enriched by new solutions and only partly modified, primarily due 
to the consolidation of new views on the position of the citizen and chan-
ges in management techniques (Izdebski & kulesza, 1999: 57). Meanwhile, 
Poland lost its independent existence in 1795 and regained it after the end 
of world war I. Short functioning of Polish administration in the interwar 
period was interrupted on September 1, 1939. After world war II, Polish sta-
tehood had limited sovereignty, and its administration was modeled on the 
political system of the Soviet Union. This raises the question of what histori-
cal experiences could have been used in the process of transformation of the 
political system in Poland, including administration, after the year 1989. 
Historians of public administration assume that the period of public law 
State – public law Monarchy (1320−1764) played an extremely important role 
in shaping the Polish state. The enthronization of władysław Łokietek (the 
Short) in 1320 was an expression of not only the revival of royal power but 
also the unity and sovereignty of the Polish state. This meant the rejection of 
the patrimonial character of the monarch’s power and acceptance of the cons-
truction of the Crown of the Polish kingdom. The powers of the Crown were 
associated with the state and not with a particular ruler, which meant that the 
leading role was played by the public law factor and not by private law.
It should be emphasized that in this period, i.e. in 1569, a real Union with 
Lithuania was concluded in Lublin. A federation Republic was founded with a 
common monarch, common parliament, common foreign policy, and mone-
tary system. The tradition of this statehood of the two nations is still alive in 
Polish society. How did administration function in the state at that time? It can 
be generally divided into central offices, local, and land offices. The first group 
encompassed those who later obtained the title of ministers and included the 
Chancellor and Vice Chancellors, the Treasurer of the Crown and the Trea-
surer of the Court and the grand Marshal of the Crown and the Court. The 
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Chancellor and Vice Chancellors administered the royal chancellery. Their 
task was to conduct diplomatic correspondence (the nucleus of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs). Moreover, letters concerning internal affairs and royal pri-
vileges passed through the chancellery. The main book of the chancellery was 
the Crown Register. Identical offices were established in Lithuania, and the 
book of that chancellery was called the Lithuanian Metrica (Ćwik, 2002: 50). 
It is worth noting that the territorial division into provinces and districts, 
and the offices of the province governor and the district governor were formed 
at that time, which in the self-government version will determine the public 
administration sub-system in Poland after 1989. The province governor direc-
ted officials in provinces. Royal officials in the area became district governors, 
whose offices, in Poland, were popularized by the king władysław Łokietek 
(the Short). It should be added that in Poland at that time the local govern-
ment administration sub-system began to take shape, i.e. municipal councils 
– made up of councilors and equipped with administrative, judicial, and le-
gislative powers. Mayors were appointed from among them, who in turn, as 
„chairmen,“ chaired council meetings. During these appointments, the will of 
district governors or province governors as representatives of the kings was 
taken into consideration (Ćwik, 2002: 52-54, kornaś, 2006: 110-111).
The presented system of state functioning with the dominant position of 
the gentry and magnates (dignitaries) was characterized by a high decentrali-
zation (often referred to as democracy of the gentry) because it was managed by 
territorially separate, partly enclosed organisms having a sense of nationwide 
and state bonds through the tradition, parliament and person of the elected 
ruler, not through a separate clerical state which would guard the power of the 
state. Reform attempts undertaken by the Polish rulers met with the resistance 
of the gentry, which led to the increasing weakness of the Polish-Lithuanian 
State exposed to the intervention of neighboring countries, especially Russia.
However, in the second half of the eighteenth century, public awareness 
of the need for systemic and administrative reforms increased, and they were 
carried out in the years 1764−1795 with a huge interference of foreign powers 
in the affairs of Poland. Under their pressure, the parliament was convened in 
1773 in warsaw to prepare the partition treaties. As a result, the Commission 
of National Education, common for the Crown and Lithuania, and the Per-
manent Council, performing the functions of government and administrative 
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authorities, were created by the parliament. The Commission was considered 
the world’s first Ministry of Education. It organized the education system, 
including two universities in krakow and Vilnius, higher schools and parish 
schools − rural and urban ones. In turn, the Permanent Council, established 
under the pressure of Russia, was a collegial government (consisting of 36 
members) and was divided into five departments, the seeds of the ministries: 
Department of Foreign Interest, police department, military department, De-
partment of the Treasury, and Department of Justice). The Council did a lot 
to regulate the affairs of the country but its subsequent submission to Rus-
sia made it unpopular in society. It was given a rather uncomfortable term 
of „permanent treason“ (Ćwik, 2002: 77, kornaś, 2006: 112-113). Therefo-
re, it was dissolved by the great Parliament that sat in sessions in the years 
1788−1992. It was this parliament that could play a big role in the strengt-
hening of the Polish state and building modern administration. It became 
famous mainly due to the enactment on May 3, 1791 of the government Act, 
which in Poland is still the basis for national pride as the Constitution of 
3 of May. Under this act, the reformers established a new body called the 
guardian of the Laws. It was a central government, or the Cabinet of Mi-
nisters, headed by the king who also presided over its sessions. government 
commissions of „Two Nations“ (common for the Crown and Lithuania) of 
the Army, Police, Treasury and Education were subordinated to the guardian 
of the Laws. They were jointly organized ministries, composed of members 
elected by the parliament. They were directed by the ministers not belonging 
to the guardians (the exception was the primate, who was a member of the 
guardians and directed the Commission of National Education).
In the last years of the existence of Poland before the partitions, nu-
merous actions to establish effective local administration were taken. Since 
1765, the Commissions of good Order (boni ordinis) were established, first 
in warsaw, then in other royal cities. These commissions were composed of 
the gentry but were also aided by townspeople and worked in many cities for 
a number of years, and did a lot to regulate municipal finance, internal regime 
of these cities, improve the economic situation. Under the government Act 
of 1791, changes in the system of municipal self-government took place. Free 
(royal) cities were supposed to have so-called enacting assemblies composed 
of municipal proprietors (property owners), who carried out the selection of 
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executive offices – municipalities with the president at the helm. In accor-
dance with the regulations on free cities – a higher level of local government 
was provided in the form of departments, grouping royal cities of individual 
provinces and lands. The country was divided into 24 departments (Ćwik, 
2002: 79-81, kornaś, 2006: 114-115).
In 1789, a four-year parliament established administrative civil-military 
commissions, acting in the given territory, province, or district. władysław 
Ćwik (2002: 80) stressed that these commissions „rose to the role of Poland’s 
first modern territorial administration bodies.“
The delayed process of reforming the state aimed at creating good admi-
nistration and the spurt of Poles during the kosciuszko Uprising did not 
produce the expected effect. Three countries: Austria, Russia and Prussia 
divided Polish lands between themselves, and for 123 years Poland disappe-
ared from the map of Europe. It appeared on it again after world war I due 
to favorable conditions, including constant aspirations of Poles to implement 
the ideas of independence.
In the interwar period, the state government system was based on three 
constitutions: the Little Constitution of February 20, 1919; the March Cons-
titution of March 17, 1921; the April Constitution of April 23, 1935. They 
guaranteed the unitary character of the state and administration, although in 
the early years of the state authorities had to take action to unify various sys-
tems of territorial division and various administrative systems inherited from 
the partitioning powers. Due to the lack of space for a wider discussion it 
should be emphasized that these issues were resolved, to a large extent, by the 
provisions of Article 65 of the Polish Constitution of March 17, 1921, stating 
that, for administrative purposes, the Polish State was divided by the legisla-
ture into provinces, counties, and urban and rural municipalities, which were 
simultaneously local government units (Adamczyk & Pastuszka, 1985: 234). 
Thus, public administration (the term very often used at the time, especially 
in the scientific discourse) had two basic sub-systems: central and field go-
vernment and local government. The main segment of central administration 
was the Council of Ministers representing the collective body of ministers 
chaired by the Prime Minister. It was appointed by the president, and its main 
task was to give general direction to domestic and foreign policy. Policies of 
individual ministers, who directed the relevant departments of public admi-
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nistration, had to fit into this framework (their number ranged from 16 in 
the initial period of the Second Polish Republic to 11 in 1939) (kornaś, 2006: 
22-123, Mróz, 1998: 200-206). 
Province governors and district governors were the representatives of 
the government in the field. The former ones coordinated the activities of 
government administration towards compliance with the political line of the 
state. They performed administration in the sphere of home affairs and their 
duty was to provide security and public order. They supervised local adminis-
tration, and performed administration in the matters of religion, culture and 
art, industry and trade, agriculture and agrarian reforms, social welfare and 
job placement, as well as communication.
It is worth noting that the supporters of the great role of local government 
in the reconstruction of Polish independence were largely taking advantage 
of the assumptions of the contemporary german school of local government, 
both in considering the local government units as corporations, but also in 
exposing the civil factor. Stefan Litauer (1918: 17) stressed that legislation 
should be characterized by the rule of harmonization of local government law 
with the state law, and also take into account the common good and the socio-
national interests. He presented it as follows: „we reach this ideal only through 
genuine democracy: as gierke (one of the founders of the german school of 
law of local government) formulates it – by reverting the state into the nation, 
by changing the state – the institution into the state – into the team.“ 
The presented idealism in the perception of the role of local government 
contributed to the fact that the March Constitution guaranteed that muni-
cipalities, districts, and provinces would obtain a local government nature. 
However, the complicated process of integration of Polish lands led to the si-
tuation in which, in practice, local government functioned only at the level of 
municipalities, which had rural and urban character. As a result of the adop-
tion of the Act of March 23, 1933, the partial change of the system of local go-
vernment was unification of the system of municipalities, meaning that rural 
municipalities existed – individual and collective ones composed of clusters. 
In both cases, the boards elected by the municipal councils were the mana-
ging and executive bodies. The village mayor directed the board that was also 
composed of vice mayors, and two or three aldermen (Mróz, 1998: 253−255). 
In turn, the cities were divided into county boroughs, which had more than 
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25,000 inhabitants, and the cities with less than 25 thousand residents, which 
did not have such status. The governing and executive bodies in both types of 
these cities were city boards elected by the legislative and control bodies, i.e. 
the city councils. In county boroughs the boards consisted of president, vice 
presidents and aldermen, whereas in cities which were not county boroughs 
consisted of mayors, vice-mayors and aldermen.
Competence of rural and urban local governments covered both their 
own and entrusted affairs. The former included, among others, public safety 
and the matters of health, construction, transport, trade, or municipal finan-
ces. The latter concerned the tasks entrusted to the municipality by the go-
vernment authorities, such as the civil status record, tax collection, statistical 
activities, cooperation in the conduct of state elections, support for the mili-
tary (Mróz, 1998: 253-255). 
Moreover, during the interwar period in Poland district local govern-
ments operated the executive bodies of which were district departments, 
elected by the district councils. Similarly to district councils, six member de-
partments were headed by the district governors, appointed by the ministers 
of internal affairs, and subordinated to the province governors, which meant 
that districts were of state-local government nature. In practice, local govern-
ment at the province level did not function then, except in the provinces of 
Poznan and Pomerania, which earlier belonged to the Prussian partition.
There is no doubt that these pro-social threads of the self-government 
thought from the period of the Second Polish Republic have become, rather 
than centralizing tendencies, a kind of a matrix of the presented ideas in 
order to rebuild local government in the period of systemic transformation 
in Poland. This was possible only after long years of statehood completely 
dependent on the Soviet Union, and characterized by the omnipotence of 
administration and the exercise of its full control over all spheres of eco-
nomic and social life. At the same time, a rapid limitation of powers took 
place, followed by a total elimination of local government modeled largely 
on the Second Polish Republic. Consequently, this led to the supremacy of 
the Polish United workers’ Party (this period of Polish history is referred to 
as the state – the party), state totalizm, or – as it is sometimes bluntly defi-
ned – „casting the society into slavery of the state,“ of officials at all levels of 
local administration, i.e. into bureaucracy (Michałowski, 1999: 171–195).
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5.4 .Determinants of Administration Reform after 1989  
Twenty-five years of functioning of public administration in Poland 
is a sufficiently long period to ensure that you can ask questions about the 
philosophy of the realized reforms and the effects of their implementation. 
Answers to these questions are neither easy nor unequivocal. Starting the dis-
cussion on this topic, it is worthwhile, however, to refer to the determinants 
of the presented philosophy of reforms.
Thus, it is obvious that the main determinant is the starting plan, which 
is the political system of the Polish People’s Republic, characterized by the lack 
of democracy and the withdrawal of society from a broader activity in the 
public interest. The second determinant is permanent social memory of a Po-
lish statehood history, and especially of the period of the independent Second 
Republic, and quite idealistic assessment of the role of local government and 
its political system. The third determinant is the shape of the political system 
in Poland after 1989, in which, after a short period of a great role of civic com-
mittees created based on the structure of Independent Trade Union Solidarity, 
political parties regained the dominant role. Finally, it should be emphasized 
that the philosophy of decentralization of public administration in Poland is 
greatly influenced by contemporary trends in the reform of public administra-
tion in Europe, i.e. its evolution towards an administration efficient in provi-
ding services for society with the increasing activity of society itself.
If we look at the philosophy of administration reform in Poland after 
1989, we can assume with a certain reservation, that there are two philosophi-
es of these reforms: the philosophy of idealists and the philosophy of pra-
gmatists (realists). At the same time, we can determine time boundaries of 
shaping these philosophies. This first was formulated as early as in the times 
of the Polish People’s Republic, i.e. in the 70s and 80s of the twentieth century 
and during the first term of office of local municipalities and lasted until 1998, 
i.e. until the introduction of legal solutions related to the implementation of 
the second phase of decentralization of public administration.
At this point, let us present only general assumptions of both philosophi-
es. The main assumption of the representatives of the idealistic trend was that 
the manifestation of state administration decentralization would be primari-
ly restoration of local government, i.e. the creation by society of local com-
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munities in task and institutional terms. The sub-system of self-government 
administration was also to contribute to building participatory democracy 
(and not only representative one), and building of a civil society, and thus a 
strong state. On the other hand, pragmatists or realists called for a practical 
approach to the functioning of public administration itself, including its local 
government sub-system. They were prepared to accept decentralization of 
state administration in terms of tasks (not always in a wide range) but at the 
same time they treated self-government institutions (local government bo-
dies) as elements of the political system, and thus the field to widen political 
competition, and as a result, also the executed power. with the current pictu-
re of Polish political scene, this takes the form of – using the Ernest Skalski’s 
term (2008: 15) – „the battle for the ground.“
It should be emphasized that the philosophy of the idealists would have 
no reason to exist if not for the quite common spurt of society in 1980, and 
then the activities of the Independent Self-governing Trade Union Solidarity, 
which quickly started to be called the construction of civil society. Leaders of 
the administration reform inherited from the Polish People’s Republic tied 
their fate with „Solidarity“, and with its ultimate support they realized their 
vision of reactivation of local government in Poland. Even before that they 
were organized in the Seminar „Experience and Future“ operating since 1978. 
In the document Basic principles of the local government reform in Poland, 
adopted on September 2, 1981 by the Team of Local governments and Spatial 
Policy Instruments, operating at the Seminar and Social Committee of Eco-
nomic Reform, we can find many thoughts, which were later practically ref-
lected in the statutory decisions restoring a self-governing municipality. The 
one pertaining to the concept of local self-government emphasizes that it is 
based on the local community: an urban or rural municipality understood as 
a territorial entity and territorial corporation. The criterion for the isolation 
of these units is recognized as follows: „local interest, the existence of own 
specific needs, and satisfying them by the community itself in an autonomous 
way“ (Regulski, 2000: 61). Moreover, the future tasks of local government 
were determined from the perspective of the local community, which is the 
representation of its needs and interests, and the protection of a wider qua-
lity of life. The „appropriately extensive“ range of activities and competences 
allowing to act as a good host of the territory was to be implemented thanks 
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to having the administrative-legal subjectivity and legal personality (for the 
disposal of assets) (Regulski, 2000: 62–65).  
During the „Round Table“ proceedings, the restoration of local govern-
ment was not considered a priority by the solidarity side, while the govern-
ment-coalition side did not accept it because, as Jerzy Regulski wrote (2000: 
59), free elections would mean a takeover of power in municipalities by the 
opposition: „The only possibility that was taken into account was the loss of 
the Communist Party in local elections.“ The author of this assessment did 
not hide his disappointment with the course of the „Round Table“ procee-
dings, and at the same time he expressed the hope that self-government issues 
would soon be appreciated: „The restoration of self-government is necessary 
(...). It is obvious (...). Unfortunately, people in Poland do not know what self-
government of towns and municipalities means, they do not understand its 
essence, they underestimate the importance. The sense of local interest has 
not evolved. Today, it is quite natural that self-government has been obscured 
by the upcoming parliament election. But these issues will surface and will 
become important“ (Regulski, 2000: 216–217).
The determination of supporters of administration decentralization and 
the reactivation of genuine self-government brought effects quite quickly sin-
ce it received the support of the higher chamber of the first term, which on 
July 4, 1989 appointed the Local government Commission, and Jerzy Reguls-
ki became its chairman. On July 29, the higher chamber passed a resolution 
on local government, which states, among others, that: „The higher chamber 
expresses its conviction about the need for genuine self-government of cities 
and municipalities as an essential element of the reconstruction of the politi-
cal and legal system of Poland. The absorption of local government by the lo-
cal organs of state power caused incapacitation of individuals and local com-
munities, their total dependence on the arbitrariness of local representatives 
of state administration, paralysis of individual and group economic and social 
activity, hypertrophy of local administration and bureaucracy“ (klein, 1998: 
29). In the presented resolution, the higher chamber pledged to undertake the 
initiative to prepare relevant draft regulations, and obliged the Local govern-
ment Commission to present, in a short time, legislative work to significantly 
accelerate elections to local governments of towns and municipalities (klein, 
1998: 29). As a result, in the Act of March 8, 1990 on local government Article 
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1 on the creation of the local community by local residents by the rule of law 
was adopted (Journal of Laws of 1990, No. 16, item 95).
The effective side of the first phase of decentralization was not univocally 
assessed because, as Jacek Pokładecki emphasized (2001: 26), in practice, the 
state theory of local government was applied as central authorities deliberate-
ly limited self-government to the level of municipalities, and determined the 
division of powers between the municipal government and the government 
administration. government administration gained an advantage in this divi-
sion. we must agree with this assessment because regional civil servants were 
not satisfied with the scope of decentralization since many evidently local 
matters remained in the hands of the central government, province gover-
nors, or newly created districts (Nawrot & Pokładecki, 2007: 282). That is why, 
the municipal civil servants and their unions and associations (Association of 
Polish Cities, Association of Rural Municipalities of the Republic of Poland, 
Union of Polish Towns) conducted sharp disputes with the governments of 
the Third Republic about the transfer of real funds for the implementation 
of statutory tasks but also about broadening the scope of tasks delegated to 
them. At the same time, a part of municipalities joined the discussion about 
further planned reforms of administration, including the creation of district 
local government units. 
In other words, the system of local government quite quickly managed to 
find its place in the political system created in Poland at that time but it was 
subjectively limited to municipalities which, according to the preamble to the 
higher chamber draft law on local self-government, remained a form of deci-
ding on public matters of local significance, the form which was embedded in 
the structure of the state, they were not opposed to government administra-
tion but on the basis of laws they complementarily participated with it in the 
exercise of public administration (Nawrot and Pokładecki, 2007: 282).  
5.5 .Assumptions, Goals, and Principles of the PAR in 1998 
The introduction of municipal local government in 1990, and equipping 
it with legal personality showed that public tasks can be efficiently and effecti-
vely carried out by the entities other than central government bodies. It tur-
ned out, however, that there was a group of public tasks whose implemen-
tation exceeded the capacity of a single municipality. There was therefore a 
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need to create local communities with the supra-municipal range. In the first 
place, it was proposed to create self-government at the district level. Over 
time, however, the attention was paid to the need to establish self-government 
at the regional level (Chochowski, 2009: 71). 
In shaping the concept of public administration reform in Poland in 
1998, in addition to many public consultations, also opinion shaping local 
government circles had a significant share, undertaking a variety of resolu-
tions, presenting their position on the idea of the local government reform 
and its assumptions. Moreover, the achievements of science and the results 
of public opinion polls conducted by the country’s largest research centers 
(the Centre for Public Opinion Research and the Centre for Research of Pu-
blic Opinion) were taken into account. The work of the Task Force for Regi-
onal Development and the government Plenipotentiary for the Reform of 
the Country’s Economic Centre constituted an important contribution to the 
process of formulating the objectives of the administrative reform. Based on 
the collected opinions and views the main objectives of the reform of public 
administration were formulated as follows:
1. Improving the functioning of the state, including greater efficiency of 
the executive. This consisted in the introduction of strong and efficient 
combined administration, and thus the liquidation of negatively acting 
ministerial administration. In the new system, the responsibility for a 
proper and effective performance of functions of the state (internal secu-
rity, public order) was to be borne by a single public administration body 
– village mayor, mayor, or marshal. An important objective in this area 
was the introduction of a system based on cooperation and agreement 
negotiations and public consultations instead of a hierarchical system.
2. Building the institutions of democratic control of civil society at all 
levels of the major territorial division of the country. This would 
mean the introduction of community representation to new admi-
nistrative units through the establishment of councils at the district 
and provincial levels elected in local elections. An important tool in 
this regard would be the institution of local referendum, and building 
of a legal basis for the so-called civil service. 
3. Regulating the territorial system through the creation of additional 
tiers of local government; a district, which would perform tasks bey-
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ond the capabilities of a single municipality, and a province, capable 
of conducting regional policy and executing the tasks of supra-local 
nature. The new self-government structures were also supposed to 
help in adapting the country to the EU standards. 
4. Another objective was decentralization of public finances, so that the 
sum of the budgets at all levels of local government accounted for 
25% of public expenditure.
5. Another important objective of the administration reform in 1998 was 
to adapt the country’s territorial organization and local government 
structures to the standards common in the EU, which would facilitate 
the use of legal and economic instruments of the EU aimed at the deve-
lopment of regional and interregional cooperation. The establishment 
of a self-governing region would give a chance for effective cross-bor-
der and interregional cooperation. This would allow to obtain signifi-
cant funding under the equalization of economic disparities between 
the actors of regional policy (Słobodzian, 2007: 134−140).
It is also important to indicate the most important principles on which 
the administrative reform was based. The new system of territorial admi-
nistration in Poland was to be based on the principle of subsidiarity and the 
principle of the unitary character of the state. The principle of subsidiarity 
as a basis for the organization of the state regulated by the Constitution 
of 1997 meant that no government should interfere with citizens or social 
groups in setting and implementing their tasks. The aim of every govern-
ment is to stimulate, mobilize, promote, and supplement the activities of 
entities that cannot cope with the given case. Subsidiarity contributed to 
the construction of local government structures by transferring tasks to 
be implemented independently to lower levels of local administration. The 
principle of subsidiarity was also to introduce the order of determining the 
rights and obligations of government entities, involving the division of cer-
tain tasks between different forms of public authority (Słobodzian, 2007: 
134−140).
The other principle on which the public administration reform in Po-
land was based was the principle of territorial integrity of the state. This 
principle was also guaranteed in the Constitution, Article 3, guaranteeing 
the full and exclusive sovereignty of the state as a whole. The realization of 
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the principle of unitarity of the state was ensured mainly by 1) a single and 
uniform legal system created by the parliament, and not by the local govern-
ment; 2) uniform citizenship associated with the state, and not with local 
government units; 3) uniform rules for the organization of public adminis-
tration apparatus which would be responsible for the implementation of ge-
neral national interests at every level of the territorial division; 4) statutory 
definition of systemic principles of local and regional government, pertai-
ning to the system of bodies, their mutual relationships, composition, mode 
of appointment and supervision; 5) functioning of administrative courts 
in the system of supervision of local government which guarantee the pro-
tection of citizens against unlawful decisions (Słobodzian, 2007: 144−146).
The public administration reform of 1998 introduced in Poland a clear 
separation of functions of public authority among three main segments of 
the state administration system: 1) local government (in rural and urban 
areas and in districts) primarily responsible for meeting collective needs of 
local communities; 2) regional government (in provinces) responsible for 
regional development policy; 3) government and government administra-
tion (central and local) responsible for nationwide matters, as well as for law 
enforcement and supervision of local government (province governors) in 
this area. In addition, the reform led to a number of sectoral reforms in va-
rious fields, including in police, fire services, education, social welfare sys-
tem, which as a result of the reform fell under the decentralized board. For 
the purpose of the reform of 1998, several basic laws of systemic character 
were introduced, among them the Public Finance Act and the Act on Civil 
Service. Moreover, nearly 200 laws in force were amended. In 2000, the Act 
on the Principles of Promoting Regional Development was adopted, which 
complemented the earlier regional legislation (kulesza, 2000: 83). 
Following M. kulesza (2000; 83), we should assume that the admi-
nistrative reform in the 1990s in Poland broke three major monopolies of 
the totalitarian communist state: the political monopoly of a single party, 
the already mentioned principle of unified state power, and the principle 
of a single state ownership fund, which were followed by the decentrali-
zation of state administration and state finances. This resulted in a thorough 
reconstruction of the public sector – including, in particular, the principles 
of political governance, and the principles of organization and delivery of 
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key public services and execution of administrative tasks. The effects of the 
public administration reform of 1998 took place in several key areas of socio-
economic life:
 − In the social sphere, there was an exponential growth of non-govern-
mental organizations and initiatives, local media and other forms of 
self-organization of society (Sługocki, 2004: 395−398); 
 − In the political sphere, local government became a very good democra-
tic tool to shape new local and regional elites, which took control over 
the operation of numerous institutions of public life and public ser-
vices, and accountability in this respect, and forged nationwide elites; 
 − In the sphere of public property, a large part of state property was 
municipalized, which resulted in the development of real estate mar-
ket, technical infrastructure was substantially expanded, and a base of 
rational management of public assets was created;
 − In the financial sphere, development of public fund management 
(both on the local and general scale) and of supporting institutions 
with the entire capital market, which allowed decentralization of regi-
onal development policy (Niezgoda, 2009: 353−366);
 − In the administrative sphere, management mechanisms in many areas 
of administration and public services were decentralized, including 
in the sphere of public order protection and collective security, which 
was subjected, together with other areas, to the control of the civil 
power;
 − In the sphere of local government institutions, new planes for coope-
ration of public, private, and NgOs partners were created in order to 
jointly establish local development;
In the sphere of inter-state cooperation, development cooperation 
between Polish local government units and partners from other countries 
was established (kulesza, 2000: 80). 
The reconstruction of the state administration system is usually a diffi-
cult and complex process encountering organizational, legal as well as social, 
political, or economic obstacles on its way. when the administrative reform 
in Poland began in 1989, it was accompanied by a widespread acceptance of 
the idea of self-governance characterized by the formation of municipalities 
able to self-administer matters that are important to the residents. Over the 
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next few years, discussions took place regarding the creation of an optimal 
model to realize this idea (Rączka, Szalewska & Jędrzejewski, 2000: 102−106).
5.6. Importance of the Concepts of Territorial Divisions in the Public 
Administration Reform
what is crucial nowadays for the course and organization of the pro-
cess of public management is a way of organizing field administration: lo-
cal and regional, scope of its duties, powers, and competences. One of the 
essential elements of the organization of administration is the territorial 
division, which is set in order to achieve better organized and efficient rea-
lization of public tasks. It can be assumed that functioning of independent 
territorial units, smaller than the state, with their own authority facilitates 
better understanding and identification of social needs, and more rational 
decisions and projects implemented by local officials in charge.
The issue of the proper division of the state is very complicated. Num-
ber of degrees of territorial division, size of individual units, size of their 
population, course of administrative boundaries are all the elements whose 
adequate planning and territorial distribution should contribute to the pro-
per attendance of the population by public administration, and facilitate the 
process of stimulating local and regional development.
Territorial division means a relatively permanent partition of a coun-
try made with the use of legal norms in order to determine the territorial 
basis of activities of organizational units of the state and local government 
units. Territorial division plays an ancillary role to public administration. 
In making this division, usually geographical, economic, cultural, urbani-
zation factors, etc., are taken into account but the most essential factor is the 
realization of the function of public administration (or functions of other 
public entities). Due to the dynamics of public administration, the territo-
rial division can be characterized as relatively permanent because it evolves 
with changes in the way of functioning / action of administration (Tarno, 
Sieniuć, Sulimierski & wyporska, 2002: 20). 
In the practice of functioning of the state and its administration, there 
are three kinds of territorial divisions: major territorial division, auxiliary 
territorial division, and special territorial division.
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Following Zbigniew Rykiel (1993: 50−51), we can assume that in the 
history of Poland in the 20th century four main political-systemic models 
of the state developed, and point out what role in each of these models was 
assigned to public administration, particularly to local government: 
1. A temporary model, lasting from the 14th century, in which districts 
appeared, and which finally formed in the 30s of the 20th century af-
ter the unification of administrative systems of the partitioning po-
wers. Rykiel (1993: 50−51) argues that this model was a compromise 
between the model of self-government and the centralized model. 
This provisional and constantly criticized solution survived until the 
end of the 40s. 
2. A totalitarian model, introduced in the 50s, which externalized the 
political system ideal of people’s democracy. 
3. An authoritarian model, introduced in 1975, which externalized the 
political system ideal of a „developed socialist state.“ 
4. A paternalistic model, which was introduced in 1990. This model was 
based on the creation of the municipality as the primary and, at the 
same time, only local government unit with an elaborate structure of 
central administration in the field.
In the process of creating public administration units, in particular, at 
the level of district local government, certain conditions were taken into 
account. włodzimierz Zając (1999: 46) enumerates the following conditions, 
which guided the process of creating districts in 1998:
1. Establishing of and preserving supra-municipal functions in relation 
to the municipalities, which were to become part of the district (e.g. 
high schools); 
2. Economic potential of the proposed district, which translates into the 
possibility of providing public services;
3. Historical and cultural conditions;
4. Acceptance of local communities regarding the district geographical 
coverage and its seat;
5. geographical conditions, including the settlement network and its nature;
6. Number of municipalities forming the district on the assumption 
that there should be fewer than 5;
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7. Population of the future district for which the lowest adopted limit 
was 50,000;
8. Area of the district.
In addition to the major territorial division, there are also auxiliary and 
special divisions in Poland. The auxiliary division is such a territorial divi-
sion, which is made for the bodies which are not independent in relation to 
major authorities (Nowacka, 1997: 65). This division is fully complementary 
in relation to the basic division because in its framework these tasks of local 
government units, whose performance in the major distribution is irrational, 
should be implemented. The creation of auxiliary units by municipalities, and 
thus the introduction of the auxiliary division is optional. The legislature also 
does not prejudge the extent to which municipalities can exercise the power 
to create auxiliary units. 
Municipality auxiliary units include village councils, estates, and 
neighborhoods. An auxiliary unit is created by a municipal council by reso-
lution after consultation with the residents, or on the initiative of residents. 
Principles of the creation, merger, division, and abolition of auxiliary units 
are specified in the statute of the municipality.
In turn, special divisions are made for the needs of certain public admi-
nistration structures. They are carried out mainly due to the nature of non-
combined government administration for which the main territorial division 
is not always sufficient (knosala, 2006: 103). Legal bases of special divisions 
are contained mainly in the laws governing the system of individual structu-
res of government administration. It should be noted that although the majo-
rity of cases of special territorial divisions are established for the needs of pu-
blic administration, special divisions are also created for the benefit of entities 
not belonging to public administration (e.g. for the judicial system).
5.7. Structure, Organization, and Functions of Public                
Administration in Poland
Public administration in Poland is divided into government administra-
tion and self-government administration. government departments consist of 
bodies (offices) and other public entities appointed to perform tasks in the field 
of public administration, subordinate to the supreme administrative bodies, 
160 Public AdministrAtion reforms in eAstern euroPeAn union member stAtes 
Post-Accession convergence And divergence
i.e.: the Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers, and individual ministers. 
government administration is centralized through the hierarchical personal, 
organizational, and official subordination of lower level bodies to higher-le-
vel bodies. In addition, superior bodies are entitled to exercise control and 
supervision of lower level units, and to obtain information on their activities. 
The Constitution does not divide government administration bodies into the 
supreme government administration bodies and central government adminis-
tration bodies. However, relevant normative acts, i.e. laws and regulations, re-
fer de facto to such a division (kociubiński, 2012: 14−21). The diagram below 
illustrates the overall structure of public administration in Poland.
Figure 5.1: Structure of Public Administration in Poland
Source: own study on the basis of Act on Government Administration Ope-
ration of 4 September 1997 (Journal of Laws of 1997, No. 141, item 943).
5.7.1. Government Administration
Supreme government administration bodies are the bodies that are part 
of the Council of Ministers. The bodies, which are the supreme government 
administration bodies, occupy a superior position among the others, and are 
appointed by the lower chamber of the parliament or by the president. Central 
bodies of government administration are not part of the Council of Ministers, 
and their appointment does not require a decision of the lower chamber of 
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the parliament or the president but only of a supreme body of government 
administration. There are two levels of administration: the central and local 
one. Supreme and central bodies of government administration constitute the 
central level. The local level is composed of local bodies of government admi-
nistration subordinated to the province governor (combined administration) 
and local bodies of non-combined administration subordinated to the direct 
superiority of ministers or central government administration bodies.
Prime Minister 
The Prime Minister exercises supreme official sovereignty over govern-
ment administration employees. The activity of the Prime Minister in this 
respect involves nomination, inspection, and supervision of employees in the 
government administration sector. Several institutions are subordinated to the 
Prime Minister over which he/she exercises a direct supervision. His/her su-
pervision covers the activity of Central Statistical Office, Polish Committee for 
Standardization, Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, Internal Se-
curity Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency, Central Anti-Corruption Bu-
reau, and Public Procurement Office. The Prime Minister also oversees Central 
Commission for Applications and Titles, Public Opinion Research Centre, Fi-
nancial Supervision Commission, National School of Public Administration, 
Polish Academy of Sciences, Polish Committee for Standardization, Council 
for Refugees, government Security Centre, government Legislation Centre, 
and Office of the Committee for European Integration. The Prime Minister is 
also the head of the civil service. The civil service includes people employed 
in the government administration structures. The essence of the civil service 
manifests itself mainly in delegating tasks to professionally prepared officials 
characterized by impartiality and total political neutrality. Other forms of so-
vereignty of the Prime Minister are competences related to the appointment 
and dismissal of the Head of the Civil Service, and the obligation of the Head 
of the Civil Service to present the annual report. The Civil Service Council – an 
advisory body – is also subordinated to the Prime Minister.
Council of Ministers
Each minister, in addition to being a member of the Council of Minis-
ters, is also an independent body of government administration. In terms of 
administration, the Council of Ministers directs overall government adminis-
tration. This involves coordination and control of operation of both the entire 
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system of government as well as its individual components. Directing in this 
case is a form of government activity encompassing a series of steps aimed at 
ensuring uniform implementation of the policy determined by the govern-
ment and by the entities located in the government administration sector in 
relation to which the Council of Ministers has a superior position with a hi-
erarchical subordination. It also involves undertaking inspection activities. 
Inspecting the activities of subordinate entities means that the Council of Mi-
nisters may, inter alia, request the Supreme Chamber of Control to inspect the 
indicated entities. Overall management, coordination, and control concern 
the central state administration bodies to which the Council of Ministers and 
the Prime Ministers are superior bodies.
Ministers can be divided into two groups: ministers in charge of parti-
cular departments of government administration, and ministers performing 
tasks assigned by the Prime Minister (i.e. the ministers without portfolio).
The departments of government were literally mentioned in the Act on 
government Administration and include the following departments: public 
administration; construction, spatial and housing management; budget; pu-
blic finances; economy; maritime; water management; financial institutions; 
computerization; Polish membership in the EU; culture and heritage conser-
vation; physical culture; communication; science; national defense; education 
and upbringing; job; agriculture; rural development; regional development; 
agricultural markets; fishery; Treasury; justice; higher education; transport; 
tourism; environment; family; internal affairs; religious denominations, na-
tional and ethnic minorities; social security; foreign affairs; health.
Central bodies of Government Administration
Central bodies are directly subordinated to supreme bodies, and are 
appointed, dismissed, and supervised by these bodies. They are created on the 
basis of laws or regulations of the Council of Ministers. Therefore, central bo-
dies do not have certain competences attributed to the ministers (the right to 
issue regulations for example). The tasks of central government bodies are laid 
down by the laws or regulations on the appointment of these bodies. The range 
of action of central bodies covers the area of the whole country. Central bodies 
are individual or collective bodies most often bearing names such as president, 
chairman, chief, chief inspector, and CEO. government administration tasks 
(i.e. the matters for which the government is directly or indirectly responsible) 
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are performed at the central level by over 100 units of varying statuses, sizes, 
organizational structures, and scopes of tasks. Among the most recognizable 
central government bodies are: Central Commission for Academic Degrees 
and Titles, President of the Central Statistical Office, Polish Committee for 
Standardization, President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Pro-
tection, President of the Polish Patent Office, President of the Office of Public 
Procurement, Council for Refugees, government Security Centre, Commis-
sioner for Patients’ Rights, Head of the Internal Security Agency, and Head 
of the Intelligence Agency, Head of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, Na-
tional Atomic Energy Agency, and Police Headquarters. 
Province Governor
According to the Act of January 29, 2009 on the Province governor and 
government Administration in the Province (Journal of Laws of 2009, No. 31, 
item 206) the province governor is a representative of the Council of Minis-
ters in the province. The province governor as a representative of the Council 
of Ministers is responsible for the implementation of government policies in 
the province. He/she is appointed and dismissed by the Prime Minister on the 
request of the Minister of Public Administration. The Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Public Administration oversee the province governor’s activities, 
and make a periodic assessment of his/her work. This supervision is to ensure 
the compliance by the governor not only with law but also with the government 
policies, including instructions and guidance received from the Prime Minister. 
Any disputes between the governors and between the provincial governor and 
the member of the Council of Ministers or the central government administra-
tive body are settled by the Prime Minister. The province governor performs 
the following functions: he/she is a representative of the Council of Ministers in 
the province; acts as a superior unit of combined government administration; 
is the supervisory authority of local government units; is a higher-level body; 
represents the State Treasury. The governor’s supervision of local government 
units lies in the fact that the province governor may waive all illegal resolutions 
adopted by every level of local government. In addition, the province governor 
is responsible for monitoring the performance of government administration 
tasks by local government bodies. In this regard, the province governor acts as 
an appeal body for decisions of the municipality, taken in matters of govern-
ment administration commissioned to the municipality (gąciarz, 2006: 199). 
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Combined Provincial Government Administration 
According to the Act of January 29, 2009 on the Province governor and 
government Administration in the Province (Journal of Laws of 2009, No. 31, 
item 206) combined government administration encompasses the provincial 
governor (implementing competence with the help of the provincial office) 
and managers of combined services, inspections, and guards carrying out their 
tasks under the authority of the governor (offices, inspectorates, and units of 
these services are an apparatus which assists the managers). Combining per-
tains to those bodies which are assigned with inspection activity, supervisory, 
and control functions. The budgets of combined provincial administration, 
including income and expenditure of the provincial budget of the combined 
organizational units of services, inspections, and guards, are included in the 
part of the state budget covering the budget of the relevant governor. 
The province governor directs the activity of combined government 
administration, and is responsible for the results of their actions. The province 
governor has a decisive influence on the cast of the most important positions 
in combined provincial administration. It is expressed in the fact that he/she 
appoints and dismisses managers of combined provincial services, inspections, 
and guards (except for the commanders of the police, and fire-fighters who are 
appointed and dismissed at the request of chief commanders of the police and 
fire service by the Minister of Interior, while the province governor only evalua-
tes the candidates). The bodies of combined provincial government adminis-
tration are: Provincial Police Commander, Provincial Fire Service Commander, 
Superintendent of Education, Provincial Inspector of Agricultural and Food 
Quality, Provincial Inspector of geodetic Supervision, Provincial Inspector 
of Pharmaceutical Inspection, Provincial Inspector of Trade Inspection, Pro-
vincial Inspector of Building Supervision, Provincial Inspector of Road Trans-
port, Provincial Conservator of Historical Monuments, Provincial Inspector of 
Environmental Protection, Provincial Sanitary Inspector, Provincial Inspector 
of Veterinary Medicine, and Provincial Inspector of Plant Health and Seeds. 
The above-mentioned bodies of combined government administration in the 
province carry out their tasks and competences with the help of the provincial 
office. In order to make the activities of combined administration bodies more 
efficient, the province governor mayestablish delegation offices in the field that 
support them. A detailed organization of combined government administra-
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tion in the province is defined by the provincial office statute enforced by the 
governor (gąciarz, 2006: 199).  
Non-combined Local Government Administration Bodies 
According to the Act of January 29, 2009 on the Province governor and 
government Administration in the Province (Journal of Laws of 2009, No. 
31, item 206) non-combined administration bodies are composed of field 
delegations of government bodies, and are subordinated to ministerial de-
partments. Non-combined administration bodies are established exclusively 
by a regulation, and are usually based on the principle of centralization. The 
appointment and dismissal of non-combined administration bodies takes pla-
ce, however, at the request of the governor or with his consent. The province 
governor also has coordinating, consultative, and, in special cases, controlling 
competences in relation to these bodies. Non-combined administration bodies 
operating in the province are obliged to consult draft local laws with the pro-
vincial governor, and ensure compliance of their activities with the instructions 
of the governor. Moreover, non-combined administration bodies are required 
to submit to the governor annual and current information about their activities 
in the province. Non-combined administration bodies include: commanders of 
military districts, heads of provincial military staffs, army recruiting comman-
ders, directors of customs chambers, and heads of customs offices, directors of 
tax chambers, heads of tax offices, directors of fiscal control offices, directors 
of regional mining authorities and specialized mining authorities, directors of 
regional offices of measures and heads of peripheral offices of measures, direc-
tors of regional assay offices, directors of regional water management boards, 
directors of maritime offices, directors of statistical offices, directors of inland 
waterways, border and district veterinarians, commanders of Border guard di-
visions, commanders of watchtowers and commanders of Border guard units 
and squadrons, local inspectors of sea fishery, state border sanitary inspectors, 
and regional directors for environmental protection (gąciarz, 2006: 199). 
5.7.2. Self-government Administration
After the public administration reform of 1998 there is a major three-le-
vel territorial division in Poland. It was established both for local government 
administration bodies and bodies of self-government units. The effective Polish 
territorial division is a consequence of the progressive decentralization of public 
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administration and the establishment of new territorial units with their own 
authority, tasks, finance, property, and legal personality (gąciarz, 2006: 199). 
This new three-level administrative division of the country into municipalities, 
districts, and provinces finally came into force on January 1, 1999, pursuant to 
the provisions of the Act of July 24, 1998 on the Introduction of the Three-Level 
Division of the Country (Journal of Laws of 1998, No 96, item 603). 
This Act  introduced 16 provinces, 308 rural districts, and 65 city dis-
tricts – townships (the city takes over the district’s powers and tasks, proper-
ty, and resources necessary for the implementation of these tasks, there are 
no separate authorities for the district since the city authorities exercise these 
responsibilities) and 2,489 municipalities.
Apart from government administration and local government units, 
there are also other entities having a specific meaning in the process of admi-
nistration (some of them, however, do not belong to the so-called public sec-
tor). In Poland these are, among others:
•	 Public undertakings,
•	 government agencies,
•	 Public foundations,
•	 Economic self-government chambers,
•	 Professional self-government chambers,
•	 Agricultural self-government chambers,
•	 Social organizations, associations, and others (Lenik, 2012: 64−66).
5.7.3. Regional Self-government
Self-governance at the regional level, which was introduced by law on 
January 1, 1999 (the Act of July 24, 1998 on the Introduction of the Three-Level 
Division of the Country), determined the shape of new territorial division of 
the country, as a result of which 16 new provinces were established. The le-
gislative action taken then might be called regional decentralization, resulting 
in the appointment of new authorities at the regional level without disturbing 
the structure of the state. Its essence consisted of granting the status of an in-
dependent entity of spatial and regional policy to provincial self-governments. 
Because of the second phase of decentralization reform Mazovian Province was 
founded in the territorial and socio-economic space of the country – a region 
with the highest economic, population, and scientific potential, and a relatively 
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high standard of living. It should be noted that the potential of Mazovian Pro-
vince results primarily from the functions played by warsaw metropolis distan-
cing itself from other areas of the province (Struzik, 2008: 11−22).
Provincial government operates according to the following regulations: 
Polish Constitution, Act on Provincial Self-government, Act on Principles of 
Development Policy, Act on Spatial Planning and Development, and so-cal-
led Departmental Acts assigning specific tasks to self-government.
The scope of provincial government operation is quite precisely defined 
by the Act of June 5, 1998 on Provincial Self-government. Provisions contai-
ned therein determine the structure of province, competencies of province 
government bodies, matters of property and finance as well as international 
cooperation and supervision of the operations.
It should be noted that in accordance with statutory provisions (Article 
11, Paragraph 2 of the Act on Provincial Self-government) the primary duty 
of provincial government is to conduct development policy, which consists of 
the entirety of issues in the field of the impact of local authorities.
The most important tasks of provincial government are as follows: 
•	 Creating the conditions for economic development in the province, 
including the support for technological progress and innovation,
•	 Maintenance and expansion of provincial social and technical infras-
tructure, 
•	 Shaping the environment and stimulating sustainable development, 
•	 Investing in the development of human resources – in the sphere of 
education, science and culture, 
•	 Initiating activities aimed at social integration and combating social 
exclusion (Struzik, 2008: 11−22).
In general, the essence of self-governing province is thus reflected in the 
Act on Provincial Self-government. According to the provisions of this Act, 
provincial government should be understood as „a regional self-governing 
community and a relevant territory“, where it is noted, „in accordance with 
law whereas the residents of the province form a regional self-governing com-
munity.“ Bodies of this self-government are the province council and the pro-
vince board directed by the province marshal. The scope of responsibilities of 
provincial government comprises public tasks of provincial nature, which are 
not reserved, by law, for the government bodies. The scope of activities relates 
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generally to pursuing policy of regional development and providing services 
to the regional community (Jaźwiński, 2010: 21−26). 
5.7.4 Essence of Territorial Self-government
Territorial self-government is an association of the local population, 
which is separated in the structure of the state, established by the law, appoin-
ted to exercise public administration, and equipped with material resources 
to carry out tasks assigned to it (Przywojska, 2014: 23). 
Currently, the municipality as the basic unit of local government was 
created by the law, i.e. a separated association of the local community – a ter-
ritorial self-governing corporation, established to exercise part of public tasks 
(exercise public administration), and equipped with material means to carry 
out these tasks (Niewiadomski, 1999: 27). Zbigniew Niewiadomski (1999: 27) 
states that the separation of municipality has a dual dimension. On the one 
hand, it is an organizational separation manifested by the fact that the muni-
cipality is a separate structure with its own elected authorities; on the other 
hand, this separation is reflected in a separate legal personality, which entails 
that the municipality can be the subject of property rights.
Agnieszka korzeniowska and Ryszard krawczyk (2004: 26) define the 
municipality as a unit of local government, constituting a special kind of so-
cio-economic system, a so-called territorial self-governing corporation of 
public law whose essential elements are: 1) residents creating local municipal 
community; 2) area occupied by the municipality – the territory; 3) authority 
exercised by democratically elected municipal bodies; 4) possession of orga-
nizational units. To the essential characteristics of local self-government, Pio-
tr Rączka also adds public administration tasks for the performance of which 
local authorities have been established (Rączka, 2003: 60, Prais, 1998: 1). 
Following Bogdan Dolnicki (2000: 154–158), it should be stated that a su-
bject of local government is the local community living in the area, and organi-
zed in a local government association. In addition, the legal personality, which 
the unit of local government has, constitutes the subject of local government.
The essence of local government, in addition to the local community and 
the status of legal personality, consists also of the legal status of authorities of 
this unit. Local government authorities act through their bodies (Brunka, ku-
morek & Łuczak-kumorek, 2003: 229). For example, pursuant to Article 8 of 
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the District Act, district bodies are the district council and the district board. 
Although the Act on District government does not give the status of the body 
to the district governor, he/she acts in such a role when he/she issues decisi-
ons in individual cases in the field of public administration which belong to 
the competences of the district (Zieliński, 2004: 67).
The essence of local government is also determined by the definition of its 
subject. The subject of the municipal government is, firstly, the territory of mu-
nicipality, and, secondly, the tasks carried out by the municipality. The territory 
of local government is a key element of separation of a self-governing unit. It is 
a space delimited by boundaries of the major territorial division within which 
the sovereignty of local community extends (Jaworska-Dębska, 2009: 243–252).
The other elements constituting the subject of local government are the 
tasks carried out by the self-governing municipality, district, and province. 
The tasks of local government are public tasks imposed by the law, and consist 
in satisfying the needs of local residents using statutorily and non-statutorily 
defined funds, and these tasks cannot violate the scope of activity of other 
local government units (Brunka and kumorek and Łuczak-kumorek, 2003: 
391). The tasks of local government were settled, firstly, by the laws governing 
the operation of various local government units and, secondly, by the special 
laws (Journal of Laws of 2003, No. 207, item 2016).
In general, the task of local government in Poland can be divided into 
two categories. On the one hand, these are the tasks listed in local govern-
ment acts, and on the other hand, the assigned tasks in the domain of govern-
ment administration (Leoński, 2004: 139–140).
5.7.5.  Functions of Public Administration and Territorial                       
Self-government
Analyzing the functions fulfilled by the local government, we should pay 
attention to the general functions of public administration in the framework of 
which the activities of local government units fit in. Not always, however, are 
these functions identical. The concept of administration functions should be 
distinguished from the objectives of administration or its tasks, although the-
se are synonymous concepts. A function is an intermediate term between the 
objective and the task (Dictionary of the Polish Language, 1995: 220, 580). Thus, 
for example, in planning local development as well as in the functioning of lo-
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cal administration, the objectives (they can be, for instance, divided into main, 
partial, and operational objectives) are rather general categories constituting 
certain guidelines to be implemented by means of specific functions and tasks. 
Tadeusz kuta (1991: 7–8) defines administration functions as „mapping of the 
basic objectives, and assigning them intermediate objectives. This mapping is 
expressed in the activities of administration which are durable (continuous rat-
her than one-off) and multi-agent, i.e. can occur in various sections of the orga-
nizational structure of public administration, and may have a different subject.“ 
Tadeusz kuta (1992: 7–8) identifies three basic functions of adminis-
tration. These are regulatory-administrative, organizational, and executive 
functions. The same author gives another division of functions of public admi-
nistration: 1) political functions; 2) social and culture-generating functions; 
3) functions in the field of organizing economic relations; and 4) regulatory 
functions. In order to comprehensively show the types of functions of public 
administration we should present another division made by Jacek wojnic-
ki. The author divides administrative functions into: 1) planning function 
(formulation of objectives, ways, and methods of implementation); 2) poli-
ce function (administration protects generally accepted values, public order, 
and safety); 3) function of service provision; 4) economic function (direct 
business activity or support for private enterprises); 5) fiscal function (enfor-
cement and collection of levies and taxes) (wojnicki, 2003: 29).
It should be noted that the last division of functions of public adminis-
tration is closest to the specificity of local government operation. This does 
not mean, however, that we can ignore other classifications of functions. Ta-
king into account a number of factors that determine the specificity of local 
government operation in Poland, we can differentiate the following functions:
1. Planning function;
2. Service provision function;
3. Executive-administrative function;
4. Economic function;
5. Political function.
The fiscal function, that is very important from the point of view of mu-
nicipal government, has no practical use for district government, of course, 
mainly because the district (except for city districts) does not have the right 
to enforce and collect local taxes in the structure of its income.
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The planning function is very important from the point of view of soci-
al and economic development of local government unit. The plan (strategy 
– they mean the same in this case) should be understood as a document 
serving to the realization of local development that was created for the ne-
eds of local government, and adopted by the resolution of constitutive body 
(Brunka and kumorek and Łuczak-kumorek, 2003: 378). Planning is the de-
finition given to the objectives which the given local government unit should 
achieve in order to develop. These are the main, intermediate, and partial 
objectives (Domański, 1999: 31).
In the framework of planning policy, which is a consequence of the 
implementation of the above-indicated functions of planning, local govern-
ment prepares the following exemplary strategies and plans:
1. Economic development strategy;
2. Local development strategy;
3. Tourism development strategy;
4. Program of crime prevention and public order;
5. Program of combating unemployment;
6. Program of environment protection;
7. Eco-energy strategy;
8. Program of sustainable development and environmental protection;
9. waste management program;
10. Investment programs.
The above-mentioned documents are always adopted by the council of 
local government units by a resolution, thus should be included to the facul-
tative and compulsory documents. The preparation of documents, such as 
an environmental protection program and waste management program, re-
sult from the obligation imposed on local government by the Environmen-
tal Protection Act, waste Management Act. It is up to municipality bodies 
whether they prepare, for instance, an economic development program or a 
tourism development strategy. 
Another function of the district is service provision. Tadeusz kuta 
(1992: 20) makes a general division of services in the field of social security, 
education, culture, youth education, environmental protection, and public 
utilities. generally, the types of services (tasks) provided by the local go-
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vernment can be divided into several groups. These include:
1. Social infrastructure, which includes public education, health care, 
and social assistance;
2. Technical infrastructure, which includes public transport and public 
roads;
3. Public order and citizens’ security which includes fire protection, flo-
od control, and real assets management;
4. Organizational activities aimed at solving local problems, for exam-
ple, in the case of district local government – fighting unemployment, 
activation of local labor market, consumer right protection, suppor-
ting disabled people, and promotion of the district outside (Zieliński, 
2004: 55–56).
The executive-administrative function of local government consists mainly 
in the exercise of the existing law by the local government bodies, issuance of 
certain legal norms as well as managing and directing the municipality (kuta, 
1992: 42). The issuance of legal acts focuses on acts which have a lower rank than 
a regulation, i.e. the acts of local law. Local government authorities are obliged to 
act based on the rule of law-abidingness, contained in the provision of Article 7 
of the Constitution („The organs of public authority shall function on the basis 
of, and within the limits of, the law“), that is, to execute legal acts which concern 
them. Supervision over the activities of local government in terms of legality is 
exercised by the Prime Minister and the province governor (kisiel, 2003: 30).
The local government’s business function manifests itself, on the one 
hand, in the possibility of conducting, under certain conditions, economic 
activity by the local government, on the other hand, in the role of local go-
vernment in the development of entrepreneurship on its territory. Pursuant 
to Article 165 of the Constitution, the municipality possesses legal personali-
ty and rights of ownership and other property rights. The Constitution is the 
guarantor of legally protected independence of local government (Journal of 
Laws of 1997, No. 78, item 483). These guarantees provide the basis for con-
ducting economic activity by the local government.
Another manifestation of the realization of economic function of local 
government is its role in the development of entrepreneurship. The basis for 
such activity is mainly created by the Act on Freedom of Economic Activity of 
July 2, 2004. For example, Article 8, Paragraph 1 of the Act states that „Public 
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administration authorities shall support the development of entrepreneurship 
by creating favorable conditions for entrepreneurs to undertake and conduct 
economic activities, and in particular, they shall support micro, small, and me-
dium-sized enterprises“ (Journal of Laws of 2004, No. 173, item 1807). 
The last of the analyzed functions is the political function of local go-
vernment. From the point of view of the interests of local community and 
the effectiveness of tasks realized by the local government it is not the most 
important function but rather inherent in the operation of this level of public 
administration. The political function of local government is mainly connected 
to the issue of elections to district bodies. It concerns both direct election of 
members of constitutive bodies and the executive body in the case of the mu-
nicipality. The discussed element is also connected with staffing, creating major 
personal positions and functions in the office and its organizational units. An 
important determinant of this function is also the issue of the functioning of 
local government bodies, namely the impact of political factors on the decision-
making process.
5.7.6. Direct Democracy in Local Government
In the process of execution of tasks entrusted to the local governments 
public authorities, constitutive and executive bodies play a key role. Re-
sidents of municipalities, districts and provinces have been authorized to 
make decisions in the popular vote – elections and a referendum (direct 
democracy), or through the authorities of these units (indirect democracy 
– representative). Referendum is an important way of residents’ decision-
making sanctioned by the Constitution of the Republic of Poland under the 
Article 170. It is also mentioned in the Act of September 15, 2000 on a Local 
Referendum (Journal of Laws of 2000, No. 88, item 985). It has a decisive, 
but not a consultative character. Through a referendum, members of the 
community express their will as to matters concerning their community. 
There are two types of referenda. The first of them is obligatorily organized 
in matters of self-taxation of residents for public purposes, and in cases of 
dismissal of a local government body which has been appointed in direct 
elections. This is a very important right as it gives the opportunity for dis-
missal of constituting bodies of the self-governing municipality, district and 
province before the end of term. This way of dismissal pertains also to the 
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municipality executive body, but in this case, the referendum can be carried 
out on the initiative of the municipal council. The other type is optional, 
and can be carried out on any other matter concerning the local community 
in the range of tasks and powers of the given local government body.
general elections are another manifestation of direct democracy. 
Constitutive bodies of all local government units have been elected in this 
way, and since 2002 also the municipal executive body. Principles and pro-
cedures for holding elections to councils and the province council are speci-
fied in the Act of January 5, 2011 on the Electoral Code (Journal of Laws of 
2011, No. 21, item 112). Executive bodies of district and provincial govern-
ments are chosen through indirect elections, e.i. by a decision of councils 
and local councils of these units (Przywojska, 2014: 24–27).   
5.8. Public Finances
Public finances are defined, firstly, as financial resource at the disposal 
of a public law entity, secondly, as a kind of mechanism which makes it pos-
sible for a public law entity to use the financial resources (kępa, 1999: 73, 
Małkiewicz, 1999: 28–23). The Public Finance Act defines public finances in 
a similar way as processes connected with the accumulation and allocation 
of public resources. These processes, in particular, consist of: 1) collection of 
public income and revenue; 2) spending of public funds; 3) financing state 
budget the borrowing needs; 4) incurring obligations involving public funds; 
5) management of public funds; 6) management of public debt; 7) settlements 
with the budget of the EU (Journal of Laws of  2009, No. 157 item 1240).
Finance is the most important instrument of local public administra-
tion operation. It would be impossible to realize any function without it. 
Public finance is closely related to the concept of financial activity of public 
administration, which involves collection and spending of financial resour-
ces in order to take them over and distribute them to public tasks, which 
are largely determined by the political factors (Jastrzębska, 2000: 29−30). 
we can distinguish four functions of financial activity in the public sector:
1. Fiscal function that is the accumulation of income;
2. Redistributive – distributive function consisting in the distribution 
of the gross domestic product;
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3. Stimulation – stimuli function associated with the collection and 
spending of funds by the public sector; 
4. Control-information function, which consists of automatic trans-
mission of information on the regularities and irregularities in the 
area of financial activity (kępa, 1999: 73).
Apart from the financial activities of public sector, it is also worth 
paying attention to the general principles of public finance system which, in 
particular, refer to the local government sector. E. kornberger-Sokołowska 
(2001: 3) divides them into three groups. The first includes the rules on 
the form of legal fundraising system for the execution of local government 
tasks. This group includes the rules of: 1) stability and certainty of income 
sources; 2) adequacy of resources to to the completion of tasks; 3) effici-
ency and flexibility of income sources; 4) territorial location of sources of 
income; 5) minimization of disparities in income levels; 6) granting local 
governments the power to finance, including tax power; 7) access to the 
capital market; 8) development of the forms of district income redistri-
bution with the participation of representatives of local government. The 
second group contains the rules of: 1) independent management of col-
lected resources; 2) modification of basic budget postulates pertaining to 
the management of public funds at the central level. The last group of rules 
relating to the control and supervision of financial management of local 
government includes the rules of: 1) statutorily limited intervention in the 
sphere of financial management; 2) diversification of the audit scope and 
criteria depending on whether local government performs its own tasks, or 
outsourced ones; 3) consistent financial control system taking into account 
the effectiveness of social and economic activities carried out with the help 
of the financial instruments (kornberger-Sokołowska, 2001: 78−79). 
The importantce of financial autonomy of local government in Poland 
will be analyzed in more details below.
5.8.1. Legal Guarantees of Financial Independence of Local Government
Financial independence means primarily a constitutional transfer of the 
right to enact public revenues to local government. It also means the possibi-
lity to finance expenditure from its own revenues. An extreme concept of fi-
nancial independence is defined as the complete separation of central sources 
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of income from local ones, which also excludes the possibility of subsidizing 
local budgets which can be supplied only with the revenues allocated to them 
(Młynarczyk, 1999: 35, Chojna-Duch, 1998: 334−335). 
A. Bury divides financial independence of local government into income 
and expenditure independence. Income independence is associated with gu-
aranteed possibilities to increase income, and obtain it from various sources 
and in various methods. In turn, expenditure independence means that each 
unit with given income is free in deciding on the method and type of spen-
ding (Bury, 2000: 21). Financial independence of local government is close-
ly connected with the level of decentralization. E. kornberger-Sokołowska 
(2001: 102) defines decentralization as: 1) transfer of public tasks to be im-
plemented at the local level; 2) use by local authorities of the assets and rights 
that guarantee their independence, and ability to decide on public matters; 
3) possession of adequate financial resources for the implementation of these 
tasks. Decentralization of tasks and competences, and transfer of assets are 
the basic premise of financial decentralization (Biley, 1999: 18−19, wright, 
1997: 43−45), the level of which determines the level of financial autonomy of 
local government (kosek-wojnar, 1995: 69; glumińska-Pawlic, 2003: 44−59). 
Financial independence is also associated with the issue of so-called fi-
nancial power which, in addition to legal power, is an essential attribute of 
territorial self-government. Financial power is connected with the ability of 
local governments to collect revenues according to its own will and discretion 
in order to carry out tasks of local government. It is expressed also in shaping 
of appropriate policies, e.g. in terms of income, using public authority means. 
Just like financial independence, financial power should be considered on se-
veral levels: local government income, expenditure, budget, and creation of 
local government debt (Borodo, 2001: 134−136). 
In order to determine the level of financial autonomy of local govern-
ment, it is necessary to analyze its grounds contained in the provisions of the 
Constitution of 1997 which, giving certain rights to local governments, also 
determines the level of their financial independence. These determinants are:
1. The right to possess legal personality (Art. 165, Paragraph 1);
2. The rights of ownership and other property rights (Art. 165, Paragraph 1);
3. The right to have public funds adequate to the tasks (Art. 167, Para-
graph 1 and Paragraph 4);
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4. The right to sources of revenues specified by statute (Art. 167, Para-
graph 3);
5. The right to taxation power consisting in setting the level of local 
taxes and charges (Art. 168);
6. The right to supply local government budget with own revenues, ge-
neral subsidies, and specific grants from the State Budget (Art. 167, 
Paragraph 2);
7. Determination of the principles and criteria of supervision and 
control over the financial activities of local government (Art. 171, 
Paragraph 1 and Paragraph 2) (kosikowski, 1997: 148−162, Miemiec, 
1997: 212−218, Ofiarski, 2003: 121−140, kosikowski, 1994: 98−100, 
komar, 1994: 94−97).
The Constitution defined specific frameworks, rules governing local 
government finance, delegating the establishment of detailed regulations in 
this respect to ordinary legislation. with the introduction of the 1998 Local 
government Reform, the system of public finance in Poland was also refor-
med. Originally, local government finances were settled, firstly, by the Act of 
November 26, 1998 on Public Finances (Journal of Laws of 1998, No. 155, 
item 1014), and, secondly, by the Act of November 26, 1998 on the Income 
of Local government Units for 1999-2000 (Journal of Laws of 1998, No. 150, 
item 983), and also, partially, in self-government acts (on municipal, district 
and provincial self-government). The Act on Public Finance, which regulated 
both the issues of central finance of the state and the local government, set 
basic principles characteristic of the system of local government finances.
These principles are:
1. Principle of openness and transparency of public finances. The most 
important manifestations of this principle are: a) statutory require-
ment of the budget debate and the debate on the report on the im-
plementation of the budget; b) requirement to disclose, in the case of 
districts, the management report on the activities relating to incur-
ring obligations and issuing securities; c) obligation to publish certain 
opinions of the regional chamber of auditors (gałkiewicz, 1999: 20).
2. Principle of reducing public debt. For local government it is connec-
ted with the constraints in incurring liabilities, loans, and the intro-
duction of precautionary procedures.
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3. Principle of increasing responsibility for spending public money. It 
manifests itself in the increasing catalogue of situations where local 
authorities commit a breach of public finance discipline, and at the 
same time, in the increasing number of sanctions for such violations.
4. Principle of responsibility of executive organs of local government 
units for the conduct of financial management. An expression of this 
principle is the regulation, according to which, e.g. the district coun-
cil, cannot, without the consent of the district board, increase the 
budget deficit by increasing spending or reducing revenues.
5. Principle of equality of rights of all operators on the local market car-
rying out public tasks. According to it, any entity operating in the 
local area may apply for a grant from public funds for the implemen-
tation of a public task after submitting an appropriate offer for its im-
plementation (gałkiewicz, 1999: 20−23).
The shape of local government finances after the Public Administration 
Reform in 1998 was finally established in the regulations of the Act of No-
vember 13, 2003 on Income of Local government Units, which according to 
its initiators, was aimed at:
1. Further decentralization of public tasks and funds and the increase of 
the share of local government units in the disposition of these measures;
2. Increasing economic responsibility of local governments by enlarging 
the level of their own income;
3. Stronger binding of the financial situation of local governments with 
the level of development of the national economy;
4. Expansion of the absorption capacity of EU funds by increasing the 
flow of funds and more flexible rules of financial management of local 
governments;
5. Creation of instruments to promote entrepreneurship and supply of 
human capital with high qualifications (guziejewska, 2005: 62).
5.9. Civil Service
The beginnings of the civil service system in Poland date back to the 
interwar period in which the fact that officials came from different parti-
tions had different qualifications, and ethical models led to the lowering of 
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the moral level and growing corruption. Some of the measures, which were 
supposed to prevent it, were the establishment of the Inter-Ministry of Quali-
fication Commission and the adoption of the State Civil Service Act (wiater, 
2015: 188). The first act, which comprehensively regulated legal and social 
status of the civil servant of the Second Republic of Poland, was the Act of 
February 17, 1922. This act, amended many times, was formally in force until 
December 31, 1974, when the Labor Code, adopted on June 24, 1974, came 
into force (Filak, 2016: 4).
The Constitution of the Republic of Poland defines the basis for the 
functioning of the civil service in Poland. Article 153 of the fundamental law 
proclaims that a corps of civil servants shall operate in the organs of govern-
ment administration in order to ensure a professional, diligent, impartial, and 
politically neutral discharge of the State’s obligations.
The superior of the civil service, in accordance with Article 153 Paragraph 
2 of the Polish Constitution, is the Prime Minister who appoints the Head of 
the Civil Service. In this context, we should also evoke Article 7 of the Consti-
tution which states that public authorities function is based on, and within the 
limits of, the law. The civil service operates based on administrative law, i.e. the 
legal norms governing the organizational structure and conduct of government 
administration as a part of the state apparatus as well as of individual natural 
persons, unless other legal provisions apply. Detailed rules for the functioning 
of the civil service are specified in the Act of November 21, 2008 on Civil Ser-
vice amended by the Act of December 30, 2015 amending the Civil Service Act 
and some other acts (Journal of Laws of 2016, item 34).
The concept of civil service is defined as „a system of filling public posi-
tions and performing the duties of a public official based on the principle of 
professionalism, political neutrality, impartiality, and legalism. In the objecti-
ve sense, it means clerical corps is formed because of these principles and 
having special professional status in the country (stability of employment on 
the basis of the appointment, privileged wage, and pension regulations). In 
the functional sense, it means such rules of administration personnel hiring 
and management which guarantee their high qualifications and efficient exer-
cising of public duties by the state regardless of the changeableness of the 
political sovereignty over administration“ (Filak, 2016: 2).
The corps of civil servants is composed of persons employed in offici-
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als’ positions and government administration offices. The civil service corps 
consists of employees and civil servants (the distinction results from the legal 
regulations which shape the employment relationship – respectively labor law 
regulations and the appointment pursuant to the Act on Civil Service). As of 
December 31, 2014, it consisted of 120,412 members, including about 7,675 
civil servants (Filak, 2016: 2).
A reference to the idea of the pre-war civil service appeared after the 
changes that took place in 1989. A manifestation of this was the establishment 
of the National School of Public Administration in 1991, and then passing of 
the Act on Civil Service on July 5, 1996. At the same time, this law applied 
only to officials appointed in the supreme and central organs of government 
administration and local organs of government administration. The situation 
changed with the adoption of a new Civil Service Law on December 18, 1998, 
the regulations of which applied to all government administration employees. 
Importantly, both Acts (of 1996 and 1998) in Article 1 referred to the prin-
ciples of professionalism, reliability, impartiality, and political neutrality as 
binding for members of the civil service corps.
Significant changes in the functioning of the civil service were introdu-
ced on August 24, 2006 pursuant to the Acts on Civil Service, state human 
resources and high-ranking state positions. The Act on Civil Service exclu-
ded senior posts in the civil service from the subjective scope, and in addi-
tion, in accordance with Article 2 Paragraph 3, it provided for the possibi-
lity that clerical posts can be taken by „persons delegated or transferred on 
the basis of separate regulations to perform tasks outside the organizational 
unit in which they are employed if the transfer results from a special interest 
of the civil service.“
The idea of an impartial and politically neutral civil service pertaining to 
all government administration employees returned with the Act of November 
21, 2008. The latest significant changes in the civil service system were intro-
duced by the Act of December 30, 2015 amending the Civil Service Act and 
some other acts (Journal of Laws of 2016, No. 0, item 34).
The act introduced important changes to the functioning of the civil service:
•	 Senior positions in the civil service will be staffed, by appointment, by 
the authorized bodies; 
181Public AdministrAtion in PolAnd: reforms And systemic-orgAnizAtionAl issues
•	 Change in the regulation of the status of persons holding senior po-
sitions in the civil service, including the abolition of the obligation to 
perform their preparatory service to be evaluated periodically, sus-
pension of their duties by operation of law for the duration of deten-
tion, and finally, granting of a special duty allowance;
•	 Allowing the possibility of appointing to the post of the Head of the 
Civil Service persons who are not members of the civil service by abo-
lishing the requirement to have experience in government administra-
tion (Journal of Laws of 2016, No. 0, item 34). 
It should be noted that according to some legal communities changes 
introduced in 2016 in the system of the civil service adversely affected the 
implementation of the principle of political neutrality of civil service corps. 
On the other hand, the authors of the reform are convinced that they allow 
a more efficient operation of public administration, and eliminate frequent 
fiction in the process of hiring public servants.
5.10. Openness and Transparency of Public Administration 
Operations: Public Participation 
Analyzing the key issues associated with the process of public adminis-
tration reform, openness and transparency, it is initially worth emphasizing 
the issue of communication within the public sector.
krystyna Serafin (2013: 139−141) determined two levels of communi-
cation processes in public administration. The first level is the level of go-
vernment administration, while the second level is the level of local admi-
nistration. According to the author, two-way relationships and two-way flow 
of information occur between these levels. The two levels send and provide 
information to the media and directly to citizens.
At the level of government administration, a key element of internal in-
formation is communication between the government press offices and the 
government representatives in the field. Unfortunately, their activity is direc-
ted primarily at maintaining contacts with the media, and providing informa-
tion to province governors coming both from the center and from the local 
media. Direct contacts with citizens are marginalized. Press offices discover 
their importance in times of crises and conflicts (Serafin, 2013: 139−141).
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Communication at the level of local administration has greater impor-
tance and far more benefits, particularly for local communities. The applied 
communication methods, tools, and policy of local authorities determine the 
image of public administration, affect the development of civil society and the 
development of openness and transparency of public administration. At the 
same time, it eliminates the existing pathologies associated with the operation 
of local authority. The basis for the development of local democracy and civil 
society is the appropriate level of public participation. A. Janus (2004: 176) 
shares this view by claiming that institutionalized possibilities of social parti-
cipation are conducive to the formation of civil society.
The possibility of active participation of citizens in decision-making on 
the future ofterritorial unit is a sign of democratization of social life in Poland. 
Systemic changes in Poland in the early 90s of the 20th century led to the forma-
tion of local self-government as one of the basic elements of a democratic state. 
A municipality and a district were created, i.e. local government units with the 
authorities elected by the local community, the operation of which was suppo-
sed, among other things, to bring the authorities closer to the citizen. More 
than 25 years of experience in the operation of local government in Poland has 
shown that the transfer of power to the local level was a very beneficial move, 
both in the economic sphere as well as from the social and political aspects.
In many local governments, we can observe the mechanism of strengt-
hening ties between the local community and the local power elites – the 
„authority“ which directs the structure of administration, and needs public 
support for the implementation of basic tasks faced by the given unit. A way 
to create the conditions for increasing public participation in the decisions 
taken by the local authorities is in the creation of mechanisms for two-way 
communication between the local government and its inhabitants. This is ma-
nifested in mutual exchange of information between the office and the local 
community. Local government should widely inform the community about 
its actions as well as create the conditions for effective reception of infor-
mation from the public concerning their opinions about, for instance, inves-
tments, general policy of local government, acceptance of planned activities, 
and expression of their needs and demands. The local community acquires 
the skills of functioning in public life if it has the possibilities to co-participate 
in decision-making processes (Chlivickas & Raipa, 2002: 117−136).
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Citing J. Hausner (1999: 41), we can assume that public participation 
means participation of citizens in managing the affairs of the community 
that they are members thereof. In a broad sense, social participation is the 
foundation of civil society whose members voluntarily participate in public 
activities. In a narrower sense, this term means public partnership of local 
government and residents for taking actions in favor of local development 
(górniak et al. 1999: 41, Horsman & Raynor, 1978: 239−253). 
Adapting this concept to our considerations, participation can be defi-
ned as involvement which is associated with a process in which two or more 
parties cooperate in the preparation of plans, implementation of projects, and 
decision-making. with regard to local self-government, it manifests itself in 
expressing opinions, views in relation to actions taken by the local authorities 
through the institution of a local referendum, public debates, and meetings 
with the residents during which current problems are discussed. work and 
public consultation on, e.g. local development plans, fit in this trend (Szot-
gabryś & Sienkiewicz, 2003: 128−130).
Social participation in terms of the cooperation of public sector with the 
non-governmental organizations (NgOs) and private sectors means the in-
clusion of NgOs, citizens, and local businesses in the process of solving local 
problems, and making key decisions concerning the local community. In this 
perspective, the representatives of local communities are co-authors of con-
cepts and solutions pertaining to local policy. An effective program of public 
participation mainly means the application in practice of a two-way flow of 
information between administration and citizens, and the inclusion of local 
communities in the planning process. 
The scope of two-way communication and public participation in local 
government is connected with the specificity of local problems. In Poland, 
a number of model solutions in the field of social participation have been 
implemented which were, in many cases, initiated (e.g. in the framework of 
Local government Partnership Program (LgPP) in 1999), and funded by the 
US Agency for International Development. The program pertained to pro-
jects concerning social participation and communication in municipalities 
and districts with the participation of external consultants. The scope of the-
se projects involved, among others, creation of organizational foundations 
of the system of social communication, and ensuring effective social com-
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munication in the office, improving the flow of information between office 
employees and managers, preparation of a catalogue of services, improving 
information about the work of the office, development and preparation of a 
newsletter, improvement of direct contacts of local authorities with the resi-
dents, external promotion, institutionalization of cooperation between local 
authorities and the NgOs.
In practice, the process of participation is implemented in local govern-
ment by creating plans of participation and communication, taking into 
account informing local communities, obtaining information from the com-
munity, conducting public consultation and co-participation of residents in 
the decision-making process (Jakubowska, 2001: 1).
5.11. Conclusion
One of the most visible trends in the evolution of political systems of the 
late 20th century was a phenomenon often referred to as a revolution in public 
administration which manifested itself in the process of reforming the public 
sector of modern states, and called for, inter alia, transformation or moder-
nization of administration. The process of reforming the public sector should 
be seen as a multi-faceted phenomenon in which socio-economic, political, 
cultural, or ideological factors occur (Herbut, 1999: 9−11). The pressure of 
such factors is conducive to this process, becoming the motivation for its 
adoption.
In Poland, since 1989, i.e. since the beginning of the process of reforming 
administration, various categories of factors have affected individual stages 
of implementation of administrative reforms. The first stage of the reform, 
crowned with the creation of self-governing municipalities, was conditioned 
first by ideological or political factors. In contrast, at the core of the Public 
Administration Reform of 1998 were largely economic and social factors, and 
political factors to a lesser extent, which together defined the fundamental 
premise of this reform – the decentralization of public administration. An 
important factor was also the process of Europeanization of public adminis-
tration and Polish integration inthe EU.
The preparation of implementation of important reforms, particularly of 
systemic ones, should be done carefully in order to avoid frequently occur-
ring risks, which a failed change could bring. Every administration reform is 
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burdened with the risk of costs and damages to be borne by a citizen or a local 
community or the state after its introduction.
we should share gołuch’s opinion that the currently functioning model 
of bureaucratic public administration is not able to meet the citizens’ expecta-
tions. The form of the current model of public administration is a result of a 
number of reasons. One of them is the lack of a target concept of the State, 
which, as Adam gołuch rightly says „[...] relied on earlier existing structures 
which have undergone a rather façade reconstruction on the basis of patterns 
found in European Union countries [...]“ (gołuch, 2011: 150). 
Today, the process of development of public administration is determi-
ned by the development of technology, globalization processes, and the de-
velopment of modern management and marketing. we have to agree with 
Bobińska’s thesis (2012: 53) that the development of technology has created 
new needs and necessities for new skills in making rational decisions, and the 
implementation of modern management and marketing concepts.
It should be stressed once again that the analyses of the efficiency of 
public administration operation in Poland point to the existence of many 
problems having a negative impact on the implementation of the function 
of public administration, the satisfaction and quality of life of society. The 
studies conducted often show that a key issue is not, for instance, a bad admi-
nistrative law or administrative proceedings but the moral level of officials 
and their approach to the given case. Frey (2007: 190−200) rightly says that 
an important role in this respect is played by mental conditions. According to 
the author, without changing the old, bad habits we will not be able to talk of 
positive changes in the sphere of relations between the administration office 
and the citizen in Polish administrative proceedings. The author also claims 
that the reason for this state of affairs is the fact that in Polish public adminis-
tration offices attention is mainly paid not to the quality of service but to the 
number of cases handled by the functionary. 
The analysis of the assumptions and functioning of public administra-
tion in Poland is undoubtedly related to the analysis of the implementation 
of objectives of the administration reform. They were supposed to consist in:
•	 Expansion of mechanisms of civil society, democracy, and social 
control of actions;
•	 Creation of political career path;
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•	 greater efficiency of institutions providing public services at the local 
level;
•	 Standardization of costs and consequent increase in the rationality of 
public spending;
•	 Reconstruction of public finance system in the direction of increasing 
its integrityand decentralization to achieve its better connection with 
collective needs;
•	 Ordering competences of public administration, improving the infor-
mation flow;
•	 Creation of better institutional conditions for the protection of public 
order and collective security;
•	 Acceleration of economic development (gąciarz, 2004: 109). 
Based on results of conducted research and analyses it can be concluded 
that the results achieved and indicators related to the functioning of public 
administration in Poland, in particular local government, do not allow unam-
biguous confirmation of the achievement of these objectives. 
we can agree with Michał kulesza who wrote: „in 1999, a structured 
three-level division was introduced in Poland. There are municipalities, dis-
tricts, and provinces.“ However, despite many changes that have been intro-
duced to the legislation and administrative practice in the last several years, 
the practice of functioning of the governmental and self-governmental sub-
system of public administration shows that we can only partially agree with 
the next words of one of the founders of the concept of the reform (kulesza, 
1999: 2): „And this operation is successful”.
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6. Public Administration Reforms in Slovakia
Juraj Nemec, Beáta Mikušová Meričková, Maria Murray Svidronova, Peter Pisár
6.1. Introduction
Slovakia is one of the youngest countries in the world. It has been esta-
blished on January 1, 1993, as a result of splitting of former Czechoslovakia, 
thus becoming an independent sovereign, democratic unitary state based on 
the Rule of Law (Constitution of the Slovak Republic). 
with the exception of some short periods in early medieval times, Slo-
vaks did not have their own state before 1918, and for more than 1000 years 
belonged to the Austrian and Austro-Hungarian monarchies. In 1918, the 
first independent Czechoslovak Republic was established as a unitary state of 
two nations − Czech and Slovaks. This state split as a result of Second world 
war developments into the „Protectorate of Czech and Moravia“and the Slo-
vak Republic, dependent on fascist germany. A history of Czechoslovakia 
continued again from 1945 with an important shift from unitary to federal 
state in 1968. The split of Czechoslovakia in 1993 was an unavoidable result 
of the transformation processes but an excellent example of the democratic 
and friendly separation of two different partners looking for their own way to 
overcome all barriers of complicated transition. 
The Slovak Republic is situated in the center of Europe and covers an 
area of 49,034 sq km. The state borders with the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Ukraine, Hungary, and Austria are 1681,9 km long. The total number of in-
habitants of the Slovak Republic is about 5.5 million. The largest city and the 
capital of Slovakia is Bratislava. The country is characterized by fragmented 
settlement with a total of almost 2900 municipalities, out of which about 2500 
municipalities have fewer than 2000 inhabitants each (Statistical Yearbook, 
Slovakia, 2014).
The Slovak Constitution was ratified on September 1, 1992, became fully 
effective on January 1, 1993, and changed in September 1998 to allow direct 
election of the president, and further amended on February 2001 to allow 
Slovakia to apply for NATO and the EU membership. 
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The head of executive branch is the President, elected by direct, popu-
lar vote for a five-year term. The head of government is the Prime Minister. 
The Cabinet is appointed by the president on the recommendation of the 
prime minister. The legislative branch is represented by unicameral National 
Council of the Slovak Republic (“Narodna Rada Slovenskej Republiky”) with 
150 seats; members are elected on the basis of proportional representation 
to serve four-year terms. The judicial branch is represented by the Supreme 
Court (judges are elected by the National Council) and Constitutional Court 
(judges appointed by president from a group of nominees approved by the 
National Council). 
The concept of public administration of the country is unclear and not 
defined by any existing official document. A very typical feature of it is over-
legalization, i.e. the will to solve existing problems by legislative changes 
through the legal system. This, in combination with the use of many New Pu-
blic Management (NPM) instruments, creates a very specific mix with several 
deficiencies, some of which are highlighted in the respective sub-chapters. 
In the following chapter we describe main public administration reform 
(PAR) trends and changes in Slovakia, and explain their character. The first 
chapter deals with the sequence and character of public administration re-
forms in Slovakia. It describes the historical legacy of public administration 
reforms, realized reforms with their contents and character, and evaluates 
the character of PAR in Slovakia. The second chapter deals with the imple-
mentation of selected NPM tools during the PAR. The focus is on marketi-
zation of service delivery systems and agencification. The selected examples 
are as follows: scale and results of externalization in local public service de-
livery, financing of education, competitive social health insurance system, 
and agencification. The third chapter presents the civil service reform. The 
creation of the Civil Service Office and its later abolishment, and current 
developments are described there. The last chapter highlights selected ele-
ments of administrative services and procedures. The problem of inefficient 
administrative services, “red tape”, and complicated administrative processes 
still remain the target for future steps of PAR in Slovakia. Some visible im-
provements include the recent ESO reform (one-stop shops are step-by-step 
being established to ensure contact between citizens and state administrative 
functions).
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6.2. Sequence and Character of Public Administration                         
Reforms in Slovakia
6.2.1. Historical Legacy of Public Administration Reforms
The period of the first modern state of Czech and Slovaks was characte-
rized by the democratic development of the civil service system in a market 
economy which became an integral part of the trends towards the develo-
pment of democratic systems of governance in Europe, based on impartial 
and professional public administration – with some features inherited from 
the Austro-Hungarian public administration – like “weberian” bureaucracy 
and legalism (For example, see Janas, 2007; or Sutaj, 2003).
After the Second world war, Czechoslovakia was re-established as the 
unitary democratic state. The Communist Party played very important role in 
the political system, and won democratic elections in 1947. In February 1948, 
it had all powers of the state in its hands.
February 1948 was the beginning of the period of centralized „socialist“ 
(post-Marxist) state, based on so-called „socialist democracy“ and planned 
economy. During this period, many principles of modern democratic public 
administration were ignored, and the system became the servant of the Com-
munist Party. Real local self-government structures did not exist and were or-
ganized together with local state administration structures in so-called natio-
nal committees. Most important aspects of totalitarian public administration 
were (Nemec, 2001) lack of control of consumers/public over the civil service 
system, absence of consumer-generated quality control because of lack of 
accountability to the public, and loyalty to the political system instead, partial 
and also formal separation of executive and legislative powers (Federal As-
sembly and Federal government at the central level, and National Commit-
tees that represented the system of combined state administration and self-
government institutions at the local level), real dominance of political power 
of the Communist Party over all sub-systems of public administration (based 
on non-democratic elections, system of „nomenclature places“ in all sectors, 
and system of „party cells“ that influenced and controlled each important 
decision). This situation guaranteed that each institution of public adminis-
tration and each public servant followed the directions, resolutions, and ins-
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tructions of the Communist Party. The Constitution defined the Communist 
Party as „a leader of the society and the state“.  Citizens were provided with 
a limited possibility to control the quality of public services as the system of 
„socialist democracy“ included some kinds of accountability of politicians 
and bureaucrats to citizens and specific rights of citizens to control  the civil 
service system − but all within the Communist Party controlled mechanisms 
(system of Communist Party analyzed all kinds of appeals, and in the case of 
important malpractice of politicians or civil servants, concrete measures to 
improve their performance were undertaken). 
The fact that bureaucracy was not “classic” monopoly but servant of the 
Communist Party partly limited the possibility to abuse position of civil ser-
vants for reasons of personal gain. The abuse of top bureaucratic and political 
position to get tangible benefits was also, in some way, limited by long-term 
perspective of remaining in this, or a similar position (most of them who 
came to top positions remained there for a whole life).
This system was radically changed after the Velvet revolution but its 
selected features still influence the “quality” of public administration in the 
country (especially accountability, responsibility, and efficiency principles).
6.2.2. Developments – Realized Reforms and Their                                       
Contents and Character
The first reform measures were orientated mostly at the local level, based 
on the conceptual document „Proposal for the Reform of National Commit-
tees and Local State Administration“, and discussed by the government of the 
Slovak Republic on June 6, 1990. Implementation of this first reform wave 
was oriented mostly toward creating real self-government institutions, divi-
ding executive and legislative powers on all levels, changing the territorial 
structure of Czechoslovakia, and restructuring the central government and 
the system of control in the public sector (Bercik & Nemec, 1999). 
The government of the Slovak Republic decided by the governmental 
resolution of June 6, 1990 to abolish the system of national committees of 
December 31, 1990, create self-government structures in each municipality 
(including those which did not have national committees or became inde-
pendent,  by splitting for example), organize direct self-government elections 
in November 1990, split self-government and state administration functions, 
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and organize new local bodies of state administration (general and speciali-
zed bodies), apply vertical superiority and subordination, and create larger 
territorial areas instead of previous districts (due to the complicated reform 
process this last expected measure was not realized).
Based on this decision, self-governing municipalities with a high level of 
independence were established by the Law No. 369/1990 Coll. on Municipal 
Administration of January 1, 1991. And based on this change, local self-go-
vernments became fully-fledged policy decision-makers at the local level with 
their own budgets and bodies, equipped with the exclusive right to take deci-
sions independently, and act in all matters pertinent to the administration of 
the municipality and its property, if a special law would not assign such acts 
to the State, other legal bodies, or natural person. The core responsibilities 
allocated to municipalities were: management of movable property and real 
estate in the ownership of the municipality, providing for public order in the 
municipality, local public transport in big cities, construction, maintenance 
management of local roads and parking places, responsibilities pertaining 
to public spaces, public green spaces, public street lightning, market places, 
cemeteries, local water resources and wells, water supply networks, sewera-
ge and water cleaning establishments in small municipalities, construction, 
maintenance management of local cultural establishments, part of sport, lei-
sure and tourist establishments, infant care homes, part of ambulatory he-
alth service establishments, basic social service establishments, education 
support, nature and heritage protection, culture and creative hobbies, physi-
cal culture and sports, humanities activities, municipal police forces and fire 
service (Nemec, Bercik & kuklis, 2000).
Changes in state administration were governed by the Act No. 472/1990 
Coll. on the Organization of Local State Administration. A new system of 
general local state administration implemented by 38 district and 121 sub-
district offices was created. At the same stage of the reform many institutions 
of locally specialized state administration bodies were created, like school 
offices, health offices, environmental protection offices, fire departments, and 
many others. This division of local general and specialized state administra-
tion became very soon the object of large criticism because of a divisionof 
local state administration into many separate, relatively independent units 
(Mesikova, 2008).
200 Public AdministrAtion reforms in eAstern euroPeAn union member stAtes 
Post-Accession convergence And divergence
PAR Reforms in 1996
Because of critical political instability in the period of 1990−94 many 
measures of PAR were postponed. From 1990 to 1994 five governments were 
in place in Slovakia as follows: 
•	 from June 1990 under the Prime Minister Meciar,
•	 from April 1991 under the Prime Minister Carnogurský,
•	 from June 1992 under the Prime Minister Meciar,
•	 from March 1994 under the Prime Minister Moravcík,
•	 from December 1994 under the Prime Minister Meciar.
The second wave of the PAR in Slovakia was based on government pro-
grammatic statements of January 1995 but focused mainly on “organizatio-
nal” changes − change from specialized to general local state administration, 
change of territorial and administrative structure of Slovakia, and creation 
of regional self-government structures (Machyniak, 2013; or kosorin, 2003). 
The Law on the Territorial and Administrative Structure of the Slovak 
Republic and the Law on Organization of the Local State Administration were 
adopted in 1996. They created a new territorial structure of the state with 8 
regions and 79 districts, and new institutions of local general state adminis-
tration − regional and district offices that deal with policy implementation in 
32 policy areas (switched to the system of general state administration).
Decentralization Reforms 2000−2005
The main idea of this period was a belief that decentralization would solve 
all inefficiencies in the public administration system (Strategia decentralizacie 
a reformy verejnej spravy, 1999). The start of the reform was postponed many 
times because of lack of political consensus between political parties, and only 
massive interventions of the Prime Minister Dzurinda in beginning of 2001 
pushed the processes forward. After this, in very (too) short time all expec-
ted basic legislation was approved by the Parliament: Civil Service Code, Pu-
blic Service Code, Law on Creation of Territorial Self-governments, Law on 
Elections of Territorial Self-governments, Law on Transfer of Competencies 
of the State to the Regional and Local Self-governments, amendment of the 
Law on Municipalities, amendment of the Law on Municipal Property, Law 
on Property of Territorial Authorities, amendment of the Law on Budgetary 
Rules, and the law on Financial Control and Audit (Zarska & Sebova, 2005).
The most visible change was the Law No. 302 of 2001 – valid since 2002, 
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under which eight higher territorial units – self-governing regions were esta-
blished, and started to work within the region borders as set in 1996. The Act 
on Municipalities was substantially amended, whereby the autonomous status 
of municipalities was significantly strengthened (Nemec & Bucek, 2012; or ko-
vacova, 2010).
The important Law on Transfer of Competencies defined the set of com-
petencies to be transferred to regional and local self-governments. According 
to it a really large number of competencies has been transferred in the period 
of 2001−2002. Municipalities got new responsibilities in areas of road commu-
nications, water management, citizenship  evidence, social care, environmental 
protection, education (elementary schools and similar establishments), phy-
sical culture, theatres, health care (primary and specialized ambulatory care), 
regional development and tourism. while regional self-government became 
responsible for the competencies in areas of road communications, railways, 
road transportation, civil protection, social care, territorial planning, education 
(secondary education), physical culture, theatres, museums, galleries, local cul-
ture, libraries, health care (polyclinics, local and regional hospitals), pharma-
cies, regional development, and tourism. A large set of these competencies was 
re-allocated from direct ministerial responsibility (hospitals, education, etc.).
The reform transferred massive set of responsibilities to local and regi-
onal self-governments but did not introduce other crucial elements of de-
centralization, mainly real fiscal decentralization − new responsibilities were 
financed by grants and not by the self-governments (kozovsky, 2005). 
Furthermore, the “Project of Further Public Administration Decentrali-
zation for 2003−2006” was adopted by the national government, focusing on 
two main aspects:
a. Fiscal decentralization (massive transfer of responsibilities was follo-
wed by changing of fiscal system of the country),
b. Changes of state administration system (change of territorial structu-
re of administrative bodies, and change from general to specialized 
deconcentrated state administration). 
Following given proposals, a new legislation was adopted in 2003 and 
2004 (Niznansky & Hamalova, 2013). District state administration offices 
were abolished, and the system of local state administration diminished and 
converted from general offices (responsible for all competencies) to speciali-
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zed offices (like school offices, social protection offices, etc.). 
The follow-up changes of 2007 built on a series of reforms implemented 
after the admission of the Slovak Republic to the EU in 2004. Pursuant to the 
Act 254/2007 Coll., regional offices of the sectoral scope of the Interior Minis-
try were abolished as of September 30, 2007. The scope of their activities was 
passed to the sub-district bodies and relevant ministries (Machyniak, 2013).
ESO Reform
In their Program Declaration for 2012 −2016, the Slovak government 
(SR) committed themselves to adopt measures to make public administration 
performance more efficient and advanced. The ESO Programme (Efficient, 
Reliable and Open State Administration) was approved by the government of 
the SR in April 2012. 
The changes in this phase included:
a. Switch from specialized deconcentrated state administration into 
a  general one. Pursuant to the Act No. 180/2013 Coll., the district 
offices of integrated local state administration were re-established in 
72 locations (Bratislava and košice had one district office each with 
the territorial scope covering all the districts of these cities). Few spe-
cialized bodies were preserved − Police Force, Fire and Rescue Corps, 
Mining Office Board, Labor Inspectorate, Financial Administration, 
Monuments Board, State Trade Inspection, Veterinary and Food 
Administration (Machyniak, 2013);  
b. Establishment of one-stop shops 2014–2015 (not finished yet);
c. Optimization of administrative processes and administrative 
structures (including e-government development) for the period of 
2014−2020.
The structure of main goals indicates that the focus of this reform was 
not only on structural changes, but to some extend, also on the improvement 
of administrative services – e-government development supported by the EU 
funds, and creation of one-stop shops (we discuss this dimensions of the ESO 
reform in specific chapter later on) – as the reform vision (Office of govern-
ment, 2012) states:
“Any citizen or business is able to administer all specialized transactions 
with the state in a simple way and with minimum costs. In contacting the 
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state any citizen or business is able to use electronic means and, if in direct 
contact with one office, there is no need to visit also other offices to obtain 
additional materials. State administration is simple, understandable, and 
accessible. State administration is “small”, flexible, sustainable, transparent, 
and functions with minimum costs”.
6.2.3. Summary – Character of Public Administration Reform in Slovakia
The brief summary of changes implemented (it is difficult to speak about 
the reforms for some of the above-mentioned measures) provides the base 
for synthetic evaluation of the character of PAR in Slovakia. we deliver this 
synthesis in more dimensions.
Two Dimensions of PAR in Slovakia: Zigzag “Administrative” Reforms 
but Progressive Decentralization Changes
At the level of state government, the entire period of 1990–2016 is mar-
ked by non-systematic changes in the management from specialized to ge-
neral deconcentrated state administration and vice versa (Table 6.1). These 
changes accompanied territorial changes, and did not bring a greater efficien-
cy of its functioning nor significant improvement of public services provided 
to the citizens. 
Table 6.1: Zigzag “Administrative” Reforms
Year Change
1990 Specialized deconcentrated state administration system establishedNew administrative structure established (district and sub-district offices)
1996 general deconcentrated state administration system establishedNew administrative structure established (regions and districts)
2004 Specialized deconcentrated state administration system establishedNew administrative structure established (district offices abolished)
2007 New administrative structure established (regional offices abolished)
2014 general deconcentrated state administration system establishedNew administrative structure established (district offices re-established)
Source: own construction.
However, during 1990–2006, a strong sub-national self-government sys-
tem was created in Slovakia. Municipalities and self-governing regions were 
fully independent bodies equipped with powers to manage their own deve-
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lopment (Niznansky, 2005). According to the recent 2016 Resolution of the 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities adopted by the Council of Eu-
rope that is based on the monitoring visit in the country, it clearly states that 
the Slovak local self-government system is in almost full compliance with 
the principles of the European Charter of Local Self-government. The mo-
nitoring report highlights only really minor issues to be reflected in future 
– except of fragmentation.
Role of New Public Management (NPM) in PAR in Slovakia
The interesting feature of PAR in Slovakia is the fact that the reform 
wave 1998–2006 implemented by the right wing coalition significantly pro-
moted private sector solutions in the public sector and decentralization. 
Many sectoral reforms were influenced by NPM ideology, for example in 
primary and secondary education “quasi market” with student vouchers 
and full plurality of all ownership forms were created. However, such NPM 
approaches were not consistent everywhere, and NPM was also never expli-
citly mentioned by the government and reformers, as the ideological base 
for changes (Nemec, 2008).   
Left wing governments (i.e. Prime Minister Fico) formally and strongly 
opposed to private solutions in the public sector, and during the period of 
1998−2006, some public sector changes were partly reverted or redesigned 
(abolishment of user fees in health care, ending of the establishment of new 
private universities, stopping privatization of hospitals, prohibiting profit for 
health insurance companies, more direct state control in utility sector, etc.) 
but most of NPM solutions remained without changes even until today (per-
formance financing, program budgeting, public private mix in delivery of 
public services, or public private partnerships project in infrastructure area). 
External ideas, Pressures and Advice 
External ideas and pressures were only relatively important factor inf-
luencing reforming of public administration system in Slovakia. Certainly, 
the most important was the EU accession process, even though public admi-
nistration was not explicit independent part of negotiations. As a part of the 
accession process many general and sectoral changes were implemented in 
Slovakia, especially in following areas:
 − Creating of necessary regulatory agencies (see details below),
 − Improving the system of financial control and audit,
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 − Establishment of the civil service system (see details below),
 − Fiscal decentralization and establishment of self-governing regions 
(see details above and below).
In this part we only briefly mention the Law 502/2001 on Financial 
Control and Internal Audit. This law introduced major changes within the 
system of public sector control – especially by mentioning, for first time in 
Slovakia,  that efficiency, economy, and effectiveness represent three core 
and interconnected pillars of evaluating performance of public sector orga-
nizations. However, in its early stage, the law suffered from lack of unders-
tanding of these principles – for example, effectiveness was defined as the 
“conformity of operation with the plan” (for more see Nemec, 2011).
The EU allocated important sums of resources to support PAR in Slova-
kia. In pre-accession phase Slovakia was allocated ECU 6.5 million in Phare 
assistance exclusively devoted to PAR in 1991−1997 programs (EC, 1999). This 
represented 3.8% of the total sum of ECU 173.5 million allocated to Slovakia 
for all Phare programs in this period. This allocation covered the following 
programs: SR9409 Public Administration (ending on 12/31/97) with ECU 2.0 
milllion, SR9515 Public Agencies (ending on 7/31/98) with ECU 3.2 million, 
and SR9516 Public Agencies (continuum) with ECU 1.3 million. After the 
accession, Slovakia did not use any EU funds to cover costs of PAR in the post-
accession phases. This changed in the previous and current programming pe-
riod where allocations were requested and provided (see details below). 
To improve the capacity of Slovakia to implement PAR in pre-accession 
period the main supporting body was SIgMA-OECD program − Support 
for Improvement in governance and Management program represent a joint 
initiative of the OECD and the EU. Its key objective is to strengthen the foun-
dations for improved public governance, and hence support socio-economic 
development through building the capacities of public sector, enhancing 
horizontal governance, and improving the design and implementation of 
public administration reforms, including proper prioritization, sequencing, 
and budgeting. SIgMA today focuses only on the EU Enlargement countries 
and the EU Neighbourhood countries but in the pre-accession period this 
body was the main source of know-how for all partial changes necessary to 
be realized before the accession (for example, already since 1992 SIgMA 
OECD supported the preparation of the public procurement laws – Slovakia 
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was the first CEE country with such a law in force since 1993).
The other important fact to be mentioned is Slovak signature to the Eu-
ropean Charter for Local Self-government, thus accepting obligations in 
promoting subsidiarity principle and its realizations. All aspects of local and 
regional government are influenced by this signature – as already indicated, 
through the Slovak participation in activities of the Congress of Local and 
Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. Slovakia signed the Charter in 
1999 (coming in force as the source of domestic law form in 2000 after rati-
fication) – but with many reservations (Slovakia declared to be bound by the 
provisions of the Charter as follows: Article 2, Article 3, Paragraph 2, Article 
4, Paragraphs 1, 2, 4 and 6, Article 5, Article 6, Paragraph 1, Article 7, Para-
graphs 1, 2 and 3, Article 8, Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, Article 9, Paragraphs 2, 3, 
4 and 8, Article 10, Paragraph 1, and Article 11). The first monitoring report 
form of 2001 highlighted many deficiencies which were reflected step by step 
(especially by the decentralization reform), and such progress allowed full 
acceptance of the Charter (in 2002, Slovakia accepted Article 6, Paragraph 2; 
and on May 21, 2007. all other provisions).
A great deal of foreign help was sought in preparing the first PAR, parti-
cularly in the phase of analysis and need definition but rather less in the execu-
tion phase (i.e. the preparation and implementation of concrete changes). The 
main foreign actors (except for the above-mentioned SIgMA OECD) were 
UNDP, world Bank, British know-How Fund, and also a number of support 
programs from developed countries (like germany and Canada) were imple-
mented. Some supportive programs (especially world Bank support to public 
financial management, health care, and pension reforms) were relatively libe-
rally orientated and tried to implement several market type mechanisms into 
the public administration system in Slovakia (Nemec, 2008). 
“Elite-driven” Reforms
Different from starting reform phase, where a lot of consultation was 
required, 1996−2006 PAR were very much elite-driven and top-down reforms. 
The reformers tried to hide this, for example by helding public meetings and 
discussions, but all decisions were clearly prepared and predefined, based on 
liberal ideology, by a small elite group. The main body behind the 2000−2006 
reform was liberal think tank MESA10, clearly placed on the right wing of 
the political spectrum (Democratic Party), indirectly connected to the main 
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political lobbies, and also supported by a lot of foreign finance focusing on 
promotion of “free market” solutions. A relatively small group headed by V. 
Niznansky prepared a basic concept of the reform. Proposed reform strate-
gies were discussed at many public meetings, and consultations with foreign 
experts (supported by the comprehensive PHARE program) were also held. 
However, in practice different voices were not taken into the account. One 
of the main problems at this phase was exclusion of the Ministry of Interior 
(responsible for public administration) from the entire process. Under these 
circumstances, the political and parliamentary discussion about the reform 
strategy in Slovakia, as could be expected, focused mainly on political rather 
than factual aspects of the reform, with protracted debates on the number of 
regions and the election system (Nemec, 2008). Recent ESO reform has partly 
similar character – the only difference is the fact that the Minister of Interior 
is fully involved. 
Decentralization versus Fragmentation
The territory of the Slovak Republic has been always highly fragmen-
ted in terms of the number of municipalities. For instance, there were 3,473 
municipalities in 1921 or 3,237 in 1961. The lowest total number of munici-
palities (2,669 municipalities) in the Slovakia territory was in 1989 but this 
number increased up to 2,891 over the next following decades. 
The average municipality population size of municipality in Slovakia is 
only 1,870 inhabitants, and concerning an area size, the average Slovak mu-
nicipality has approximately 17 km². Only two cities (Bratislava and košice) 
have a population size over 100,000 inhabitants, and seven other cities have a 
population size over 50,000 inhabitants. Almost 70% of all Slovak municipa-
lities have less than 1,000 inhabitants (klimovský, 2014). 
The fact of large territorial fragmentation is significantly connected 
with the decentralization process problems. The theory (see for example the 
contents of papers from recent Istanbul conference on the topic – gyomen & 
Sazak, 2014) is not able to define any “optimum” size of municipalities, but it is 
obvious that too small self-governments have limited administrative capacity 
to manage a very broad set of allocated and delegated responsibilities (all of 
them are, for example, responsible for delegated state administration in prima-
ry education or building permits – and such tasks require necessary capacities). 
Because the forced municipal amalgamation at the central level is still 
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politically impossible, the only viable option to cope with possible economic 
and implementation problems connected with municipalities, which are too 
small, is inter-municipal cooperation; however, this mechanism is insuffici-
ently supported and promoted by the state (klimovský, 2015; or Tichy, 2005). 
The municipalities‘ right to cooperate has already been implemented in 
Slovakia since 1990. The basic legal provision on the IMC is explicitly mentio-
ned in the Constitution of the Slovak Republic (No. 460/1992). More detailed 
legal provisions are written in the Municipal Act. According to the legislation 
each municipality is entitled (within the performance of their own powers) 
to cooperate with other territorial and administrative units as well as with the 
authorities of other countries which carry out any local functions. Municipa-
lities also have the right to become a member of international associations of 
territorial units or territorial authorities. Despite the fact that there is no special 
law on the IMC in Slovakia, the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic pu-
blished a methodical instruction on establishing joint municipal offices in 2002. 
The main forms of inter-municipal cooperation are: agreement on the 
performance execution of task/s; agreement on the establishment of a joint 
municipal office; agreement on the establishment of municipal association; 
agreement on the establishment of a legal entity; and agreement on the esta-
blishment of an association of legal entities (see for example klimovsky, 2014).
Partnerships
As seen in previous chapters, the PAR in Slovakia (except for its starting 
phase) is, to a great extent, based on the ideas of party policy, interest groups 
and elite-. This, together with other factors (like limited accountability – see 
for example Vesely, 2013) limits the “quality” of partnerships of the public 
administration bodies with all main stakeholders.
Existing research clearly documents the fact that the will of all levels of 
government to involve stakeholders in decision-making and service delivery 
process is rather limited. This fact can be documented by the research of Vita-
lisova (2015). She mapped the level of cooperation/non-cooperation of muni-
cipalities with stakeholders. Despite the fact that answers of municipal repre-
sentatives are certainly positively biased, half of municipalities claim that they 
do not cooperate with universities (universities are located in all parts of the 
country, so this is not territorial availability problem), only about 60% of mu-
nicipalities cooperate with local businesses, and only 70% clearly showed the 
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will to cooperate with local non-governmental organizations (the limited coo-
peration between self-governments and the NgOs is also documented by our 
research – see for example Svidronova, Nemec & Mikusova Merickova, 2015). 
6.3. “Marketization” of Delivery of Public Services,                                     
and Agencification
Before 1989 almost the entire organizational structure of public service 
delivery was ‘owned’ and operated by the socialist state. This system progres-
sively changed during the respective phases of PAR, and the private (partly 
also non-profit) sector is today a major player in service delivery. The switch 
to public private non-profit sector delivery of many public services is not con-
nected to the liberal reform period (2000−2006) as one might expect on the 
base of the previous chapter.
Most changes happened already in earlier stages of PAR – we present the 
examples of local communal services, education and health care in the next 
three sub-parts of this chapter. The second wave of “marketization” is domi-
nantly connected with the EU accession and agencification – its main aspects 
are described in the last sub-part.
6.3.1. Local Communal Services Delivery: Massive Externalization
As indicated above, local public services represent a clear example of the 
mixture of all ownership forms participating in their delivery – and the main 
changes happened before 2000, where the existing data sets start. Majlingova 
(2005) mapped the system of municipal waste management (these data, with 
minor changes, are actual also today). The Table 6.2 shows the structure of 
service suppliers.  
Data presented by Majlingova (2005) show that externalization was rat-
her frequent already at the beginning of this century but may not deliver cost 
savings (with the exception of municipal association performing really well). 
Our data provide the same picture. Table 6.3 documents the scale of contrac-
ting selected local services to private producers by our research samples – 
contracting was realized in a massive way already in 2000, when our data 
start, and its scale remains more or less stable, depending on the sample (lar-
ger municipalities contract more frequently than their smaller counterparts).
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Table 6.2: Profile of Organizations Providing waste Management Services in Slo-
vakia Ranked in Ascending Order of Cost to the User (situation in 2003)
Institutional form / Size <1,000 <5,000 <10,000 <30,000 <50,000 >50,000
Municipality-owned (internal)
Municipal house staff 4–5 11 3 2
Municipal budgetary org. 8
Municipal semi-budgetary org. 6 7 3 1
Municipal limited company 2 1 4 4
Municipal shareholder company 2 8
Publicly-owned (external)
Public non-municipal budgetary org. 3 7
Public non-municipal semi-budge-
tary org. 10
Privately owned (external)
Private individual 4–5 9
Limited company 6 4 6 3 1
Share company 7 5 4 2 6
Mixed
Mixed limited company 3 2 5 5 2
Mixed share company 3
Municipal association 1 1 5 1
Source: Majlingová, 2005: 98.
Table 6.3: Percentage of Contracted Local Public Services
Service 2001 2005 2006 2008 2009 2015
waste 49 64 69 80 80 75
Cemeteries 27 12    16 13 13 75
Public green areas 16 18 33 14 6 56
Communications 21 41 45 38 55 78
Public lighting 30 35 40 39 38 78
Source: own research.
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Table 6.4 calculates the index of production efficiency for each service 
category, comparing the costs of delivering services from contracting to in-
ternal production. Using the average costs of internalized services as the base 
(= 100), the index scores are constructed by taking the ratio of costs for out-
sourced services to costs for internalized services (measured per inhabitant 
per year), and multiplying by 100 to normalize the charts.  Majority of index 
scores are above 100, indicating that the costs per inhabitant of service delive-
ry were higher under contracting out arrangements compared to internalized 
production arrangements.  
Table 6.4: Comparative Efficiency Index for Contracting vs. Internal Production 
(Internal Form = 100)
 Service 2005 2006 2008 2009 2015
waste management 94 125 184 60 210
Cemeteries 13 67 146 66 422
Public green areas 192 150 151 133 135
Maintenance of local communications 109 119 114 104 130
Maintenance of local lighting 138 128 156 127 81
Source: own research.
The data collected indicate that contracting does not deliver clearly posi-
tive outcomes (compared to the expectations in the existing NPM literature). 
The direct supply made by the public organizations is in many cases more 
efficient and (as our other own data document – see for example Merickova 
et al., 2010) of a higher quality compared to external production. However, 
we need to be aware of several methodological problems connected with our 
research. The core problems are the reliability of the data since the data col-
lected from municipalities are imperfect because their cost monitoring is not 
sophisticated. They do not use cost centers accounting, and so cannot know 
the real cost of service delivery. with internal service delivery, the reported 
service costs only cover direct costs, and so are likely to be too low. However, 
all our research documents show that the results of in-house versus external 
production of local public services depend on concrete local conditions, atti-
tudes, and goals of local self-governments, and not on NPM paradigm of the 
preference of private ownership.     
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6.3.2. Education – Student Vouchers at Primary and Secondary Level and 
Performance Financing of Higher Education
From the point of ownerships, the education at all levels in both re-
publics takes the form of a mixed system with public and private delivery, 
although the public sector is clearly the dominant player. The main pro-
market feature is the method of financing − funding is currently based on a 
performance-based formula at all levels. 
Primary education is a mixture of own (original) and delegated res-
ponsibility of municipalities (as the original responsibility municipalities 
finance local art schools and catering of all pupils), and the largest part of 
their expenditure. A formula-based funding system in which the number 
of pupils is the main determinant of resource allocation represents Slovak 
form of student vouchers financing system – resources follow the number 
of pupils / students enrolled. Existing private schools can charge fees but 
are also eligible for state subsidy. Secondary education is under the respon-
sibility of regional governments, and is delivered under the same financial 
system. 
In higher education, public and private schools also co-exist but in a 
different way – private high schools are not eligible for state grants (thus 
may receive some support only in very specific cases) – their core revenue 
comes from the student fees (for more on this topic see for example Nemec 
& Sagat, 2007).
The revenues of public higher education establishments in Slovakia 
consist of two main sources – public grants/transfers and their own inco-
mes. From the beginning of this century, the allocation of public grants in 
the Slovak Republic is based on the formula used for performance system 
of financing of universities, as one of outcomes of public finance reform, 
namely of introducing of program budgeting. In its beginning, the system-
was as follows: 
Program of Higher education, Science and Social Support to Students
•	 Sub-program: Higher education – grant to finance accredited study 
programs;
•	 Sub-program: Higher education science and technique – grant to finan-
ce research and development;
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•	 Sub-program: Higher education development – grant to finance deve-
lopment needs;
•	 Sub-program: Social support for students – grant to provide support 
to students;
•	 Sub-program: Targeted transfers.
Source: Ministry of Education
Universities transparently “competed” for public resources mainly in the 
first two sub-programs. In the first one the only factor used was the number 
of students (weighted by “unit costs per student” different for different uni-
versities). Research grants were allocated by an open competition within the 
existing programs (mainly VEgA and kEgA programs). 
The results of the first phase with dominant focus on the number of stu-
dents (Table 6.5) caused too important pervasive effects – we may argue that 
it acted against a better quality, and simply caused an increase in the number 
of students. 
Table 6.5: Public Transfers to Public Higher Education 2002–2006 (mil. Skk, 
current prices)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
grant to finance 
study programs 5,825 78.3% 6,660 80.1% 7,460 79% 8,023 77.5% 8,745 76%
grant to finance 
research & develo-
pment
584 7.9% 638 7.7% 948 9.1% 1,066 10.3% 1,119 9.7%
grant to finance 
development needs 378 5.1% 370 4.4% 330 3.5% 450 4.3% 500 4.3%
grant to provide 
support to students 648 8.7% 650 7.8% 700 7.4% 810 7.8% 1,150 10%
Total 7,435 - 8,318 - 9,438 - 10,349 - 11,514 -
Source: Ministry of Education.
All managements of public higher education establishments started to 
maximize the level of public grants by maximizing the number of accepted 
students. The outcome is visible in Table 6.6.
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Table 6.6:  Number of Newly Accepted Higher Education Students in Slovakia
1990/91 1995/96 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06
New full time 
students 13,404 20,809 24,279 24,270 26,974 24,150 32,488 35,542
% of new full 
time students 
from 18 (19) old 
population
15.9% 21.8% 27.2% 27.2% 30.4% 27.2% 36.7% 41.3%
New part-time 
students 1,868 3,881 9,665 12,763 8,057 15,057 15,718 17,254
Total 15,272 24,690 33,944 37,033 35,031 39,207 48,206 52,796
Source: Ministry of Education.
A significant increase of newly accepted students might be a positive de-
velopment but since the total amount of allocated resources has increased 
very slowly, in fact just marginally “faster” than inflation, the outcome is sub-
optimal – the grant per student has decreased significantly over the evaluated 
period. The outcomes were straightforward – overcrowded facilities, decli-
ning level of entry examinations (or their full abolishment), and increasingly 
overworked staffs. 
The higher education law also envisaged the system of public grants to be 
complemented by a significant increase of own revenues. As indicates Table 
6.7, this has scarcely happened. he The Table 6.7does not include unofficial 
sources, derived mainly from semi-legal fees paid by their part-time students 
through many different channels. 
Table 6.7: Public and Own Resources of Universities/Higher schools (thousands Sk)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Public grants 5,845,870 6,472,289 6,816,340 8,631,711 9,831,900 10,349,388
Own resources 532,884 454,592 1,207,204 1,397,170 1,440,983 2,191,299
Total 6,378,754 6,926,881 8,023,544 10,028,881 11,272,883 12,540,687
Source: Ministry of Education.
Politicians and managers of the system have come to appreciate some of 
these problems, and tried to cope with them. The main change was splitting 
the financing formula into two parts, i.e. providing the main public grant on 
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the basis of two criteria – according to the number of students (approx. 60%) 
and according to the research results (40%). These changes (together with the 
changes in accreditation process) delivered certain positives, but also new per-
vasive effects – especially inflation of low quality publication volumes (or focus 
on web of Science conference proceedings today). However, all the changes 
did not change the problem of over-supply: today many universities accept all 
candidates to fill in the existing capacities which present today about 130% of 
the maximum potential demands due to the decline in youth population.
6.3.3. Health Care Delivery: Competitive Health Insurance Financing 
and Plurality of Ownership Forms
The objective of the pre-1989 health care system in Czechoslovakia had 
been to provide a comprehensive system of health care for all members of 
society. Under the old system both services and medicines were free for the 
patients. Despite of limited resources (about 5% of gDP), everyone was 
able to get necessary health care, when necessary, at a relatively good medi-
cal standard. Most considerations of equity were achieved although special 
medical institutions provided higher quality care for high-ranking officials. 
The processes of reforming the Slovak health care system started 
immediately after the Velvet Revolution in 1989. They introduced impor-
tant changes into the system – especially privatization, and a shift in finan-
cing health care from general taxation to social health insurance. On the 
other hand, the state did not opt out from the principle of universality of 
access – according to the Slovak Constitution, based on an insurance sys-
tem, citizens have the right to free medical care according to the provisions 
of complementary law (Law on Health Care).  
From the point of health finance, Slovakia switched to the so-called 
“Bismarck” system of social health insurance to replace the old general 
taxation system of financing health care. However, together with the Czech 
Republic, it decided to introduce a competitive/pluralistic social health in-
surance (no other “post-soviet” country decided for such radical pro-mar-
ket switch). The main laws on health insurance were passed in 1994 which 
created the base for establishing “competing” health insurance companies 
(two of them public). Most of these have disappeared since then from the 
‘market’. In 2002, five health insurance companies existed but since 2010 
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only two private and one public remained (for more see Nemec, 2013).   
Changes in the health insurance system were supported by the typical 
arguments of plurality, independence, and competition. However, because 
the health insurance premiums were centrally defined, and the main package 
of services had to be delivered by all insurance companies for the price that 
was regulated by the Ministry of Finance, some level of plurality and com-
petition was visible only during the initial phase of insurance system (for 
more see Medved, Nemec & Vitek, 2005).
The introduction of a pluralistic health insurance system is frequently 
considered an imperfect state decision during the health care transforma-
tion process in Slovakia. Arguments for a plurality of insurance providers, 
their independence from the government, and competition between them 
have been strongly questioned by several authors. Because the evidence for 
these doubts comes from the advanced market systems, it seems likely that 
their potential to improve health care in transitional countries may be even 
more limited. Simple data indicate that this reform idea did not achieve its 
objective. Many resources were withdrawn from the system when several 
private insurance companies collapsed, and better quality was not achieved. 
Privatization or denationalization of health service production began 
in the mid-1990s, mainly in outpatient care and pharmacies, and is almost 
completed (for more see Nemec & Lawson, 2005). In 1995, the state system 
accounted for 58% of expenditures in primary care, in 1996, it was only 8%, 
and by 2001, it was 5%. For the pharmacies the trend was similar: the pro-
portion in the state sector decreased from 97% in 1995 to 5% in 1996, and 
3% in 2001. Privatization of specialized ambulatory care was slower but, by 
2001, the state sector accounted only for 26% of facilities (today only ambu-
lances in public hospitals remain public).
The process of hospital privatization began during the second term of 
the Dzurinda government. In 2002, the management of hospitals was de-
centralized, and some hospitals were given self-governing status. By 2003, 
all regional hospitals had been transferred to regional self-governments or 
converted into non-profit bodies. The Ministry remained responsible for 
university hospitals. Although the latter were expected to be transformed 
into shareholder companies, such a transformation did not occur during 
the Dzurinda government period, and the Fico government terminated the 
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idea. Table 6.8 displays the evolved structure of hospitals in Slovakia, and 
documents that the idea of plurality of ownerships forms (except for faculty 
hospitals) was achieved (the situation is more or less similar also in 2016). 
Table 6.8: Hospital Ownership by Region (2009)
Ownership
Western Slovakia Central Slovakia
Eastern                 
Slovakia Bratislava Total
TT TN NR BB ZA PO KE
State – Ministry of 
Health establishments 4 3 6 13 6 8 11 10 61
State – other state 
bodies 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 2 6
Public – regional or 
local self-governments 4 4 2 2 5 3 1 1 22
Other (profit and non-
profit companies) 4 8 6 14 5 21 11 14 83
Total 12 16 14 29 17 34 23 27 172
Abbreviations of regions: TT – Trnava, TN – Trencin, NR – Nitra, BB – Bans-
ka Bystrica, ZA – Zilina, PO – Presov, KE – Kosice; Source: Ministry of Health.
From the point of patients’ direct financial participation in covering he-
alth care expenditures, Slovakia belongs to the group of (developed) coun-
tries with moderate to high patients’ participation – together with most new 
EU member states. Most all co-payments were introduced by the second 
Dzurinda government in 2004, and despite to the fact that most of them were 
abolished, this reversal did not impact the trend towards an increased priva-
te financial participation, which shifted to the area of drug expenditures. To 
what extend a relatively high level of private payments limits the universality 
of access is bit unclear – there is no effective research on this topic in Slovakia. 
6.3.4 .Agencification
In the early phase of transformation, the agencification was connected 
only with financing of health care, pensions, and unemployment benefits. In 
1993, three public agencies were created – Vseobecna zdravotna poistovna 
and Poisťovna MV SR for health care insurance, and Socialna poistovna for 
unemployment and pension benefits. 
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The main wave of agencification is connected to the reform measures of 
the liberal governments of 1998−2006 period, and to the EU accession pro-
cess (for more see Nemec, Mikusova Merickova & Vozarova, 2011). Both fac-
tors served as major catalysts of changes contributing to the creation of a re-
latively comprehensive set of agencies, many of which enjoyed a very high de-
gree of autonomy from the executive government. without much (or almost 
no) discussion about the normative and practical aspects of privatization and 
agencification ideas (e.g. the split between policy and administration; more 
efficiency through specialization and expertise; depolititization) massive re-
organization of the public sector occurred during the two Dzurinda Cabinets 
(between 1998 and 2006). Table 6.9 shows sectoral examples of the created 
agencies, and Table 6.10 main regulatory agencies.
Table 6.9: List of Service Delivering Agencies (per Selected Sectors) in Slovakia
Sector Legal Status of Providers Evolutions of Forms of Ownership
Telecommuni-
cations
Slovak Telekom, shareholder 
company, owned by Deuts-
che Telekom Ag
Privatization of state body 
Slovenske telekomunikacie in 
1999−2000
Postal services Slovak Post, shareholders company, owned by the state
Converted from state enterprise 
in 2004 
Production, trans-
port and marketing 
of electricity
Many licensed private 
companies. Largest body is 
Slovenske elektrarne, share-
holders company
Deregulated market, Slovenske 
elektrarne owned by the state 
(34%) and ENEL SPA (66%)
gas transport 
anddistribution
SPP distribucia – for delivery 
of gas to consumers and Eu-
rostream – for international 
gas transport – both 100% 
daughter company of SPP
Unbundling from 1. 6. 2006
Marketing of gas
SPP – shareholders company, 
51% state-owned, and 
49% owned by Slovak gas 
Holding B.V. − consortium 
of E.ON-Ruhrgas and gaz de 
France 
Privatization in 2002
Railway transports 
of passengers
Railways of the Slovak Re-
public 
State enterprise, established on 1. 
1. 1993 
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Freight rail trans-
port Cargo Slovakia
From 1. 1. 2005 as the separate 
state shareholders company, before 
part of Slovak railways
Regional and local 
transport of pas-
sengers
Railways of the Slovak Re-
public,  State-owned railway 
infrastructure company road 
infrastructure provided by 
licensed private companies
Deregulation of road transport 
from the mid-2000s, regulated by 
sub-national governments 
Air transport Private companies
After the split of Czechoslovakia, 
the federal airlines CSA became 
Czech body only. A few new pri-
vate companies were established 
later. Attempts to create a national 
airline failed.
Inland water trans-
port Private companies Privatization of formed state body
water and waste 
water
Regional mixed or private 
companies Deregulation since 2006
Heating All types Privatization in 1990
Broadcasting
State-owned nationwide pu-
blic broadcasting organi-
zation with three channels, 
private TV broadcasters, 
regional TV broadcasters
Licenses for private TV stations 
issued
Source: Nemec, Mikusova Merickova & Vozarova, 2011.
The endogenous motives for agencification (there was no major political 
or public opposition to changes) were strengthened by exogenous pressure on 
policy makers – especially the need to comply with “the Acquis Communau-
taire“ as the basic conditions for joining the EU. 
In 2006, the left wing government under the Prime Minister Fico was 
elected by the voters who were very dissatisfied with the perceived radicalism 
of previous reforms. This new government was not able but also not willing 
to revert previous agencification decisions (also because of the EU members-
hip obligations) – compared to some other countries Slovakia did not even 
react to the fiscal constraints caused by the economic and financial crisis with 
cutting its staff or merging agencies. The same is valid for later Fico’s govern-
ments (in power again from 2012 and re-elected in 2016).  
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Table 6.10: Main Regulatory Agencies in Slovakia
Sector Market structure Regulation modes
Telecommuni-
cations Liberalized
Independent regulator: Telekomunikacny urad 
SR (www.teleoff.gov.sk) 
Postal services In the process of liberalization
Independent regulator: Postovy regulacny urad 
(www.posturad.sk) 
Production of 
electricity Liberalized
Independent regulator: Urad pre regulaciu 
sietovych odvetvi (www.urso.sk) 
Electric networks 
(transport 
anddistribution)
Regional mono-
polies
Independent regulator: Urad pre regulaciu 
sietovych odvetvi (www.urso.sk) 
Marketing of 
electricity
Regional mono-
polies
Independent regulator: Urad pre regulaciu 
sietovych odvetvi (www.urso.sk) 
gas transport-
distribution Monopoly
Independent regulator: Urad pre regulaciu 
sietovych odvetvi (www.urso.sk) 
Marketing of gas Monopoly Independent regulator: Urad pre regulaciu sietovych odvetvi (www.urso.sk) 
Railway transports 
of passengers Monopoly
Semi-independent regulator: Úrad pre 
reguláciu železničnej dopravy (www.urzd.sk) 
Freight rail 
transport Monopoly
Semi-independent regulator: Úrad pre 
reguláciu železničnej dopravy (www.urzd.sk) 
Regional and 
local transport of 
passengers
Regional and local 
licences, normally 
given to one 
supplier
Semi-independent regulator: Úrad pre 
reguláciu železničnej dopravy (www.urzd.sk) 
Air transport Liberalized Semi-independent regulator: Letecky urad SR (www.caa.sk) 
Inland water 
transport Liberalized
Semi-independent regulator: Statna plavebna 
sprava (www.sps.sk) 
Hospital health 
services
Mix of all types 
of companies and 
NgOs
Independent regulatory office: Urad pre dohlad 
nad zdravotnickou starostlivostou  (www.udzs.
sk) may represent agency (2).
Ambulatory 
health services Mainly private
Independent regulatory office: Urad pre dohlad 
nad zdravotnickou starostlivostou (www.udzs.sk) 
Higher education
Dominated by sta-
te/public schools, 
few private high 
schools exist
Semi-independent Akreditacna komisia 
(www.akredkom.sk) 
Financial services Competitive market
Independent regulator: Narodna banka SR 
(www.nbs.sk) may represent agency (2).
Broadcasting Competitive market
Independent regulator: Rada pre vysielanie a 
retransmisiu (www.rada-rtv.sk) 
Source: Nemec, Mikusova Merickova & Vozarova, 2011.
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De-agencification is not the issue today; however, the level of independen-
cy of agencies from the central structures and politicians visibly decreased. As 
Beblavy (2002) states, depolitization in general and depolitization of agencies 
was never the real agenda of any Slovak government. However, the opposite 
might be true – just after creating agencies political parties started to unders-
tand the benefits emanating from controlling agencies. As a result, the political 
fight for the “allocation” of agencies – either between coalition and opposition 
parties, or within political parties in power – is more and more visible. 
6.4. Civil Service Reform
Slovakia did not decide to pass the Civil Service Law in the earlier pha-
ses of transformation. Only the pressure connected with the final phase of 
EU accession process forced the political elites of the country to accept the 
fact that civil service shall be regulated by special law, providing a guarantee 
for the existence of professional and politically independent civil service.
The Act No. 312/2001 Coll. on Civil Service stipulated for the first time 
the legal relations in the Slovak civil service performance. This Act provided 
the legal framework for the civil service, and was aimed to establish profes-
sional, impartial, politically neutral, efficient, and flexible civil service. The 
Act made a  clear distinction between political (minister, state secretary) 
and apolitical posts (head of office, directors general of the sections, direc-
tors of departments, and other civil servants at the ministries). The Civil 
Service Office was set up and was responsible for the implementation of 
the Act (for more see Staronova, Stanova & Sicaková-Beblava, 2014) – the 
Office sought to coordinate national service with two instruments: systemi-
zation and central register of civil servants but it was not very successful.
The simultaneously accepted Act No. 313/2001 Coll. on Public Service 
regulated the public service matters (teachers, part of staff of territorial self-
government, and other public sector professional employees, without status 
of a civil servant). 
In addition, specialized laws, which established the civil service of mi-
litary forces, policemen, customs officers and fire-brigades, were adopted 
during this period.
By doing so, the legislative framework regulating the status of civil ser-
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vants and other public sector employees has been created. However, soon 
after the EU accession in 2004, major regressive changes happened (Mayer-
Sahling, 2009). The Civil Service Office that was politically independent, 
and its chair was not very popular amongst the whole spectrum of politi-
cal parties (Staronova, Stanova & Sicakova-Beblava, 2014) operated only 
between 2002 and 2006, when it was repealed by the Parliament. Except for 
personal reasons, other factors determining the abolishment of the Civil 
Service Office were lack of law harmonization and lack of clarity of the law 
on the civil service which influenced the uncertainty concerning the role of 
the Civil Service Office as well as disseverment of individual service offices 
which hardly cooperated with that time newly established office. 
According to Meyer-Sahling (2009), Slovakia (together with Poland 
and the Czech Republic) represents a group of “destructive reform rever-
sal” countries. Not only the Civil Service Office was abolished but most of 
main civil service principles are not well respected by the legislation. and 
especially the practice in Slovakia. Open competition for civil service posts 
is formally established but, in reality, patronage is the main principle for se-
lection of new civil servants, especially in higher posts (Staronova, Stanova 
& Sicakova-Beblava, 2014, describe this phenomena in detail). Specific way 
to by-pass a real open competition are given by selection criteria – if exami-
nations happen, they have, in majority cases, only oral form, thus allowing 
any kind of manipulation (Table 6.11 shows changes of the civil service se-
lection process – and the fact that competition for permanent civil service 
post is not compulsory since 2009). 
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Table 6.11: Civil Service Positions and the Selection Process thereof
Preparatory 
civil service 
(1. 4. 2002 – 
31. 3. 2004)
Permanent 
civil service
(1. 4. 2002 – 
today)
Temporary 
civil service 
(1. 1. 2004 – 
today)
Nominated 
civil service 
positions
(1. 1. 2004 – 
1. 11. 2009)
Qualification examination (1. 4. 
2002 – 1. 6. 2006)
After passing 
this examina-
tion, the status 
of permanent 
civil servant 
was achieved.
x x x
Nomination examination 
(1. 1. 2004 – 1. 11. 2009) x x x y
Standard open competition (1. 
4. 2002 – today) y Optional Optional x
“group” open competition (1. 
1. 2004 – 1. 11. 2009) x
y 
(but not 
for the 
highest 
positions)
x x
Direct selection 
(1. 11. 2009 – today) x Optional x x
Source: adapted from Staroňová – Láštic, 2011.
The civil service in Slovakia is also far from the ideal of political neutrality 
– the legislation and the practice give virtually no guarantees to the senior civil 
service appointees, making these positions susceptible to political appointments 
and political pressure. Managers – from the top state secretary/deputy minister 
down to the head of unit/division – can be ‘relieved of their duties’ at any time 
and without any reason (Meyer-Sahling, 2009: 40).
Another dimension involves performance evaluation and performance pay. 
The basic salary is fixed but the allocation of any non-predetermined premiums 
is fully arbitrarily, and varies in structure and number. For the majority of the 
authorities performance appraisal (if exists) is not at all related to remuneration, 
i.e. the link to a salary is missing, although the performance salary component is 
far from being marginal. Because Heads of service offices and Directors-general 
are occasionally paid the salaries (all premiums included) that are as high as the 
salaries of top managers in the private sector, such situation is alarming. 
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6.5. Improving Administrative Services and Procedures, 
E-Government
As indicated above, most “reform” changes were of structural character, 
or promoting decentralization. None from all existing Slovak governments 
really directly addressed the need to deliver reliable, predictable, transparent, 
and efficient administrative services to the citizens and the private sector, 
and/or minimize “red tape”, and simplify administrative processes. As of to-
day, administrative courts and/or tribunals are still not established; the same 
is valid for necessary systemic complaint mechanisms (except for some very 
recent steps within the ESO reform). 
6.5.1. Improving Efficiency and Quality of Administrative Services 
For this topic we provide one short case study to document the situation 
(for more see Nemec, Medved & Sumpikova, 2005). with the support of 
Phare public administration reform program a comprehensive experiment 
with focus to improve the quality and effectiveness of performance of the 
deconcentrated state administration was introduced at the level of district 
and regional offices of state administration in Slovakia. The preparation of 
the experiment started in 1998, and the first year of operation was in 2000.
The aim of this experiment was to try to assess and measure performan-
ce of offices in the following four dimensions:
1. Professional quality of performance (the quality of administrative 
actions),
2. Client satisfaction,
3. Employee satisfaction,
4. Efficiency of performance – delivery of products.
Already the starting phase of this experiment was problematic – because 
of many implementation problems, the experiment was realized in limited sca-
le (contents), and on a very small sample of state administration bodies (size). 
During the period of 2000–2002, three of its four parts started to opera-
te. Client satisfaction was measured by using a comprehensive questionnaire, 
filled in by the citizens coming to the office for any kind of administrative 
action. 23 quality target questions tried to obtain the data on the most impor-
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tant dimensions of service, including performance of personnel, premises, 
and process (all aspects of service design). Employee satisfaction was also 
measured by the questionnaire covering 39 questions about important fac-
tors influencing the employee satisfaction. Issues like working conditions and 
environment, career planning and development, working relations, workload 
and rewards represented the most important parts of the questionnaire. 
The measurement of the efficiency of performance of public adminis-
tration activities was based on data obtained from cost-center based ma-
nagement and accounting. The cost-center approach was introduced as an 
experiment in one regional office of the state administration as a part of the 
Phare project, focusing on public administration reform since 1998. Later, the 
Ministry of Interior decided to use this approach as a compulsory method 
in all district and regional offices of the state administration. The data from 
cost-center based computerized system (using software IBEU) provided full 
information about the direct and indirect costs of the respective department. 
These data were processed further to obtain data per product as the pre-con-
dition for future full-cost accounting. 
Despite of the potential of this approach, the project was suspended, espe-
cially because of a lot of resistance from the offices. Regional and district offices 
complained that it was too complicated to obtain data, or they were not willing 
to provide it, being afraid of the consequences. Some of the complaints were 
realistic – for example that the calculation of costs per product was only partly 
based on the existing software IBEU but needed additional manual interven-
tions. There were no interconnected information management systems within 
the offices of the state administration. Nor there were national information 
systems collecting the data automatically. The interface between IBEU and the 
central program to process the data at the level of the Ministry did not work 
well.  In this situation the running of the system caused additional workload 
for all actors, thus limiting the success of the experiment. The group processing 
data at the Ministry was too small to be able to prepare comprehensive mate-
rial summarizing the data obtained, and to draw the necessary conclusions. 
Cost-centers increased the workload but also achieved better transparency of 
performance data – something not appreciated by most offices. 
Positive elements from this experiment were not used in later stages of 
“reforming” the Slovak public sector. It seems that all involved stakeholders 
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do not want too transparent information about performance of public admi-
nistration bodies – including citizens who do not demand it (the problem of 
non-reliability of existing cost data in Slovak public administration system is 
well documented by our studies on contracting and outsourcing: unit costs of 
in-house versus external production are not compared because they are not 
available – see for example Merickova et al., 2010).
6.5.2. Administrative Procedures:  “Red Tape”
Excessive regulation and rigid conformity to formal rules are the typical 
features of the Slovak public administration system. we can document this 
fact in many cases. Two core purposes might lie behind this situation – ger-
man legal tradition and politicization. In the Slovak conditions, the typical 
reaction of top politicians to any problem or scandal in the public (and also 
private) sector is changing the existing laws, or preparing a new legislation. 
In such conditions, for example Public Procurement Law is amended two 
or three times over some years, adding and re-adding new paragraphs and 
requirements (the first law was about 30 pages long, the current law is more 
than 200 pages long and not executable because of internal controversies). 
Regulatory impact assessment system was formally introduced in Slovakia 
as a part of accession and post-accession process, but as Staronova (2010: 124) 
states, it is just formal and does not have any impact on decreasing “red tape”: 
“The lack of a single unit in charge of RIA quality assurance in Slovakia de facto 
weakens the whole system, and makes the use of RIA only a symbolic exercise”.
we briefly introduce one interesting study documenting the issue. Ciz-
marik (2013) tried to assess the compliance costs of taxation in Slovakia 
(cost that have to be paid by the tax payers for fulfilling legal tax obligations). 
He used statistically significant sample, and his results are really negative as 
shown in Table 6.12. 
Because the findings, especially the estimates of compliance costs for in-
come taxation of physical persons, were very negative, he recalculated the 
results for the following possible biases – total tax revenues from income tax, 
real total number of legal persons, replacing average with median data, diffe-
rent values of the coefficient “A”, and different monetary values of time as 
shown in Table 6.13. 
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Table 6.12: Estimated Costs of Taxation in Slovakia in 2011: Income Taxation
Subject:
Legal form
Avera-
ge CC 
(EUR)
Total 
number 
of tax 
subjects
Total CC 
(EUR)
Total tax 
revenues 
(EUR)
Relative 
CC (%)
CC to 
GDP (%)
Self-employed 861 481,996 414,871,309 x x x
Other physical 
persons 770 75,754 58,354,569 x x x
Physical persons in total 473,225,878 56,402,000 839.02% 0.69%
Limited companies 4,067 181,192 736,921,800 X x x
Other companies 3,186 12,191 38,841,609 X x x
Legal persons in total 775,763,409 1,645,905,000 47.13% 1.12%
Total 1,248,989,287 1,702,307,000 73.37% 1.81%
Source: Cizmarik, 2013.
Table 6.13: Alternative Recalculations
Alternative CC to tax revenues total
CC to tax revenues 
physical persons
CC to tax revenues 
legal persons 
Original results 73.37% 839.02% 47.13%
Alternative „A“ 53.11% 242.29% 35.98%
Alternative „B“ 62.36% 713.17% 40.06%
Alternative „C“ 40.12% 637.04% 19.67%
Alternative „D“ 61.36% 734.61% 38.29%
Alternative „E“ 62.99% 599.71% 44.59%
Alternative  „A+B+C“ 24.69% 156.37% 12.76%
Source: Cizmarik, 2013.
To summaries the results – tax payers and physical persons have to 
spend minimum 1,5 EUR to pay 1 EUR taxes to the state, probably much 
more. Even with the most cautious assumptions, the compliance costs of 
taxation in Slovakia are higher compared to those in most other countries. 
 The issue of rigid conformity to the rules is well visible on the example 
of public procurement or within the system of public sector control. Nemec, 
Orviska and Lawson (forthcoming) mapped the impact of the Supreme Au-
dit Office on innovations in the public sector and the level of efficiency of 
its audit. The theory anticipates that accountability institutions, such as the 
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SAO, may create feedback loops supporting public innovations. However, 
their detailed checks on the concrete situation in the Slovak Republic confi-
dently conclude that in Slovakia such a feedback loop barely functions. One 
of the core purposes for this situation is the way how controls function – 
most controls are compliance controls, and the main feature of controlling 
is “fear”. 
6.5.3 .Transparency
As regards transparency, the most important step was introducing of 
free access to information legal package (since 2001), progressively increa-
sing access of citizens to any public data. Two core laws defining this field 
are the Law on Free Access to Information and the Law on Public Contracts.
The Law on Free Access to Information is to large extend fully com-
parable (or even more progressive) with the situation in most developed 
countries – formally any physical person can ask for all existing non-secret 
information – and public bodies must provide information about the access 
point (channels). Implementation gaps exist but are not too much limiting 
the functionality of this law.
The Law on Public Contracts requires that all contracts signed by the 
public bodies (except for few secret exemptions and above fixed financial 
limit) must be stored in the central registry – and are valid only after they 
are stored and displayed. As a result, any interested party has a full access to 
all information on governmental purchasing but also many other types of 
public expenditures (like grants to non-profit sector bodies).  
Transparency is formally very well promoted, especially at the self-go-
vernment level. For example, the city of Martin (Central Slovakia) received 
several awards for its project “Transparent City” from important interna-
tional bodies – especially the United Nations Public Service Award in 2011 
in category: Preventing and Combating Corruption in the Public Service. 
However, as the existing studies document, a really high level of transparen-
cy in Slovakia does not prevent corruption. For example, grega (2013) ana-
lyzed public procurement in the above mentioned city of Martin. Thanks 
to transparency, he did not have any problems to obtain data documenting 
that many procurements are manipulated.
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6.5.4. Accessibility and E-Government
Except for very marginal improvements implemented especially at the 
local level (most progressive municipalities started to create client centers at 
the beginning of this century), not much has been done for a better accessibi-
lity of administrative services prior to the ESO reform.
Thanks to the available financing from the EU funds, the ESO reform in-
cludes some visible improvements, especially the fact that one-stop shops were 
established step by step at the deconcentrated state administration level, to 
ensure contact of the citizens with the state administrative functions. One-stop 
shops operate within the organizational structure of district offices, and are 
expected to provide services like Trade Licences, Road Transport administra-
tion, Environment, Registration of Vehicles, Commercial Register, Offences, 
Forest and Land Office, Labor, Social Affairs and Family in one place. The core 
limit for full operation of one-stop shops is the existence of thousands different 
administrative registers that are not interlinked – and probably cannot be in-
terlinked in short or even medium time perspective. The principle that a piece 
of information is provided to the state only once cannot be respected in such 
environment, thus increasing administrative burdens to citizen and business.
E-Government
Electronic public administration, i.e. e-government, became the visible is-
sue less than ten years ago. The Strategy for the Public Administration Informa-
tization 2007–2013 included the task to provide selected agendas in electronic 
way – providing e-services to the citizens and the private sector by using public 
administration information systems. However, also because of lack of resour-
ces and technical problems with e-signature, communication, and transaction 
functions of e-government, it did not start to function on expected scale.
The problem of limited resources was addressed by the creation of ope-
rational program Public Administration Electronization as a part of recently 
finished EU funds programming period. The expectation was that all main 
state services will be electronized (especially job search, filing of income tax 
return, motor vehicle registration, or social security). This program allocated 
to various projects worth about one billion of euros in total, and its formal 
goals were specially (www.informatizacia.sk) the increase of satisfaction of 
citizens, businesses and other entities with public administration by reducing 
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the administrative burden on citizens in contact with the public authorities, 
and to simplify citizens‘ opportunities to participate in public affairs; intro-
ducing of electronic devices in public administration processes through the 
creation of additional electronic registers for administrative operations and 
their connection to existing registers; ensuring their usability for legal acts, 
effective and efficient public administration through a functional system of e-
government; increasing of public administration competence by increasing 
the computer literacy of public servants.
The 2013 survey carried out for the Ministry of Finance by a company 
gfk Market Research Institute Ltd. (www.informatizacia.sk) regarding the 
citizen satisfaction with e-government services reveals some very interesting 
facts regarding the situation and possible achievements. 
The results confirmed the computer literacy of the population as well 
as the possibility of access to the Internet − up to 84% of surveyed residents 
used the Internet. The users were not only the younger age groups or groups 
of people with higher education but 57% of the elderly population aged 60 
to 67 years used the Internet and up to 60% of the population with primary 
education could use the Internet. Use of the Internet by the citizens of the 
Slovak Republic is growing every year − since 2010 it rose from 60% to 72%. 
These facts suggest that Slovak citizens are prepared for e-government, i.e. 
they expect growth in the volume of services provided electronically. 
In reality, however, electronic contact of citizens with public authori-
ties in its simplest form, such as obtaining information by the citizens from 
public authorities, is still not intensive and also not improving (in 2011, 69% 
of citizens obtained information from the public authorities, and 54% used 
the forms downloaded from the websites of public authorities, while in 2013, 
only 53% of citizens obtained the information electronically, and only 40% of 
citizens downloaded the official forms). The dominant form of citizens con-
tact with the public authorities is still a personal visit (75% of the citizens). 
On average, 48% of citizens considered information on electronic public 
services insufficient. Only 18% of citizens were aware of electronic public ser-
vices directly from their providers − most citizens received information from 
the media, friends and relatives, and these data are incomplete (70% of citizens 
do not understand the principle of public e-service completely, regardless of 
age, education, or the size of the municipality). 54% of Slovak citizens never 
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used any form of electronic contact with the public authorities. For citizens, 
who did use an electronic contact with the authorities, only 20% used a full 
electronic public service, the rest only looked up information from the website 
s or downloaded official forms but they received the service in person).
Citizens do not evaluate e-government services well − only 10% of citi-
zens perceived that electronic public services fully met their needs. Most of 
them claimed that the only benefit of e-government is time saving but issues 
like increased efficiency, service quality, and increased transparency were not 
perceived. 23% of those who wanted to use public e-services had to visit the 
office in the end. 
6.5.5. Lack of Accountability and Responsibility
Accountability and responsibility represent important problem in the 
Slovak public administration system – this fact is revealed by many existing 
studies. As Vesely (2013) states, the fact that the Slovak (and some other Sla-
vic languages) is not able to translate these two terms properly indicates a lot.
Because accountability and responsibility is not required by the citizen, 
and the tolerance to corruption is really high (Orviska & Hudson, 2003). 
In Slovakia nothing happens to a Minister, who publicly announces (www.
pravda.sk): “Yes, our office did not follow public procurement rules. Maybe 
we will pay the fine as set by the Public Procurement Office; however, this is 
just the transfer from one state pocket to another one. But the most impor-
tant is that we have necessary cars”. Nothing happens also to a hospital di-
rector, who responds in a discussion on public procurement problems in his 
institution as follows: “The life of the patient is much more important than 
the Public Procurement Law. Our only concern is to provide the patient with 
maximum care. The patient does not care about the procurement of medica-
ments; he just wants his/her drug.” (www.stv.sk).
6.6. Conclusion 
The text of this chapter first shows the consequence of public admi-
nistration changes in Slovakia after the Velvet Revolution in 1989. Its main 
goal is to assess all these changes from more global analytical perspective 
according to main selected comparative areas analyzed in this book.
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The facts indicate that, except for first phase of reforms when all de-
mocratic structures were created, frequent later changes deliver moderate 
impacts, if any. The core task for almost all governments was to change the 
administrative structures – this happened in zigzag way by switching from 
specialized to general administration and back (generating massive costs 
but with almost no benefits). On the other hand, some necessary steps were 
not recognized, or even reverted – the most visible example is Civil Service 
situation.
Important positive achievements and results, however, do exist. Slovak 
self-government situation is one of the closest in Europe to the principles of 
the European Charter of Local Self-government – except for too large fra-
gmentation that is not well addressed on top-down line. The transparency 
and right for information principles are almost perfectly respected – legally 
but also in practical life. Recent ESO reform has ambitions to improve the 
quality of administrative services and processes for citizens and businesses 
– some important changes already happened (one-stop shops and e-go-
vernment services). 
we argue that the core purpose for the limited capacity of all Slovak 
governments is over-politicization of the public life in the country – public 
administration is expected to serve the politicians, and the task for every 
new minister is to “reform” it. In such environment, in many cases, “ill re-
forms are badly implemented”, and the need to change this – to switch form 
politic to policy is well stressed by the Strategy of the Development of the 
Slovak Republic (2010) – just needs to be implemented.
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alita politicko-administratívnych vzťahov na Slovensku. Bratislava: Uk. 
32–81.
16. Machyniak, J. 2013. Transformácia verejnej správy na Slovensku po 
roku 1989–  výzvy a realita. Teória a prax verejnej správy. košice: Uni-
verzita P. J. Šafárika. 29–41. 
17. Majlingová L. 2005. Sposoby zabezpecovania sluzieb odpadoveho hos-
podarstva v SR. Banská Bystrica: EF UMB.
18. Merickova, B., Nemec, J., Sicakova Beblava, E., Beblavy, M. 2010. kon-
trahovanie služieb vo verejnom sektore. Presov: Adin.
19. Mesikova, E. 2008. Vývoj územného a správneho členenia na Slovens-
ku. Politické vedy. 11 (3), 72–96. 
20. Meyer-Sahling, J. 2009. Sustainability of Civil Service Reforms in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe Five Years after EU Accession, Sigma Papers, 
No. 44, OECD Publishing.  
21. Medveď, J., Nemec, J., Vitek, L. 2005.  Social Health Insurance and Its 
Failures in the Czech Republic and Slovakia: The Role of the State. Pra-
gue Economic Papers. 14(1), 64–81.
22. Nemec, J., Bercik, P., kuklis, P. 2000. Local government in Slovakia. 
In: Decentralisation: Experiments and Reforms. OSI/LgI Budapest. 
297–342. 
23. Nemec, J. 2001. The Local Response to Democracy and Bureaucracy: 
The Case of Slovakia. In: Baker, R. (Eds). 2001. Transitions from Autho-
ritarianism. New York: Praeger Publishers. 133–150. 
24. Nemec, J., Lawson, C. 2005. Health Policy in Slovakia and the Outco-
mes of Health Care Reforms 1989–2003. Journal of Comparative Policy 
Analysis. 7(1), 49–72. 
235 Public AdministrAtion reforms in slovAkiA
25. Nemec, J., Medved, J., Sumpikova, M. 2005. Ohodnotenie výkonnosti 
verejnej správy: teoretického východiská a  skúsenosti z  experimentu 
v SR. Politická ekonomie, 53 (1), 95–110.
26. Nemec, J., Sagat, V. 2007. Performance-Based System of Financing Slo-
vak Universities: Selected Problems. Acta Aerarii Publici. 4 (1), 72–80.
27. Nemec, J. 2008. Public Management Reforms: Slovakia. In: Bouckaert, 
g., Nemec, J., Nakrosis, V., Hajnal, g., Tonnisson, k. (Eds). 2008. Public 
Management Reforms in CEE. Bratislava: NISPAcee. 287–316. 
28. Nemec, J., Ochrana, F., Sumpikova, M. 2008. Czech and Slovak Lessons 
for Public Administration Perfomance Evaluation, Management and 
Finance.  Ekonomicky casopis. 56 (4), 353–369.  
29. Nemec, J. 2011. Modernizácia verejnej správy v SR ako nevyhnutná re-
akcia na súčasnú krízu. In: Tokarova, M. (Eds). 2011. Aktuálne trendy v 
manažmente verejnej správy. Bratislava: Vysoká škola ekonómie a ma-
nažmentu verejnej správy. 21–35. 
30. Nemec, J., Mikusova-Merickova, B, Vozarova, Z. 2011. Agencification 
in Slovakia. The Current Situation and Lessons Learned. Transylvanian 
Review of Administrative Sciences. Special Issue. November 2011. 140–
159. 
31. Nemec, J., Buček, M. 2012. Local government in Slovakia. In: Moreno, 
A.M. (Eds). 2012. Local government in the Member States of the Euro-
pean Union: A Comparative Legal Perspective. Madrid: INAP. 555–576. 
32. Nemec, J. 2013. Health Reforms in Slovakia. In: Bjorkman, J. w. and 
Nemec, J. (Eds). 2013. Health Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Hague: Eleven International Publishing. 193–220. 
33. Nemec, J., Orviska, M., Lawson, C. (forthcoming). The Role of Accoun-
tability Arrangements in Social Innovations: Evidence from the Uk and 
Slovakia. NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy.
34. Niznansky, V., Hamalova M. 2013. Územné a správne členenie Slovens-
ka. Bratislava: VŠEMVS. 
35. Niznansky, V. 2005. Decentralizácia na Slovensku – bilancia nekone-
čného príbehu 1995–2005. Bratislava: Považská tlačiareň s. r. o.
236 Public AdministrAtion reforms in eAstern euroPeAn union member stAtes 
Post-Accession convergence And divergence
36. Orviska, M., Hudson, J. 2003. Tax Evasion, Civic Duty and the Law Abi-
ding Citizen. European Journal of Political Economy. 19 (1), 83–102.
37. Staronova, k. 2010. Regulatory Impact Assessment: Formal Institutio-
nalization and Practice, Cambridge University Press. Journal of Public 
Policy. 30 (1), 117–136.   
38. Staronova, k., Stanova, L., Sicakova Beblava, E. 2014. Systémy štátnej 
služby. koncepty a trendy. Bratislava: Uk.
39. Statistical Yearbook Slovakia, 2014.
40. Strategia rovoja Slovenskej spolocnosti. Bratislava: EU SAV 2010.
41. Svidronova, M., Nemec, J., Mikusova Merickova, B. Dark Side of Co-
Creation: Social Innovations Failures in Slovakia. Paper presented at 
2015 EgPA conference.
42. Sutaj, Š. 2003. Dejiny verejnej správy na Slovensku. košice: FVS UPJŠ.
43. Tichy, D. 2005. Združovanie obcí ako predpoklad rýchlejšieho rozvoja 
samospráv a regiónov. Ekonomický časopis, 53 (4), 364−382.   
44. Vesely, A. 2013. Accountability in Central and Eastern Europe: Concept 
and Reality. International Review of Administrative Sciences. 79(2), 
310−330.
45. Vitalisova, k. 2015. Marketing vztahov v miestnej samosprave. Banska 
Bystrica: Belianum.
46. Zarska, E., Sebova, M. (Eds). 2005.  Decentralizácia verejnej správy Slo-
venskej republiky – otvorené otázky. Bratislava: NHF EU. 
237 Hungarian Public administration: last tHirty years, Waves in tHe story
7. Hungarian Public Administration: Last Thirty 
Years, Waves in the Story
György Gajduschek, Tamás M. Horváth, Károly Jugovits
7.1. Introduction – Defining Models 
In this chapter, we16 provide an overview of the Hungarian PARs, and try 
to analyze and assist understanding of these changes in the light of various 
models of PA. The chapter is divided into four main parts. In the first part, 
we attempt to define the type of approaches to PA, including the bureaucratic 
and the socialist model as well as the three identified reform-models. In the 
second part, we review major reform waves separately in various segments 
of PA: (a) structure (central and territorial organizations), (b) functioning 
(policy making, public service provision and administrative procedures), and 
(c) civil service. In the third part, we provide an overview of the Hungarian 
scholarly literature regarding PAR. Finally, we attempt to present a summary 
by interpreting the findings in the light of PAR models and answer to the qu-
estions raised by the editors of the book. 
Hereby, we attempt to identify major reform movements in the Hun-
garian public administration and to categorize them into a certain type of 
reform ideology, or reform type/style (hereinafter: reform-model or model). 
Regarding the potential models reflecting on the international literature, 
most importantly relying on Pollitt & Bouckaert (2004, 2011) and, to some de-
gree, Ashworth et al. (2013), and specifically Hajnal & Rosta (2016), we iden-
tify three major streams of reform-models, namely New Public Management 
(NPM), Neo-weberian State (NwS) and New Public governance (NPg) accor-
ding to Pollitt & Bouckaert (2004).17 Besides, these three models may have do-
16   The final version of this chapter is a result of a joint effort of the authors. Originally, the respon-
sibilities for the sub-chapters were shared as follows: györgy gajduschek the models, central 
government, decision-making, administrative procedures and civil service; Tamás M. Horváth 
local government and public service delivery; károly Jugovits scholarly debates.
17   In the new edition of their analysis (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011) the authors introduced a new 
term: digital governance instead of NPg that refers to the impact of ICT on PA. whereas this 
impact is crucial and largely changes the functioning of the public sector, especially administra-
tion/management, we believe that this is a different dimension of the changes. 
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minated the mainstream international professional discussion on PA reforms 
in the past decades.18 Our chapter will discuss the impact of these three impor-
ted models but two other ‘models’ have also relevance in this study. Firstly, the 
communist-socialist model (we use the term ‘socialist’ as the Hungarian system 
could surely not be called ‘communist’), and secondly, the weberian-bureaucra-
tic model, as several Hungarian and foreign authors emphasize, it could have 
been better if the PA of socialist countries, at the first stage of transformation, 
had attempted setting up a full-fledged bureaucratic system (Hajnal & Rosta, 
2016). The three reform-models are usually contrasted with the bureaucratic 
system, in the west, whereas these three as well as bureaucracy may have appe-
ared as an option to overcome the socialist past.
7.1.1. Socialist System
Unfortunately, we could not identify one major volume that would provide 
a comprehensive systematic description of the communist-socialist system, 
its major mechanisms, and especially the role of government and PA within 
that. Nevertheless, several such elements are well known and can easily be 
enlisted (e.g. kornai, 1986; Janos, 1996; goetz & wollman, 2001; Dimitrov, 
goetz & wollmann, 2006; Meyer-Sahling, 2009b). In this perfectly totalita-
rian regime it is the government led by the communist party, i.e. led from 
the center (of the country and ultimately from Moscow), by one despot that 
controls everything, even the purest private (family) life of the citizens. No 
market functioning, no civic initiatives are accepted; on the contrary, even 
cruelly suppressed. In other words, it is an extremely etatist and centralized 
system. The state institutions are organized based on the officially advocated 
principle of “unity (as opposed to division) of power” serving also the pur-
pose of central direction as opposed to checks and balances. All these had a 
major impact on the way of government functioning that has perhaps been 
less investigated and analyzed. Below we list those features that we believe 
are the most relevant for our study, discussed in a descending order in the 
literature. Etatism and centralization naturally have its impact on the gover-
nance. Another crucial issue is the strict political control exercised by the 
Communist Party. This generates some crucial characteristics that may be 
18   In fact the latter two (NwS and NPg) are also discussed as „post-NPM”, or as Pollitt and Bouck-
aert (2004) present them, an alternative adoption and adaptation of NPM in various parts of 
Europe. For our purposes this theoretically highly significant question is of minor relevance. 
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behind some features of present government attributes. The most important 
such elements may be: 
1. The functions of policy formation and policy implementation were lar-
gely divided between the party and the state apparatus. Major policy 
decisions were prepared and surely adopted in the offices of the Central 
Committee of the Socialist Party.19 Ministries may have been respon-
sible for the formulation of related laws and other activities, whereas 
local units carried out the work of everyday operative implementation.
2. Naturally, loyalty to the party, its ideology and leaders was a must that 
was enforced by the so-called nomenclature system that provided the 
prerogative to the party unit in the given field/level to evaluate and 
veto candidates to any relevant civil service positions. Furthermore, 
a party resolution set up quasi-official rules on the selection for ci-
vil service position that named political loyalty as the first criterion, 
followed by professional qualities. Though, from the late 1960‘s pro-
fessionalism became more and loyalty less emphasized, this rule was 
valid as long as the regime existed (gajduschek, 2007b).
3. The administration was a kind of conveyor belt between central poli-
tical decision-making and the society at large. Consequently, the key 
function and responsibility of the administration was to control the so-
ciety. This exacerbated the suppressive, authoritative element of PA (or 
state administration as it was called at the time) over a service approach. 
4. Most of the activities of the administration were based on the laws 
(though party resolutions hold a similar or higher status to that of laws). 
Laws, in this regard, however, hold a different position than in a system 
of rule of law, where the laws provide guarantees to the citizens against 
arbitrariness, unfair, and suppressive actions of the government. Laws, 
similarly to that of the Prussian Polizeistaat, are generalized orders 
from the center of the hierarchy to the lower levels. In other words, 
rules are to assure organizational efficiency. Uniformity is necessary to 
ensure that the will of the center is carried out precisely at lower levels 
but exceptions may also be created if the will of the center requires so.
19    According to official statistics of the time, the size of full-time party apparatus was 5793 (Hell, 2010). 
The size of the civil service (officials working in the offices of central and local government) was 
about 50,000. Additional units of the party organizations, such as the Social Sciences Institute, a 
kind of Think Tank of the Central Committee, are not included into the above-mentioned numbers. 
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5. State administration could rely on various instruments and methods 
to enforce central will against the society and its individuals. Frequ-
ently, this was the application of laws, issuing of permits, adjudica-
ting individual cases, monitoring activities, and sanctioning in case 
of infringement of laws by the citizens or other entities − a type of 
activity dominating the PA nowadays as well. Nevertheless, during 
the socialist period, the administration, and especially its managers, 
had much more methods at hand to enforce the will of the centrum 
(or their own personal interests for that matter). Most importantly:
a. As the economy was dominated by the state-owned companies, 
and so-called civil organizations (including the unions) were also 
run by the government, the top managers of these organizations 
were – formally or informally – controlled via HR methods of 
appointment and lay-off, setting up salaries and other ways of 
remuneration, etc., by the government.
b. Laws could be used selectively; one may have been sanctioned 
for something thousands of others have done without retribution 
(kulcsár, 2001). 
In brief, the orders of the local party and state administration were car-
ried out without resistance even if the laws did not support them as informal 
institutions offered the incentives20 strong enough to regulate non-state ac-
tors behavior in the direction expected from the higher positions in the hie-
rarchy. Obedience in this system was easily assured through semi-informal 
sanctions and incentives.  
with the transition most of these well-functioning, widely and routinely 
used (though highly suppressive and arbitrary) governing techniques became 
obsolete. A perfectly different way of administrative functioning was neces-
sary, techniques that were new needed to be learnt and put into practice, on 
individual and organizational level, and a perfectly new way of governance 
(relying on much more limited authority) was to be elaborated. This is a cru-
cial issue in transition that has hardly been analyzed in the literature. 
Hungary, was specific, to some degree, for its so-called goulash Com-
munism that allowed somewhat more freedom in the private sphere, and 
20   This fact may explain why the number of civil servants doubled after the transition, from below 
50,000 in 1989 to over a 100,000 in 1994 (the first time the official data are again available). 
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even some market activities were allowed, a relatively large smallholders sec-
tor existed, whereas the suppression of civil society was seemingly milder 
than in most CEE countries. 
A note on pre- and post-communism – the longer historical perspective
Even though communism was ‘imported’ to the CEE region, it fits, in a 
certain way, to a longer-term history of – at least some of – these countries; it 
fits into the historical Eastern (Byzantine) model described by Szűcs (1983). 
Moreover, it may represent even an ultimate accomplishment of that model 
imported to Central Europe from the East (i.e. Soviet Russia). For instance, 
government control over every segment of the society, and authoritarian style 
of governing, both in political decision-making and administrative culture, 
are such historically overarching features (kulcsár, 1982, 2001). Other publi-
cations that address the transition from a wider perspective (such as Elster, 
Offe & Preuss, 1998; Meyer-Sahling, 2009b) also point to the long run featu-
res, like continuous disagreement on major values and political direction, fra-
gile formal institutions, and frequent large scale changes both in the short run 
(after the elections) and in the long run (frequent regime changes), when the 
newcomers deny everything their predecessors did, and attempt to generate a 
180 degree turn. This historic feature may also be a highly relevant historical 
feature to understand the societal, and within that, governmental functioning. 
7.1.2. Bureaucratic Administration
Description of the bureaucratic arrangement is typically traced back to 
Max weber. weber treated the phenomenon of bureaucracy mostly in two 
parts of his great work Economy and Society (weber, 1978). Four attributes 
dominate the later studies of bureaucracy as an organizational phenomenon:
1. Division of labor (according to weber: division of legal competencies 
/ jurisdiction) and specialization;
2. Expertise (well-trained personnel with significant job experience, i.e. 
merit-based civil service system);
3. Rules, which define everything: structures, procedures, and individu-
al responsibilities as well as the way the personnel (bureaucrats) get 
employed; and
4. Hierarchy; organizational units, personnel, and even the norms 
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applied are arranged in a vertical manner, e.g. chain of commands 
(down) and reporting and responsibility (up), while making infor-
mation flow and accountability lines highly simple, and thus poten-
tially transparent.
It is generally accepted that specialization and division of labor direct-
ly lead to increased productivity. Expertise, i.e. knowledge of how to deal 
adequately with issues at hand, has a similar effect. Rules may describe and 
enforce the one best way of handling cases; thus, they may also greatly contri-
bute to an increased efficiency. Hierarchy assures coordination in the organi-
zation. Beyond their primary function in directly increasing efficiency, rules 
may also serve as a tool of coordination (see khandwalla, 1974). 
This bureaucratic arrangement, as elsewhere was argued (gajduschek, 
2003), assures the highest level of rationality, and most importantly, pre-
dictability of procedures and outcomes. This, in turn, is especially relevant 
in PA operations to assure the rule of law, especially equity, equal treatment, 
etc. Furthermore, hierarchy and rule-based behavior is a key for democracy 
assuring that elected top government officials may determine and control the 
administrative functioning to the greatest extent possible.  
As for most of the new approaches, the new PA models have challenged 
exactly this bureaucratic model of PA. The NPM criticized its rigidity, mono-
polistic arrangement (i.e. lack of competition among the providers and lack 
of choice for the consumers), and consequent lack of efficiency. The NPg 
can be conceived as a serious critique of rigid, somewhat aristocratic-style of 
decision-making in small professional-bureaucratic circles, lack of openness, 
and hierarchical arrangement vis-à-vis deliberative processes with the parti-
cipation of interested / influenced but non-professional parties. The Neo-we-
berian approach, at least in its original meaning (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004), 
referred to an approach that, while strived to retain several bureaucratic ele-
ments, attempted to mix them with increased efficiency, client-orientation, 
openness, and participation. 
7.1.3. New Public Management (NPM)
New Public Management (NPM) has been analyzed extensively in the 
literature. In fact, this approach had dominated the discussion over PA (or 
in this context, strictly public management) for at least two decades before 
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2008. The great economic crises, however, have largely undermined the ide-
ological basis of NPM, which can be, in a somewhat simplified way, defined 
as: ‘government is a problem, market mechanisms (i.e. competition, private 
management techniques) are the solution.’
Two main layers of NPM may be identified, as Pollitt & Dan (2013) point 
out, ideological one, praising market solutions, and heavily criticizing the 
size and the bureaucratic functioning of government, and another one dea-
ling with various techniques that may solve or alleviate government failures. 
Critique is generally based on neoclassical economics, and especially, public 
choice theory (weimer & Vining, 2011: 156−208). For instance, rigidity of 
financial or human resources management is severely criticized, and alterna-
tive solutions are offered (Hughes, 2012). As it is said, the merit system that 
assures life-long employment, and sets up wages based solely on position, 
practically on seniority, does not provide incentive for high performance as it 
favors average or even minimum achievers. The solution could be giving up 
the merit system. Civil servants should be employed under the labor law and 
their remuneration be dependent on performance appraised by their man-
agers. Methods of business management, like TQM, MBO, are also widely 
promoted by zealots of NPM. 
In the field of public services, they also prefer market organizations, or at 
least the competitive market mechanism that ranges from full privatization, 
through PPP and contracting out, to voucher system. From a structural point 
of view, they prefer independent agencies and devolution as these units may 
compete with one another. 
In brief, NPM is a reasonable tag for reforms that introduce market 
mechanism, competition, or apply organizational and management arrange-
ments imported from the business to the public sector. The achievements are 
measured mostly in terms of efficiency and client satisfaction. 
7.1.4. New Public Governance (NPG)
Pollitt & Bouckaert (2004) introduced the term to describe a certain 
trajectory of adaptation, or rather reaction to NPM. The term clearly re-
fers to the extensive governance literature (Peters & Pjeras, 1998; kooiman, 
1999; Rodas, 2000; Salamon, 2000; Sorensen & Torfing, 2016). The essence 
of this literature, in our view (gajduschek, 2009, 2015b), is that the govern-
244 Public AdministrAtion reforms in eAstern euroPeAn union member stAtes 
Post-Accession convergence And divergence
ment is not able (anymore) to make, and especially to implement policies 
alone, but in interaction with various networks of the stakeholders’ groups 
(policy communities). These policy networks are formed in a mainly infor-
mal process from/by social groups that are impacted by the given policy. 
groups like interested businesses, civic organizations, experts and others 
bring their interest and resources (including knowledge and information) 
into this bargaining-like process. The role of government may range from 
the position of an equal participant, through that of a mediator, to a key, 
though still not dominating actor. In the classical terms of political scien-
ce, “participation” could be used to describe this approach. The interested 
parties are involved, and the decisions are made with them in a deliberative 
process.
This model appears typically in a CEE context as a normative model 
that is most widely known, in Hungary and in the region, as good gover-
nance. good governance has been advocated by major international organi-
zations as the appropriate way to organize government in the Non-western 
world.21 Irrespective of the roots of the term, there has been, by now, a 
relative agreement on the basic elements of its content (kovač, 2015).
7.1.5. Neo-Weberian State (NWS)
The term first appeared in the second edition of the seminal work of 
Pollitt & Bouckaert (2004: 100), and was further elaborated in the third 
edition of the book (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011: 118−119). In both versions, 
NwS seems to be an alternative reform trajectory followed mainly by the 
Continental European countries not subscribing to the hardcore NPM ide-
ology and practice. The new (2011, 3rd ed.) interpretation of NwS is so-
mewhat more specific, seemingly leaving out governance arrangement from 
this concept. It seems to be a variant somewhere between the weberian state 
and NPM, embracing mostly the managerial (vs. market and competition) 
21  The concept appeared first in the vocabulary of United Nations’ development activities (see UN 
ESCAP),  wB documents in 1992, and IMF documents in 1996. However, for several years, only 
UN documents emphasized the importance of participation, consultation, transparency, and the 
rule of law as equally or more important than administrative and service efficiency. In the case 
of the wB, and especially the IMF, it appeared as a somewhat modified version of NPM with 
the above-mentioned elements working rather as a democratic façade covering the harsh pro-
market approach.
245 Hungarian Public administration: last tHirty years, Waves in tHe story
elements of NPM. Referring back to their earlier volume of 2004, Pollitt & 
Bouckaert (2011: 19) sum up: “In essence, this was an attempt to moder-
nize traditional bureaucracy by making it more professional, efficient, and 
citizen-friendly. It was particularly characteristic of the stable, prosperous, 
western European democracies which had sizeable welfare states − inclu-
ding germany, France, and the Nordic group.” In this vein, the authors pro-
vide two sets of characteristics (ib.: 118−119) as explained below.
The ‘weberian’ elements are: (a) reaffirmation of the role of the state 
as the main social actor; (b) reaffirmation of the role of representative de-
mocracy (central, regional, and local) as the legitimating element within the 
state apparatus; (c) reaffirmation of the role of administrative law regulating 
citizen–state relationship, including legal guarantees for the citizens; (d) 
high status and value of serving the public. The ‘neo’ elements embrace: (e) 
a shift from an internal orientation of rule-based action towards an external 
orientation towards meeting citizens’ needs and wishes by creating a profes-
sional culture of quality and service (i.e. not through market mechanisms 
offered by NPM); (f) active involvement and participation of the citizens in 
decision-making; (g) changing laws and accountability mechanisms that, 
besides − not instead of − internal procedures output and outcomes are 
monitored and controlled as well eventually involving some performance 
management techniques; (h) professionalization by adding special experti-
se besides legal knowledge, and increasing the importance of management 
skills as well as skills handling clients.
NwS has become a key concept of PA literature in CEE22. It regular-
ly appears, for instance, in the publications of wolfgang Drechsler (2005a, 
2005b), the leading PA academics in the region, and in the paper of Ran-
dma-Liiv that provides an excellent summary on the drawbacks of NPM in 
CEE (Randma-Liiv, 2008). Seemingly, the concept has a special appeal in 
the region for various reasons. A relatively stable feature of various inter-
pretations is that NwS is typically conceived – not necessarily in accordan-
ce with the original meaning – as a modern polar concept of NPM. 
22  A simple search on google Scholar yields 3,400 hits on ‘Neo-weberian State’ compared to 659,000 on 
‘New Public Management’ in the 2004−2013 period. However, if we look for the articles referring to 
NwS or NPM, and at the same time ‘Central and Eastern Europe’, we find that 42% (!) of the papers 
addressing NwS refer, in some way, to the CEE region, whereas only 2.6% of papers on NPM. 
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Pollitt & Bouckaert (2011: 120) call attention to the fact that “the pre-
cision of the NwS model, or the NPM for that matter, must not be exagge-
rated”. This may be the reason that in several countries of the region, and in 
Hungary as well, NwS has become a central tenet of government ideology 
requiring a “strong state”, centralization, and extensive regulation as opposed 
to autonomy, liberal arrangements, and reliance on market mechanisms. In 
other words, in the CEE region the term, as it is used in practice, frequently 
refers to etatist and centralist tendencies, and thus its denotation is closer 
to the bureaucratic, and to some degree, socialist model, and surely has not 
much to do with the neo (e-h) elements listed by Pollitt and Bouckaert.
7.2. On Major Governance Fields: Structure, Procedures, Personnel
Below we will investigate three major fields or rather analytical layers 
of public administration as it is typically done by the Hungarian course bo-
oks in public administration (Lőrincz, 2010), which are in fact almost solely 
administrative law (see Rixer & Patyi, 2014): (i) structure discussing separa-
tely central, local, and municipal organizations, (ii) functions and procedures 
(identified typically by the Administrative Procedures Act), and (iii) civil ser-
vice (Civil Service Act and related regulations). we will, however, somewhat 
diverge from the typical Hungarian black letter law approach; we concentrate 
on the reality as much as we can encompass it. 
7.2.1. Structure of PA
Traditionally, the structure of PA is divided into two main fields: the cen-
tral government with its hierarchical arrangement, including territorial units 
(altogether called államigazgatás or state administration), and municipal or-
ganizations (called önkormányzat or self-government with both political-re-
presentative and administrative units).
Central Government
Until 2011, the central government had been hierarchically organized as 
reviewed in Figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1: Simplistic Model of State Administration before 2011
Source: own research.
On the top of the executive power is the Cabinet that consists of the Pri-
me Minister and ministers heading also ministries (in some cases ministers 
without portfolio – especially in coalition governments). The President has 
no relevant role in the normal functioning of the executive. Formally, the Pri-
me Minister is only primus inter pares, however, he has always played a cru-
cial role, and his dominance has largely increased in the past decade or more. 
Researching the central organizational arrangement in the past quar-
ter of a century, Hajnal & kovács (2016a, 2016b) differentiate between three 
main stages.23 The first (1989−1998) period would be centered around the 
establishment and consolidation of a new organizational arrangement that 
fits to the polity of a democratic government. This included the establishment 
of external control mechanisms over public administration, such as the ju-
dicial control over practically every administrative legal actions, setting up a 
full-fledged National Audit Office (of the Parliament), ombudsmen, and one 
of the most powerful Constitutional Court in the world, last but not least the 
23   Below we will greatly rely on these papers. However, we will use other sources as well which, at certain points, 
may be different from Hajnal and Kovács.   
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newly elected Parliament was to exercise severe control over the executive. 
The authors, referring to other publications as well, note that the control 
over the executive may have been too tight. while this was an understanda-
ble reaction to the suppressive nature of the executive during the socialist 
regime, it has also jeopardized government activities in several fields, lea-
ding to severe governmental anomalies that, in turn, may generated social 
distrust towards the rule of law (gajduschek, gajduschek, 2008b; 2015b).
Beside the formation of ministerial structures, the creation of agencies 
was a quite stochastic process in the early ‘90s, and consequently, the legal 
status of these organizations was chaotic. This has gradually been solved, 
and three categories were formed that remained – with some legal changes 
– relatively intact for a longer period. The first category controls a larger 
social sphere that is not in the portfolio of a ministry; the second serving on 
a field that is within the portfolio of a ministry but enjoys relative indepen-
dence; and the third category that is organized only for practical-technical 
reasons (e.g. handling large number of routine cases) as an independent 
unit, in fact it could be a division of the ministry as well. The list represents 
a descending order in terms of status and relative independence of these 
organizations. (A forth type depicted as independent agency on the figure 
was introduced later as mentioned below.)
There are several likely reasons for the creation of a large number of 
these agencies. One reason is the consequence of democratic transforma-
tion that created new tasks that would enlarge enormously the size of mi-
nistries. In the same vein, with the disappearance of the Party apparatus the 
policy drafting shifted to the ministries, which then wanted to get rid of the 
regular-routine administrative tasks. Another reason may be the general 
pattern of agencification these times reflecting the NPM approach. A third, 
probably crucial reason lays in the centrifugal forces generated by sectoral 
independence efforts. Namely, ministries and agencies strived to control 
their own field without intrusion from above. This is a general problem 
in most post-socialist states (Verheijen, 2007) as emphasized by Hajnal & 
kovács (2016b). The authors refer to several, failed attempts of the Cabinet 
to strengthen the overall coordination and control over the ministries who-
se autonomy largely prevented the formation of successful cross-sectoral 
policies.   
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The next period spans from 1998 to 2010. This period may be cha-
racterized, according to Hajnal and kovács, by a gradual preparation for 
the EU accession.24 Another key feature of the period is strengthening of 
the position of the Prime Minister. The so-called presidencialization of the 
executive is a widely discussed issue in the Hungarian literature (Pakulski & 
körösényi, 2013; Mandák, 2014; körösényi, 2015). This process is manifested 
in gradual strengthening of the Prime Minister’s Office in terms of both size 
and legal status (becoming a Ministry). On one hand, this process, aims at 
increasing (some would argue establishing) effective political control over 
the administrative units, and on the other hand, aims at effective coordina-
tion of these units. Several coordinating bodies (committees) were created 
directly under the Cabinet, and several new agencies were established with 
a similar purpose, e.g. in the field of government-wide HR management, 
or the EU funded development projects. Meanwhile, the overall number of 
agencies was radically cut by amalgamation of agencies, or bringing back 
some functions into the ministries. This became characteristic especially 
after 2006. In the period of 2006−2010, the position of administrative state 
secretaries has been abolished, and only one state secretary was appointed 
to each ministry, who was admittedly a political appointee.25 At the same 
time, a new − though in the international practice well-known − agency 
24  It may be surprising that hardly any periodization considers that Hungary’s EU accession was a 
key date, whereas in several other countries it may be considered so. Neither from structural, nor 
functional, or personnel point of view it has been considered as a major milestone for the Hungar-
ian public administration, at least not for its internal arrangement. Similarly, András körösényi, a 
leading Hungarian political scientist, in his recently published overview of the Hungarian political 
system in the past quarter century, set up the following periods: 1990, 1998-2006, 2010-date. The 
EU accession may have not become a milestone because Hungary started its preparation relatively 
early on administrative level, whereas the EU accession – at those times – was one of the few politi-
cal issues that received unanimous support from all major political parties. Furthermore, the EU 
did not set up specific requirements towards the national system of public administration, and the 
Hungarian PA – at least on the surface – mostly met the general principles. 
25  Previously, following the german system, there were a political and an administrative state sec-
retary in each ministry. As the names suggest, the political state secretary was practically the 
deputy minister, who may act on behalf of the minister, for instance in the Parliament, whereas 
the administrative state secretary supposed to be a professional person, managing the apparatus 
and assuring the continuity. In reality, however, administrative state secretaries were also ap-
pointed on the basis of political, or rather personal loyalty. I.e. an administrative state secretary 
remained in position for about two years only, as when a new minister got to the postion (even 
within the same party) the administrative state secretary had to leave as well (Staroňová & gaj-
duschek, 2013).
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type was created, namely an independent − or in the Hungarian version − 
autonomous agency that supposed to report directly to the Parliament. 
The third period starts in 2010. The essence of this period is a sharp 
etatist turn and radical centralization that may be captured well in the 
structural reform. Most importantly, in our view, the state is captured by 
the ruling party, or more precisely by the head of this political party, one 
person, Viktor Orbán. This has been achieved mostly through informal ins-
truments or personal/personnel policies. Heads of almost all relevant go-
vernmental organizations were appointed from a set of Orban’s personal 
allies – including the President, Head of the Parliament, Head of the Natio-
nal Bank, Attorney general – or persons from whom loyalty may have been 
expected – like Heads of the Judiciary, ombudsmen, members and the Head 
of the Constitutional Court, and heads of independent agencies, such as the 
one regulating the media. This led to empowerment of the executive and, on 
the other hand, decreased functioning, some argue practical termination, of 
control over the executive carried out by such institutions as the ombuds-
men or the Constitutional Court. Checks and balances hardly function.
In terms of formal structural changes, the number of ministries has 
been largely decreased to about eight in the period. For instance, health care, 
education, social services, cultural policy were incorporated into the Minis-
try of Human Resources. Consequently, the internal ministerial structure 
has changed. The Cabinet is still composed of the ministers and the Prime 
Minister but key portfolios (like social policy or finance) are not directly 
present. The state secretaries within the ministries control these fields. Thus, 
beside the administrative and political state secretaries, state secretaries res-
ponsible for a portfolio are appointed to the ministries. The number of these 
state secretaries depends on the number of major portfolios of the minis-
try. These sectoral state secretaries are considered as political appointees, 
even by the law, whereas the administrative state secretaries and deputy sec-
toral state secretaries (responsible for the sub-fields, e.g. higher education 
within education) are considered “professional” appointees, though they are 
appointed seemingly on a political-personal basis.
The agency landscape has been under the reconstruction as well. In 
2012, a new type of independent agency was created that is entitled to create 
statutory laws. This is a new element in the Hungarian system where this 
251 Hungarian Public administration: last tHirty years, Waves in tHe story
type of regulatory agency was unknown, as a general principle was that laws 
might be made only by the entities that are legitimated by elections.Decrees 
(i.e. the laws made by the executive) may be issued by the Cabinet, individual 
minister, or representative body of local self-governments (valid for the citizens 
in the given territorial jurisdiction only).26 Naturally, the heads of these “auto-
nomous regulatory agencies” were also loyal to the Prime Minister.27
In brief, an extremely centralized executive, or more generally, govern-
ment system has been created relatively quickly after 2010. while it may be 
questionable if this arrangement meets the requirements of a democratic 
system, and it is surely deficient in controlling the executive according to 
the principle of checks and balances, it also gave – though a radical – answer 
to the challenges accumulated in the previous two decades caused mostly by 
the governmental system formed in 1990, largely as a denial of the socialist 
past. As we indicated above, the executive was controlled (through legal gu-
arantees and constitutional organizations) to such extent that it was hardly 
able to carry out the basic functions like enforcement of laws or effective 
presentation of public interest over illegal personal or small-group inte-
rests. Orban’s so-called political governance (körösényi, 2015; Pesti, Farkas 
& Franczel, 2015) solved most of these problems and several others. Me-
anwhile, professional aspects in government may hardly be voiced over the 
central political will. The ministerial apparatus is strongly discouraged to 
provide any professional feedback if that contradicts the intent of the poli-
tical center (gajduschek, 2016). This, in turn, results in a bulk of erroneous 
Cabinet and ministerial decisions.
 
Local and Territorial Government
Local Autonomies and Administrative Units in the Hungarian System 
The scholarly literature differentiates between three major types of or-
ganizations at the local level: administrative units subordinated to central 
agencies (in the Hungarian literature called also deconcentrated organs), 
26   An exception to this rule may be the Decree of the Head of the National Bank which was on the 
level of Cabinet decree but could refer to a highly specific field, not directly setting up the norms 
for individual citizens. A brief overview of the Hungarian legal system is provided by Rixer 
(2012).   
27   For instance, the first Head of the ’Media Authority’ was the well-known media expert of the 
Orbán's ruling party FIDESZ. 
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self-governments that function at the local and county level as well as non-
traditional administrative organizations. The local level in Hungary means 
the level of settlements let this be a city (Budapest and the 23 so-called cities 
with county rights), towns, or villages (the smallest is with about a dozen ci-
tizens). Every such settlement elects its municipal representative body and 
the mayor. The historically stable mid-level unit is the county. There are 19 
counties plus Budapest, which is a local and county self-government at the 
same time. Local units of central agencies have been typically functioning at 
the county level. For a short period, such agencies operated at the so-called 
regional level (seven such larger territorial units were created in relation to 
the EU accession), and after 2013, at a smaller territorial level called “járás” 
(hereinafter: district). 175 such districts exist, and the 23 districts of Bu-
dapest have an identical legal status.
During the socialism, soviet-like councils were dominant below the 
central level (i.e. there were only a few agencies functioning at the sub-
national level). These councils, while formally had a locally elected body, 
were, in fact, organized in a hierarchical manner. Local councils were su-
bordinated to county councils, which conveyed the central will, while be-
came themselves a kind of power node in the structure. During the 1970’s, 
roughly parallel to the process in the west, larger councils were created by 
the amalgamation of several small village councils, typically against the will 
of citizens. The structure of the offices of these governments mirrored the 
ministerial structure of central government. This arrangement is depicted 
in Figure 7.2.
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Figure 7.2: Schematic Structure of Soviet-Type Council System
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Source: own compilation.
The transition in this field was (also) motivated by the denial of the 
previous regime. The goal was to create highly autonomous local govern-
ments, responsible for organizing the life of the town and providing most 
of the public services. Furthermore, taking into account the will of the ci-
tizens, all settlements became entitled to launch their own local govern-
ments. As a result, more than 3,000 local governments were created, though 
villages below 1,000 inhabitants were required to run a joint office. It was 
also hoped that a spontaneous cooperation would occur, and gradually lar-
ger units would be formed. This did not happened in the past quarter cen-
tury. Municipalities were established at county level as well. However, they 
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had no control function over local municipalities. They were responsible for 
services that local governments could not provide.  
There were three stages of the development so far. After the transi-
tion, the consolidation and a relatively stable period occurred (1990−cca. 
2004−05), a crisis emerged (2006−2010), and then radical institutional 
changes have been taking place since 2011. First, we address the structural 
arrangement of the first two decades, referring also to the deficiencies, and 
then we review the crucial changes that took place from 2010.  
In the first phase, high level of local autonomy was provided, in spite of 
the economic recession and crises coming with the transition, as several lar-
ger revenues were generated for the municipalities. The revenue was created 
by selling the assets that earlier constituted an indivisible state property and 
that were passed to the municipalities, and the shares received in return for 
property rights. This was the case, for instance, in the gas network services. 
In addition, during the privatization of former state companies, local go-
vernments could have the right to the value of the land of these companies. 
Some of the municipalities were farsighted enough to spend this money on 
development projects that might generate further revenues later, such as 
infrastructural investments serving the establishment of new enterprises, 
creating new employment opportunities, and so on. Some others, however, 
spend these extra sources on running costs.
Nevertheless, smaller municipalities with less or none extra resour-
ces may not be able to use strategic approach, as they had to tackle critical 
problems, such as bankruptcy. In these cases, extra resources were spent 
for current operational goals. In some cases, incompetent decisions led to 
prestige investments, such as football arenas. 
Another source of strengthening of the autonomy in that time was the 
increasing role of non-state actors in providing of public services as the 
local autonomy supposed to be based not only on state-involved institu-
tions (such as elected bodies, their offices and budgetary schools, social 
care homes, etc.) but, directly, on communities of the settlements provi-
ding various public services. These associations, foundations, and volunta-
ry organizations involved in the provision of public services have an effect 
on the public service management as such. If the government counts on 
these actors as at least supplementary providers, its policies must be har-
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monized with the non-state actors. For instance, this policy requires nor-
mative grants for all actors. Consequently, the effect on the state sector is 
also visible in setting up more open, measurable criteria, and at the same 
time, much more independence was provided for the professional work of 
schools, cultural institutes, etc.The effect is also measurable from financial 
point of view. Quite a lot of resources arrived to foundations, non-profit 
organizations, and churches involved in different educational and social 
welfare activities incurred outside the general government expenditures 
(Horváth & kiss, 1996). Such services were organized so as to complement 
the functions of municipalities. In this way, the number of choices for the 
consumers and the users increased. Special services were also provided by 
these alternative actors for the users whose needs could not be adequately 
served by the traditional system. Thus, the option of choices became general 
among schools maintained by local governments, foundations, churches, 
and private undertakings (in the case of private schools). 
More than 3,000 communities authorized with a relatively wide set of 
rights, responsibilities, and financial resources created new foundations for 
the development of the whole public sector, including intergovernmental 
levels and their administration in Hungary. The greatest challenge facing 
the Hungarian local management system at that time was the need to create 
a proper mechanism for enhancing the relationships between particular au-
tonomies. Independent units with tools of their own should recognize the 
connection among settlements, and face the regulation of linkages focusing 
on adequate institutional, financial, and service-providing instruments.
Horizontal and regional intergovernmental relations became crucial 
in this arrangement. In a system where many small municipalities enjoyed 
substantial independence, special attention had to be paid to the coopera-
tion among municipal and county governments. One of the opportunities 
was to form associations within them in order to fulfill their common tas-
ks. In the first decade of new municipal development, local governments 
were quite reluctant to establish such joint structures. E.g. running jointly a 
secondary school, or an administrative unit dealing with special licensing, 
etc. The Act on Local governments enumerated different forms of such 
structures, however without any obligation to form them. Only indirect in-
centives led to make administrative associations of official affairs and rural 
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joint offices. Because of the strong autonomy, it was difficult to reach the 
economy of scale either in organizing administration or providing public 
services. Municipalities were not eager to cooperate because of their strong 
feeling for independence, and they were not motivated enough either. Ur-
ban areas, on the other hand, were traditionally ready for coordinated deli-
very of certain services for an larger area. For instance, towns are responsi-
ble for maintaining colleges for secondary school children attending from 
the surrounding smaller villages. It is a traditional task of towns. Later on, 
from the early 2000s, central incentives were introduced to strengthen coo-
peration in and with rural areas, financing supplementary costs of this kind 
of re-organization mainly in administrative services.
Another way of motivation in order to widen intergovernmental re-
lations was managing regional relations. According to the original concept 
and its realization in the first 20 years of the development, there were three 
distinct types of organizations in PA at the medium territorial level. First 
type is the county self-government, which was not superimposed over the 
local governments. Secondly, there were deconcentrated organs and offices 
in each county responsible for coordinating these organs, but had a limi-
ted success. Finally, special corporate bodies were working to fulfill various 
tasks under the control of delegated bodies, such as councils for territorial 
development and labor councils.
Basically, the county government carried out the tasks serving several 
settlements or the entire county. There was also a possibility to take over 
some of the responsibilities that the local governments were not able to 
carry out (e.g. a town to run a secondary school). In this case, county level 
is only subsidiary way of management.
Deconcentrated organs (administrative units of central agencies with 
a territorial, typically, county jurisdiction) carried out most of the admi-
nistrative activities. Before 1990, only a few such organs (like land registra-
tion offices) existed, whereas after 1990 dozens of such agencies appeared 
within a year. The most important reason may be the changed controlling 
power of central government organizations. In the socialist system, as it 
is depicted in Figure 7.2, administrative units of the councils, especially 
the county councils, largely reflected the structure of central government. 
Most central units (ministry or agency) had its parallel unit at county and 
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even at local level. These units functioned under so-called double control. 
On the one hand, they were responsible to the Executive Committee (e.g. 
the general secretary) of the council, and on the other hand, to the appro-
priate central agency (e.g. consumer right protection). After 1990, as local 
self-governments, were not hierarchically subordinated to central agencies 
and they shaped their offices according to local needs, so the opportunity 
anymore for a hierarchical coordination was lost and other ways of coordi-
nation have been alien, or even unknown to the Hungarian administrative 
culture (Hajnal & kovács, 2013).
Furthermore, central government units (either ministries or agencies) 
reasonably believed that local governments (especially the small ones) lack 
the expertise that is necessary to carry out these functions. As a reaction, 
they established their own territorial agencies. These county level agencies, 
while working in the same territory, hardly communicated with one anot-
her, thus being unable to act in a harmonized way, let alone in synergy. 
Coordination of these agencies at the county level has been a continuous 
problem during the first two decades (Hajnal & kovács, 2013).
There were also special corporate bodies at the middle level. They are 
characterized by the need to integrate traditional administrative functions 
and social involvement on delegated basis. Therefore, the representatives of 
local and county governments and the delegates of social organization were 
involved in these corporate bodies. These structures, such as Quangos, were 
based on that type of activity to draw various interest groups of society into 
the administration.
One of the corporate bodies are county and regional development 
councils, which were established in 1996. Their function was to enforce the 
objectives of central government regional policy and to coordinate rela-
ted tasks. Delegated persons of different ministries, involved counties and 
towns with county rights, representative associations of small settlements 
and other delegated members were involved. Councils’ managements ope-
rated as non-traditional agencies. Long-term development concepts were 
elaborated by them, including financial plans. They were allowed to collect 
funds, and explore assets contributed by private stakeholders and entre-
preneurs. County- and region-wide development projects were managed in 
this way in a result-oriented manner.
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The other more important type of corporate bodies were county labor 
councils. They were established in 1991. Their most important tasks were to 
to allocate state funds for the purposes of promoting employment. In addi-
tion, they enjoyed various rights to initiate and formulate opinions with res-
pect to employment programs, and monitor effectiveness of labor market 
interventions. They professionally supervised the labor policy management 
in their territorial competence. The members of the council represented lo-
cal governments, interest of employers and employees. Councils made their 
decisions about quite a crucial amount of financial resources on a consen-
sual basis.  
The above-mentioned solutions on intergovernmental relations sho-
wed openness to economic and social environment of public tasks. The 
mixed composition of delegates and decision-making bodies which com-
prises the representation of central government, local authorities, chambers 
and other lobbies, by the law, gave expression to a wide variety of interests. 
Though these bodies were not key players in territorial administration, 
their role is especially crucial for our research as these entities represented 
an alternative to the classical, hierarchical, strictly structured organizatio-
nal arrangement. In that vein, they may be considered as manifestations 
of an NPg-type of arrangement. (Their ‘early death’ could thus also be an 
indication of a poor chance of this approach in Hungary.)  
Since approximately 2006, a crisis occurred, or became evident. The 
tension between the small size of most municipalities and the wide range 
of task and high level autonomy have been addressed soon after the new 
system was established (Verebélyi, 1991), and then analyzed more in depth 
(Pálné kovács, 2012; Horváth, 2016, 2000), including books issued for the 
tenth (Verebélyi, 2000) and twentieth anniversary (kákai, 2010) of the es-
tablishment of the municipal system. However, the given arrangement was 
favored to such extent by the citizenry, and a potential change would be 
opposed by so many local power holders that it seemed politically impossi-
ble to change inefficient and dysfunctional elements of the system for more 
than a decade.
The municipal system gradually revealed several deficiencies by the 
2000s. Firstly, local and other autonomies (actors of governance instead of 
simply government) lost from their ethos. The role of interest groups incre-
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ased, frequently capturing the local government. Secondly, municipalities 
remained relatively reluctant to cooperate in a more developed manner in 
spite of positive cases. Thirdly, administrative regions were not developed 
to representative regions (like in Poland for instance) but their position gra-
dually weakened. Fourthly, in the budgets of municipalities central grants 
were devalued by that time generating a constant tension in education and 
healthcare. Consequently, the social trust had gradually lessened. The lack 
of well-trained personnel at municipal offices28 caused insufficient adminis-
trative capacity. Efficiency losses became evident because of the economies 
of – small – scale, and potential democratic deficiencies stemming from 
the very weak legal control of municipalities. whereas several settlements 
profited from the functioning of their municipalities by finding specific lo-
cal solutions to the local needs, a few others may have been run by a few 
families, suppressing local opposition, and misusing local resources. Some 
local leaders wanted to satisfy the electorate’s needs by accumulating large 
local debt as there was no central control over local indebtedness, whereas 
the central government was responsible for all government debt payments. 
In the third phase, as an answer on tensions of the former period, the 
Orban’s government (from 2010) replaced the emphasis of the territori-
al system from local governments to the state administration. Enormous 
changes were brought in this field as well. with the establishment of the 
so-called County government Offices almost all previously independent 
deconcentrated organs were integrated (some would formulate forced) into 
these Offices − a major exemption being the tax authority, presumably as it 
has a uniformed service unit as well. Somewhat later at the lower level, Dis-
trict government Offices were established. while these Offices (altogether 
198) work at the lower level, smaller territorial jurisdictions, from a legal 
point of view, are a part of the Country Offices − they are not independent 
legal entities.
The County government Offices are lead admittedly by a politician, 
the Cabinet Commissioner, and frequently a Member of Parliament of the 
28   The fact that several municipal offices consisted only of 3-6 civil servants of which only the 
chief executive officer held a diploma was in sharp contrast with the fact that these offices were 
responsible for making various legally binding decisions, drafting and implementing policies 
regarding education, social and environmental issues, garbage collection, etc. 
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ruling party, thus the Offices function under a direct political control. The 
Commissioner is assisted with a country director who supposed to be a pro-
fessional civil servant. This arrangement, while not unknown in the interna-
tional practice, was surprisingly new in the Hungarian system. Previously, 
it was formally expected that professional career civil servants lead central 
agencies, and this expectation was stronger at deconcentrated organs (at a 
lower level of administration). This has radically changed in the new arran-
gement where the political head has a veto power over any appointment 
to managerial civil service positions within his/her Office. In this way, the 
sub-national administration was placed under a direct political control, the 
political will from the center can be conveyed directly (prime minister – 
political county ‘commissar’ – specialized territorial administration) inste-
ad of a much longer chain of command (prime minister – minister – central 
agency head – county agency head – specialized territorial administration). 
The longer chain that includes professional actors is less favorable for ‘poli-
tical governance’ as the command may be distorted or even sabotaged, thus 
professionally and especially legally questionable orders may be blocked. 
A graphic summary of government Office structure is provided in Figure 
7.3. Arrows refer to the lines of controlling. Normal lines refer to so-called 
organizational control exercised most of all by the Cabinet Commissioner 
through HR and financial decisions on availability of resources to various 
units. Professional-administrative control over the county boards supposed 
to exercise control by the relevant central agencies (e.g. Consumer Right 
Protection Agency), whereas these county boards supposed to excises 
control over relevant functions of District government Offices if such an 
activity is carried out at the level. (This arrangement is similar to the double 
control of the socialist council system depicted in Figure 7.2.).
The Orban’s government has completely transformed the municipal 
system. while the municipal organizations (we may say the structural 
façade) have remained intact everywhere, the county municipalities practi-
cally lost all previous relevant functions and existed as an empty shell. Local 
governments have lost several functions in public services as well. Most 
importantly, the elementary and secondary education (the largest chunk in 
municipal budgets) was re-organized under a central agency, the municipal 
role in health care system was abolished as well and some of the social ser-
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vice functions were also terminated at municipalities. Furthermore, more 
than a half of legal functions (licensing, etc.), and the major tasks of muni-
cipal offices were shifted to the District government Offices. Villages with 
less than two thousand inhabitants had to join to a unified office. 
Figure 7.3: generalized Organogram of a County government Office
Source: own compilation.
The Orban’s government seemingly favors centralization and hierar-
chy over autonomy. All their radical reforms aim at strengthening the role 
of political center and minimizing any type of autonomy. Centralization 
means primarily a political as opposed to administrative centralization. In 
this regard, the reforms of the Orban’s government seem to be closer to the 
bureaucratic and – in terms of party control of administration – the socia-
list model. 
In a wider historical perspective, the extreme centralization of the 
communist system was exchanged with a high level of autonomy imme-
diately after the collapse of that system. One may argue that this was an 
extreme level of autonomy in an international comparison with hardly any 
control over municipal activities. After about two decades this system, that 
undoubtedly generated deficiencies besides the several success stories, was 
replaced again by an extremely centralized structure (e.g. where all schools 
of the country supposed to be managed centerally from Budapest). In other 
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words, the pendulum keeps swinging from one extreme to the other. Howe-
ver, more time and information is needed to provide an in-depth analysis 
of the new structural arrangement at the sub-national level administration. 
7.2.2. Functioning and Operation
This aspect or dimension of government may be further divided into at 
least three main fields. The way governmental decisions are made, general 
features of public service provision, and administrative legal procedures.
A general aspect of government functioning in the region but espe-
cially in Hungary is the so-called legalistic nature of governance (Liebert, 
Condrey & goncharov, 2013: 353). This may be captured by a high propor-
tion of lawyers among civil servants, especially in higher positions (gajdus-
chek, 2008a: 146–152), in the content of PA education (Hajnal, 2013), and in 
the general assumptions about the nature and function of PA (gajduschek, 
2006, 2012). In this view, government activities are conceived in a legal as 
opposed to a policy setting. The function of the executive may be divided 
into two fields: making and applying (adjudication, monitoring and enfor-
cing) laws. Some of the most important consequences of this approach may 
be the lack or distorted reflection of the social problems (as a starting point 
of the rational “policy cycle”), lack of precisely defined goals and lack of sys-
tematic assessment of the expected outcomes Staroňová, 2010; gajduschek, 
2016; Laws may be adopted for their own sake (not for any social purpose), 
whereas the implementation of these laws is somewhat sporadic, stochastic, 
or simply missing (Falkner & Treib, 2008; Hajnal & Ványolós, 2013). we 
will not address this otherwise crucial characteristic here.
Decision-making
According to the official process laid down in the Resolution on the 
Procedures of the Cabinet, laws (and thus policies) are drafted by the mi-
nistries. The next step is the consultation with other ministries and possibly 
with stakeholders. About ten days before the proposals reach the Cabinet 
meeting, they are discussed during a weekly meeting of the administrative 
state secretaries of the ministries. Most of the proposals become the Cabi-
net Decrees or are submitted to the Parliament for legislation. 
The reality is highly different from this ideal. Based on the interviews 
Pesti (2000) described these differences, which may have largely exacer-
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bated after 2010 (Pesti, Farkas & Franczel, 2015; gajduschek, 2016). Sum-
ming up the Hungarian literature in this regard, the major distortions may 
be: (a) laws are not drafted by the ministries but frequently at law firms 
close to the ruling party; and several proposals are (b) submitted to the 
Parliament at a personal initiative of a Member of Parliament. In this way 
the professional and democratic scrutiny is completely excluded and the 
consultation is avoided as well. The method has been especially intensively 
used since 2010. The proportion of such submission of draft laws preventing 
any kind of transparency jumped to 34% in the first 2.5 years of the Orban’s 
government, and that is about the double of the previous periods, whereas 
the Parliament devoted only 34 days on average discussing an Act, that is a 
bit more than a half of the time devoted during the period of the previous 
Cabinet. 
In fact, the period devoted to preparing and drafting has always been 
very short. It is well known from the interviews that the laws are prepared 
on an ad hoc basis instead of a well-planned manner. In some cases, only a 
few weeks or even less are devoted to the whole process. The time has hardly 
ever been enough for other ministries to carefully read and comment the 
proposed draft laws. The Orban’s government typically and seemingly in-
tentionally neglects the discussion with the stakeholders, or it is carried out 
with loyal stakeholders and so called gONgOs. 
There has never been sufficient policy capacity either (goetz & woll-
mann, 2001). There are practically no civil servants at the ministries trained 
in policy analysis methods. A highly legalistic nature of the administrative 
culture and a strong political intrusion into professional issues make im-
possible to build such a capacity. Furthermore, the extremely short time 
and ad hoc nature of law making makes it impossible to assess the expected 
outcomes of laws (RIA) (Staroňová, 2010) and even the assessment of ne-
cessary public resources (human, financial, technical, etc.) for their imple-
mentation. These deficiencies have been present for a longer period, though 
they have exacerbated significantly since 2010. 
Public Service Provision
The term ‘public services’ includes public utilities and communal ser-
vices, a large and highly heterogeneous field from network industries provi-
ded by the public companies (water, sewage) to gas and electricity companies 
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(frequently provided by the private companies), public transportation, gar-
bage collection, and road maintenance that may be shared between private 
firms, national, and municipal companies. Another large segment of public 
services are so-called ‘human services’, like health care, education, social ser-
vices, most of which are typically provided by the municipalities.
The Local government Act (1990) was one of the first laws passed by the 
freely elected Parliament. Quite a wide range of services was delegated to the 
responsibility of municipalities. In the framework of infrastructural services 
the provision of healthy drinking water, public lighting, solid waste mana-
gement, maintenance of roads and cemeteries became an exclusively local 
function. Additionally, urban settlements maintained public transport, sewer, 
district heating, etc. Among human services, every municipality was respon-
sible for providing kindergarten services, primary education, basic health 
care, and basic social services for the elderly. In addition, cities maintained 
secondary schools, basic hospitals, specified elderly care homes, etc. The legal 
solution of discharging tasks ensured the equality of settlements as far as the 
extent of responsibility to fulfill public tasks is concerned. It was contradicto-
ry that in spite of the fragmentation, functions were very wide and expensive. 
However, budget instruments were to follow the breakdown of responsibili-
ties stemming from the discharging of tasks. 
Parallel to the devolution, a radical privatization process took place, in 
the meantime, led by the State Property Agency in the productive and the 
service-providing sector, thus reducing government functions. For instance, 
medicine, films, dairy companies, previously owned by the county councils, 
were mostly privatized.
In the 1990s, various international programs (PHARE, USAID, British 
know How Fund, wB programs, Soros Foundations OSI, and pre-acceding 
support programs of the EU like ISPA, SAPARD) focused (Horváth, 2007: 
9–10) on either the development of democracy or the provision of public 
services at the municipal level. For instance, a countrywide network of in-
tegrated landfills for solid waste was established with the support of US AID 
and ISPA. It means that the political and administrative transformation was 
extended to the functional profile of local authorities. 
From the functional aspects basic changes in public service provision 
(Horváth, 2015) took place as summarized in table 7.1.
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Table 7.1: Basic Changes in Public Service Provision from the System Transition
Stages of 
changes 
[(a)→(e) 
detailed in 
the analysis]
Transformation 
→
Liberalization
→
Realized 
model of 
privatization
→
Budgeting 
crisis
→
State-owned 
solutions
→
Utility 
services
Re-structuring Unbundling / 
contracted pu-
blic companies
Privatization 
contracts
Increase 
of fees and 
charges
Public 
holdings, 
state-owned 
enterprises 
(SOEs)
Human 
services
Service de-cen-
tralization
Outsourcing / 
contracted pu-
blic institutes
Selling assets State-center 
solutions
Re-centrali-
zation
Source: own research.
Now, the main stages of the process are described in details.
Transformation. The transformation of the utility sector (Fleischer, 
1994: 9–15) began in the early 1990s. The first step was the restructuring 
of state monopolies. It meant the auditing of companies, then the trans-
fer of ownership from the state to local governments. At this point, former 
budgetary companies were transformed. Firms became subjects of compa-
ny law, while all their shares remained the property of municipalities. Anot-
her precondition at this stage was unbundling, i.e. division of assets which 
can be sold or, if it is considered more beneficial, to be retained as a public 
property. After that, marketing of a certain amount of shares took place, if it 
was possible at all. Privatization under the policy of liberalization may have 
consisted at least of four phases (Horváth & Péteri, 2001). The first stage was 
communalization, i.e. transfer of state-owned property to municipalities. 
This process, among others, supported local governments to face the total 
real costs of services, and to identify the subsidies needed for their particu-
lar activities. The second stage was corporatization as mentioned above, i.e. 
transformation of companies from the state budget under the corporate law. 
It meant 100% of shares owned by the municipalities at first. The third stage 
was privatization, if happened, inviting domestic or foreign investors with 
the aim to attract external capital. The fourth stage is that semi-independent 
regulatory agencies were established.
while the trajectories may largely be different in various sectors, the 
266 Public AdministrAtion reforms in eAstern euroPeAn union member stAtes 
Post-Accession convergence And divergence
underlying process was similar. In the water sector, an extensive fragmenta-
tion occurred with the creation of around 400 local government service or-
ganizations and 5 state-owned regional companies in 1991−92 instead of the 
former 5 national and 28 regional companies. On the other hand, solid waste 
management became integrated and large scale enough company to operate 
services economically. In the service provision of district heating 290 local 
heat generation and distribution companies were transferred to 103 (urban) 
local governments (Horváth & Péteri, 2004: 309). After restructuring, semi-
independent regulatory authorities were established for the energy sector (gas, 
electricity, district heating). For other service areas central state offices or mu-
nicipalities had control over the operation and restricted prices to some extent.
As far as human services are concerned, particular service − decentra-
lization took place. Main characteristic elements of the process consisted of 
the following elements. The role of the NgO sector increased in the provision 
of social services. Churches and private charity organizations re-emerged in 
social care, maintenance of secondary schools and, to a lesser extent at that 
time, also in the area of basic education. Simultaneously, operation conditions 
of state-owned and municipal institutions also changed, allowing a spread of 
sector-neutral financing and quasi-market conditions in operations.
Liberalization. After this kind of preparation of service providing in the 
sector, the liberalization process began to spread. This development started 
around the middle of the 1990s. In the public utility sector, it led to privati-
zation. In the area of electricity, after restructuring the industry and service, 
delivery relationships of ownership became different in terms of productivity, 
maintenance of the distribution network and service provision. The Hun-
garian Electricity Board (MVM) transformed into a commercial company, 
which remained state-owned. Shares of the six regional electricity trade com-
panies were finally obtained by three big investors, like the german energy 
suppliers RwE and E.ON, and the French EDF. 25%+1 of shares of gas distri-
bution companies remained state-owned according to the law. The Budapest 
gas works, which were traditionally linked to the capital, remained partially 
owned by the Budapest City government after the transition.
As far as the “outsourcing” of services is concerned, human services, 
especially in the area of elderly care, were increasingly being taken over by the 
non-profit organizations. The number of civil-sector organizations grew dy-
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namically during the transition. According to comparative data (Civic Atlas, 
1997), this figure was 430 per 1 million inhabitants in Hungary at that time 
(the second highest in the region was Czech Republic with 400).  
By the middle of the 1990s, the transfer of state-owned core assets to lo-
cal governments was completed. Then two parallel stages followed. A part of 
the transformed companies managed to privatize, while others failed. At least 
three good reasons were responsible for the managed privatization of public 
companies by the decision-makers. Firstly, private capital seemed to be more 
efficient to economize than the public sector. Secondly, a price competition 
arose due to the privatization tender (which includes consumer pricing for-
mulae over a longer time period). Thirdly, responsibility may be taken for lo-
cal functions through private providing companies. On the other hand, large 
west-European companies in the energy, water, and waste sectors were ready 
to enter in the open, regulated market in the 1990s and 2000s. These compa-
nies and their investors, in general, naturally followed their own interests. The 
whole pre-accession process to the EU very much supported this progress. 
Simultaneously, other companies remained non-privatized for various 
reasons. Fees paid by the consumers may not cover costs, and subsidies are 
not defined clearly in advance by the normative regulations. Privatization of-
ten needed to sell the infrastructure itself, apart from the right to provide 
the service. Separating the maintenance of network infrastructure and ser-
vice supplement initially aimed at making providers interested in increasing 
efficiency. Acceptance of this aspect very much depends on the investors. Ne-
vertheless, these companies were re-organized widely to increase their effecti-
veness and efficiency. 
It is hard to say that this phenomenon concentrated on one type of servi-
ce or another type. Indeed, the particular solution depended on the result of 
policy strategy in the specific municipality. For instance, in the water sector 
local governments chose very different options. Some of them even sold out 
the core local assets, like pipe networks, while others maintained their ow-
nership directly supervising the providers’ activity, especially price setting. 
There are also examples of a shift in local strategy after the failure of direct 
and extreme privatization. Especially, in the city of Szeged the extreme rise 
of consumer fees led to a scandal, therefore the municipality made another 
contract out on a different basis. It was a much more controlled and publicly 
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regulated model of water service provision than it had been before. 
Privatization. generally accepted paradigm of privatization was as fol-
lows. Shares were sold to the professional investors who were involved in the 
particular sector. For instance, water network services were announced to 
operating water companies, and not simply financial investors. Mainly large 
west European-centered firms won the tenders, and their founded daughter 
companies started to provide services. Sometimes purely profit-oriented sta-
te-owned enterprises operated these huge international networks doing it 
with long tradition. 
Consumer prices agreed upon in the privatization contracts were based 
on formulas for year-by-year basis. Because of the relatively underdeveloped 
regulatory control and not sufficient experience of even large municipalities, 
they could not create enough guarantees for longer period to keep conditions 
under control. However,  it was accepted at that time, that the state aid should 
be stopped, and it was necessary to cover maintaining and development costs 
from user charges.
This scenario was heavily criticized more than fifteen years later. Two 
main arguments were emphasized. Firstly, prices of public utility services in-
creased continuously guaranteeing fixed and long-term profits for providers. 
Secondly, international owners were accused of distributing profits to abroad. 
Crisis. Severe budgetary crisis emerged in Hungary from 2005−2006. 
By that time, restrictions on overspending on social services became clearly 
visible to the public. School maintenance for every settlement, including the 
smallest one, seemed to be unsustainable. Some hospitals operated by smaller 
towns had to be closed in spite of the protests. In addition, although 63% of 
elderly care homes were maintained by the local government institutions, as 
well as 17% by churches, and 20% by NgOs, in the meantime, formerly equal 
rules and sector-neutral financing had been changed. Experts had been tal-
king about the re-emergence of a state-centric role in service provision (gye-
kiczky, 2009) since that time. Budgetary institutions under state direction 
gained exclusive influence over the delivery of public services at the expense 
of NgOs or private bodies. 
A specific answer to the budgetary crises from the side of larger urban 
municipalities was the establishment of integrated institutions in human ser-
vices. Similarly, municipally-owned companies were re-organized as holdings, 
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such as entities of corporate governance in public ownership. Some examples 
of re-municipalization took place in the early stages of this period. Then the 
bank crises deepened these conflicts because the local debt also increased. 
State-owned solutions. Since 2010, these phenomena strengthened into a 
clear tendency. Larger municipalities at first, and then later the central govern-
ment started to get back shares of formerly privatized providing companies 
from private investors. The motivation was to control the increase of consumer 
fees in a direct way, and to limit investors’ profits. Municipal owners started to 
shift non-privatized companies into the direction of becoming multi-utility 
companies. Multi-utility holding companies were established from single-pro-
file municipal companies in order to exploit options for synergies. At the same 
time, so-called in sourcing emerged in contrast to the formerly exclusively 
preferred model of outsourcing. This development was not independent from 
the changes in the EU legislation. Municipal corporate governance (grossi & 
Reichard, 2008; grossi & Thomason, 2011) emerged in Hungary similarly to 
what took place in other European countries. However, it makes a difference 
that the process was quite heavily promoted by the regulatory environment. 
Privatized companies are owned by foreign investors, i.e. west-Euro-
pean groups of monopolistic providing companies, like the german RwE, 
E.ON, EnBw, the French gDF and EdF, the Italian Enel in energy sector; the 
german RwE, Berlin wasser, the French Suez, Veolia in water suppy sector; 
the Austrian A.S.A. in waste management, etc. There are crucial differences 
between re-municipalization or corporate governance on the one hand, and 
nationalization on the other. The Hungarian government of 2010 placed this 
issue at the center of its policy agenda. Some of the key dilemmas of the whole 
process in the region may be illustrated by the Hungarian case which repre-
sents a rather extreme answer to the ongoing challenges facing Europe. The 
characteristic feature of the developments in the 2010s is the emergence of 
governmental opposition to the former process of privatization. Prime Mi-
nister Viktor Orbán argued that private companies had abused their domi-
nant position by overcharging for their services, and wanted to buy back the 
shares. This was one of the key motivations for changing the political system 
(Hajnal, 2014) and market relations, including public services provision. The 
national-conservative ideology paradoxically focuses on state-centered solu-
tions for every conflicting social or economic issue. Market-orientation shif-
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ted to state-centered defense of so-called national interests. 
The local government system has become highly centralized with the 
setting up of the County government Offices and District Offices as descri-
bed above. Maintenance of public schools, previously a task of self-govern-
ments, was shifted to a central agency, whereas civil control over the edu-
cation system ceased to exist. Institutions previously run by the county level 
self-governments, like social care homes, hospitals, and special schools, were 
centralized. Regional development was also centralized. District Offices took 
over most of the bureaucratic work of mayors’ offices. By 1 January 2013, 
an average urban government lost one-third of its public servants with their 
technical belongings, such as rooms, computers, furniture in offices, etc. Now, 
they are ‘state servants’. 
The economic environment of public utility service provision has also 
changed since 2010. Several measures were undertaken to centralize profits 
from the energy, water, waste, and other public utility sectors (funeral, park 
maintenance, chimney sweeping services). Providers are now burdened with 
a central tax levied on public utility networks. A general cut in prices of user 
charges is required, and a new supervisory fee has been introduced. Munici-
pal utilities previously exempted from some of the taxes are taxed now, ma-
king costs of municipal units higher.  
Recent acts clarify that public service infrastructure created in the future 
may be publicly owned only, though management rights can be transferred 
to private companies to operate services. It is planned that the purchasing of 
shares of existing service providers shall be done with credit that companies 
will pay back from their profits. However, banks find risk too high and they 
are reluctant to finance this. Maintenance costs are covered by user charges; 
however, tariffs are defined by the Parliament and the government. The aim of 
the national government seems to be to shift public utilities to non-profit-ma-
king services. In this case, the role of municipalities has not yet been specified 
nor the providers’ presumable counter-interests.
It is easy to detect a change in the EU regulation regarding public servi-
ce provision. It is also evident that a general change in this regard has occur-
red in western Europe as well in the past decades that may be described as 
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a movement from public to private and from private back to public29 service 
provision, though this does not mean a perfect reversal. Methods of han-
dling problems raised by the private monopolies in the field may include 
regulation of profit-rate interest or increase transparency, renegotiation of 
expired service contracts, or in-sourcing. Instead of relying on a variety of 
methods, the Hungarian central government relies solely on hierarchical bu-
reaucratic coordination as a means to handle this market failure. A comple-
te refusal of privatization and most of other methods involving the private 
sector in this field is manifested in this simplistic solution. Functions were 
reallocated from private to public actors and within the public sphere, prefe-
rably to the least autonomous ones. In terms of the models identified above a 
similar pendulum movement may be identified that we found regarding the 
structural changes. The first decade of transition may be characterized by an 
increased role of non-governmental, most of all business and civil-NgO ac-
tors. This could be described as an NPM approach. However, one part of this 
tendency is due to the inevitable termination of socialist institutions, like 
privatization of companies previously owned by county council but being 
purely market companies, like dairy production companies. Others may 
fit well into the European tendency and even the EU requirements. Since 
2006−2007 and especially after 2010, a sharp turn may be detected, which, 
in terms of models, may fit most – again – to the bureaucratic, possibly to the 
simplified NwS or the socialist model.
On administrative procedures30
The first comprehensive Administrative Procedures Act31 was adopted 
in 1957 (Act IV/1957), just a few months after the 1956 uprising against the 
totalitarian regime. Though the preparation and drafting of the law started in 
1955, most commentators regard it as part of the consolidation initiated by 
the kadar regime of providing certain guarantees to the clients of adminis-
trative processes. The law was largely amended in 1981, and of course, major 
amendment took place in 1990 providing increased level of guarantees for 
the clients, most importantly allowing a judicial review of all administra-
29   See wollmann & Marcou (2010) about this problem throughout Europe.
30   An overview of the content and changes in the law up to 2006 is provided by Fazekas (2007). 
More recent overview in Boros (2014).
31  The law has been dealing only with the decisions applying to laws in concrete cases, not on ad-
ministrative law making, which is regulated by different laws.
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tive legally binding decisions (Darák, 2014). In 2004, a new Act (No. 140) 
was adopted based on the suggestions of a drafting committee. Though there 
were several new institutions in the law (e.g. administrative contract as a 
substitute to sanctioning, some new ways of appeal processes), these do not 
seem to work in practice. A further important element was a detailed regu-
lation of administrative fees, determining the obligation of clients but also 
used as an immediate sanction towards administrative units not fulfilling 
their obligation (e.g. not completing the procedure by the deadline, the fee 
or twice its value must be paid back to the client). The new law in 2004 also 
reflected the Hungary’s accession to the EU regulating some, previously not 
covered, technicalities regarding the EU citizens as clients and administrati-
ve cooperation with other EU countries.  
A permanent feature of the law since 1957 until nowadays is that it 
provides general rules in administrative adjudication and legal procedures. 
This method, that is quite typical in the European continent, usually sets 
up general rules or rather principles (like in most Scandinavian countries). 
The Hungarian law, however, is very detailed well over two thousand sub-
paragraphs (about 60 thousand words). This design supposed to provide ci-
tizens with overall guarantees and an easy-access source of their legal rights 
in this regard. However, exactly because of the high level of detail in the 
general law, there is an enormous number of specific rules in specific fields 
of procedures from issuing construction permits to tax rules, or competition 
controlling activities. For instance, if the Act specifies general deadline (30 
days) to finish administrative procedures, there must be exemptions on such 
fields where the complexity of the issue and/or the required process (e.g. 
the cooperation of several other administrative units is needed) cannot be 
finished within the given deadline. As Fazekas (2007: 36) notes only about 
5% of all procedures are based solely on the general procedures regulation. 
In this regard, the Act does not really serve as an information source of client 
guarantees.
The Act also provided a high level of guaranties against administrati-
ve arbitrariness, unfair, and unlawful procedures. Some of these guaranties 
seemed to jeopardize the operations and the enforcement of laws, as gajdus-
chek (2015b) empirically proves it.32
32  For instance, it seemed practically impossible to demolish illegally built buildings for there are so 
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The Act 140/2004 opened the opportunity for the interested parties to 
step into the process as clients (class action). This is most typical in case of 
larger construction works if the neighborhood resist the change or in the field 
of environmental protection. It seems that this type of rights has been largely 
curtailed after 2010. The Act 140/2004 contained several rules allowing the use 
of ICT in client-administration relationship. However, most of these rules were 
terminated before the Act got into power in 2005 as the technical basis did not 
exist. Most of these rules were reinstated in 2012 with the establishment of ne-
cessary capacity in terms of hardware and software. Improvement of electronic 
government is a top priority of the new government, presumably as an effective 
instrument of control of lower administrative units and other social entities. 
It would be hard to identify the impact of any specific reform movement 
in this field. European accession undoubtedly generated some minor, rather 
technical amendments in the law. The impact of e-governance, if that is con-
sidered as a reform direction, is clearly visible though. 
7.2.3. Civil Service Regulation
The civil service system of Hungary has been extensively discussed in the 
international literature by the Hungarian and foreign authors. Most impor-
tantly, Jan Hinrik Meyer-Sahling studied the Hungarian system either in itself 
or in a comparative context (Meyer-Sahling, 2001, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2008, 
2011; Meyer-Sahling & Jáger, 2012). The civil service was a crucial issue in the 
accession process to the EU that has also generated several research projects 
(Bossaert & Demmke, 2003; Demmke & Moilanen, 2010). A relatively detai-
led, descriptive study was published recently addressing both the law and re-
ality in the field of civil service (gajduschek & Linder, 2014), whereas Linder 
(2011) analyzed the legal regulation in detail. Shocking similarities between 
two countries of the region are discussed by Staroňová & gajduschek (2013). 
The large number of studies allows us to concentrate specifically on the im-
pact of various reform approaches.
many guarantees that practically prevent the authorities to carry out their obligation against no-
torious law-breakers. Similarly, for over a decade, administrative decisions could be implemented 
only after the judicial process initiated by the client was finished. However, judicial processes, 
especially if the client is interested in that, may take almost or even more than a decade, even in 
cases where the administrative process has to be finished in thirty days. This fact made the execu-
tion of administrative decisions highly questionable, frequently impossible or simply inadaquate. 
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The Civil Service Act was adopted in 1992 (Act No. 23). This was the first 
comprehensive regulation in the CEE region. During the communist regime, 
so-called spoils system was in function. Civil servants were employed accor-
ding to the Labor Code without any specific regulation to assure that the bu-
reaucracy does not alienate from the masses. Naturally, this system required 
strict political loyalty even over professionalism. This approach has gradually 
weakened (gajduschek, 2007b), and leading scholars, from the early 1970s 
proposed an arrangement that was close to the merit system. By 1990, eve-
ryone agreed the new merit system law was in a great need. The Act 23/1992 
was intended to serve this goal. 
However, for various reasons, the real functioning was largely different 
(Nunberg, Barbone & Derlien 1999; Verheijen & kotchegura, 1999). In fact, po-
litical or even personal loyalty was crucial at least in more important positions 
(gajduschek, 2007c). There seemed to be an honest devotion to build a profes-
sional civil service on one hand and, on the other hand, the pressure has been 
constantly present to infringe this principle in individual cases. Still the quasi-
merit nature of the Hungarian civil service gradually became obvious. A com-
parative OECD study (Meyer-Sahling, 2009c: 37) found that, out of the eight 
CEE accession countries, Hungary scores the second worse in terms of merit 
based recruitment (ib.: 26, 30), promotion (ib.: 36), evaluation (ib.: 45), whereas 
political connections considered the most important for career out of the eight 
countries. In a concluding diagram the author finds that Hungary fits far worst 
to the European Principles of Administration (in this case a depoliticized, pro-
fessional civil service system). Others, based on self-reporting on the authorities 
of the countries, reach a similar conclusion (Demmke & Moilanen, 2010). 
In 2001, among several other amendments, the performance appraisal sys-
tem was introduced. The system has been applied on all civil servants, carried 
out by the heads of the administrative units (several of which employed over 
a hundred civil servants), and resulted in a quite significant (+/-20%, or even 
more in some time and some cases) wage divergence from the one stipulated by 
the law. This was clearly an NPM element, though may not be intended as such. 
In 2006−2007, a sharp turn was declared in the civil service policy expli-
citly towards NPM direction. The merit system was criticized for its rigidity, 
lack of performance orientation, etc., exactly according to the NPM narrative 
announced by the newly appointed state secretary for CS; coming from the 
275 Hungarian Public administration: last tHirty years, Waves in tHe story
business sector as an HR manager of a tobacco factory before. He increased the 
role of performance appraisal and performance bonus that could be as high as 
50% of the normal salary. Other major changes were also introduced which, 
however – presumably unintendedly, or even against the conscious will of the 
designer – strengthened the merit elements of the system. Most importantly, a 
new central HR unit was established that – as originally was planned – would 
have carried out the HR activities for all the ministries. It was only during this 
short period that vacant civil service positions had to be widely announced, 
and – most importantly – a systematic selection procedure for new appointees 
was set up, including a generally obligatory and relatively difficult entry exam 
and a systematic selection based, at least partly, on the central HR unit. Before 
and after this period, the appointment of a new civil servant has been largely the 
arbitrary decision of the head of the administrative unit. The reform attempt 
failed within a few years, the ministries blocked some reforms and all major 
reforms were reversed by the new Cabinet in 2010. 
After 2010, as the Orbán’s Cabinet got into power, a new era started in 
the civil service as well. A large portion of managers was replaced by new 
loyal persons. In the senior civil service, hardly anyone remained in position. 
The Orban’s Cabinet made it quite explicit that unconditional loyalty is requi-
red, and rewards and sanctions are dependent almost solely on this factor – 
somewhat similarly to the socialist era. A new Civil Service Act was adopted 
(199/2011) after a short period of making several major amendments on the 
existing law. The Act sharply differentiates between civil servants of the cen-
tral government and that of the municipalities. Civil servants may be dismis-
sed with only a two months’ notice with area son – for instance – of the “loss 
of the superior’s confidence”, which in fact makes firing of a civil servants ea-
sier that non-professionals at a company. The above-mentioned arrangement 
that the political Head of County government Offices where the majority of 
civil servants work has a veto power on appointments of civil servants, thus 
builds political criteria openly into the civil service regulation.  
Meanwhile, the analyzed period has been scattered by regular, though 
always unexpected initiatives to cut back the number of civil servants by 
10−30+% within a few months after the initiation was announced. At least 
five such radical political attempts have been lunched in this period.33 The 
33   The last one, announced only a few month before this chapter is closed, targeted 150,000 people 
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experience tends to show that the real decrease is well below the planned 
proportion and – more importantly – the number of civil servants grew to the 
original volume or even above (gajduschek, 2008c: 112−114). These types of 
cuts obviously would be impossible in a merit system. 
In brief, the Hungarian civil service was hoped to follow the merit sys-
tem ideal of the classical weberian bureaucracy. However, this has never been 
achieved. Politicization has been present from the beginning of the transition 
and it has continuously increased34. Major elements of a merit system were 
attempted to be introduced during the reform program that aimed at exactly 
opposite − NPM-like ideals. After 2010, the new government reconciled law 
and reality as the law openly and effectively breaks up with the depoliticized 
merit ideal and allows direct political interference with civil service. In that re-
gard, again, the Orban’s government seem to be closest to the socialist model. 
7.3. Public Administration – Scholarly Debates over Models
In this chapter, we attempt to answer to what extent the Hungarian scho-
lars of various disciplinary origin address PAR generally, and various appro-
aches to administration and reform-models (as identified to what extent in the 
first chapter of this analysis, and some other reform approaches) are presented. 
7.3.1. Materials and Methods
In order to attain the objectives set out above, we reviewed four major 
Hungarian journals, which may deal with PA from different perspectives. The 
main criteria of the selection was permanency (i.e. the journals have to publish 
on a regular basis, but at least four times a year, and be present in the analyzed 
period35), relevance (cover the temporal focus of examining), and evident re-
putation (scientific level and general acceptance in academic circles). we also 
from the civil service, which amounted at that time around 114,000 indicating that the decisi-
on-makers – presumably – cannot differentiate between ’civil servants’ and ’government-paid 
employees’ that may be around 800.000 (still indicating approx. 15% cut in a few month period). 
Retrieved from: http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20160128-csepreghy-nandor-allamigazgatas-kozi-
gazgatas-leepites.html (Downloaded: 29.5.2016)
34   One may reasonably, but wrongly, expect that the large change took place when the first democrati-
cally elected government got into power in 1990, and exchanged the communist cadre with its own 
people but then political appointments gradually ceased to exist. The opposite has been true.  
35  Important journals that were published only in a shorter period are thus omitted. 
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attempted to find periodicals representing various research fields relevant to 
PA. Based on these requirements the scrutinized journals are:
•	 Magyar Közigazgatás [Hungarian Public Administration, HPA], the 
best known and, according to the editorial preface, the most respected 
journal of administrative sciences in Hungary that has a long history. 
It has gone through numerous changes (in line with the prevailing 
regimes) from the 1884’s first volume to the recent volume in 2016; 
now HPA has kept almost nothing from its original form, even its title 
has changed in 1990 from Állam és Igazgatás [State and Administra-
tion], and in 2006 to Új Magyar Közigazgatás [New Hungarian Public 
Administration]. For many years publishing of HPA was supported by 
different ministries, currently it is funded by an international compa-
ny engaged in scientific publishing. Initially, for more than a centu-
ry  the journal was released monthly, but after being suspended for 
almost two year between 2007−200836, from 2014 it is published in a 
quarterly format.  
•	 Közgazdasági Szemle [Economics Review, ER] firstly published in 
1876, originally in german language during the years of the Aus-
tro-Hungarian Monarchy. It is funded by the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences (hereinafter: HAS), its principles of editing state that ER 
is mainly a theoretical journal in the area of economic sciences. The 
journal is published 11 times a year.
•	 Politikatudományi Szemle [Political Science Review, PSR] was foun-
ded in 1992 by the Political Science Association and the Institute of 
Political Sciences of HAS. PSR is publishing the studies from all fields 
of political science if those comply with the requirements expected of 
scientific publications, and contain original theoretical and empirical 
research. Since its release, the first volume of the journal has not chan-
ged much, apart from the alteration of formal properties. It is publis-
hed PSR quarterly.
•	 Jogtudományi Közlöny [Jurisprudential Bulletin, JB] published as a 
journal of the HAS government and Legal Studies Committee, is a fo-
rum for both basic and applied researches. JB has a long tradition (its 
36   As – naturally – this journal has published most of the relevant articles, this interim period can 
be seen quite well in the figures. 
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first volume was released in 1866) and good reputation among legal 
scholars, at all times, the most respected personalities are among hun-
garian legal its editors. Over the last decades, the journal is generally 
published on a monthly basis.
The reviewed period covers 27 years from the beginning of transition in 
CEE countries until very recently(1988−2015). Not all items published in these 
periodicals were analyzed. we excluded a large number of research material, 
such as historical overviews or reports of already implemented changes in PA, 
foreign examples if they do not have expressed domestic conclusions, and quasi 
‘case studies’, or private specific experiences without generalizable consequence. 
we excluded also ‘in honorems’, introductory essays, published laws, etc.  
As a next step, we looked through the titles and abstracts to search for rela-
ted content to PAR or any other reform-models. If a potentially relevant paper 
was identified, the entire paper was read looking for the relevant parts. For this 
exercise a more detailed and operationalized definition of the categories, espe-
cially the five models was used. Thus the used categories are: Socialist or Com-
munist, Classic weberian State (as corresponding to bureaucratic administra-
tion), New Public Management, New Public governance or good governance, 
and Neo-weberian State. Additionally to these models, further categories were 
introduced to identify specific but relevant reform approaches. Europeani-
zation (containing all issues related to the European Union, e.g. membership, 
requirements, and accession preparation, etc.), e-government (everything is 
heading to the e-state, and ICT in PA), and legal solutions37. In addition to the 
specific models, it was also reasonable to add an ‘other’ category for the purpo-
ses of classifying the relevant but non-classifiable (value-free) contents. 
The majority of papers dealt only partly (sometimes only to a small ex-
tent) with PAR. we classified papers on a 1-4 scale regarding overall relevance 
for PAR. Furthermore, we assessed the percentage devoted to a certain model 
in the given paper as – naturally – several papers addressed more than one re-
form-models. All these findings regarding any paper that had some relevance 
to our research was entered into a database which aggregated data presented 
37   For some reasons, due to  the traditionally legalistic nature (or Rechtstaat tradition) of Hungarian 
public administration and administrative science in particular (Drechsler, 2005a; gajduschek, 2012; 
Hajnal, 2013), a major part of the analyzed papers prefer conventional solutions realized by means 
of law. Consequently, it was appropriate to include this atypical reform category to the others. 
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below calculated from. Here, for the sake of simplicity, we will provide only a 
rough overview. For this reason, we take into account if a paper addresses cer-
tain or probably more reform-models or not, putting aside how many words 
were devoted to that model. 
7.3.2. Overview
The outputs, in fact, came from came from four disciplines: administrative, 
political, legal, and economic sciences, each of which is represented by a journal. 
All of them are published in a (roughly) permanent basis during the concer-
ned period, relevant to the examination, and have a considerable reputation. we 
found 572 articles as a result of the reviewed 7,998 articlesn fact, came from. 
Consequently, the average hit rate is 7.15%, in other words, on average every 14th 
article dealt with PAR, but the intensity of occurrences is varied, and different 
periods can be identified in it. This is exactly what Figure 7.4 illustrates below.
Figure 7.4: Reform-based Articles in the Journals
Source: own compilation.
At first glance, it may seem that in each analyzed year most of the rele-
vant articles were published in Hungarian Public Administration. Indeed, 429 
of articles in total are about three quarters of the total amount. Political Science 
Review and Jurisprudential Bulletin come second with 87 pieces, followed by the 
Economic Review with almost equal 29 papers (value 27). Please note that HPA’s 
publishing was suspended in 2007, and only two issues were published in 2008. 
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we can see some clearly visible waves from the graph. It seems that, 
with some important exceptions, the with some important exceptions the in-
terest in PAR, in most election years significantly drops (1994, 2002, 2014 
seem such years). The first years after the transition are seemingly below 
the years before the transition took place. Furthermore, there is a relative 
peak in papers on PAR in the period of 1998−2006 that was described, from 
most findings, as the period of consolidation. The ‘political governance’ of 
the second and third Orbán’s governments may have discouraged scholars 
to deal with the administrative reform as these professional-administrative 
issues may have seemed highly irrelevant. In all the three presumed regula-
rities the explanation may be that the technical questions of administrative 
functioning became less relevant if large-scale political issues dominated 
the given period. 
It also shows us how the four periodicals representing four disciplina-
ry fields appear in the investigated period. The economics approach seems 
to be quite strong in the first few years of transition probably because of 
the enormous changes in the economic system that was strongly related, in 
several ways, with the government functioning. The legal approach seems 
relatively modest, presumably as the HPA is full of administrative law pa-
pers, and thus it is considered as the journal publishing administrative law 
papers. A plausible statement may be that the more general legal approach 
becomes stronger when the rule of law became an issue in the early years 
of transition, the sharp decrease of the governing coalition‘s popularity be-
tween 2006-2009, and the two-thirds government after 2010. 
7.3.3. On Various Models of PAR 
The nine approaches that we analyzed in scholarly papers altogether 
appeared in a very different frequency as it is shown in Table 7.2. Papers that 
are encoded as “legal approach” are the ones that most frequently address 
PAR (note that this is largely because the legalistic nature is far most preva-
lent generally in PA). The “others”category, includes papers legalistic nature 
addressing the issue of PA in a more general context, e.g. organizational 
studies and change, overall governmental category, includes and its change, 
social environment of administration, etc., that could not fit to any of the 
above categories. The EU accession and the requirements for administrative 
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change were widely discussed especially around the accession in 2004, whe-
reas the e-government was a relatively stable though not widely discussed 
topic, which became more characteristic in the past decade. Regarding the 
five models, and especially the three reform-models, it is clear that NPM is 
far the most dominant, whereas NPg is hardly discussed, and even those 
cases are of questionable  character. 
Table 7.2: Appearance of the Nine Approaches 
Model / approach Number of appearances
New Public Management (NPM) 154
New Public governance (NPg) 11
Neo-weberian State (NwS) 39
EU-ization 63
E-government 51
Socialist 41
Classic weberian 55
Legal 176
Other 156
Nevertheless, let us proceed to the trajectory of these approaches. Figu-
re 7.5 shows only the distribution of the five major models discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter.
Figure 7.5: Aggregated Distribution of Models
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The early years of transition were characterized by the intensive discus-
sion of the socialist system, and then the weberian bureaucratic arrangement. 
From the second half of the 1990s, NPM seemed to dominate scholarly dis-
cussion reaching its peak in the mid-2000s. Indeed, NPM is present to the 
highest quantity but also most continuously, i.e. NPM is the only reform-mo-
del which can be found in most analyzed years, while other approaches occur 
only in certain periods. The categorization, as we indicated at the beginning 
of the chapter, is based on the content of the model. This is the reason why 
some publications were categorized as NwS even before the term was coined. 
However, NwS became relatively important only from 2009, and especially 
after the Orbán’s government got into power, as NwS refers in this termino-
logy to etatism, anti-liberal, anti-NPM sentiments as well as to centralization 
with a strict hierarchy and the smallest possible level of autonomies. NPg or 
good governance is discussed somewhat more intensively only in the past 
few years as the very term was used both by the left and right wing parties. 
The Orbán’s government even initiated a large-scale program (Magyary pro-
gram) devoted to the creation of “good government”, whatever it may mean 
in that context. Most items categorized as NPg may have been written in that 
vein while referred to the original model (Hajnal-Pál, 2013).
An in-depth analysis of the content reveals some further findings. In the 
first period, the authors planned to implement the recommended reforms 
within the socialist framework. This is demonstrated by title selection of this 
era: ‘Solution of Organizational Decentralization: The Small State Businesses’ 
(Laky, 1988), ‘Financial Innovation in Market Socialism’ (Liska, 1988). when 
the transition started, the articles took a new direction: since then the reforms 
had already incurred a deeper intent of change in the articles. Once again, 
just based on the titles: ‘Limited Company and Reform’ (Hoch, 1990), ‘The 
New Model of Corporate Ownership’ (Sebestyén, 1990), ‘The Foundations of 
Constitutional System of Local governments and Directions of Development’ 
(Verebélyi, 1989). From this time forth, the articles contained more and more 
intensively the issues related to the changes of PA. During this period, HPA 
has also released several special thematic issues on PAR (e.g. 1993/11 in con-
nection with the intended revision of the new Local government Act). 
The next major change dated around the year 2000 when the papers rela-
ted to the EU accession started to occur in a larger number. According to the 
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foreword of HPA in January 2000, the journal aims to provide (more) space in 
the future to the publications related to modernization of PA and preparation 
for the EU accession.
The third and recent large change may have been provoked by the 2010 
parliamentary elections. Due to the results, the election-winning party gained 
a two-thirds majority, and began to fundamentally transform public-legal fra-
mework of the country at a rapid pace. This event seems to restructure the 
distribution of publications related to PAR in favor of NPg and NwS appro-
aches. Vast majority (more than 70%) of them has been published after 2010. 
The drop in relevant publications from 2014 occurred because HPA has been 
released from this date only on a quarterly basis.  
In view of the  above-described, we can conclude that the previously 
identified three major breakpoints are related to three major political events: 
first, the transition in CEE and the newly formed democratic framework 
which allowed the authors, through ensuring freedom of science, to deal with 
and publish papers on state affairs; second, after a steady downward trend, 
consolidation between 1998−2006 (and partly the EU accession) re-launched 
interest on the subject, in addition the development of PA, at that time, was 
considered to be of a wider public interest due to the involvement of the scien-
tific community; and third, from 2006 and particularly after 2010 once again, 
there was a drop in publications, and possibly the scholarly interest in PAR. 
7.4. Conclusion: Stages and Models in Hungary                                              
with Further Considerations
In this chapter, we attempted to provide a brief summary of PAR and 
its various segments. In this regard, we followed the Hungarian PA literature, 
dividing the topic in analytical terms into (a) structure (central and territorial 
PA organizations), (b) functioning (policy/law making, public service provi-
sion, and application of laws), and (c) civil service system. Additionally, we 
also analyzed the Hungarian scholarly literature on PAR. The description of 
the trajectory served the purpose of determining major stages in the process 
as well as assessing the prevalence of various models of public administration. 
we have predefined three reform-models that were widely discussed in the 
past decades in the international literature, and two models that served as a 
kind of ‘starting points’ against which these models may be interpreted − bure-
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aucratic PA arrangement in the west and the socialist PA model in our region. 
Regarding the periodicization. generally three stages were identified 
by most reviewed authors. The first period may be titled as the creation and 
initial consolidation of the new system characterized by a radical shift form 
the socialist system. On a macro level, this is described by the double tran-
sition creating a democratic political system and the system of rule of law 
on one hand, and a market economy on the other. For the PA this required 
completely new ways of functioning, characterized most importantly – in 
our interpretation – by the loss of several administrative tools used before 
to enforce compliance from social actors. The new methods had to be learnt 
and that created great difficulties, and at least for this initial period loss in 
effectiveness, especially in the field of law enforcement. Naturally, this period 
brought large changes in the organizational structures as well with an incre-
ased role of ministries (as the policy making function of the Party apparatus 
was terminated), creation of a large number of agencies and their territorial 
units (deconcentrated organs), and perhaps most importantly, establishments 
of a new highly autonomous self-government system with a wide range of 
competencies. The second stage, that stems roughly from the mid-1990s to 
2006 or rather 2010, may be named as a period of fine-tuning with an incre-
ased sense of difficulties inherent in the new system. The scholarly literature 
devoted most publications specifically to PAR in this period, and relevant, 
though not enormous, changes took place in various fields during this period. 
In a more pessimistic interpretation, this period may be described as actors 
getting accustomed to the positive elements of transition, while new pro-
blems occurred but they were not really handled (especially if that required 
the change of constitutional setting), while disillusionment became widespre-
ad among the professional and wider public. 
Somewhat strangely the EU accession hardly appeared as an impor-
tant periodic point, presumably because the Hungarian PA was among the 
best prepared candidates, working on the accession for about a decade be-
fore 2004. Still, the EU induced significant, though somewhat contradicting, 
changes, especially in public service provision.
From 2010, a completely new PA system has been built in accordance with 
a larger transition detected in the field of political system, namely the illiberal 
state and all its attributes and the economy with an increased role of state in 
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terms of ownership and regulation. 
In a more general view, the story of the past 25 years may be described 
as movements of a pendulum, which started with the sharp, extreme deni-
al of all attributes of the socialist regime. For instance, while the socialist 
system is characterized by the unity of powers with the primacy of the – 
communist party led – executive, the new arrangement set up several orga-
nizational and legal institutions to control the executive to such an extent 
that, at some points, it was not able to carry out its key functions (i.e. enfor-
cement of laws). The socialist system prefers centralization and hierarchy; 
the new system provided a sound autonomy and wide range of competencies 
for local governments leading to several other administrative autonomies. 
Illiberal state may be considered as the pendulum swinging back again to the 
extremes of centralization, hierarchy, party-run administration, and practi-
cal elimination of checks and balances that reminds the observer to that of 
the socialist model.
What models were followed in the various reform movements? First 
of all, we emphasize that we identify certain reform actions with a certain 
model in an objective manner if the act fits to the attributes of a pre-defi-
ned model. In other words, we do not try to answer the question in a strict 
sense: “what the decision makers had in mind?” for several reasons. Most 
importantly, because we cannot identify the actors’ real will. This is a general 
problem of social sciences that is exacerbated in political science where the 
vested interest of the actors is frequently to hide their real motives.  we also 
detected that, in several cases, the proclaimed reform direction and the factu-
al one may greatly differ even if the actors indeed wanted to follow the given 
reform agenda. This was most self-evident in case of civil service where per-
formance appraisal (NPM) was introduced in a reform that aimed at reinfor-
cing merit system, whereas the actual functioning was brought closest during 
this 25-year period to a real merit system as a result of an NPM-oriented PAR 
project (that otherwise attempts to terminate merit system). 
By all means, the fact that the attributes of NPM fit to the general ten-
dency of the transition may be the reason that this reform approach seems 
to be the most relevant not only in the scholarly literature but also in reality. 
Agencitification in central structures and devolution in local ones may be 
interpreted this way. NPM has also appeared in civil service with the intro-
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duction of performance appraisal and as an official ideology of reforms in the 
period of 2006−2009. Most clearly, however, NPM is manifested in the field 
of public service provision as several service providers were privatized at first 
stage as a result of transition, and in the second stage to a great extent induced 
by the – at that time NPM-oriented – EU regulation. 
The other two reform-models. New Public governance (NPg or good 
governance) and Neo-weberian State (NwS) appear both in practice and in 
the literature to a much smaller extent; in the literature, frequently, in a quite 
distorted, misinterpreted way. Some good governance methods, not reviewed 
here in detail, have appeared at the local level, in self-governmental functio-
ning, most of all by involving local NgOs and civil society organizations in 
decision-making. However, this remained sporadic. One may argue that the 
involvement of NgOs in service provision and the sector-neutral financing 
that enabled this arrangement may be considered as NPg, even though most 
authors would categorize that under NPM. Furthermore, some units that 
existed at the territorial level (e.g. Regional Development and Labor Coun-
cils) that broke up with the classical bureaucratic administrative model, and 
seemed to be more open to the cooperation with non-state actors may be 
considered as manifestations of NPg approach. The relatively small weight of 
these organizations and their short life, however, indicate the bad fate of this 
reform-model based on participation, cooperation and consensus-seeking, 
generally time-consuming procedures with less predictable outcomes, irres-
pective of long-run positive effects of this arrangement. 
The Hungarian literature seems to largely misinterpret the meaning of 
this model as well as that of NWS. In fact, while NwS may serve well as a 
descriptive model, it is quite vague and less robust as a normative model (i.e. 
how a NwS arrangement would look like.) It seems that NwS is rather a qu-
asi-ideology in the region against NPM and intended for bureaucratic arran-
gements. This is exactly what we see in Drechsler’s or Randma-Liiv’s quoted 
papers. In the Hungarian literature a clear, though not necessarily conscious, 
misinterpretation occurs that identifies NwS with the endeavor of Orban’s 
Cabinet fitting to the illiberal state: etatism, high degree of centralization, and 
abolition of all kind of autonomies.
Bureaucracy in this region appears differently to its interpretation in 
the west. All the three reform-models are originated from the west, and all 
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of them are formulated – to larger or smaller extent – against the weberian 
bureaucratic model. NPM appeared explicitly as a denial of the bureaucratic 
administration, most of all its hierarchical arrangements (vs. competition), 
inward-looking nature (vs. outcome and client orientation), and relative ne-
gligence to efficiency and effectiveness. NPg emphasizes transparency, ci-
vic participation and informal, non-structured, network-like functioning as 
opposed to secrecy, administrative professionalism (that excludes dilettante 
though interested parties from the decision-making and implementation), 
and strict, pre-defined hierarchy. NwS, while accepting the need for some 
bureaucratic solutions (vs. NPM), still vows that classical bureaucracy is not 
anymore feasible. In the CEE region, however, as most agree, classical webe-
rian bureaucracy would have been a step forward from the socialist model 
with its politics-run mechanism, systematic lack of professional capacity, and 
considerations in decision-making and implementation. Though the analysis 
of publications may be confusing in this regard, the first period (was domina-
ted mostly by the papers reviewing NPM, typically in a positive manner, and 
condemning classical weberian model as outdated, sometimes even identi-
fied with the socialist past. Later, however, more and more voices articulated 
the view that classical bureaucracy may have been a stage in development 
that cannot and/or should not be skipped to jump directly to NPM or other 
fashionable western models. This change can be clearly detected in the pu-
blications in the region, so much that recently Pollitt and Dan (2013) argue 
against the view that NPM does not fit to the CEE reality, and classical bure-
aucracy is needed to be established first − a view that they find dominant in 
the region.38
Marketization sometimes brought to extremes, and privatizing public 
infrastructures that most of the leading NPM countries kept as government 
property seemingly failed to fulfill their promises. Prices typically went up 
as the market mechanism was introduced instead of dropping due to incre-
ased efficiency. The customers frequently felt more defenseless facing large 
multinational companies than earlier with government-run providers. The 
ideology of the supremacy of market over the state may have been questioned 
38  The fact that they assessed the general mood well is reinforced by the immediate reaction by 
Drechsler and Randma-Liiv (2015), who harshly criticized the proposed finding that “NPM can 
work” in the region.
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by the fact that large part of the public infrastructure was privatized to wes-
tern government-owned companies. generally, NPM, a pro-market appro-
ach, was surely difficult to be mentally handled by a population socialized 
during the socialist regime. Furthermore, NPM was intensively advocated, 
frequently forced by the international organizations, most of all IMF, world 
Bank, and OECD in the first one or two decades, despite the increasingly 
clear negative effects. This raised suspicion if that endeavor served other 
purposes than the well-being of the countries (Stiglitz, 2002). In this way, 
NPM may generally exacerbate alienation form the transition which may 
be a mental basis of the illiberal turn.  
NPg is also originated from the west. It is based on such structural 
and cultural conditions that are hardly present in most countries of the 
region; surely not in Hungary. NPg may function well if all major social 
groups can articulate their views, if they are relatively well organized, or at 
least able to organize themselves. The Hungarian society hardly meets these 
requirements. Large social groups are unable to voice their views and ne-
eds. For instance, the Roma (about 10% of the population) have no effective 
representation neither at the central nor at the local level. The same is the 
case with the unemployed people. The unionization may be – according to 
our surveys – about 1-2%. Even local governments were unable to form a 
unified, and thus powerful association. Besides interest articulation, inte-
rest aggregation is a key in NPg. However, though this is difficult to empiri-
cally capture, the mental disposition for consensus seeking is very low. The 
debates are highly personalized (vs. issue-oriented) and conceived as a zero 
sum game that hardly allows mutually satisfying solutions. 
In brief, most models coming from the west have been attractive and, 
at the same time, inappropriate presumably for the same reason: being wes-
tern. The tension between rather Eastern reality and western ambitions are 
not new in the region (Szűcs, 1983), and may be captured in the PA system 
as well. The tension between foreign ideals and local realities became more 
self-evident as the ideals originated this time from the Anglo-American 
administration that was different not only from the reality but also from 
the historical ideals of germany and France in this region. Furthermore, 
ideals and models offered by the west sharply contradicted one another, 
exacerbating confusion and leading to the cacophony of PAR. By analyzing 
289 Hungarian Public administration: last tHirty years, Waves in tHe story
the administrative reforms in a systematic manner, most authors concluded 
that no clear models can be identified during the past 25 years, or shorter 
periods within this time span (Rosta, 2015). However, in a recent study 
investigating the nature of sub-national level PAR in Hungary Hajnal and 
Rosta (2016) find that the reforms since 2010, while diverging from or even 
contradict the three analyzed models (NPM, NPg and NwS), seem to form 
a specific, consistent model. This model, that they call ‘illiberal’, is charac-
terized by “radical rolling back of the market […], harsh downplaying of 
network-type coordination instruments, and degradation of rule of law” 
(ib.: 19). To these rather general governmental attributes, we added in this 
chapter some more PA-specific elements, most importantly: (a) elimina-
tion of checks and balances, especially checks of the executive; (b) centra-
lization, purely hierarchical coordination, and denial of autonomies; and 
(c) politically, party-driven PA (vs. professional administration). Regarding 
the potential cause, the authors presume that “western values of liberal 
democratic governance constitute some sort of an unintended error or an 
inability of the central power to exert control” (ib.: 19), which may have 
instigated the establishment of the illiberal state. 
Based on all the above, now, as an ultimate conclusion we attempt to 
answer the questions raised by the editors of this book. 
1. It seems that for a long period of time there was not an administrati-
ve reform-model specific to the region or Hungary. Instead, a caco-
phony of reform directions may be detected. Most of these reforms 
were based on western, typically Anglo-Saxon, theories contradic-
ting one another and, more importantly, the reality of transitional 
Hungary. However, from 2010, a new governmental and, as its part, 
PAR model may have been gradually formed. This model seems to 
be consistent, feasible, and adequate to Hungary and/or to the regi-
on as similar tendencies may be identified in some other countries 
(e.g. Poland). This specific model, however, is based on the denial 
of western, liberal democratic governance and administration both 
in terms of its ideology and its practical solutions. In a brief and 
somewhat subjective manner: recently, Hungary has seemingly a 
country/region-specific PA model, though we are not necessarily 
proud of it. 
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2. Post-socialist transition narrative plays only ideological, propagan-
distic role, whereas an in-depth analysis of socialist and transition 
governance is seemingly missing. As we already indicated, harsh 
anti-communist propaganda of the Orbán’s regime is accompanied 
with a governmental and administrative system resembling, in se-
veral elements, the socialist PA model. 
3. Europeanization has played only a minimal role in the Hungarian 
administrative reforms trajectory. The EU sets up general and vague 
requirements regarding the administration that has not generated 
a challenge, especially as Hungary may have been one of the best-
prepared accession countries in 2004.  
4. ‘Implementation gaps’ in the PAR have been present at least befo-
re 2010. we identified three major causes. First, the contradicting 
nature of reform-models may have prevented the implementation 
of any consistent strategic reform. This was exacerbated by the fact 
that various political actors followed various models, thus one got 
to power, and frequently annulled actions of the previous PAR befo-
re it could have been accomplished. Second, the necessary capacity 
to carefully design a reform strategy, prepare a feasible operatio-
nal plan, and carry out activities is largely missing. Furthermore, 
the time span is too short for implementing such projects. Third, 
as most analyst mention, the necessary political support is usually 
missing behind PAR project. 
PAR is rather a technical activity that does not yield many votes, espe-
cially not in a culture where symbolic actions are preferred over factual 
ones. PAR of the recent Orbán’s government is an exception in this regard 
as well as it was mostly implemented. 
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8. Slovene Public Administration Reform: 
Europeanization as a Bridge over Traditional and  
Post-Socialist Legacies39
Polonca Kovač, Primož Pevcin
8.1. Introductionary Characteristics of Slovenia and Its Public 
Administration
Slovenia is a nation state, a parliamentary democratic republic, inde-
pendent since 1991 with approx. 2 million population. It has about 20,000 
km2, and lies between the Alps, Adria and Pannonian Basin; its neighbo-
ring countries are Austria, Hungary, Croatia, and Italy. Today, Slovenia is 
mostly secularized with acknowledged heritage of mainly Catholic Church. 
The country’s official language is Slovenian or Slovene. As an independent 
state, Slovenia aimed at building a democratic society founded on market 
mechanisms. Slovenia is a full member of the EU since 2004, applies euro as 
a currency since 2007, and a member of the United Nations (1992), Council 
of Europe (1994), NATO (2004), and OECD (2010). 
Slovenia has been most often, especially before the economic crisis in 
the late 2000’s, considered as one of the most successful post-socialist or 
Central and Eastern European states that introduced the reforms in society, 
economy and public administration as well. It gained its independence after 
struggles within the former Yugoslavia leading to a break-up in 1991.  
As within the Yugoslav experience between 1918–1941 (i.e. State of 
Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, later kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 
renamed in kingdom of Yugoslavia  in 1929), and 1945–1991 in “new” 
or “second” Yugoslavia, Slovenia has been a part of other state structures 
throughout the centuries before that.40 Yugoslavia was under Tito one of 
39   The authors acknowledge the financial support from the Slovenian Research Agency 
(research core funding of programme No. P5-0093, Development of an Efficient and 
Effective Public Administration).
40   Other Eastern European countries have gained their independence at least in a certain 
limited period or formally if not in a full meaning. This is not the case for Slovenia unless 
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the few countries in the socialist bloc as a socialist or communist mono-
party state but not a part of the  warsaw Pact, and hence not under the 
Soviet governance. Technically, the politico-economic system of the coun-
try, although it was socialistic in its fundaments, differentiated substantially 
from the Soviet type, still it needs to be recognized that a uniform “Soviet 
type” of politico-economic system did not exist, and consequently, many 
political and economic differences existed even among the “Soviet-umbrel-
la” countries (Šušteršič, 2003). Basically, the system in Yugoslavia was, in 
politico-economic terms, much more liberalized and pro-market oriented 
from the 1960’s onwards in comparison to other socialist countries, and the 
system was eventually transformed towards labor self-management rather 
than state socialism. Nonetheless, the common point with other former so-
cialist countries was observed in the debt crisis of the 1980’s that was fueled 
by the growing need to stabilize the economy given the poor dynamic pro-
perties of socialist politico-economic systems as well as by the incentives 
of western countries to use indebtedness as a tool to boost reforms in the 
socialist countries. 
Slovenia has therefore been developed until ww II predominantly un-
der german and Austrian continental or Central Europe societal, political-
administrative, and legal culture. This legacy has been upgraded by socialist 
system in Yugoslavia, expressing a capture of the state over society. PA in 
this respect had been seen as a purely instrumental structure for execu-
ting politically set priorities of national policies within the socialist system. 
From this standing point, Slovenia underwent major development rather 
fast in few years after its independence (see Pirnat, 1993; Dujić, 1997; kovač 
& Virant, 2011). However, such a legacy has had and still does influence 
public administration (PA) functioning and its reforms (PAR) since their 
taken into account the ”first Slovene state”, i.e. Duchy of Carantania in the 7th century, 
annexed to Bavaria in the 8th century. After a split with the former Yugoslavia, the fol-
lowing countries have been established as recognized today: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and kosovo. However, already in 
1974, the Yugoslav Constitution gave increased autonomy to these federal units, provid-
ing a legal basis for independence of the federative constituents after 1991. Except Slove-
nia and Croatia with Habsburg heritage, the former even more as a part of Cisleithania, 
other former Yugoslav states shared mainly Ottoman influence. If comparing Slovenia 
to Croatia, there was only so-called ten days’ war in Slovenia in 1991 while the war have 
gone on in Croatia for several years, heavily blocking the processes of modernization. 
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starting point anticipates a state that dominates a society with PA being un-
derstood primarily through government policies and public law. The main 
characteristic of this system are: rule of law and Rechtsstaat, division of po-
wers, division of public and private law and judiciary, and (lately neo-) libe-
ralism (cf. Fink Hafner & Lajh, 2003; Statskontoret, 2005: 74–76; Peters & 
Pierre, 2005: 267 et seq.; cf. Raadschelders, 2011: 156–181; koprić, 2011 and 
2012). In this respect, the European Administrative Space and its principles 
played a significant role in Slovene PAR as well (OECD, 1999; Olsen, 2003; 
kovač & Virant, 2011: 35; Petelin, 2013). PAR was a more or less systematic 
set of strategies and activities, which thus differs Slovenia to majority of 
CEE countries with overproduction or vagueness of different measures (cf. 
Dunn et al., 2006; koprić, 2012; Vintar et al., 2013; Aristovnik et al., 2016). 
From economic perspective, Slovenia is one of the most successful 
countries in the group of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. It 
has now predominantly services-oriented economy, reflecting the shift from 
manufacturing orientation. However, the economy is rather small (around 
186,500 registered companies) and export-oriented (germany being Slove-
ne first trading partner, over 2/3 of goods are traded with germany). That 
leads, with some ups and rather sever downs due to global financial crisis, 
to approx. 18,100 EUR of gross domestic product (gDP) per capita in Slo-
venia in 2014, i.e. 83% of EU28 average, and 9% of unemployment in 2015 
based on the ILO methodology. Public finances have shown fiscal deficit 
problems in recent years as government spending increased during the last 
years to around 50% of gDP. Consequently, this has led to a mounting pro-
blem of government indebtness, rapidly skyrocketing from slightly more 
than 20% of gDP in 2008 to almost 100% of gDP in 2016, according to the 
latest OECD (2016) data. Approx. 160,000 persons, i.e. 15% of overall acti-
ve population, are employed in public sector, i.e. state administration and 
municipalities, police, public education, and health care institutions, etc., 
whereas state sector employs approx. 240,000 persons.
After its independence in 1991, Slovenia has submitted its public admi-
nistration mainly to the state government. Its origins and connections stem 
from former Yugoslavia and Eastern European countries. The transition of 
Slovene public administration from the previous Yugoslav setting saw no 
major obstacle since Slovenia had been relatively autonomous republic sin-
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ce the mid-1970’s. Following independence in 1991, however, certain new 
structures had to be developed, such as new custom service and the ove-
rall modernization of local self-government, whereby in accordance with 
the Constitution of 1991 the functions of municipalities (now 212 of them) 
were separated from those of state administration at the local level. In the 
next PAR stage after 1996, the emphasis was on the preparation and adop-
tion of new laws aimed at Slovenia’s accession to the EU. In the years after 
2000, the reform was intended to consist of constant modernization based 
on several pillars such as rationalization of structures aiming to decrease 
the share of public expenditure in gDP, reorganization of specific adminis-
trative bodies, and introduction of a new common and unified wage system 
in the public sector. 
The structure of PA in Slovenia reflects its smallness, duality betwe-
en the state and local self-government, and slow process of delegation of 
powers from central PA. PA is defined mainly functionally by conducting 
public tasks, both authoritative and public service tasks through:
 − State administration with ministries (around 11 to 15) and govern-
ment offices (10), agencies within ministries (approx. 45), and lo-
cal administrative units (58), together totaling to slightly more than 
30,000 employees; 
 − Local self-government within 212 municipalities with nearly 5,000 
employees;
 − A few hundreds of legally autonomous entities in the form of pu-
blic institutes, agencies, and funds, such as institutes for social insu-
rances, regulators of energy, telecommunications, market security, 
schools and hospitals, etc., employing approx. 120,000 employees, 
taking into account that these entities are part of public adminis-
tration/sector when conducting public tasks and/or funded at least 
partially through budgetarian resources;
 − Private bearers of public authority or providers of public services 
(through concessions) that had been delegated certain powers by the 
state or the municipalities.
Regarding PAR, an important stage was the establishment of autono-
mous Ministry of Public Administration in 2004 that has acted as a govern-
mental and broader PAR coordinator since then.
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In Slovenia, three main processes can thus be identified throughout the 
reform: (1) modernization in terms of political interests and, in substantive 
and technical terms, informatization, and (2) Europeanization (see in detail 
in kovač in Vintar, 2013; Aristovnik et al., 2016). The latter is sometimes 
seen as “false Europeanization” since the reforms were taken as a formal 
requirement of the EU (see koprić, 2012). However, in Slovene case, it was 
proved that it acted as a valuable external incentive to support domestic 
changes. Slovene administrative reforms can be categorized under several 
targets: the prevailing rationalization and wish for a greater efficiency (mi-
nimization) on the one hand, and the confirmation of the existing regu-
lation (maintenance) on the other, which we can join up into omnipresent 
modernization processes. Politically speaking, the reforms of public admi-
nistration were thus one of the most important projects of Slovenia. Finally, 
(3) process that shaped the reform were the emerging and, later on accu-
mulated, fiscal crisis issues and problems since the early 2010’s onwards, 
which significantly shaped governance mechanisms and decision-making 
processes in the recent years − an issue that is further addressed in the pa-
per. Nevertheless, there is still a need and possibility for developing good 
governance and good administration in terms of a modern European sys-
tem, simultaneously enabling efficiency and democratization of political-
administrative structures.
Furthermore, the paper has a standardized structure consisting of two 
parts, whereas the second part represents its main part. Thus, it is subdivided 
into four parts, the first one representing changing paradigms and strategies in 
public administration reforms initiated and/or implemented in the country, the 
second part representing organizational, functional, and financial dimension 
of PA, the third part elaborating on the civil system characteristics, and the last 
one on good administration and good governance issues. Taking comparati-
ve perspective, this chapter focuses on country-specific issues of PAR, and in 
this context, special focus is also given to the role of recent fiscal crisis in im-
plementing reforms, as hence Slovenia was one of the most fiscally challenged 
countries in Europe, where the fiscal challenges of the country more resembled 
the problems of Mediterranean and peripheral European countries rather than 
former socialist countries. This represents a rather interesting dimension to as-
sess and compare PA and its reforms.  
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8.2. Mainstream PAR in Slovenia 1991–2016
8.2.1. Paradigms Shift in National Strategies on PAR in Slovenia 
In general, within PAR processes Slovenia undertook the path of re-
volution (1990–1994), transition (1995–1997), and EU accession and inte-
gration (1996–2004), further continuous modernization of political-admi-
nistrative system through specific policies (2003–2008), and adjustments to 
cope with the economic crisis (2008–2015; similarly to other countries in 
the region; see Lane, 1995; Cardona & Freibert, 2007; koprić, 2011; Agh, 
2013). The reforms have been designed through several governmental stra-
tegies in a rather neo-liberalistic fashion under the New Public Manage-
ment elements. Simultaneously, PAR has been carried out rather legalis-
tically despite pursuing some good governance principles (e.g. customer 
orientation, or delegation of powers to regulatory agencies; see kovač & 
Virant, 2011; cf. kovač & gajduschek, 2015: 10−12).  
In 2002, Slovenia enacted a package of what is known as the “reform 
laws”, including the State Administration Act, Civil Servants Act, Public 
Agencies Act, etc., unifying PA, civil service and pay system in overall pu-
blic sector. The principles followed in these laws, umbrella strategies and ot-
her measures within PAR were: PA depoliticization and professionalization, 
decentralization and deconcentration, rationalization, citizen orientation. 
Slovenia had to tackle the issues of apolitical orientation and culture, and 
develop professional strategic planning, such as public-policy design and 
participation of and with the citizens (more kovač in Vintar, 2013; similarly 
in other EE countries; see Linz & Stepan, 1996; Dunn et al., 2006; Meyer-
Sahling, 2009; koprić, 2011: 14–20).
However, mostly all reforms, legal, managerial, organizational, finan-
cial, etc., have been at least at declaratory level run under the umbrella 
strategies (Table 8.1). On the other hand, almost no evaluations of earlier 
strategies have been prepared when adopting the next one since they mos-
tly followed explicit political or macroeconomic goal (e.g. cohesion funds 
accessibility set out in 2015 Strategy, described in detail in Aristovnik et al., 
2016). 
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Table 8.1: Strategic Documents on Slovene PAR
Strategy 
Year of 
adoption 
Issuer and its political 
orientation Period
Realization 
(authors’ 
evaluation)
Strategy for EU Accession 1996
Parliament (left-wing dri-
ven, but based on overall 
political
consensus)
1997–99 Mainly
Umbrella “reform laws”
(Civil Servants, State 
Administration, Agencies, 
etc.)
2002 Parliament(left wing-driven, but ove-
rall political consensus)
2000–03
Almost fully 
in structural, 
less in 
functional 
parts
Strategy on Further De-
velopment of the Slovene 
Public Sector 
2003 government (left) 2003–05
Mainly, again 
prevailing 
in structural 
aspects
Slovenia’s Development 
Strategy 
2004 governments
(left & right) 2005–13
Partly, and 
rather decla-
ratory
Exit Strategy (from 
economic crisis) 
2010 government (left) 2010–13 Partly
*Draft – The Origins of 
Further Development 
and Organizational and 
Normative Regulation of 
the Public Sector
2011* government 2011–12
Partly as 
pursued prior 
and parallel 
to it
Changed Jurisdiction of 
Ministries and Agencies 
& State Administration Act 
2012
government & Par-
liament (right wing 
majority)
2012– Partly 
Strategy of Development 
of PA 2015 government (central) 2015–20 /
* Not adopted due to early parliamentary elections and new (left wing) government 
appointment in autumn 2011.
In Slovenia, as in the majority of other countries in the region, the ove-
rall basis for modern administrative reforms was primarily the paradigm of 
New Public Management. As time passed by, however, the understanding of 
NPM as the ultimate stage of development in the sense of a “Neo-weberian” 
administration has been widely accepted was overcome throughout the world 
and in Slovenia (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011; Brezovšek, 2009; kovač & gaj-
309 Slovene Public AdminiStrAtion reform: euroPeAnizAtion AS A bridge over trAditionAl And PoSt-SociAliSt legAcieS
duschek, 2015: 11). Considering the dilemmas expressed especially in CEE 
(see Randma-Liiv in Pollitt 2008/09: 70–77), Slovenia and its public admi-
nistration have therefore been facing some general regional CEE problems, 
such as determining the proper scope of minimal vs. strong state with the 
level of de/regulation or non/marketization and developing democratic over 
technocratic values. In sum, among the elements assessed as highly achieved, 
we can emphasize (cf.  Pollitt et al., 2008/09: 15): 
 − “weberian” elements: state as the main facilitator of societal problems 
and highly developed (traditional) principles of administrative law;
 −  “Neo” elements: a shift from internal self-satisfaction of PA towards 
citizens’ and business orientation and rationalization of resources 
through their management.
On the other hand, representative democracy, NgO involvement, deve-
lopment of public service as a system of distinctive status and its professiona-
lism are still to be analyzed and systematically supported.
As in many political systems of the world, yet more often in less con-
solidated social environments such as post-socialist countries (see Linz & 
Stephan, 1996; Dunn et al., 2006; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011; Vintar et al., 
2013), in Slovenia, the reforms were often run merely in relation to a specific 
area or the priorities of the current government. This is mainly due to the 
lack of consistent and persistent coordination at the highest strategic level of 
government in relation to reform goals and activities, which results in oppos-
ing measures taken by individual ministries (see examples in kovač & Virant, 
2011). Hence, PAR in Slovenia may − if evaluated top down − well be consi-
dered successful in an operational or technical sense (e.g. use of TQM tools, 
elimination of administrative barriers), and less so in the most conflicting 
segments of the society, such as development of local government or privati-
zation (see more in kovač in Vintar, 2013). 
Moreover, an important factor shaping public sector governance mo-
del in particular context of Slovenia in recent years has been related to the 
emergence and persistence of fiscal crisis. governance issues in this speci-
fic context relate predominantly to the pre-crisis logic of public governance, 
where typically increased efficiency of public sector units was advocated, and 
this should be achieved with decentralization and competition among public 
sector units (Peters et al., 2011). Following the outline in Peters et al. (2011), 
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five areas of governance issues should be addressed: path dependence, coor-
dination and coherence, time perspective, centralization, and politicization. 
Typically, the evidence suggested in Pevcin (2014) reshaped the prevailing go-
vernance model in Slovenia by increasing the voters’ acceptance of public sec-
tor reforms being implemented; it helped boosting the concentration of power 
within the Ministry of Finance; put pressure on the increased coordination of 
policies; shifted the political focus towards short-term fixes and quick solu-
tions for existing problems; put additional pressures for centralization within 
the government; and caused that the politicians favor policies being implemen-
ted by the ruling parties’ supporters rather than by “neutral” public servants. 
Similarly, the modes of governance have somehow changed in recent years, 
involving mainly politicization and coordination of policy-making, but also 
increased coordination within the public administration has been observed le-
ading to the movement of certain political powers to the center of government. 
Interestingly, this to a large extent corresponds to the findings portrayed in the 
comparative literature (see e.g. Cepiku & Bonomi Savignon, 2012). 
If we would have to address the future trends in public governance models, 
it could be quite plausible to state that the mixture of New Public Management 
and Administrative State methodological principles are expected to be im-
plemented. governments also promoted several “lean government”-oriented 
approaches which means that current crisis has actually promoted the intro-
duction of NPM-based reform principles. However, also the opposite direction 
of influence could be argued, as hard pressures existed towards more centra-
lized governance, which could be particularly observed in the functioning of 
the executive branch of government. For instance, a strong pressure existed 
to re-centralize several tendering systems where the main motive was related 
to achieve greater technical efficiency of the system. government, supported 
by the parliament, started to adopt and implement legislation under the rule 
of urgent procedure, in particular in the year 2012, where greater efficiency of 
policy-making was seen as the main motive. In fact, it could be argued that 
government tried to downsize and recentralize the public sector of Slovenia. 
These recentralization pressures existed on macro as well as on micro level 
as there was a tendency to reorganize the sector and institutions within the sec-
tor in the manner to ensure efficient work organization through specialization. 
Contracting out in the public sector was severely limited, in particular in re-
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lation to consulting, vocational, and supporting activities. In fact, limitation of 
contracting out was perceived as one of the easiest way to reduce the operatio-
nal costs of the sector. This was the cornerstone of the planned reorganization. 
This supports another argument: the focus was on achieving greater technical 
efficiency of the sector, whereas allocative efficiency of the sector − favored 
by NPM ideology − was neglected. Furthermore, both governments have also 
limited the autonomy of public organizations. This indicates that more centra-
lized and institutionalized modes of functioning of public organizations have 
been introduced, and governments increased control on those organizations, 
in particular if the costs where under consideration. Namely, the austerity 
measures have actually prescribed the ability of public organizations to cover 
work-related costs of public servants, formulation of employment plans, deter-
mination of salaries of public servants, framework for spending resources, etc. 
Following, it can be easily argued that one of the major factors shaping the 
public governance and politico-administrative decision-making model in Slo-
venia in the future will be fiscal conditions of the country. The start of econo-
mic downturn in 2008, with sharp recession in 2009, when gross investments 
decreased by almost a quarter, net exports by almost a fifth, leading to gross 
domestic product reduction by almost 8% in real terms (see data by SORS, 
2013), was accompanied by a relatively long economic stagnation that ultima-
tely contributed to the worsening of fiscal situation in the country. Subsequ-
ently, governmental policies and decision-making started to resemble typical 
austerity and cutback management practices, particularly in 2012 and 2013. 
Interestingly, although Vintar et al. (2013) have recognized several potential 
opportunities for further modernization of public administration in Slovenia, 
like delegation of administrative tasks to non-classical administrative bodies, 
and possible further de-politicization of public administration, it might be 
argued that the outcome of cutback management in government was increa-
sed by centralization and politicization of public administration. Moreover, it 
seems that one of the major threats recognized by Vintar et al. (2013), which is 
the prevalence of view that government represents actually a burden to society, 
materialized. Namely, the Table 8.2 below indicates that cutback measures in 
the main period of austerity were predominantly oriented at expenditure side 
of government accounts, which suggests that government was perceived as a 
burden to society, thereby imposing necessity to cut costs.
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Table 8.2: Cutback Management and Political Decision-Making in Slovenia, 
2008−2014
Period
Practice 2008−2011 2012 2013−2014
Fiscal consolidation overview
Main category of public 
finance restoration Modestly needed Pre-emptive
Market-pressure 
based
Main type of fiscal 
consolidation
Predominantly 
expenditure-
based
Predominantly 
expenditure-
based
Expenditure- and 
revenue-based
Cutback management practice
Main types of measures Relatively small measures 
Implementation of 
across-the-board 
and efficiency cuts
Imported priori-
tization of cuts/
consolidation
Prevailing cutback decision-
making
Incremental, small 
and gradual steps, 
incoherent
Political priority-
setting, centralized, 
systematic
Short-term quick 
fixes to ease market 
pressures, drastic 
decision-making
Source: adapted from Pevcin, 2014.
Furthermore, one of the main disadvantages plaguing Slovenia is the 
contribution of government and its efficiency to the competitiveness of the 
national economy. The figures in recent years indicate that the efficiency of 
government is actually one of the worst components of competitiveness, and 
in recent years, the ranking of this component dropped from place 38 in 2009 
to place 56 in 2014 according to the world Competitiveness Yearbook (2014) 
where 60 selected countries are scrutinized. This reflects unfavorable develo-
pment as within this component particularly the public finance (rank 60) and 
institutional system (rank 54) are perceived to be major relative weaknesses 
in international comparisons. Specifically, three indicators of governmental 
efficiency point out negative trends in decision-making patterns as the indi-
cator of governmental policy-making flexibility exhibits rank 57, economic 
legal and regulatory framework rank 52, and the efficiency of implementa-
tion of governmental decisions rank 57. In relation to the Table 8.3 below this 
indicates that the development of governance and political decision-making 
seem to be going in the wrong direction if the context of international com-
parisons is taken into the account.
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Table 8.3: Selected Indicators of governmental Efficiency, Values and Ranking 
in Eastern European Countries
Indicator
Flexibility of 
governmental 
policies
Economic legal 
and regulatory 
framework
Governmental 
decision-making 
efficiency
Slovenia 1.47 (57) 2.79 (52) 2.22 (57)
Estonia 5.47 (17) 5.61 (19) 5.36 (17)
Latvia 4.78 (26) 5.13 (26) 4.42 (28)
Poland 4.77 (27) 5.20 (25) 4.35 (29)
Hungary 3.58 (40) 3.00 (51) 4.32 (30)
Romania 3.56 (42) 3.52 (42) 3.75 (35)
Lithuania 3.41 (43) 4.93 (29) 3.23 (45)
Czech Republic 2.70 (48) 3.52 (43) 2.91 (48)
Slovakia 2.42 (50) 2.69 (54) 3.57 (37)
Bulgaria 1.86 (55) 3.22 (47) 2.11 (58)
Croatia 1.38 (59) 2.31 (57) 2.74 (51)
Source: World Competitiveness Yearbook, 2014.
 In sum, we can say for Slovenia, that good governance still stands as 
the declared but not fully realized objective of recent reforms. Moreover, it 
seems that practical evidence suggests that in recent years, due to predomi-
nantly fiscal pressures, a deviation occurred that even hampered the efficient 
transformation towards better governance. In essence, cutback management 
principles seem to prevail in recent years where the managerial point of view 
stresses the necessity of fiscal normalization in order to continue the transfor-
mation. Nevertheless, statically, so-called formal democracy (cf. Agh, 2013: 
3) with some more in-depth results in certain (technical) areas is in place. In 
future, we should design reforms particularly addressing openness, participa-
tion, and accountability of PA in order to upgrade to a stage of participative 
democracy in the European sense. An emphasis on the implementation is 
thus of utmost importance when planning and evaluating legal, managerial, 
and organizational measures, since − as analyzed in the following chapters − a 
respective gap to reforms in run insofar is present in Slovenia.  
8.2.2 .Organization, Decentralization, Funding, and Functions of the PA
Slovenia is among the group of countries with a relatively large public sec-
tor as total general outlays typically range in the last few year from 45% to 50% 
of gDP, in 2013, they even amounted to more than 60% but this was due to 
the exceptional transfers delivered to the banking sector (see SORS, 2016). The 
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majority of outlays are transferred for the social welfare state purposes (almost 
20% of gDP), which indicates welfare dimension of the country stated also in 
the Constitution. Nonetheless, the majority of revenues are generated through 
taxes, predominantly sales and income taxes, and the growing worry of PA is 
growing public debt which accumulated to 83% of gDP in 2015, almost re-
latively quadrupling to 22% in 2008, technically transferring the country from 
low level of indebtedness to relatively large one in just few years.
  Slovenia is also relatively centralized country, both from fiscal as well as 
organizational tier dimension, which goes in line with the relative size of the 
country where substantial fragmentation on several tiers of the public admi-
nistration is not expected. Besides to central government which consists of 
state government, central government departments, and local administrative 
units of central government (not to be confused with local self-government), 
it has only one tier of sub-national government, i.e. municipalities. Slovenia 
is also heavily centralized in fiscal terms, as approx. 90% of total government 
outlays are transferred through the central level. This reflects also historical 
issues as former socialist countries tended to be rather centralized for politi-
cal and practical purposes. Interestingly, from the local perspective, it is not 
entirely uniform, what actually labels public sector, public administration, 
and government encompass, and so specific terminological issues should be 
taken into account when addressing this topic (see, e.g., Pevcin, 2002 for de-
tailed elaboration on this issue). For instance, according to some local defi-
nitions, public administration should encompass all organizations of central 
government, local self-government as well as public enterprises, but it should 
not incorporate political system, etc.  
For this purpose, when relating to the organization of public adminis-
tration, we will follow gFSM (2001) approach, and distinguish governmen-
tal institutions at the central and sub-national level and public corporations, 
which will be treated out of this context. Following, at the central level, go-
vernment has currently 14 ministries, 12 governmental offices, 34 agencies 
within the ministries, and 30 autonomous agencies (see government of RS, 
2016). At the sub-national level, according to the Constitution, Slovenia is 
a unitary state with two tiers of sub-national government, i.e. regions and 
municipalities, but regions were not implemented yet. It should be noted that 
reforms (as well as discussions on reforms) of public administration are rat-
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her intensive also at the local level, where the first major reform occurred in 
1994 with the establishment of the first wave of “new” municipalities that 
started to operate in 1995. The process of formation of new municipalities in 
the last quarter of century had several waves, the first was the 1994 wave with 
the establishment of 82 new municipalities, the second one was the 1998 wave 
with the establishment of 47 new municipalities, 1 additional municipality 
was established during the 2002 wave, 17 new municipalities during the 2006 
wave, and 2 new municipalities were established after the 2011 wave, the last 
one in 2014 with the decision of Constitutional Court of Slovenia. Evident-
ly, the fragmentation occurred at this tier of government, the trend that was 
heavily opposite to the prevailing trends in the majority of others either old 
industrialized or newly transformed countries (see Pevcin, 2014a for   detai-
led discussion on this issue).
Currently, 212 municipalities exist, of which 11 have so-called city status, 
that need to have, according to the Local Self-government Act (2007), more 
than 20,000 residents, at least 15,000 working places, and they should also be 
in a sense economic, social, and cultural centers of specific “geographical regi-
ons”, which means that they should have hospital(s), theatres, at least seconda-
ry schools, etc. It is worth nothing that the number of municipalities increased 
by more than three times in last twenty years, and substantial variations exists 
in the size, both regarding the spatial size as well as the number of residents. 
In fact, the data might even indicate that excessive fragmentation occurred as 
more than half of the total number municipalities have less than 5,000 resi-
dents, which is a legally prescribed minimum size of municipality allowed to be 
established, in fact, legal exemption becomes the rule. The reason for this is re-
lated to the fact that many of them tended to be established for political reasons 
or exceptionality clause on historical, economical, and other reasons (legally) 
justifying the smaller size of particular municipality often used (see Oplotnik & 
Brezovnik, 2004). Besides, the same authors have also argued that cooperation 
and cost-sharing between the municipalities is very small since municipalities 
are not obliged (and consequently no incentives exist) to do that.
The second major reform proposal was related to the establishment of 
the second tier of local self-government, i.e. regions. Administrative reforms 
in the 1990’s and the 2000’s also involved pressures to create intermediate 
tier of government, so-called regions (see Pevcin, 2015, on detailed historical 
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and technical report on this process). The reforms began in June 2006 when 
the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia was amended in order to enable 
the transfer of responsibilities from central government to the second tier 
of sub-national government in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. 
The main issue under consideration was to fulfil the existing gap between the 
central government and the very fragmented local level of government, whe-
re very small municipalities prevail.
 One of the main issues associated with the implementation of regions 
related to their territorial size and number of residents. Several variants were 
delivered that involved introduction of 3, 6, 8, 12, and even 14 regions (Plut, 
2004). It is worth noting that the models of the introduction of either six or 
either eight regions were among the most appreciated variants that ought to be 
introduced, when professional discussions took place. Namely, these two mo-
dels tried to optimize the combinations of technical and allocative efficiencies, 
so that the preferences and attachment of residents to a particular region would 
be met but simultaneously cost inefficiencies would not be too large. Since the 
first model (three regions) would disregard, at least to some extent, allocative 
issues, these two models took into the consideration also the necessity to have 
polycentric model of development, spatial integration, and round up of regi-
ons, and thus perceived greater regional affiliation of residents (SVLR, 2012).
The whole issue of regionalization was actually plagued predominantly 
with the territorial and population size of regions − i.e. the number of regions. 
There were also two other extremes presented that further fragmented Slove-
nia at the regional level. Those two proposals involved creating 12 and even 
14 regions, and the allocative issues were the main backbone of those propo-
sals. The main considerations within the discussions on the regionalization 
were related to two opposing views: should regions be the form of voluntary 
cooperation of municipalities, or should central government impose regions 
(and municipalities should subsequently find other frameworks for potenti-
al cooperation). The political process of establishing regions started in 2006 
when constitutional amendments related to the local self-government issues 
enabled the implementation of the second tier of sub-national government 
in Slovenia. The main focus was put on further decentralization of the coun-
try, and strengthening of the subsidiarity principle when dealing with local 
issues. The original plan was to adopt all the necessary legislation in 2007, 
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and establish the regions during the year 2008. Ultimately, they would start to 
function in January 2009. 
From the political stakeholders’ point of view, it seemed that only mu-
nicipalities (and their mayors) were somehow sceptical on the introduction 
of regions which could be contributed to the possible reduction in their 
available resources as some of the tasks would be transferred to the regional 
level (see Bačlija & Brezovšek, 2006). Nonetheless, the existing government 
tried to push the approval of the Act on Regions to establish 14 regions in 
the parliament in 2007 but the Act was not approved by the parliament. The 
process continued in late 2009 but the process terminated in 2010. The Act 
on Regions was not approved, and effectively this meant that the process of 
regionalization was over, at least for now. Namely, by 2010, it became evident 
that country was entering the period of increased fiscal stress, and numerous 
cutback strategies and measures started to be implemented. Effectively, since 
2009 cutback management pushed for an increased centralization of politi-
cal and public decision-making (see Pevcin, 2014) which turned the focused 
away from potential decentralization and regionalization of the country.  
However, it seems that we might be experiencing bottom-up trends in 
the form of regionalization as municipalities are establishing so-called joint 
municipal administration (JMA) bodies, which represent the form of inter-
municipal cooperation. Namely, it became evident, not just due to the econo-
mic downturn, that especially smaller municipalities are often faced with the 
problem that they are not large enough, or do not have sufficient resources in 
order to effectively and efficiently perform their tasks, and organize efficient 
service delivery. Currently, more than 90% of Slovene municipalities belong 
to some JMA bodies (Fonda and Žohar, 2015). Interestingly, the creation of 
JMA bodies could indicate those areas where potential, or better put, necessi-
ty for the establishment of regions might be necessary.
Regarding other forms of decentralization, there are:
a. Territorial and functional deconcentration of state administration, and 
b. Agencification − the latter being the most important regarding the 
European (and global) trends − usually NPM driven (Peters & Pierre, 
2005: 260; Bevir et al., 2011: 256; Verhoest et al., 2012). 
Regarding the state administration deconcentration, countries introduce 
measures on structure rationalization. Such attempts were present in Slovenia 
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as well, however unsuccessful. Moreover, one often forgets the importance of 
territorial deconcentration of state administration regarding its close linkage to 
decentralization of local self-government due to joined PA system in relation 
to common parties, especially in circumstances of fragmented municipalities 
as exist in Slovenia. As for Slovenia, we are facing with highly dispersed and 
uncoordinated structure of state administration. There are 58 local adminis-
trative units; in our assessment, 8−12 of them would suffice. The establishment 
of today’s 58 state local administrative units in Slovenia took place in 1995. A 
simple political transfer of jurisdiction was made, taking into account both 
the employees and the users, and the then number of municipalities (kovač & 
Virant, 2011: 60). For the most part, administrative units are too small for an 
economical organization of administrative procedures and, precisely because 
of this, decentralization of decision-making and supervisory functions is not 
possible at this level (Trpin, 1998: 259). Furthermore, constitutional disputes 
concerning the competences of municipalities on one hand, and (general) lo-
cal state units on the other, were unavoidable. But more problematically, we 
face also other parallel structures organized through sectoral ministries, any of 
them with different territorial system, such as tax and customs offices, centers 
of social work, inspectorates, surveying and mapping authorities, social insu-
rances, etc. Therefore, we need to critically assess Slovene PAR in terms of state 
PA (re)organization since a network has been purely copied from a system 
before the independence. Due to tradition, the system functions but potentials 
for a more efficient and responsive organization are left behind. 
As for agencies, in terms of executive and more autonomous regulatory 
ones, Slovenia has been conservative in changes. There is a ratio of 2:1 betwe-
en executive agencies within ministries and independent public agencies. 
Comparatively, this is rather positive since other countries often face excessive 
agencification and all side effects (cf. Verhoest et al., 2012). Several models of 
autonomous entities have been developed with differing levels of autonomy 
based on umbrella Public Agencies Act and State Administration Act adopted 
in 2002. However, it si a benefit that these system laws include agencies within 
public administration based on their public tasks and public funding. 
In Slovenia, the idea of independent administrative institutions or regu-
latory agencies was closely linked to the privatization of (economic) public 
services with coordination of general public and private interests. Consequ-
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ently, the first agencies that were established in the 1990s were in the field 
of market security, insurance supervision, energy, telecommunications and 
postal services, etc. with the establishment of (state) public agencies, certain 
administrative tasks were delegated from state administration to more flexibly 
regulated and legally independent entities outside the constitutionally limited 
administrative bodies within the state itself. The process of agencification in 
Slovenia has intensified, and is still progressing, especially with regard to the 
aspects of (personal and financial) autonomy. In 2011, the government even 
designed an explicit reform program regarding public agencies, institutions, 
and funds as a part of the general public sector reform program (more in ko-
vač in Vintar et al., 2013). However, experts warn against misuse of this form 
especially in times of crisis (Pirnat, 2010). The delivery of public tasks can 
become more efficient because they are specialized, oriented to specific areas 
or sectors, and able to engage specific expertise. On the other hand, there 
are concerns as to their accountability, transparency, and technocratic risks. 
As regards agencies as independent regulators, there are frequent complaints 
about both political or sectoral capture, and characteristic of Eastern Europe 
as well as constitutional concerns about them breaking the principle of divi-
sion of powers in a state. In sum, today there are 16 autonomous agencies, 
although some are not classical regulators, hence this form is not the most 
suitable. On the contrary, other institutions parallel to agencies might better 
function as regulators, such as pension institute. 
The figures for Slovenia indicate one regulatory agency established in 1994 
and five in 2000, 16 in 2010 and 17 in 2012, with two less and one more in 
2013. The majority of agencies fall under the scope of the Ministry of Econo-
mic Development and Technology (five) and Ministry of Finance (four), some 
under the Ministry of Infrastructure and some under non-commercial sectors 
of science, education, culture and health (some agencies fall under the super-
vision of two field ministries). The number of employees in agencies varies si-
gnificantly (from 3 to 250; total about 800 in 2014). There are several phases of 
agencification. After 2000, the (moderate) proliferation of public agencies can 
be observed in Slovenia as well as in the region. The processes of transition and 
accession to the EU led to a rapid increase in the number of agencies in CEE in 
order to implement new or reorganized functions of democratic state, market 
economy, and EU MS. 
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Table 8.4: Number of (Public) Agencies in Slovenia (Type 2, National level) over 
Time 
Years No. of new agencies In total
         –2000 (1994–) 1 1
           2000–2004 7 8
          *2005–2008 3 11
         **2009–2012 6 17
            2012–2015 -2 (1 new, 1 abolished, 2 merged) 16
* In 2004, Slovenia entered the EU. ** In 2009, financial crisis started to influence 
public sector funding.  Source: own research. 
In certain elements, Slovene agencies seem to exceed the standardized 
autonomy required by the OECD if one did not simultaneously identify the 
implementation gap. Despite overall positive assessment of agencies in Slo-
venia, there are respective gaps identified particularly regarding managerial 
(in)efficiency and political (non)accountability as analyzed for all national 
agencies in 2011−2014, following goals of PAR strategies (Virant & kovač, 
2011: 71–73; Pevcin et al., 2012: 166−172; koprić et al., 2012/13: 40; kovač, 
2014). There is an especially vivid gap between declared and actual autono-
my and professionalism in terms of setting and reaching goals as defined in 
theory and field legislation. One of the key problems seems also to be the 
lack of a systematic approach to agencification owing to non-coordinated 
governmental field policies but the situation is comparatively not proble-
matic, especially following the EU sectoral requirements. In sum, Slovene 
agencies seem as a reasonable system and one of successful reforms, howe-
ver, there is a room for improvement regarding more developed professio-
nalism and better accountability of agencies.  
8.2.3. Civil Service and Integrity System 
Main goals, regarding the European Administrative Space harmoni-
zation as a base for PAR (see Cardona & Freibert, 2007: 57; OECD, 1999: 
21–24, 2014; Olsen, 2003), have been related to professionalism, enhanced 
capacity and coordination within the civil service system, both generally 
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and also in Slovenia. A new umbrella Civil Servants Act was adopted in 
2002, together with State Administration Act, wage System in the Public 
Sector Act, and other systemic reform legislation. Such an approach should 
enable real change, however, some of these laws entered into force imme-
diately, and some with rather significant delay. Although the wage System 
in the Public Sector Act, for instance, had been adopted in 2002, the new 
system eventually began to apply only in 2008, after six years of negotiations 
between the government and public-sector trade unions, and was again 
partly amended in 2010 to reduce public expenditure. Consequently, one 
can detect several dysfunctions and incompliances among different laws 
and effects, particularly within parts of public sector that function outsi-
de state administration (health, social care, education, etc.). For instance, 
when renewing the wage system in these sub-systems, their internal syste-
matizations have been firstly redefined in order to enable employees to get 
higher wages. Or although the Civil Servants Act aimed at apoliticization 
and higher professionalism, particularly for the highest officials, the law 
was changed in 2008 to give grounds for political replacement of directors-
general and other similar posts without fault-based grounds but purely “in-
consist” with new minister in power in the period of six months. 
The focuses of Civil Servants Act in force since 2003 followed the SI-
gMA recommendations, and built up on a rather stabile civil service as 
established in former decades (cf. Meyer-Sahling, 2009). Pursuant to the 
Civil Servants Act, the civil servants or civil-service jobs within the state, 
municipal, and judicial authorities fall into two major groups (Article 23) 
− officials and staff positions. These are differentiated according to their 
respective principal tasks and entry requirements (Articles 78 and 79, such 
as professional exams − but many of them were abolished in 2008), rights 
and duties, and HRM mechanisms. The first group consists of officials or 
positions of officials in five career classes and 16 ranks. For them implemen-
tation of the core (mainly authoritative) tasks of administration is reser-
ved, while the second group comprises support stuff or support-related jobs 
where, in addition to simple administrative tasks, it is mainly supportive 
clerical and technical work that is performed. The number of officials in 
2011, according to the ranks and classes, indicated the following structure: 
in the first class approx. 3,400 officials were employed, in the second 3,600, 
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in the third 4,000, in the fourth 2,100, and in the fifth 12,000 (korade Purg in 
kovač & Virant, 2011: 119–147). Secondly, there are special rules for mana-
gerial officials as opposed to expert ones). 
generally, the law offers grounds for (see Pirnat et al., 2004; kovač in 
Vintar, 2013): reorganization of human-resource planning and employment 
by integration in the budgetary procedure, decentralization of management 
to the level of individual bodies, greater internal mobility of staff (given that 
the employer is the same, i.e. the state), setting up top public management as 
an expert not political force, more objective system of selection, introduction 
of horizontal training and qualifications at the Administrative Academy un-
der the Ministry of Public Administration, mechanisms to increase flexibility 
and rationalize operations (project work, reorganization, reassignment), soci-
al partnership, etc. Nevertheless, as the most important characteristic of this 
law and its subsidiary legislation (especially, unified governmental Decree on 
Internal Organization and Systematization of work Posts in force since 2003 
and Rules on HR Planning in force since 2006), one can emphasize its scope. 
Namely, the law applies to all employees (except functionaries) in overall sta-
te administration, municipal administrations, and all types of public entities, 
such as agencies, funds, and institutes (e.g. schools, hospitals). This law hence 
acts as an anti-fragmentation tool joining up civil service as a professional for-
ce providing public services, or issuing authoritative decisions regardless of a 
status of an organizational unit where civil servants are formally employed. 
Moreover, the Officials’ Council as a hybrid body consisting of 12 mem-
bers41 was set up in April 2003 with the primary goal (Pirnat et al., 2004: 418) 
41   3 members out of 12 are elected by officials themselves, 3 members are appointed by the Presi-
dent of the Republic from among the experts in the public sector, 2 are appointed by the trade 
unions of professions in the PA, and 4 members are appointed by the government as a general 
rule for a period of six years. This is therefore not a governmental body but an independent 
one aiming to enhance professionalism. See standards:  http://www.mju.gov.si/fileadmin/mju.
gov.si/pageuploads/JAVNA_UPRAVA/Uradniski_svet/STANDARDS_OF_PROFESSIONAL_
QUALIFICATIONS_2015.pdf. A research carried out in 2012 (kovač & Virant, 2013: 137−158) 
among the candidates, selected top officials and Ministers as their political superiors revealed 
an overall efficiency of the Slovene selection scheme in the sense of restricted over-politicization 
and increased professionalism. Its outcomes lead to the conclusion that the selection system in 
Slovenia, owing to its two-phase based on strict standards and further political selection, is most 
adequate in terms of both regulation and practice since it takes into account the twofold role of 
top officials and civil service or public administration as a whole. But in relation to a higher level 
of professionalization, the OECD comparative survey (Meyer-Sahling, 2009) underlines the im-
portance of defining top positions in PA as professional positions with only the very highest 
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of ensuring a professional selection of the highest administrative managers. 
For the latter the Act provides an open competition, particularly among the 
highest officials by adopting obligatory special criteria for their selection, 
combining professional knowledge and managerial competences, and furt-
her training and promotion. This applies to the positions specified by Article 
60 of the Civil Servants Act, such as directors-general, principals of bodies, 
and secretaries-general within the ministries, principals of government of-
fices, and principals of administrative units. All together, the Act applies to 
around 150 official positions. In reality, these intentions have been realized 
only partially (more in korade Purg in kovač & Virant, 2011, and compara-
tively in Meyer-Sahling, 2009: 21, 33). Despite a strong tradition of apolitical 
PA, Slovenia regulates its system more openly by replacing certain circles of 
top officials, i. e. about 50%, hence converging merit and spoil models, which 
is close to the French and german systems. Namely, most competitions for 
the highest public management positions took place in the years following 
parliamentary elections and changes of government. The number of competi-
tions was extremely high in 2005 compared to other years, exceeding the ave-
rage by 80%; a rise of 45% above the annual average could also be observed in 
2009, and similarly in 2013. 
The politicization in appointing top officials in Slovenia is hence defini-
tely a (post)socialism relict despite other rather successful reforms within the 
civil service system. However, politicization in PA is inevitable; administra-
tion often interferes with political decision-making and politics (over)influ-
ences administrative operations but this leads to several dysfunctions of the 
being political appointments. Also, the Slovene Constitution states in Article 122: "Employment 
in the state administration is possible only on the basis of an open competition, except in cases 
provided by law.”  The competition procedure for the highest officials/managers is initiated by 
the principal of the future official. Candidates are first assessed in terms of formal requirements 
(e.g. education, work experience, special certificates); eligible candidates are then invited to ap-
pear before the special commission established for each competition separately, and comprising 
at least one member of the Officials Council, a representative of the state administration and 
an outside expert. The commission examines the candidates' suitability in accordance with the 
standards, i.e. in terms of work and leadership experience, professional knowledge in the field 
covered by the body in which the candidate is applying for the head post, and management and 
communication skills, whereby candidates are entitled to legal protection. Finally, the politically 
superior official (as a general rule, the Minister) can take advantage of his political discretion to 
choose from among suitable candidates the one with whom he wishes to collaborate. The candi-
date is appointed for a five-year term with possibility of re-appointment.
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system − from democratic deficit to unprofessionalism and lower effective-
ness (more in Peters & Pierre, 2005; cf. OECD, 1999: 21, on pursuing separa-
tion between politics and PA with its merit system) − so there is a search for a 
balance that still needs to be establishedin Slovenia in the future.
Overall, the Slovene reform in the field of civil service was mainly re-
gulatory driven with further organizational and managerial measures, e.g. 
introduction of schemes of job satisfaction or establishment of special Admi-
nistrative Academy (in 1997) as internal training unit. However, in practice, 
especially after 2009, the importance of continuing education and in-service 
training of civil servants has been underrated as proved by several analyses 
(korade Purg, kovač & Virant, 2011; cf. SIgMA Paper, No. 16, 1996). Today, 
the Academy acts mainly as a mediator between PA and private trainers in-
stead of a policy unit. Consequnetly, there have been rare systemic initiatives, 
like development of holistic model of competences in PA in 2008−2011, but 
later not put in force due to lack of resources to verify these skills and ele-
ments. In sum, it is not surprising to find in the 2015−2020 Strategy for Deve-
lopment of PA almost the same goals and activities as known but not realized 
through earlier strategies since the mid-2000s, for instance professionalism, 
anti-corruption, decentralization, privatization, rationalization, higher capa-
city, loyalty, etc. On the other hand, we can claim that for the Slovene system 
to be transparently regulated, sound grounds for further good governance-
oriented principles of development should be offered. 
Regarding development of integrity, the Civil Servants Act introduced 
specific principles to be respected by all servants and officials explicitly. The 
Act provides ten principles common to all civil servants in the public sector 
(Articles 7–15a; the principle of prohibition of harassment was added with 
a subsequent amendment to the Act, and five principles applying to officials 
performing authoritative tasks in state and municipal bodies (Articles 27–32; 
the principle of protection of professional interests was deleted with a sub-
sequent amendment to the Act). Moreover, national anti-corruption strate-
gies and bodies have been set up, such as the anti-corruption commission 
provided by the 2010 Public Sector Integrity Act. The Act binds all public 
bodies to act transparently and ethically, and provides procedures before the 
Anti-corruption Commission, if contrary. The law also protects against the 
whistle blowers. Since, especially officials act as an authority or public service, 
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their work is guided by public law, including ethical principles. A violation of 
these is therefore considered unlawful conduct rather than just bad practice − 
only moral and legal norms together make up the integrity of the official. For 
example, pursuant to the gAPA, an official who is not impartial may not par-
ticipate in administrative proceedings since this conduct – i.e. either refusing 
to recognize rights to a party whom the official is unfavorable to although the 
party meets the necessary conditions, or by recognizing excessive benefits 
contrary to regulations and public interest – is unethical as well as unlawful 
(kovač, 2012: 29). In this essence, the Officials’ Council adopted the Code of 
Conduct in 2011, in a form of ten guidelines, based on a two-year analysis of 
existing codes in individual parts of Slovene and other PAs in order to encou-
rage lawfulness and the respect for common good, and regulate the activities 
of Slovene officials in the European setting. However, not all guidelines can 
be regulated by the norms, therefore it is rather important for Slovenia also 
in the future, as emphasized among others by the Strategy until 2020, to de-
velop a doctrine of integrity, and train public servants to express honesty and 
service-oriented attitudes.  
8.2.4. Good Administration: Modernized Administrative                      
Procedures and Transparency  
As in the EU in general, also through PAR in Slovenia, a concept of good 
administration has been developed (Rusch, 2014; Venice Commisssion, 2011; 
Staskontoret, 2005; kovač & Virant, 2011: 208; cf. Art. 41 on the Right to good 
Administration of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). Even though it may be 
said for Slovenia that the process has been conducted rather unsystematically 
and, again, more regulatory-oriented. Slovene general Administrative Proce-
dure Act as an umbrella field law for efficient and democratic procedures was 
adopted in 1999, and later on was subject to several further amendments. The 
latter were mainly devoted to removal of administrative barriers under the EU 
recommendations but the major reform was not introduced insofar contrary 
to most other countries, in western as well as in Eastern and Southern Europe 
(cf. Rusch, 2014: 4; koprić et al., 2016). However, the gAPA has been recogni-
zed as a rather modern law, based on Austrian legacy, in compliance with the 
European principles and requirements, even though its scope, in Slovenia, is 
limited to unilateral administrative decision-making. Additionally, the admi-
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nistrative judiciary as well has been operating based on the long tradition ever 
since the creation of the independent state, initially under the general Supreme 
Court, and since 1998, as a specialized court (Administrative Court of the Re-
public of Slovenia) enabling better accessibility for the parties and more focus 
on administrative matters. Although the gAPA was adopted already in 1999, 
while the related Administrative Dispute Act (ADA), amended Constitutional 
Court Act, and Tax Procedure Act (TPA; covering the most regulated spe-
cial proceeding, and among other, also Civil Servants Act adopted in 2002), 
followed several years later, the remaining corpus of basic legislation concer-
ning administrative procedure in Slovenia is consistent with the provisions 
of gAPA and its subsequent amendments in terms of Europeanization. Thus, 
for example, the ADA (applyed since 1 January 2007) takes account of the 
need for prompt finality and enforceability of administrative law relations, and 
upgrades the gAPA with the principle of two-level decision-making pending 
finality, thereby limiting the appeal in administrative dispute exclusively for 
the protection of constitutional rights and freedoms and the establishment of 
a different state of affairs in court (Article 73 of the ADA). In terms of reaso-
nable time for decision, the provision of the same Act is rather crucial, stating 
that the appellant may invoke administrative silence regardless of the possible 
continuous performance of procedural actions before the administrative bo-
dies if within three years no final administrative decision on the merits or no 
order to suspend the procedure has been issued (Article 28(3) of the ADA). 
Moreover, the Access to Public Information Act was enacted in Slovenia 2003, 
even broadening its scope in 2015.
The gAPA and related laws (ADA, TPA) in Slovenia have, however, al-
ways been integrated into, or at least mentioned in, the strategic documents 
concerning reforming public administration issued between 1996 and 2015, 
yet almost always only on the declaratory level and have never featured as a 
pillar of development (kovač & Virant, 2011: 202; kovač et al., 2012: 57). The 
greatest emphasis on the significance of administrative procedural law in this 
context was given by the 1996 Parliamentary Strategy aimed at reforming the 
Slovene public administration to meet the requirements of EU membership 
which defined the revision and adoption of the Slovene gAPA as a foun-
dation of the democratic protection of individuals against the possible abuse 
of power (on the latter aspects see Ziller and Craig in Peters & Pierre, 2005: 
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261, 271). Subsequently, the reforms mostly involved debureaucratization of 
regulations, for instance simplified notification or reduced legal remedies. On 
the contrary, some amendments even increased the level of rights of parties, 
such as the guarantee of the participation of interested parties, or the increa-
sed right of access to one’s file and access to public information.  
Administrative procedure codification has been characteristic of the cur-
rent Slovene territory since 1923 with a common heritage of Austrian law of 
1925, old Yugoslav law of 1930, and Yugoslav gAPA of 1956. However, no radi-
cal improvement was introduced comparing present law to these, except some 
minor simplifications. One of the reasons for this is also a successful realization 
of several organizational measures over the last 15 years with no re-regulation 
required to comply with the EU standards, such as data exchange within public 
databases, a one-stop-shop in some fields or developed e-government (more in 
Aristovnik et al., 2016: 93, 111 et seq.). The degree of protection of the parties’ 
rights has been traditionally high in Slovenia − with some gaps in practice, 
such as often excessive long proceedings. On the contrary, the need for (more) 
efficiency in the administrative procedure and work of public administration 
in general has been stimulated in Slovenia over the past few years mainly by 
the economy, either in the pursuit of greater national competitiveness, or in or-
der to overcome the impacts of the economic crisis. Compared to the previous 
regulation, the modifications introduced by the new gAPA since April 2000 
included, for instance redefinition of the basic principles (e.g. added discretion, 
supplementary examination of the party, definition of legal interest, suspended 
efficiency, transfer of completeness and finality, and use of language as a rule, 
new principle: the duty to tell the truth and fair exercise of rights); determina-
tion of the (date of) beginning of the procedure and the procedural conditions 
for such; encouragement of participation of all persons with the status of party 
(including accessory participants and representatives of public interest) in the 
procedure; reduction of legal remedies (appeal and extraordinary remedies) 
and the reasons for that in order to improve legal certainty. The amendments 
adopted in 2002–2013 furthermore focused on the reduction of administrati-
ve burden, such as exchange of information from official records held by the 
administrative bodies (2002); introduction of e-communication (2005); redu-
ced deadlines for legal remedies (2005); more efficient delivery (2008); incre-
ased competences of the internal administrative inspection (2010); etc. There-
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fore, we can claim to have traditional protection of public interest and rights of 
the parties implemented, but in a rather formal way. Additionally, many effecti-
ve and innovative approaches have been regulated already since 1999, such as 
the mutatis mutandis application of the gAPA in the delivery of public services 
and special administrative enforcement, which, inter alia, reduces the need to 
re-codify the general law, and enact special rules. On the other hand, present 
regulation in place overprotects the rights of parties, and rather neglects the 
efficiency of administrative procedures as a whole (kovač & Virant, 2011: 198; 
cf. koprić et al., 2016). 
However, according to the Constitution, the rights and obligations of in-
dividuals, particularly in their relations toward the authorities when interfering 
with the legal positions of the parties, can only be regulated by the law and not 
by a minor regulation as only in this manner it is possible to achieve the pre-
dictability of relations (the rule of law), and perform a review of the constitu-
tionality or legality of a regulation. The tendency of sector-specific (subsidiary) 
regulations that interfere with the status of the parties in individual administra-
tive cases, as above, needs to be therefore critically evaluated, mainly because 
of their inconsistency with the gAPA when a different regulation is neither 
necessary nor justified. Over the last few years (of economic crisis), such at-
tempts have been quite frequent in Slovenia (kovač & Virant, 2011: 205), and 
were triggered by political pressures to shrink administration and by the need 
for an easier implementation of the rights of providers of economic activities 
(cf. OECD, 2014). Hence, when re-regulating through debureaucratization, 
one has to bridge the dilemma between efficiency (in economic terms) and 
lawfulness in order to realize good administration (kovač et al., 2012: 38). This 
arises also from statistical data. Namely, around 10 million first-instance admi-
nistrative decisions are issued every year in Slovenia, 3% of which are challen-
ged by the appeal in administrative procedure. A further share of completed 
administrative acts – up to 4,000 per year – is challenged in administrative 
dispute, while the parties file around 500 constitutional complaints against fi-
nal decisions in administrative matters; the number of appeals and suits varies, 
yet slows down over time. The success of the parties is, of course, much more 
modest – empirical data show that at all levels of legal protection approx. 20% 
of appellants or plaintiffs succeed. The main message of European- related (and 
not just the EU) changes must therefore remain to pursue the balance or duali-
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ty of guarantees, both of public interest and the rights and legal interests of the 
parties and interested persons (Statskontoret, 2005: 78).  
To sum up, a new gAPA in Slovenia is required to continue a high level of 
protection of fundamental democratic principles but to support more towards 
the parties-oriented PA conduct while simultaneously ensuring efficient public 
policies. This law should be much shorter (presently with over 300 articles) 
and balanced, with a main benefit to broaden its scope according to most Eu-
ropean countries (see Hofmann et al.,  2014) to administrative legislation and 
administrative contracts. It should pursue modern institutes, such as alternati-
ve dispute resolution. It might also incorporate overall legal protection, judicial 
too, as in the Netherlands. Such a model would (see more in kovač, et al., 2012: 
57–60) preserve the traditional foundation of administrative procedure, i.e. ba-
lanced protection of the parties’ rights and public interest, and simultaneously 
represent the driving force of modernization of the Slovene PA.
Regarding transparency, the access or right to information is a funda-
mental principle in a democratic society as stipulated also in the Article 42 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In the respective area, the degree 
of awareness of the need for an open and good administration governance 
is rather high in Slovenia, taking into account the EU guidelines, yet regu-
lation alone does not suffice, and should be thus followed by effective im-
plementation to overcome still undergoing processes of Europeanization and 
(post)transition (Pirc Musar in kovač & Virant, 2011: 230).42 It has been pro-
ven (cf. Statskontoret, 2005: 35–43, OECD, 2014: 29, 60) that selected proce-
dural institutions particularly contribute to “real” transparency. They are all 
guaranteed in Slovene law, such as time limits (to reveal the information in 20 
days), and an appeal to an independent body (e.i. Information Commissioner 
in Slovenia since 2003 as a kind of special ombudsman) with judicial review 
(in administrative dispute).
In Slovenia, the access to one’s file as regulated by the gAPA (1999) ispa-
rallel to the Right to Information Act (RTI Act; 2003), providing grounds for 
a substantive right to access public information. Such a “double” protection 
42  In general, the problem of (non) implementation of open democracy is particularly topical in 
countries burdened by the legacy of a captured state with no true participation, and economic 
transition. Yet the culture of openness and transparency is developing in this region based on the 
EU impact (Agh, 2013: 6, 11; kovač, 2015: 186).
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derives from the Constitution and fundamental administrative principles as 
set by State Administration Act, Civil Servants Act, etc. (kovač, 2015: 194). 
The purpose of the gAPA is to inform the party – i.e. the person who’s right, 
legal interest, or obligation toward the authority is being decided on in the 
procedures – on the grounds for decision. The competent body must there-
fore assess legal interest and related rights on a case-to-case basis under the 
concept of subjective affectedness. Yet the restrictions may only relate to the 
method of access, not the actual familiarization with the relevant procedural 
documents, and an explicit legal basis should be provided for exceptions. Li-
kewise, a recognized right should not be restricted beyond the purpose in a 
disproportionate manner (e.g. in relation to costs). Quite different is the right 
of access to public information; according to the RTI act, given the ultimate 
purpose which is to ensure openness, and thus prevent any abuse of authori-
ty and responsibility, the party is not required to demonstrate legal interest. 
However, the statistics show that there is an implementation gap regarding 
the latter, indicating approx. 50% of all appeals are made to the Information 
Commissioner‘s Office due to silence of liable administrative bodies. Legally 
speaking, a radical shift could be achieved with an integral understanding of 
the rights concerning information. In the future, it would be reasonable to 
combine the detailed, and almost formalistically defined systems of rights of 
the parties in administrative procedures to access the file of persons requiring 
public information into a single basic principle of the right to know (kovač, 
2015: 196; cf. Statskontoret, 2005; Hofmann et al., 2014). In this regard, over-
detailed codification of administrative procedures and freedom of expression 
have a counter-productive effect, especially when combined with too formal 
culture (kovač & Virant, 2011: 220; cf. Bevir et al., 2011: 287). More focus 
should be placed, de lege ferenda, on proactive openness, broader participa-
tion of several participants in the procedure, individual accountability, and 
service-mindedness in general (Pirc Musar in kovač & Virant, 2011: 237).
In the future, it must be recognized that, in Slovenia, especially trans-
parency and administrative procedural law should not be underestimated 
as a part of the overall functioning and modernization of PA. Namely, it re-
presents a key business process as a basic function of state administration, 
municipalities, and all fragmented bearers of public authority. Also, defining 
the regulation of administrative procedural law together with the rational or-
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ganization of public administration and the public servant system as a sound 
reform, it largely implies the exercise of constitutional safeguards (cf. Peters & 
Pierre, 2005: 260; Statskontoret, 2005; koprić, 2012; Aristovnik et al., 2016). 
In this respect, this area need definitely more attention in future PAR in Slove-
nia, both in more proactively defined regulation as in more efficient practice. 
Therefore, the plans, as laid out in the 2020 Development Strategy addressing 
administrative procedures only as a part of deregulation efforts, do not suffice 
neither in contextual sense nor in terms of their role within PAR.  
8.3. Conclusion 
Slovenia was historically a part of several different countries, mainly 
within central Europe, and in the period of 1945−1991, within the former 
socialist Yugoslavia. In this respect, it differs from majority of other Eastern 
European countries (together with Croatia) since it is characterized by ger-
man-Austrian-oriented culture and “soft” form of communism compared to 
the Soviet satellite countries. Consequently, it is usually established that, in 
public governance, Slovenia (and Croatia) presently face a combination of 
german traditional values and post-socialist (rather than post-communist) 
transitional elements. In both areas, respective characteristics can be evalua-
ted as positive than rather negative in terms of good governance and Europe-
an convergence. Namely, due to german legacy, rule of law is highly regarded, 
however, presenting itself not rarely in a form of (excessive) legalism and for-
malism. Socialism, on the other hand, introduced still a vivid capture of the 
state and lack of strive for efficiency in public management but offered more 
flexible approaches in public administration. 
Slovenia is a typical Central and Eastern European country facing a 
mixture of its own specifics due to certain cultural legacies and radical chan-
ges aimed to internalize the European standards and principles in its public 
governance and administration. Consequently, we can identify radical chan-
ges of previous governance approaches due to internal incentives but mainly 
based on Europeanization process in a decade since the mid-1990s. However, 
there were and still are certain implementation gaps from the start, parti-
cularly in the areas requiring political consensus and democratic change as 
opposed to technical and operational measures. Nowadays, we can also detect 
some steps backwards if we compare aims and results of reforms after the first 
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years of full membership in 2004. Both side effects reveal the necessity for a 
further systematic top-down led strive for contemporary understood good 
Europeanization combining national specifics (e.g. its small size) and gover-
nance modes as pursued at a European level. 
Moreover, it can be easily argued that fiscal crisis also substantially 
contributed to the changed modus of public governance in the country, 
where pre-crisis logic of decentralization and competition introduction 
was replaced by increased coordination, centralization, and politicization of 
decision-making. This evidence can further be supported with the lack of 
decentralization initiatives, including the introduction of the second tier of 
sub-national government as well as with the deagenticifation, although only 
modest, that occurred in the last 4 years. 
As for the future, if Slovenia is to pursue continuous system develo-
pment, overall strategic orientation should be designed based on the vision of 
the role of Slovenia within its national society and international environment. 
The development of public administration through good governance princi-
ples opens new possibilities for further development of Slovene democracy as 
well. As we can observe, the dynamic perspective is particularly viable, the-
refore we should be focusing more on improving efficiency of governmental 
policies and decision-making as well as on operating framework as they are 
acting as one of the most important inhibitors in achieving national competi-
tiveness. Besides achieving a better balance between legalism and manageria-
lism that should be found through participative inclusion of different societal 
groups, the decision-making process itself should be streamlined and more 
strategically oriented. 
To finalize, as the evidence stated above might suggest, the following 
can be observed among others. First, fiscal crisis has changed substantially 
the modus operandi of the government as austerity and cutback manage-
ment practices started to prevail from 2009 onwards. Typically, this has in-
creased pressures towards recentralization and coordination in political de-
cision-making, sharply redefining public governance practices. Second, the 
cross-national evidence might indicate that the quality of PA might be getting 
worse, in particular, if we observe its perceived contribution to the national 
competitiveness, therefore clear reforms of decision-making mechanisms in 
particular are needed. 
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9. Reform of the Croatian Public Administration: 
Between Patchy Europeanization and Bumpy 
Modernization
Ivan Koprić
9.1. Introduction
Croatia is a relatively small country situated between Central and Sout-
heast Europe, i.e. in the north-western part of the Balkan Peninsula. It en-
compasses the area of 56,594 km2 in three geographical and climate zones, 
i.e. Pannonian Plains, Adriatic coastal zone, and mountainous area of Dinaric 
Alps lying in between the first two. Croatian Adriatic mainland coast is rather 
long – 1,777,3 km. Croatia‘s territorial waters encompass 18,981 km2 with 
1,246 islands and islets. The neighbouring countries are Italy (sea border), 
Slovenia, Hungary, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The population has been in decline after the census of 1991 when it peaked 
at 4,784,265 inhabitants. The next two censuses have shown a drop to 4,437,460 
in 2001, and 4,284,889 in 2011. Real urbanization rate is 53.6% (DZS, 2011: 19). 
Majority of inhabitants are Croats (90.4%), and the largest national minority 
are Serbs (4.4%). Other minorities are Bosniaks (0.7%), Italians (0.4%), and 
Roma (0.4%). There is a growing group of inhabitants who perceive themselves 
as Istrians, i.e. Istrian regionalists (0.6%), although the “Istrian” nation does 
not exist. The largest religious group is Catholics (86.3%), while Orthodox po-
pulation has a share of 4.4%. The average age of population is continuously 
growing, ranging from 30.7 years in 1951 to 41.7 years in 2011. 
During socialism, Croatia was one of the federal units of the Socialist 
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. Although the regime was socialist, after 
the 1948 break with the Soviet Union, Tito’s leading group chose so-called 
third way. Such an orientation had internal and external consequences, ran-
ging from self-management and “soft” socialism within the country to the 
establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement and overall country’s openness 
in international relations.43 
43   The Non-Aligned Movement was established in Belgrade in 1961. Yugoslavia was one of the 
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The first free, multiparty democratic elections were held in the spring 
of 1990, and the democratic Croatian Parliament was constituted on 30 May 
1990. A referendum on independence was held on 19 May 1991, resulting 
in the declaration of independence on 25 June 1991. Croatia’s independence 
was recognised by the European Community on 15 January 1992. 
The Constitution of 1990 instituted a semi-presidential system with 
directly elected president of the Republic who had a very strong position 
following the model of the French Fifth Republic. The parliamentary system 
was introduced by the constitutional amendments of 2000. The Constitution 
retains directly elected President of the Republic, but his competences are 
significantly reduced. The Croatian Parliament (Sabor) has been unicameral 
since the Constitutional Amendments of 2001 which abolished the Cham-
ber of Counties. 
Croatia is a unitary State (Constitution, Art. 1) with three governance 
levels: national, mezzo (20 counties; županija), and the local levels (428 mu-
nicipalities and 128 towns, 17 of which have a special status of large town). 
The capital of Croatia, the City of Zagreb (790,017 inhabitants), has a spe-
cial status, having the competences of both town and county, and a signifi-
cant role in performing delegated state administrative tasks on its territory. 
Croatia is also divided into two statistical regions (Continental Croatia and 
Adriatic Croatia) for regional development purposes according to the Euro-
pean Union NUTS rules. 
Croatia became a member state of the United Nations in 1992, and the 
Council of Europe in 1996. It joined NATO in 2009, and became a European 
Union member state on 1 July 2013. Last decade has been characterised by 
increasing influence of the EU liberalization, commercialization, and priva-
tization policies regarding services of general interest. 
Croatia was hard hit by the global economic crisis in 2008. The largest 
gDP rate drop of -7.4 was experienced in 2009, followed by negative values 
until 2015 (-1.7 in 2010, -0.3 in 2011, -2.2 in 2012, -1.1 in 2013, and -0.4 in 
2014). In the period of 2008−2014 gDP dropped by more than 12%, and 
unemployment rate grew from below 9% to more than 17% with rather high 
youth unemployment rate. The employment rate fell to 57.3% in 2013. Since 
leaders of this network. The Movement tried to promote a middle course between the western 
and Eastern Blocks. 
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the beginning of the crisis, about 150,000 jobs have been lost. government 
debt increased during the same period from 38.9% to 85.1% of gDP. At the 
end of the crisis, in 2014, the share of persons at risk of poverty and social 
exclusion was extremely high − 29.3%. In the same year, total number of em-
ployed persons was 1,342,000. The prolonged recession lasted for six years. 
The beginning of economic recovery started only at the end of 2014, and is 
rather slow (EC, 2016; Petak et al., 2015).  
Croatia is in 50th place with score of 51 on the 2015 Corruption Percep-
tions Index list, improving its 67th place of 2004, when it was confirmed as 
an EU candidate country. In 2015, Croatia was ascribed UNDP’s Human 
Development Index of 0.818, and was placed in the 47th position on the list. 
gross domestic product per capita in 2014 was € 10,162. 
After presenting the basic data about Croatia, its complex history, and 
current societal environment are delineated in this chapter. The basic institu-
tions of the Croatian public administration are outlined and its post-1990s 
development is traced. Following the historical institutionalism pattern, four 
developmental phases are identified: establishment, consolidation, Europe-
anization, and modernization phases. Main problems and attempts to solve 
them are systematised and analysed in the next paragraph as the problems of 
orientation, organization, motivation, and implementation, along with the 
relevant reform attempts. 
The five main reform concepts and processes in Croatia are identified 
on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of empirical data, various previous 
project findings, and our own research: a) democratization and decentraliza-
tion, b) building transparent and open public administration, c) introducing 
modern human potential development and management, d) reforming ad-
ministrative procedures and strengthening legal protection of citizens, and 
e) experimenting with public management. 
Three potential scenarios of future development are conceptually 
straight modernization, inertia, and – the least probable – chaotic institu-
tional decline. The Croatian public administration reform has been con-
ducted in a patchy manner, although continuously under the notion of Eu-
ropeanization − a major part of dominant concepts is connected with good 
governance model with some elements of new public management. 
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9.2. Croatia as a Country Imbued with History
Having a highly complex history does not make Croatia an exception 
among European countries, but its case is somewhat more specific than expec-
ted. After the establishment of an early medieval Croatian state (845−1102), 
followed by a personal union with the kingdom of Hungary (1102−1526), 
it became a part of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1527. Not only was the Cro-
atian territory subjected to constant and serious Ottoman attacks, it was also 
used for the establishment of the so-called Military Border (Militärgrenze) 
and Military Zone. New settlers coming into this Zone, mostly migrants from 
Serbia and other areas conquered by Turks, were after some time granted 
autonomy with regard to the autonomous Croatian bodies (Sabor and Ban).44 
After political and administrative reforms during the second part of 19th 
century, Croatia gained certain internal autonomy within Hungarian part of 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Croatian autonomy was relatively limited, 
and its political position quite weak. Croatian regions were organized within 
the Austrian (Istria, Dalmatia, and Military Zone) and Hungarian parts of the 
Monarchy (Central and North Croatia, and most of Primorje). Croatian regi-
ons lodged to Austrian part of the Monarchy did not have any internal autono-
my. The majority of Croatian territories in the Hungarian part of the Monar-
chy had internal autonomy, while the city of Rijeka and some other territories 
were ruled directly by the Hungarian authorities. The efforts to integrate the 
Military Zone with the rest of the country finally ended in 1881. However, 
Istria and Dalmatia remained within the Austrian part of the Monarchy. 
The development within a large and complex monarchy that had a well-
known professional bureaucracy, cameralism as the dominant administrative 
doctrine, legalistic orientation in functioning of administration, and weak 
democratic standards had a deep impact on public administration in Croatia. 
The beginnings of professional administration date back to the period of po-
litical absolutism. The first, unsuccessful attempt to establish a professional 
administration in Croatia during the reign of Maria Theresa was paralleled 
by the feudal organization below the level of central government institutions. 
There were counties with aristocratic self-government, royal boroughs, and 
rural communes. 
44   One of the first important legal documents in that regard was Statuta Valachorum of 1630 issued 
by the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II. 
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A new attempt to create professional administration in Croatia was not 
made until one hundred years later, after the abolition of feudalism and the 
Revolution of 1848 that led to the reforms of Franz Joseph I. Counties and 
communes lost their feudal aristocratic autonomy during the wave of abso-
lutism led by the Austrian Minister of the Interior, Bach. A vertical line of 
administration was created: Croatian vice royal (Ban) government – coun-
ties – districts. The real commencement of professional state administration 
and modern local self-government in Croatia is connected to the reforms of 
Vice Roy (Ban) Ivan Mažuranić following the Austro-Hungarian Compro-
mise of 1867 and Croatian-Hungarian Compromise of 1868. 
After world war I, Croatia became a part of the kingdom of the Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenians. Some parts of the Croatian territory (Međimurje and 
some others) were returned to and merged with the newly established state. 
Dominant Serbian political forces managed to turn the country into a uni-
tary centralistic monarchy. After the royal dictatorship of king Aleksandar 
had been established in 1929, the country was renamed the kingdom of Yu-
goslavia. Yugoslavia was divided into nine large administrative provinces – 
banovina(s). Croatian territory was divided between two of those provinces. 
In 1939, Croatian and Serbian politicians agreed upon the establishment of 
Banovina Hrvatska, a political, administrative, and territorial unit within the 
kingdom of Yugoslavia that was projected to have a relatively high auto-
nomy in relation to the central government in Belgrade. However, it never 
came into function.45
During world war II, there was a collaborationist regime called the In-
dependent State of Croatia (NDH) led by Ante Pavelić. The main collabo-
rationist force was the Ustashe. However, as early as in 1943 the anti-fascist 
Yugoslav Partisan movement on the liberated Croatian territory (ZAVNOH) 
established a new Croatian government. Both authorities, those of the pu-
ppet NDH and ZAVNOH, continued to function until the end of the war. 
Affiliation to either Ustashe or Partisans incepted one of the main social and 
political cleavages in Croatia.    
The new Yugoslavia created after the world war II was a federation 
consisting of six republics. It managed to regain authority over the Croatian 
territories in the coastal zone, such as Istria, kvarner, and Zadar. Croatia 
45  The territory of Banovina Hrvatska included Croatia and large parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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was given the status of a federal republic and kept it until Yugoslavia’s dis-
solution. The provisions of the 1974 Constitution significantly strengthened 
that status. Along with the federative organization, the “new” Yugoslavia was 
characterised by a single-party system and an attempt at building socialism, 
which placed it among the socialist countries of Eastern Europe where the 
state was in charge of planning the economy, and the whole system was cen-
tralised and politically monopolised by the single party − the Communist 
Party.
what distinguished Yugoslavia from other socialist countries was an 
attempt to realise the concept of self-management. The state experimented 
with the idea of self-management in both economic affairs and territorial 
organization of the country. workers’ self-management was referred to as a 
kind of extremely developed type of industrial democracy. It was based on 
the concept of social ownership, which was considered to be “everybody’s 
and nobody’s”. The idea that those who worked simultaneously had a share 
in decision-making, i.e. that the workers managed their factories by them-
selves, displayed certain motivational effects. Although the economic system 
was based on planning, market rules gradually gained more space. Those re-
asons made economic development possible, even quite intensive and quick 
during some periods (Horvat, 1984). 
As far as territorial organization of the country was concerned, the idea 
of self-management was incorporated in the concept of commune. The no-
tion of commune as a basic territorial unit was formed on Marx’s glorifi-
cation of the 1871 Paris Commune as a prototype of ideal socialist political 
community (Šmidovnik, 1995: 153). The governance system in Croatia, si-
milar to the situation in other Yugoslav federal units, was locally oriented 
with strong, autarchic communes that provided a wide circle of public ser-
vices on their territory.
At the end of the 1980s, the political system in Croatia was not as rigid 
as in other Eastern European socialist countries. Its economy moved towards 
the world business processes, trying to experiment with market principles, 
and was familiar with strong elements of industrial democracy. However, 
the privatization that followed during the 1990s was unnecessarily harsh and 
non-transparent, and did not respect any peculiarity of the social ownership 
and self-management system.
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The constitutional position of Croatia and other federative republics in 
Yugoslavia was quite strong. The first multi-party elections of 1990 and the 
transfer of power to the winners passed peacefully. The new Constitution of 
the Republic of Croatia adopted at the end of the 1990s enabled transition 
to market economy and multi-party democracy, and granted a wide range 
of human and civil rights. Referendum on the independence of Croatia was 
held in May 1991. Those elements constituted a firm basis for the Croatian 
Parliament’s decision on independence and secession from other parts of 
Yugoslavia adopted on 25 June 1991. International community recognized 
Croatia at the beginning of 1992.
Transition to the new economic and political system happened under 
the complicated circumstances of intra-Yugoslav conflict between the re-
publics that were in favour of democratization led by Slovenia and Croatia, 
while Serbia was striving for domination over all Yugoslav federal republics. 
The war began in the summer of 1991, provoked by the aggression of the 
Yugoslav People’s Army and rebellion of the Serbian minority in the regions 
where the Serbs either were a majority of population or had a significant 
share in it. The war exhausted the country economically and politically, har-
ming the political democratization in the process.
The dominant governance concept during the 1990s was based on the 
paternalistic notion of the decisive role of a charismatic political leader. 
That notion was supplemented with the attitude that the majority had a full 
legitimacy and the right to make decisions by outvoting, regardless of the 
opinion of any minorities (national, political, social) and with the insistence 
on the principle of state sovereignty in its obsolete form. On the other hand, 
citizens’ patriotism was strongly stressed. The dominant type of culture was 
one of the unfavorable conditions that hindered further development of the 
new democratic institutions. Political, administrative, and general social 
culture was based on the authoritarian values (Pusić, 1992: XIV-XV; kasa-
pović, 1996: 153−178).
The 1990s were the years of strong etatization and centralization, whi-
le privatization was connected with general transformation of the former 
social ownership into either private or state ownership. In the public sec-
tor, privatization was delimited to certain services, like primary healthcare, 
telecommunications, or waste management, that followed the new public 
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management and EU privatization experiences. However, many services 
were retained in the public sector but under a strong control of central state 
bodies. Local government and its role in the service provision were signi-
ficantly weakened. There existed vivid remnants of public esprit de corps. 
The main circumstances that outline societal environment for the de-
velopment of the Croatian public administration are the following:
 − Croatia acquired independence after hundreds of years at the very 
beginning of the 1990s, which asked for and offered opportunity for 
building the whole public administration system in a modern way, 
 − Development has not started anew, since public administration in 
Croatia during socialism had significant constitutional, legal, orga-
nizational, and functional autonomy from federal (Yugoslav) bodies 
similar to other Yugoslav republics,
 − Certain important parts of state administration had to be developed 
from scratch, such as diplomacy, custom service, army, intelligence 
service, certain components of internal affairs, and police service, 
etc., 
 − Self-management political and social experiment in the “second” 
socialist Yugoslavia (1945−1990) raised consciousness about public 
value, social welfare, and public participation in political decision-
making, especially during the 1970s and 1980s,
 − Serb rebellion and war with the former Yugoslav Army and Serbian 
paramilitary forces postponed genuine democratization, and cau-
sed significant economic and demographic loses in the period of 
1991−1995, 
 − There has been a strong need to strengthen the private sector in the 
course of transition from so-called social ownership economy to 
market economy, 
 − Privatization of the former social ownership provided impetus for 
the introduction of the new public management doctrine in the pu-
blic sector,
 − Europeanization of public administration, meaning harmonization 
with the acquis communautaire, court, and soft EU law, and entrance 
into the European Administrative Space, have strongly emphasised 
the issue of good governance.
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9.3. Croatian Public Administration
9.3.1. Outline
The Croatian public administration consists of state administration, local 
and regional self-government, and public services (services of general interest). 
These three fields are regulated separately. Moreover, public services are regu-
lated in a fragmented manner by many sectoral laws. Apart from constitutional 
provisions, core public administration is regulated by two systemic laws, the 
Act on State Administration System (1993; 2011) and the Act on Local and Re-
gional Self-government (2001; previously Act on Local Self-government and 
Administration of 1992). The civil service system has been regulated by three 
main laws, State Servants Act (2005; previously the Act on State Servants and 
Employees of 1994 and 2001), Act on Servants and Employees in Local and Re-
gional Self-government (2008), and Act on Salaries in Public Services (2001).46 
There are two levels and four types of state administrative bodies. At 
the central level, there are ministries, state administrative organizations, and 
state offices of the government. There is also the government’s Office mainly 
functioning as the government’s secretariat with a rather weak position and 
narrow competences. The difference between the ministries and state admin-
istrative organizations is in political importance and political influence as the 
ministers are members of the government, and heads (ravnatelj) of state ad-
ministrative organizations are not. These two types of bodies are in a way suc-
cessors of former republic secretariats (transformed to ministries) and com-
mittees (transformed to state administrative organizations) from the social-
ist period. The state offices are in the closest relation with the government, 
serving as a tool for improving government’s efficiency. The smallest total 
number of central state bodies was 23 in 2003, while the largest number oscil-
lates between 30 and 35. Currently, there are 31 central state administrative 
bodies, 20 ministries, 4 state offices, and 7 state administrative organizations. 
A clear distinction between different types of organizations at the central level 
does not exist either in systemic legal regulation or in practice. All three types 
of organizations – ministries, state offices, and state administrative organiza-
tions – have similar types of competences, including public policies, drafting 
46  It only regulates the pay system in public services financed by the State Budget. 
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legislation, administrative supervision, etc. In practice, the decision about the 
number of types, number of organizations and their classification with regard 
to the types is mainly a political one.
There is a legal base for and widespread practice of establishing adminis-
trative organizations within the ministries and state offices. One type of such 
“organizations within organizations” has even been established and regulated 
by special laws, such as the Tax Administration Act, Police Act, Financial Po-
lice Act, etc. Another type has been established by the government’s decrees 
on internal organization of the ministries and state offices. Regular types of 
administrative organizations within the ministries are administrations, com-
mittees, and directorates, while sectors can be established within state offices. 
These “organizations within organizations” function in practice as pure internal 
organizational units within administrative bodies, except those that have been 
established by special laws – they are much larger, have greater importance, 
and a higher level of autonomy. when theoretical criteria apply (Verhoest, 
2012), some 20 type-1 agencies (without legal personality as the administra-
tive organizations with certain degree of managerial autonomy) can be identi-
fied within the Croatian state administrative system (government’s Offices and 
professional services, administrative organizations within state administrative 
bodies, state offices, and state administrative organizations).
There are many other bodies at the central level, such as executive and 
expert agencies, independent regulatory bodies, other public bodies, and legal 
entities with public competences. All of them may be subsumed under the no-
tion of public agencies.47 Some of the agencies have this notion in their official 
name (“agency for …”), while others are called institutes, funds, offices, cen-
tres, bureaus, etc. The process of agencification was at its peak in 2009 when 
87 public agencies were identified. In the 2010−2012 period, 19 agencies and 
similar bodies were abolished but 7 new were established (Musa & koprić, 
2011; Musa, 2014).48  
47   Current scientific research throughout Europe tends to use common classification of administrative orga-
nizations within national public administrations that has been developed in the course of a large scientific 
project by Sandra Van Thiel (see in Verhoest et al., 2012).   
48   The Ministry of Public Administration collected information about 173 (2012) and 176 (2015) 
public agencies and other more autonomous bodies (MABs; comp. Pollitt, 2004; Musa, 2014) on 
survey basis, trying to institute the de-agencification process. However, the results of rationali-
zation process are rather modest.  
349RefoRm of the CRoatian PubliC administRation: between PatChy euRoPeanization and bumPy modeRnization
On the first level, there are 20 deconcentrated offices of state adminis-
tration, one on the territory of each county, competent for the first instance 
administrative procedures and other administrative tasks. while these first 
instance offices have 91 branch offices and 302 register offices, central admin-
istrative bodies have 1,279 branch offices all over the state territory (Strategija, 
2015: 44).49 The practice of delegation of state administrative tasks to local gov-
ernments, although legally possible, is almost non-existent. The only local gov-
ernment granted with delegated state administrative tasks is the City of Zagreb, 
in which some ¼ of the city servants perform such tasks for the central state.  
The system of local and regional self-government consists of 428 munici-
palities, 127 towns (17 of them with over 35,000 inhabitants have a special sta-
tus of large towns), 20 counties, and the City of Zagreb (which has a twofold 
status of local and regional government). Municipalities in predominantly rural 
areas and towns in predominantly urban areas perform local affairs. Slightly 
less than 30% of population lives in rather small municipalities (2,964 inhabit-
ants in average). A bit more than 70% of population lives in towns (17,529 in-
habitants in average). There are 70.9% of local governments with less than 5,000 
inhabitants (18 towns and 376 municipalities). The second tier governments 
are counties (174,744 inhabitants in average, if Zagreb is excluded). Counties 
are autonomous second tier governments, strictly separated from the offices of 
state administration in terms of organization, finances, and personnel. Croatian 
local government system has been characterized by the fragmentation process, 
whose course may be observed from the data presented in Table 9.1.
Table 9.1: Fragmentation Process in Croatia 1991−2016
   Type 
Year Communes Municipalities Towns Counties Total Index
1991 101 - - - 101 -
1993 - 418  68 20+1 507 502
1998 - 420 122 20+1 563 111
2003 - 423 122 20+1 566 101
2006 - 429 126 20+1 576 102
2016 - 428 127 20+1 576 100
Source: Author.
49  About 65% of state servants and employees work in branch offices, while only about 35% work in 
central units of ministries and other state administrative bodies. Less than 4.5% of state servants 
and employees, i.e. 2,642 of them work in the first instance offices of state administration. 
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The majority of public services are centrally financed. These are education, 
health service, social security, culture, science, and the like. Some of the public 
services are locally financed, like, for example, pre-school education and kin-
dergartens, libraries and museums, utility services, etc. 
In the whole public sector, there are four categories of civil servants and 
other professionals whose status is regulated separately by a special legislation. 
There are approx. 59,500 civil servants and employees in the state administra-
tion, not counting the military and intelligence service personnel and police of-
ficers. In all local governments and counties, there are approx. 14,500 executive 
functionaries with professional status, civil servants, and employees. Centrally 
financed public services are employing about 180,000 people (including those 
in the agencies and other bodies), and locally financed public services addi-
tional 26,500. The fifth category in the public sector comprises the employees 
of public companies whose status is regulated by the Labour Act, e.g. in utility 
services, state oil company, state postal service, state electric power industry, 
and the like. Total number of public personnel is shown in Table 9.2. 
Table 9.2: Number of Personnel in the Croatian Public Administration, 2016
Employed personnel in various parts of 
public administration Number of employed persons 
State administration 59,500 
Public agencies at the national level 5,00050
Local governments 14,500
Centrally financed public services 180,000
Locally financed public services 26,500
Total 285,500
Source: Author.
9.3.2. Development
The development of Croatian public administration can be systematized 
in four phases (described below). The first, establishment phase started with 
independence gained in 1990 and finished with administrative reforms in 
1993, when the second (consolidation) phase began. The third phase started 
in 2001 and was initiated with a new package of reform measures motiva-
ted mainly by political decision to enter the process of Europeanization. The 
50  An assessment. 
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adoption of the first Strategy of State Administration Reform in 2008 denoted 
instigation of the new, fourth phase − the phase of modernization of Croatian 
state administration.
•	 Establishment Phase
The Constitution of 1990 introduced a semi-presidential system based 
on the French model. The government was appointed by directly elected pre-
sident of the Republic, and was accountable to him and to the Parliament. 
Before the first significant reform of the territorial administrative system, 
which took place in 1993, the development of Croatian state administration 
had been characterized by a number of frequent changes, and poorly con-
ceived and executed reorganizations. The frequency of such reorganizations 
was caused by the necessity of creating new administrative organizations in 
a new State (foreign affairs, defence, customs service, etc.), and by political 
contingencies in governance system which was not fully stabilized. At the end 
of the socialist period, local units in Croatia were large monotypic communes 
with 42,339 inhabitants in average, having a substantial decision-making au-
tonomy, a very wide scope of affairs, and high financial share in public reve-
nues and expenditures (more than 40%). At the beginning of the 1990s, such 
strong communes either became the central government’s obedient servants, 
or established themselves as the focal points of a strong opposition, even re-
sistance to the central government (almost all communes with Serbian ma-
jority). The Serb rebellion and war started in 1991. Rigorous screening took 
place in the civil service based on political, national, and similar criteria, and 
subsequent hidden lustration changed the picture in the whole public sector.51 
•	 Consolidation Phase
From 1993 to 2001, public administration in Croatia faced etatization, 
centralization, and politicization of an authoritarian type. An ever-increasing 
number of civil servants, insufficient level of professionalism, and politici-
zation of civil service additionally encumbered the situation. Democratic po-
litical values were repressed, public policies weak, and the rule of law was 
endangered. The lack of coordination in the administrative system was com-
pensated for by arbitrary, ad hoc political interventions. governance system 
was closed and bureaucratised, imbued with the climate of secrecy.
51   Approx. 20% of state civil servants were replaced with newcomers as well as about 10% of people 
in public services (koprić & Marčetić, 2000).
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The first systemic law that regulated state administration was the Law on 
the System of State Administration of 1993. It determined the ministries, state 
administrative organizations, and county administrative departments as the 
state administrative bodies. A large proportion of public services provided 
in the communes as the powerful local governments until the end of 1992 
were taken over by the central state bodies. It was a massive etatization, i.e. a 
process in which the central state appropriated public services from the for-
mer local self-government units, followed by a tremendous redistribution of 
public revenues, responsibility, significance, and power.  
The reform at the local level was carried out in 1993 through the Law on 
Local Self-government and Administration, and certain other laws. The old 
French centralistic model of state organization with a strong position of cen-
tral executive was literary transplanted to Croatia in its most important cha-
racteristics. The key role in the new system was given to the county level as a 
supervisory, and decreeing middle level between the central government and 
local units. The most powerful official was county governor, who was central 
state representative in the territory of the respective county approved by the 
president of the Republic on the proposal of the government (for details see 
koprić, 2010a: 110−111).52 
The State Civil Servants and Employees Act of 1994 regulated their status 
for the first time after the Croatian independence. The Act on the Salaries of 
52   In comparison with other states on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Croatia went through 
the most intense fragmentation process, increasing the number of local governments five times 
(from 102 to 556; 392% increase) and introducing counties as the second tier governments. In 
the group of former Yugoslav countries that went through the fragmentation process in the 
period 1990−2016 are also Slovenia and FYR Macedonia. Slovenia increased the number of 
local governments 2.5 times (from 62 to 212; 241.9% of increase), and Macedonia for 1.5 times 
(from 34 to 84; 147.1%; Macedonia had 123 local governments in the period of 1996−2003 
but then reduced their number to 84). In the group of countries with moderate increase of the 
number of local governments are kosovo with 40.7% and Bosnia and Herzegovina with 30.3% 
increase. Montenegro with increase of 15% and Serbia with increase of 6.1% have experienced 
only a mild fragmentation. The largest average size of local governments is at kosovo (about 
58,900 inhabitants) and in Serbia (about 55,800 inhabitants). Local governments in Macedo-
nia and Montenegro have about 27,000 inhabitants, and those in Bosnia and Herzegovina have 
about 26,400 inhabitants in average. The smallest average size of local governments is in Slovenia 
(about 9,700 inhabitants) and in Croatia (about 7,700 inhabitants) (calculated on the basis of 
data in Osmanković, 2015). Only Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have established second 
tier governments. In Bosnia and Herzegovina they are called cantons (10 of them), and only in 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina they were estalished as one of the three federal units. 
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Civil Servants and Employees in Public Services was passed simultaneously. 
Before that, the provisions of the Administration Act of 1978, which regu-
lated civil servants’ status, applied on the Croatian state and local servants 
“accordingly”. Local civil servants remained in the same position during the 
period 1994−2001, since the laws of 1994 did not regulate their status. The 
number of employees in certain public services (research and development, 
culture, sport, art and media, health care, welfare and education) decreased at 
the beginning of the 1990s, while defence, police, finances and foreign affairs 
recorded a considerable increase of their personnel.53 
•	 Europeanization Phase
The Amendments to the Constitution of 2000 were adopted following 
the first political change after 1990. They were prepared by the new, coalition, 
left-centre government of Ivica Račan, and marked the beginning of the de-
mocratization and decentralization processes. The previous semi-presidential 
system was substituted with the parliamentary one. Harmonization with the 
European Charter of Local Self-government began three years after its ra-
tification in 1997. The Constitution guaranteed transfer of many significant 
public affairs to local governments and counties. The lines of subordination of 
local governments to the central bodies were cut off by redefining the institu-
tion of the county governor, and limiting or specifying the powers of the state 
administrative bodies over local self-government. County governor became 
local official elected by the county assembly. 
The first instance county administrative departments (175 of them) were 
merged, and reorganized to only one state administrative office per county. 
The number of state servants was reduced, particularly in defence, internal 
affairs, and in the first instance state administrative offices. The status of state 
civil servants was regulated by the State Civil Servants and Employees Act of 
2001. The main intention of that Act was to replace the former career system 
with the classification according to job complexity − at least formally. 
Croatia was a latecomer to the Europeanization process, which started 
53   There were 72,421 people in the army and police in 1998, counting for 7.20 % of the employed 
working force in the country. The whole public administration employed 243,983 people in the 
same year, while only 45,659 civil servants and employees were employed in the state (civil) 
administration. The employed working force in the country amounted to about 1,005,500 peo-
ple. The most tragic situation was in research and development, where the number of employees 
in the period 1990−1996 decreased to 47.1 per cent (koprić & Marčetić, 2000). 
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only in the third phase. By that time, the majority of former socialist countries 
had already advanced deep into that process. The first significant formal step 
in Europeanization was signing of the Stabilization and Association Agree-
ment in 2001. Croatia was granted the candidate country status in June 2004, 
a month after the accession of 10 transition countries. The negotiation pro-
cess was completed in summer 2011, after six years. The accession contract 
was signed at the end of 2011, and Croatia became the 28th member state on 
1 July 2013. The referendum on the EU accession was held in January 2012. 
There were 66.3% of citizens in favour of accession, but turnout was relatively 
low, only 43.5% of the electorate. 
One of the numerous tasks during the accession process was harmoni-
zation of domestic legal system with the EU acquis communautaire. The who-
le governance system dealt with this huge task. As many as 523 laws (out of 
2,005, or 26.1%) were harmonized in the 2000−2011 period. Urgent legislati-
ve procedure with only one reading was applied in about 80% of all “har-
monized” laws, which was criticised by the OECD-Sigma and professional 
community (Vidačak & Škrabalo, 2014). 
A complex new institutional arrangement was established for accession 
negotiations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Sta-
te Delegation for Accession Negotiations, government’s Coordination for 
Accession Negotiations, Accession Negotiation Team and its Secretariat, wor-
king groups for all negotiation chapters (35 chapters; over 1,800 experts, one 
third of whom were not from public administration), Chief Negotiator and 
his Office, and National Committee for Monitoring Accession Negotiations 
participated in this new network.
Croatia’s progress in acquiring the European administrative standards, 
and building administrative capacities for effective implementation of the 
EU acquis communautaire was extensively assessed by the OECD-Sigma and 
the European Commission (koprić, 2014: 2−14). They both clearly stated 
serious reform problems and inadequacies in six regularly evaluated areas: 
democracy and the rule of law, civil service and administrative law, integri-
ty, public expenditures management and control, public procurement, policy 
making and coordination. Croatia was a carefully monitored country during 
the accession decade. The OECD-Sigma alone submitted and published more 
than 40 reports on the progress in various administrative fields. 
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The EU technical assistance, financial support, monitoring, and repor-
ting significantly supported many and considerable improvements of the 
Croatian public administration. The EU invested about € 1.6 billion in admi-
nistrative reform projects in Croatia (koprić et al., 2012: 267−271). During 
the same period, additional projects were financed by other international or-
ganizations, such as the world Bank or UNDP as well as by other countries 
through their international development organizations and funds (Denmark, 
the USA, the Netherlands, Sweden, the Uk, etc.). 
•	  Modernization Phase 
A sort of administrative modernization started parallel with Europea-
nization. Modernization is, according to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2003), one 
of the administrative reform strategies, different from maintenance, marke-
tization, and minimization. It intends “to make more fundamental changes 
in structures and processes, for example, by changing the budget process to 
an output rather than an input orientation; create new types of public sec-
tor organization, such as autonomous agencies; or change the employment 
contract for civil servants” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2003: 23). 
Although signs of modernization efforts may be found even earlier, a de-
cisive moment happened in March 2008 when the government adopted the 
Strategy of State Administration Reform for the Period of 2008−2011. Among 
particularly desirable and, in the long run, potentially most productive mea-
sures are those concerning administrative education and in-service training.54 
The indicators of implementation progress were broad and insufficiently pre-
cise, which makes the monitoring and evaluation of its implementation diffi-
cult. A body in charge of evaluation of Strategy implementation (the National 
Council for Evaluation of State Administration Modernization) was establis-
hed in autumn 2008, and dissolved in summer 2009 without any significant 
output. Many reform measures have been defined only on the normative basis, 
i.e. amendments to the existing regulations, and enacting new regulations were 
promised but the principles on which these regulations were to be based had 
not been established.55 There was neither financial plan nor funds for the im-
54   Many authors have stressed the importance of in-service training for the necessary change of 
administrative culture and public administration reform (see, for example, Rocha & de Araújo, 
2007: 588).
55  That enabled as many as about 40% of measures to be achieved in some 15 months, according 
to the official data of the then Central State Office for Administration. Official assessment of the 
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plementation of the Strategy. There was an attempt to amend the Strategy in 
2010 but it ended without results. At the end of the period, there was no further 
effort to adopt a new Strategy. Although the Strategy had only moderate influ-
ence (for detailed review see koprić, 2008a), it marked general modernization 
policy of the right-centre government of Ivo Sanader and Jadranka kosor.  
The new left-centre government of Zoran Milanović, elected in 2011, 
was rather reluctant to prepare a new strategy of public administration re-
form. However, after long preparation, in June 2015 Croatian Parliament 
adopted the new Strategy of Public Administration Development for the 
period of 2015−2020, mainly because of the EU pressure. However, some 
participation of interested civil society organizations and representatives of 
academia in preparation of the Strategy was provided. The new strategy co-
vers not only state administration, as the previous one, but also public agency 
model at the central level, and the local self-government system. Public servi-
ces are still not included. It contains 17 goals with regard to better provision 
of administrative services, development of human potentials, and improved 
system of public administration. As many as 42 serious reform measures have 
been programmed for their implementation. 6 additional measures have been 
programmed, and a special institutional arrangement was invented for the 
Strategy implementation. The first Action Plan for the Strategy Implementa-
tion in the Period 2015−2017 was adopted by the government in September 
2015. The end of mandate prevented the government from starting a real 
implementation process, and even an institutional arrangement for imple-
mentation was not established.    
After the parliamentary elections in November 2015, the government of 
Tihomir Orešković was elected in the Parliament in January 2016. Instead of 
Strategy implementation and regardless of the 2015 Action Plan, the new go-
vernment adopted the Decision on Implementation of Reform Measures for 
Improving System of Public Administration in February 2016. This Decision 
Ministry of Public Administration included in the text of the new 2015−2020 Strategy stressed 
that about 89% of all reform measures were implemented, partly implemented, or in the course 
of implementation at the moment of the new Strategy adoption (Strategija, 2015: 4). Criticism 
on the formal normative approach and excuses can be found not only in academic papers but 
also in the Ombudsman’s Annual Report of 2009 (Pravobranitelj, 2009: 107): “It seems that there 
is expectation according to which new legislation might in itself prevail over all weaknesses in 
the system that cause the problems.”
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reduced the number of reform goals to three: a) efficient and citizen-orien-
ted public administration, b) development of human potentials for efficient 
public administration, and c) quality of ICT-supported administrative servi-
ces. Three different commissions were established for coordination of reform 
activities: a) commission for modernization of public administration system, 
b) commission for development of human potentials in public administra-
tion, and c) commission for improving ICT support to public administration. 
Because of the internal governing political coalition’s reasons, the Ministry 
of Public Administration with the minister from a minor coalition partner, 
lost the leading position in the reform process. The Ministry preserved its 
influence only in regard to overall administrative modernization. However, a 
few months later the Parliament passed a vote of no confidence in the govern-
ment, and new elections were scheduled for September 2016, thus aborting 
the government’s public administration reform efforts.       
9.3.3. Main Problems and Attempts to Solve Them
Croatian public administration has been burdened by numerous com-
plex problems requiring solutions that meet high standards, firm and com-
mitted pro-reform leadership, and professional monitoring and evaluation of 
reform implementation. The main problems may be systematized into four 
groups which tackle orientation, organization, motivation, and implemen-
tation. Many other administrative problems can be added, witnessing that 
this simple classification may be used only as an initial analytical tool for the 
analysis of current situation. 
•	 Orientation Problems
A traditional opinion inherited from the earlier non-democratic systems 
that politics and politicians exclusively look after public affairs and take care of 
public interest has led to great deficiencies in the capacity of public adminis-
tration to formulate a long-term public interest. This interest goes far beyond 
a single political mandate and needs to be defined on the basis of a well-esta-
blished and informed strategic planning (extensively in Brusis et al., 2007). 
The data on which the strategic plans are based must be reliable, and the plans 
themselves professionally prepared. The strategies must have in-built mecha-
nisms of monitoring, control, and adjustment to changing conditions. Results 
have to be evaluated in a systemic manner. what seems discouraging in Cro-
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atia can be called the paradox of “glass-strategies”: having much more than 
a hundred formally accepted strategies in various fields and with regard to 
various issues and problems, the country is still lacking strategic plans of solid 
quality despite certain improvements. Strategic goals are not clearly establis-
hed, financial resources are not decided, performance indicators are vaguely 
defined, monitoring and control are either lacking or are defined in a forma-
listic manner, etc. Moreover, even when strategies are well designed, there is a 
significant lack of political will to support implementation of adopted strate-
gies.56 The first significant step in improving the capacity of strategic planning 
was made in July 2000 when the government’s Office for Strategy of Develo-
pment of the Republic of Croatia was established.57 Its main task in the period 
2000−2003 was to serve as the organizational support for the project “Croatia 
in the 21st Century”. The project gathered some 600 experts and resulted in 
the preparation of 19 strategic documents, out of which 9 were adopted by 
the Parliament (Boko et al., 2004). Further efforts regarding strategic planning 
were connected mainly with the EU accession. Based on the experience of the 
two functional review projects, which stated almost complete lack of strate-
gic goals and poor practice of strategic planning (koprić, 2006; Tišma et al., 
2012: 56), the Budget Act of 2008 obliged the ministries and other central state 
bodies included in the state budget to prepare three-year strategic plans. The 
practice of preparing such plans started in 2009, for the period 2010−2012, un-
der the guidance of the Ministry of Finance. Obligation of counties to prepare 
their development strategies was established by the Regional Development Act 
of 2009, and has existed from 2010 onwards. 
Closely linked to the problem of deficient strategic planning is the weak 
capacity of public administration to design high quality, long-term public 
policies. Public policies have been excessively influenced by day-to-day po-
56  Two strategies of public (or state) administration reform were adopted (2008, 2015) but a strategy of 
decentralization has not been prepared yet, although decentralization has been a topical issue since 
the end of the 1990s (for a plea for such strategy see Perko-Šeparović, 2010; comp. koprić, 2008). 
In spite of the importance of services of general interest for the community, economy, and quality 
of life, there is neither a general policy document nor any general regulation on the basic issues of 
public services. There are only sectoral strategic documents which are not coordinated at all. 
57  It continued to function until 2011 as the Central State Office for Development Strategy (2003−2006) 
and the Central State Office for Development Strategy and the EU Funds (2006−2011). In 2011, 
it was merged with the Ministry of Regional Development and the EU Funds. In such a way, it 
mainly lost its role as the government’s tool for coordinating strategic planning.  
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litical constellations58 without sufficient participation of civil servants, citi-
zens, civil society organizations, academia, experts, and other stakeholders. 
Political partisans’ “innovations” are dominant, while evidence-based poli-
cies and learning from the past policies are highly neglected (comp. Petak, 
2008: 449−451). Evaluation studies are missing.59 In order to improve the si-
tuation, the government adopted the Code of Practice on Consultation with 
the Interested Public in Procedures of Adopting Laws, Other Regulations 
and Policies in November 2009. The 2011 Regulatory Impact Assessments 
Act introduced obligatory public consultations for new regulations. Central 
Internet portal for public consolations has been functioning since spring of 
2015. Only 48 laws and regulations (1/3) underwent public consultations in 
the first year of application (2011), and 173 comments were received. In 2012, 
the number of regulations which were open for public consultation increased 
to 144 (4,786 comments received). The number increased further to 374 in 
2013 (12,738 comments), 544 in 2014 (18,767 comments), and 608 in 2015 
(15,411 comments). Other forms of stakeholders’ influence and participa-
tion are working groups for the preparation of documents and regulations, 
consultative meetings, public discussions, etc. The government’s Office for 
Associations collects data about these forms, and also prepares structured 
annual reports. Some of the local governments have started to use public con-
sultation in the preparation of local by-laws. what is still missing is improved 
possibility for citizens and other interested subjects to influence identification 
of public problems and agenda setting. Furthermore, what Petak, Bartlett and 
Bönker (2015) stated about participation of academic experts is valid gene-
rally: the citizen participation “is largely limited to the early phases of policy 
formulation, and does not extend to the final drafting of legislation, let alone 
the monitoring of implementation” (Petak et al., 2015: 20).
Public policies often reflect on legal regulation. In the beginning of the 
transition process, the preparation of regulations and law drafting had been 
58   Although since 2012 all government bodies prepare annual regulatory plans, there is a cons-
tantly decreasing rate of realization, from 37.6% in 2013 to only 10.7% in 2015, indicating the 
government’s fast changing political priorities (gLO, 2016). 
59   For example, no systematic official or scientific evaluation of the 2001 Decentralization Reform 
has been carried out in the last 15 years, although it was one of the biggest intended public go-
vernance reforms in Croatia. Lack of evaluative approach has been explicitly recognized in the 
2015−2020 Public Administration Development Strategy (Strategija, 2015: 5).
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seen as pure mechanic registration of ideas of politicians or members of di-
verse interest groups. Although the role of legal professionals has improved, 
such practice continues until today. Law drafting is a complex task since each 
new regulation must be adequately placed within the constitutional and legal 
system, harmonized with the European acquis and other standards, written 
according to the principles and canons of legal technique, armed with effici-
ent ways of application, etc. Their future impacts ought to be analysed (RIA 
− regulatory impact assessment). Unnecessary and obsolete laws and regu-
lations must be eliminated, which requires a continuous attention of those 
who prepare new regulations (deregulation). In Croatia, the quality of law 
drafting is still not an issue which would attract attention outside the legal 
profession. After a scientific conference devoted to the state of legal system, 
the Academy of Legal Sciences in its Statement of 11 June 2014 warned about 
many deficiencies, problems, and “crisis of the Croatian legal system” after a 
decade of harmonization with the European standards. The Academy prepa-
red and offered a project of improving the legal system and regulatory proce-
dures to the Croatian Parliament but it has never been approved. Although 
the pursuit of better regulation is a part of general pro-reform public sector 
endeavours (comp. Musa, 2011), moderate success has been achieved only 
with regard to regulatory impact assessment. An attempt to promote deregu-
lation can be noted but its results are rather limited. An ambitious project of 
regulatory guillotine (Hitrorez) started in 2006 with a significant support of 
international donors. The project was performed by the government’s Spe-
cial Unit for Simplification in cooperation with international experts. It las-
ted ten months after which the Unit made their recommendations. Several 
thousands of regulations were considered, but at the end only 706 of them 
were recommended to be abolished and 865 to be simplified, mostly those 
of minor importance. The government formally accepted 1,571 recommen-
dations, and established the Office for Regulatory Impact Assessment. After 
two years only, 366 recommendations were implemented (23.3%) and the 
new Office was abolished (Musa, 2011; Petek, 2009). The RIA Act adopted in 
2011 designated this task to the government Legislation Office. In addition 
to RIA, which has to encompass the assessment of impacts on the econo-
my, socially sensitive and other groups with special interests and needs, and 
on the environment and sustainable development, the government imposed 
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the obligation of assessing fiscal impacts of the new laws and regulations in 
2011. In 2012, the government adopted the Strategy of RIA and the Decree 
on RIA. Although the Legislative Plan requested that 61 laws out of 344 that 
underwent the legislative procedure in 2013 (17.7%) be accompanied by the 
RIA, the RIA was prepared for only 22 of them (6.4%), i.e. 33.4% of the laws 
planned for RIA procedure.60      
•	 Organization Problems
Despite several reform attempts, state administration is still burdened 
with many structural and organizational problems. The criteria for esta-
blishment of ministries, other types of central state bodies and public agen-
cies at the national level are non-existent. The State Administration Act is in 
both versions (1993; 2011) based on the traditional model of state adminis-
tration with big ministries whose number depends on ever-changing political 
will and the needs of coalition parties, some other bodies and agencies whose 
position is neither clearly defined nor is a result of a sound policy. Functional 
review, as a prerequisite for a more rational organization, was conducted in 
approx. a half of the state administration system (without agency model) in 
the mid-2000s but its results have never been formally adopted or implemen-
ted. Only a minor number of recommendations have inspired certain reform 
efforts but some of them have not been implemented successfully. One of 
them is the recommendation to widen the competences, strengthen the capa-
city, and reorganize the first instance offices of state administration in order 
to transform them and their branch offices (91 of them) into one-stop shops 
well prepared for reliable, fast, and integral provision of administrative ser-
vices to citizens. There was an attempt in that regard in 2014 which was po-
litically blocked by a small coalition partner (IDS) at the beginning of 2015. 
Simultaneously, the number of deconcentrated branch offices of various mi-
nistries, other administrative bodies, and public agencies exploded, causing 
harmful and irreparable consequences for coordination in implementation of 
public policies and state regulations, administrative control, and accountabi-
60   In his report, submitted on behalf of OECD-Sigma, based on 10 regulatory impact assessments 
analyses, Donelan (2014) stated the following: “None explained the problem to be addressed su-
ccinctly and none undertook a very satisfactory analysis of the costs or benefits of the different 
approaches. However, all of the RIAs undertaken followed the procedures laid down by the law. All 
made an effort to consider alternatives but quantification of alternative options were not addressed 
in a satisfactory manner.” Low quality of assessments was also noted in Petak et al., 2015. 
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lity (comp. koprić, 2015; for similar situation in Slovenia, see kovač, 2014). 
There is a special problem with organizational fragmentation of inspections 
− they are organized in as many as in 60 administrative fields, half of them in 
the central bodies, a bit fewer in fragmented branch offices of central bodies, 
and only 3 in first instance offices of state administration.       
The agency model still functions in a grey legal zone with huge institu-
tional and organizational obscurity (see Musa, 2013). There is not any pie-
ce of legislation which regulates public agencies in general. Despite certain 
warnings from the OECD-Sigma and the world Bank about the overlapping 
competences between ministries and agencies, weak administrative coordina-
tion, lack of accountability and poor agency performance, the first attempt to 
regulate the basic issues and overall position of public agencies was initiated 
by the Ministry of Public Administration only in 2012. The Ministry instigated 
the preparation of the new State Administration Act which was to regulate 
not only traditional administrative bodies but also public agencies and other 
forms of performing state administrative tasks (delegation, outsourcing, pu-
blic-private partnerships, etc.). However, except an agreement about the new 
concept among the respective expert working group, that legislative proposal 
has never been prepared. Because of the lack of establishment criteria, Cro-
atia experienced mushrooming of public agencies during the Europeanization 
phase as well as other problems, such as coordination with other parts of the 
public sector, poor functioning, wastefulness, miserable relationships with ci-
tizens and societal environment, etc. Their streamlining is still an open issue. 
The system of local self-government, suffering from conceptual inconsis-
tencies and organizational problems, fails to deliver an equal level of quality 
public services in cost-efficient manner. Huge differences in size and capacity 
of local governments cause significant regional and local disparities and de-
mographic problems (koprić, 2014a). The fact that most of the local govern-
ments are either small or very small opens the issue of economy of scale in a 
dramatic way (Jambrač, 2016). genuine regional governments have not been 
established, and counties function only as the second tier local governments, 
supplementing municipalities and towns with extremely weak capacities. 
Only a small number of towns, mainly large towns (those with more than 
35,000 inhabitants), and several municipalities are able to perform their local 
tasks on their own. Since counties are too small and financially weak, they are 
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not able to support regional development, although this is one of their main 
constitutional tasks. Support to regional development is centralised with the 
Ministry of Regional Development and the central Agency of Regional De-
velopment as the main institutions. Beside them, two statistical regions have 
been established (Continental Croatia and Adriatic Croatia) as the NUTS 
II units. Low capacity of local governments to absorb money from the EU 
funds hinders local and regional development (koprić, 2012; koprić et al., 
2014). On top of that, local governments have established about 4,300 forms 
of internal territorial decentralization (territorial committees, town districts, 
and city quarters) whose effectiveness in improving political participation of 
citizens is rather low (more in koprić & klarić, 2015).  
•	 Motivation Problems
The problems of civil service motivation are evident from local to na-
tional levels. It is ruined by deep politicization, insufficient knowledge about 
and usage of motivation tools (see for example Bregn, 2008), deficient profes-
sionalism of the civil service, and non-existent system of education for public 
administration, and authoritarian and bureaucratic culture.61
Deep politicization is a continuous feature and one of the main pro-
blems of the Croatian civil service. The problem has usually been approached 
in a formal manner, through amendments to the Law and reshapnig of the 
appointment procedure for managerial positions in public administration. 
One of the attempts was conducted in course of Europeanization under the 
pressure from the EU, when positions of assistant ministers, ministries‘ se-
cretaries, deputy heads and assistant heads of the state administrative organi-
zations, and some other positions in the Croatian state administration were 
“depoliticised”; on the grounds of the State Servants Act of 2005 political 
appointments in the period 2008−2011 were replaced with the public compe-
tition procedure. However, since the procedure remained completely in the 
government’s hands, and the professional and educational standards were 
diminishing, the real situation did not change significantly. In 2011, legal re-
gulation changed once again, introducing stronger influence of politics on the 
appointments to managerial posts in state administration. Moreover, amen-
61  Problems with motivation are not specific for Croatia. They are one of the public administration 
features in the western Balkans, South Eastern Europe, and beyond (koprić, 2009b; koprić, 
2012a; etc.).
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dments to the State Servants Act in early 2012s introduced political advi-
sors to the ministers. Although the Constitutional Court proclaimed these 
amendments unconstitutional at the end of 2015, similar regulation enabling 
employment of political advisors was once again proposed in spring 2016. 
Only political instability prevented reintroduction of this category into the 
Croatian state administration. Introduction of direct election of mayors in 
2009 triggered legal innovations in local self-government system that intro-
duced politicization of hitherto professional positions in local bureaucracy. 
The appointment procedure for managerial positions is only a pinnacle of 
the politicization problem in public administration. Much greater problems 
have been created by interfering of politics in everyday work of the civil ser-
vice (even in individual administrative cases), open political activities of civil 
servants, etc.
Politicization discourages professionalism of civil servants and devasta-
tes tiny administrative capacities. Fast promotion of the obedient and politi-
cally privileged servants sends a negative motivational message to the others. 
Education and competence turn out to be less important. Political criteria 
have sometimes been imposed even in access to professional training. Sound, 
coherent, and full-scale educational system for typical administrative jobs and 
positions at all levels, from clerks who carry out the administrative procedu-
re to public managers on highest positions does not exist (more in koprić, 
2013a; Marčetić et al., 2013). Classification of public administration studies 
within the category of vocational studies with continuous efforts to prevent 
public administration students from access to quality university studies cau-
ses long-term damage to the profession.62 The cooperation of public adminis-
tration with universities is weak, and the educational and research capacities 
of domestic administrative science have not been used. Many domestic and 
technical assistance projects have ended up without any impact on practice. 
The situation regarding competence and professional standards is not good in 
the state administration, and is even worse in local self-government. In-ser-
vice system is developing with moderate success. Instead of insisting on the 
quality and effectiveness of civil servants, the public discussion is focused on 
62   One of the most grotesque haps in the field is the Constitutional Court decision of 2016 initiated 
by the University of Zagreb, which prevents access of public administration students to postgra-
duate studies (after a five-year study), even to postgraduate studies in public administration. 
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their number and salaries.63 Human potential development and management 
system are developing slowly. 
The administrative culture is predominantly of an authoritarian and 
bureaucratic type (koprić, 1999; koprić, 2009b). It is still based on the cli-
mate of formalism, secrecy, obedience, resistance to changes, and evasion of 
responsibilities. Top-down approach without the initiative and innovation 
of civil servants cannot be a driving force of administrative modernization. 
In addition, governments that do not have partnership with citizens are an 
anachronistic deviation from the good governance concept.64 Efforts to im-
prove openness and transparency have changed the situation. Croatia beca-
me a member of the global Open government Partnership Initiative in 2011. 
Both the National OgP Council and the first ever Public Information Com-
missioner, appointed in 2013, have developed a lot of activities undertaken to 
fight against corruption as well as to open public administration and make its 
functioning more transparent.65
•	 Implementation Problems
The implementation of public policies is burdened by remaining unsol-
ved problems of legality, ethical problems, bureaucratic resistances, and ina-
dequate managerialism. Even the introduction of e-governance, which serves 
as an anchor of reliable, efficient, and effective implementation, carries the 
risks of petrification of administrative structures which still have not been 
rationalised. Sometimes the quality of information and communication equi-
pment procured is questionable as well as the quality of software, which is 
expensive and often prepared without sufficient knowledge about adminis-
63  However, low salaries and poor remuneration are a real problem in most of the countries in the 
region, including Croatia. Civil servants and HRM managers perceive it as one of the two or 
three most serious problems (koprić, 2009b). 
64   Previous Croatian Ombudsman had continuous problems with the Croatian government and 
the Parliament majority because he did not hesitate to criticize the members of the government, 
and stress the problems of politicization, corruption, lack of competence, and others. His annual 
reports for 2007 and 2008 were not accepted by the Parliament. Consequently, his position was 
undermined by the establishment of other, specialised ombudsmen (for disabled persons, for 
gender equality, and for children), by squeezing finances, not resolving problems with basic 
facilities, etc. (Pravobranitelj, 2009: 112−115).    
65  Despite these efforts and achievements, the IRM Progress Report for 2014−2015 states: “whi-
le significant progress was made in implementing the anti-corruption strategy and improving 
transparency processes in key sectors, access to information and open data reforms stalled due 
to a lack of political will.” (IRM Progress Report, 2016: 2).
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trative processes. On top of that, interoperability and digital divide are very 
important and present poorly resolved issues.  
Legal standards, i.e. the rule of law, begin at the level of legislation and 
continue to the level of implementation. Laws must be based upon the Consti-
tution, and ratified international treaties harmonised with one another and cor-
rect in a procedural sense. The EU law ought to be implemented and respected. 
The laws have to provide legal predictability and certainty. Moreover, they have 
to be derived from the basic principles of contemporary democratic state, such 
as the principle of subsidiarity, respect of human rights, protection of minori-
ties, etc. Secondary legislation must be in conformity with the Constitution and 
laws. Local by-laws must not infringe higher laws and regulations. Activities, 
decisions, and acts of all state bodies in concrete cases must be based on state 
regulations in the substantial, organizational, and procedural sense. Local bo-
dies must respect not only state regulations but also those adopted by the local 
representative bodies. Arbitrariness is not allowed to either state or local offi-
cials and servants. The problems concerning legality of Croatian public admi-
nistration are based on legal inconsistencies, modest quality of laws, and secon-
dary legislation, partially outdated regulations, various meta-legal influences, 
weaknesses in legal control, low court capacities, and underdeveloped ethical 
and professional standards in implementation of regulations. The EU accession 
brought new problems, since the acquis communautaire is highly complex, and 
its implementation is a very demanding task (koprić et al., 2012; koprić, 2014). 
The ethical dimension has usually been highlighted through various 
claims about corruption within public administration.66 Corruption at higher, 
political levels is the most dangerous type of corruption. Corruption at the 
level of civil servants is also dangerous, the more dangerous the higher their 
positions are. If corruption existed only at lower positions, it would be relati-
vely easy to eradicate it by measures taken by the repressive machinery – the 
police, general Attorney‘s Office, and similar bodies as well as courts. The 
perception is that corruption in Croatia is rather widespread, although anti-
corruption efforts have produced moderately positive results. Several criminal 
charges of top politicians at the central, regional, and local levels are signs of 
66   In the mentioned regional research, this is the opinion of 68 respondents (48.6%). At the same 
time, only 30 of them (21.4%) consider corruption as not so serious problem, while further 42 
respondents (30%) see medium importance of the corruption problem (koprić, 2009b).
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strong fight against corruption. Anti-corruption measures are predominantly 
of normative and institutional nature but the control system is not very effi-
cient (koprić et al., 2016). Moreover, the commitment of high state officials 
to act impartially and in the long-term public interest is not clear enough. 
Little has been done through education and training, although strengthening 
of professional standards is firmly connected with education and the adoption 
of proper ethical standards. Numerous local units, overlapping competences, 
and very complicated structure of deconcentrated state administration open 
space for unethical behaviour. It seems that ethical problems are even worse at 
the local level (comp. kregar et al., 2016; Marčetić, 2013).67
There is a strong resistance to changes and modernization of public 
administration among higher professionals. Unnecessary formalism, sticking 
to petrified practices, rejecting innovations in procedures and techniques, 
best practices and European standards, and resistance to administrative sim-
plification are some examples of frequently observed bureaucratic resistan-
ces. They are partly supported by the conservative groups within the acade-
mic community. 
A wrong type of managerialism has shown up as a peculiar answer to 
bureaucratic resistances. The idea that the public sector is in no way different 
from the private one, and that it is desirable to manage it in exactly the same 
way has become very popular among certain groups of actors. In order to re-
alise that idea, managers from the private sector, banks, large private compa-
67  The first Ethical Codex for state servants was adopted by the government in 2006, and was 
amended in 2008. The Ethical Commission started to function in May 2009. Associate profes-
sor gordana Marčetić from the Faculty of Law in Zagreb was elected president. A new Ethical 
Code of Civil Service was adopted in 2011. Citizens can report breaking of ethical standards in 
the civil service to the Department for Ethics in the Ministry of Administration but there were 
only 77 complaints with regard to ethical standards of state servants in 2008 and 2009 initiated 
through this Department. In addition, there were 296 commissioners for ethics appointed in 
state bodies in 2010 (data on the situation at the beginning of June 2010). As many as 355 ethical 
complaints were submitted in 2008. Only 2 civil servants have been fired on that grounds, and 
in 18 additional cases serious penalties have been imposed. In sum, disciplinary penalties have 
been imposed in only 20 cases, counting for only 5.6% of the reported ethical cases. Only 0.03% 
of civil servants have been sentenced for ethical offences. As many as 416 complaints were su-
bmitted to these commissioners in various administrative bodies in 2009 (an increase of 17% in 
comparison to 2008). In 356 cases it was decided that complaints were not firmly grounded, in 
19 cases disciplinary responsibility was initiated, and in 41 cases the procedures have not been 
completed yet. The number of submitted complaints was 275 in 2010, 272 in 2011, 492 in 2013, 
and 477 in 2014 (data for certain years are not available). 
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nies, etc., have been appointed to or employed in public administration. Simi-
larly, a claim that there are no well-educated people for public administration 
has been overemphasized. However, at the same time, the initiatives for es-
tablishing a high-quality university education for public administration have 
been systematically suppressed, ignored, and actively undermined in specific 
arrangements with the conservative groups within the academic community. 
The fluctuation between the private and public sectors is the most intensive at 
the level of high-ranking state servants and officials. The fact that it is a matter 
of a very dangerous conflict of interest capturing the state within the network 
of private interests and influences has been neglected. The danger lies in the 
fact that public administration can become an instrument of powerful private 
sector companies instead of being in service of the community and citizens.
9.3.4.  Reform Concepts and Processes
The South-Eastern European countries emerged on the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia have shown some common governance characteristics 
which may be explained by the notion of muddled governance. Muddled go-
vernance is a governance type “with strong reliance on classical government 
with weak forms of inter-jurisdictional and third-party governance that arise 
when not very clear European ideas about public administration reform flow 
into shrinking domestic ideas on governance.” Apart from Europeanization 
and modernization, the framework for the development of such governance 
includes search for national identities and regional cooperation and learning 
process based on the common tradition developed during 70 years spent 
within the first and second Yugoslavia, and facilitated by speaking similar 
languages. Strengthening the political legitimacy, modernization of human 
potentials development and management, and improving legal protection of 
citizens in their relations with the state are the three basic common gover-
nance processes in South Eastern Europe (more in koprić, 2012a). 
However, the situation is not the same in each country on the territory 
of the former Yugoslavia. Firstly, there is a significant part of their histories 
that divides the two groups of countries according to the prevailing historical 
influences on their administrative institutions (Habsburg, i.e. Austro-Hunga-
rian and Ottoman). Secondly, the development in the post-1990 period has 
followed different paths. Croatian situation is peculiar because of the rebel-
369RefoRm of the CRoatian PubliC administRation: between PatChy euRoPeanization and bumPy modeRnization
lion, aggression, and war in the most sensitive period after dissolution of the 
former Yugoslavia. Moreover, in the very beginning the rebellion relied on 
the formal competences of strong communes inherited from socialist times. 
Parallel with these dramatic and profound changes, non-transparent, politi-
cally influenced, and harsh privatization of the former social ownership oc-
curred causing divided but predominantly bitter feelings about the role of the 
private sector. Such circumstances led towards the development of new social 
and political cleavages; dismantling strong local governments, centralization, 
etatization, building hierarchical structures of state government, and political 
authoritarianism. After some time the situation called for changes, and influ-
enced main administrative reform processes and concepts.         
•	 Decentralization and Democratization 
Historical reminiscences of the communes as powerful local govern-
ments with substantial decision-making autonomy, very wide scope of affairs, 
and high financial share in public revenues and expenditures were still vivid 
during the 1990s. Until 1990, communes had been able to ensure the whole 
life circle, meaning almost all public services, social welfare, employment 
possibilities, cheap housing, leisure, etc., with formally high level of citizens 
and workers’ political participation (koprić et al., 2016a). 
Decentralization claims were rather strong at the end of the 1990s. The 
basis for the construction of a decentralization strategy was professionally 
elaborated in the project Legislative Frameworks for Decentralization in Croa-
tia (1999−2000). Although its results (published in koprić, 2003a) inspired 
the government’s reform efforts, that project had never been translated into 
an official decentralization strategy. Similar destiny hit another large project, 
Decentralization of Public Administration, financed by the Open Society and 
the Croatian government in 2000−2003. Its results were not adopted by the 
government either.
Simultaneously, the government’s Programme for the period 2000−2004 
offered firm political basis for decentralization, announcing wide decentraliza-
tion, strengthening of local autonomy, especially that of large cities, introduction 
of general clause and subsidiarity principle, increase of financial autonomy of 
local governments, and possible and gradual territorial reform (Program VRH, 
2000). Decentralization was perceived not only as an instrument of strength-
ening local autonomy but also as a prerequisite for further democratization of 
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society and abandoning nationalistic politics of the 1990s. Decentralization 
policy guided the Constitutional amendments of 2000 and amendments of the 
general local self-government legislation of 2001. After the adoption of new 
general legislation on local and county self-government in April 2001, several 
sectoral laws created fresh legal foundations for decentralization in four policy 
areas: education (primary and secondary), health, social care, and firefighting. 
However, because of the fragmented structure and low capacities, only 
the counties and 33 towns were able to take over these services. A significant 
part of finances for these services was ensured by the central budget. These 
33 towns represented only 6% of all local governments in Croatia, indicating 
that local budgets were rather weak and unable to endure the burden of de-
centralization. Subsequent Croatian governments have also, at least formally, 
committed themselves to decentralization and indicated some reform direc-
tions.68 The only result in later period was the design of large towns, i.e. those 
with more than 35,000 inhabitants, by the legislative changes in 2005 which 
were entrusted with only two additional public tasks: 1) maintenance of pub-
lic roads, and 2) issuing building permits and other documents necessary for 
the construction and implementation of spatial planning documents. 
Because of weak local capacities, after decentralization attempts in 2001 
and 2005, further decentralization efforts have refocused from widening local 
responsibilities and autonomy to the promotion of citizens’ political partici-
pation at the local level. The new orientation was conducted mainly in incre-
mental manner. Legislation was changed several times to attract the interest 
of citizens to local participatory institutions, such as referendum, citizens’ 
initiative, sub-municipal councils, occasional consultative meetings, youth 
councils, public consultations, national minorities’ councils, etc. Direct elec-
tion of mayors was introduced as a major innovation in 2009, with a possibil-
ity to recall the new, more powerful local executive officials (koprić & klarić, 
2015; koprić & Vukojičić Tomić, 2013; koprić, 2012: 34−35; koprić, 2009).  
•	 Building Transparent and Open Public Administration 
Effort to build open and transparent public administration has been 
one of the main reform processes in Croatia, which was, to a large degree, 
68   During this time, several technical assistance projects were financed by the EU and other inter-
national donors. They were also intended to support further decentralization steps (CARDS, 
2007; Mikelsons, 2007). 
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facilitated by the harmonization with the EU standards and fuelled by the 
conceptual considerations about good governance. Transparency means ma-
king public data and information accessible to the public by efforts of public 
bodies, while openness means enabling citizens’ feedback, comments, propo-
sals, and criticism (comp. Musa, 2011). Although the prevailing purpose of 
transparency and openness is fostering citizens’ participation in public life, 
other purposes are also important, such as protecting the rights of the citizens 
in their relations with public bodies, strengthening control of public admi-
nistration, reuse of open data gathered by the public bodies in other sectors 
(economy, etc.), and others.   
The first Croatian Right to Access Information Act was adopted at the 
end of 2003, and was amended in 2010. The right to access public sector in-
formation was proclaimed a constitutional right by the Constitutional Amen-
dments of 2010. A number of cases initiated on citizens’ request have been 
more or less constant after the first high wave. The highest number of requests 
was in 2004 – 19,600. There were 4,499 requests in 2005, 4,357 in 2006, 3,670 
in 2007, 2,730 in 2008, and 3,173 in 2009, 12,340 in 2010, 51,930 in 2011, 
53,521 in 2012, 24,330 in 2013, 21,078 in 2014, and 18,007 in 2015. 
A new step in developing transparent public administration was made 
by the appointment of the first Croatian Public Information Commissioner 
in 2013. The Commissioner has a task to provide legal protection of the right 
to public sector information and reuse of such information (open data), and 
monitor and promote these rights. In one of her reports (23 September 2014), 
Public Information Commissioner, Anamarija Musa, stressed that the largest 
number of appeals have been submitted because of the silence of adminis-
tration (practice of not responding to the citizens’ requests for public infor-
mation), and that only 15% of appeals are refused, which means that 85% of 
appeals have firm legal grounds. The number of requests for usage of open 
data is rather low, witnessing that the usage of such data for economic and 
other purposes in Croatia is at the very beginning.     
According to the 2015 Report, in the newly established Registry of Pu-
blic Bodies there were data about 6,045 bodies and about 4,425 information 
officers in such bodies. At the beginning of 2016, an Internet application was 
established for reporting of all public bodies about their realization of right 
to public information. By mid-February 2016 as many as 4,539 public bodies 
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submitted their reports. However, there were 23.6% of public bodies that resi-
sted reporting, and about 20% of bodies have never appointed their informa-
tion officers. In 2015, the mentioned 4,539 bodies received 18,007 requests for 
public information and 898 requests for reuse of public information. Public 
bodies have replied positively to almost 85% of requests, mostly within legal 
deadlines (Izvješće, 2016).
Improvements indicate better effectiveness of the institutional fra-
mework for public sector transparency, upgraded preconditions for access 
to public sector information (better design of websites, easier Internet access, 
better structured information, etc.), and stronger trust in the public sector. 
Continuous efforts and measures to plan and support realization of e-govern-
ment, e-administration, and open government concepts have also contribu-
ted to transparent and open public administration. 
Introducing Modern Human Potential Development and Management 
Human resource management (HRM) as a new, modern concept connec-
ted with the new public management doctrine tends to replace the traditional, 
more weberian-like, public personnel concept. The accent of HRM concept is 
on flexibility and managerial discretion, decentralization and/or devolution in 
managing civil service structures, pay for performance, performance measu-
rement and performance management, greater flexibility in civil service law, 
“normalization” or even abolishment of special civil service status, application 
of regular labor law to civil servants, shrinking civil service, etc. Human poten-
tials development is a kind of softer approach to human capital in the public 
sector which is more oriented to the development of skills, competences, and 
knowledge of the civil servants, to proper use of their talents, training and 
education, improvement of organizational culture, etc. Human potentials de-
velopment is used to express the standpoint according to which people in the 
public sector are worth developing and are not “pure bureaucrats”, while HRM 
implicates that people in the public service are mostly a passive organizational 
element that should be connected with other elements, such as financial and 
material resources and the like, for results to be produced. Both approaches 
may be combined in order to avoid their main obstacles. 
Despite the lack of a really well-informed debate, except in academia, 
and some inconclusiveness in legal regulation, Croatia has opted for human 
potentials development model shyly enriched with several elements of HRM 
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concept. Elements of the traditional concept of personnel administration 
have persisted as well (Marčetić & Musa, 2013). The situation is similar in 
the whole region of South Eastern Europe, probably because such a civil ser-
vice model has been advocated by the OECD-Sigma which is in charge of 
assessing various elements of public administration reforms in the accessing 
countries. Regional cooperation in the civil service field, promoted through 
the Regional School of Public Administration (ReSPA) and the western Bal-
kan Human Resources Management Community of Practitioners (wB HRM 
CoP) has also contributed to that. If common administrative tradition is ta-
ken into account, it is not surprising that both the problems and the prospects 
for improvement in whole region are very similar (koprić, 2012a; 36−38; ko-
prić, 2009b; koprić, 2010).      
The State Servants Act of 2005 provided for a more modern civil service 
practice. The Ministry of Public Administration is the main competent body. 
Job analysis is one of the most complex tasks performed on the basis of that 
Act with numerous problems, misunderstandings and resistances (Ratko-
vić, 2008). work plans are still not common in administrative organizations. 
Performance measurement has been regulated but it still does not function 
properly. Pay for performance has never started to function neither at the 
national nor at the local levels because of the tight budgetary framework and 
lack of political will (Manojlović, 2016). Strategic approach towards deve-
lopment of civil service was promoted by the Strategy of Human Potentials 
Development in Public Administration for the period 2010−2013. The new 
registry of civil servants has been established recently, including state, local, 
and public servants. Annual personnel planning, new public administration 
ethics system (comp. fn. 35), and system of in-service training are the main 
three novelties which can be positively assessed.  
Central state institution for in-service training started to function in 
June 2005. It operated as the Civil Servants’ Training Centre within the Cen-
tral State Office for Public Administration (until 2009) and the Ministry of 
Public Administration (from 2009 until 2011) when it was merged with the 
Academy of Local Democracy into a new institution called the State School 
for Public Administration. During 8 years, these institutions performed 1,075 
training programs with 46,758 civil servants participating in them (Bošnja-
ković, 2015). Along with that, many training programs have been organized 
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by other institutions, such as the Diplomatic Academy, Judicial Academy, Tax 
Administration, Customs, Ministry of Regional Development, etc.  
Reforming Administrative Procedures and Strengthening Legal Pro-
tection of Citizens
There was a long tradition of general administrative procedural law and 
court control over public administration in the former Yugoslav territory. 
They were the components of the system of legal protection of citizens. Such 
a system was a complex and interdependent group of legally regulated ins-
titutions which consists of procedural protection within public administra-
tion, national and international court control over administrative acts and 
actions, court protection of constitutional rights (mostly in the constitutional 
courts), ombudsman protection, guarantees of open access to public sector 
information, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms (the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, etc.), and some others. All the 
countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia took over the Yugoslav 
general Administrative Procedures Act (gAPA), which was a federal law, in 
the beginning of the 1990s. During the 2000s, almost all of them amended 
their general administrative procedural laws, and started to prepare new ones 
(see more details in koprić et al., 2016b).
The Yugoslav gAPA was known as the longest administrative proce-
dural law. It offered fairly good protection of citizens’ rights. It guaranteed the 
right to appeal and the right to be heard; it offered several other procedural 
guarantees; established duties of state bodies to find out true facts; equip an 
administrative act with written explanation of grounds and deliver it to the 
concerned party(ies); etc. However, it was casuistic, court-imitating, and too 
complex, with many possibilities for ministries, state prosecutor’s office, and 
other central state bodies to intervene in the final administrative act. Becau-
se of the underdeveloped administrative justice system, it was possible for 
administrative practice to neglect certain procedural rules and guarantees, 
and weaken the protection of citizens. 
Real modernization of administrative procedural regulation started in 
the second half of the 2000s, with Croatia as a forerunner, under strong Eu-
ropean influence and with expert assistance of the OECD-Sigma. Better le-
gal protection of citizens’ rights, simplification of administrative procedure, 
regulation of modern information and communication technology usage in 
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the procedure, and better efficiency of procedures are among the main goals 
of current administrative procedural reform efforts in South Eastern Europe.
Changes of general administrative procedures simultaneously enable 
and call for changes in the administrative justice systems. If court supervisi-
on of administrative actions becomes more effective, there is more room for 
designing administrative procedures to be much faster and efficient in issu-
ing decisions in individual administrative cases. Ratification of the European 
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), judica-
ture of the European Court of Human Rights, and spreading of the common 
European model of administrative justice (woehrling, 2006; winkler, 2007) 
are the main reasons for current reforms of administrative justice in many 
countries. The standards from Article 6 of the European Convention of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) require a two-tier system of 
administrative justice with administrative dispute of full jurisdiction, public 
hearing, right to appeal to the higher court, and protection of issuing admi-
nistrative decisions within a reasonable time. 
The Croatian Parliament enacted the new general Administrative Pro-
cedures Act in 2009 and the new Act on Administrative Disputes in 2010. 
The former entered into force on 1 January 2010 and the latter on 1 January 
2012. Since then, the system of administrative justice has been organized as 
a two-tier system with four administrative courts of first instance (in Zagreb, 
Split, Rijeka, and Osijek), and the High Administrative Court which decides, 
in principle, on the appeals filed against first instance administrative court 
decisions. Despite certain criticism which raises the issue of hesitating mo-
dernization (koprić, 2009a; Đulabić, 2009), there is no doubt that Croatia 
is well on the reform path in the field of legal protection of citizens in their 
relations with public administration.69 
•	 Experimenting with Public Management  
Solutions from the new public management repertoire are springing up 
here and there. The Croatian public administration displays a whole range of 
reform measures, from privatization and liberalization, through establishment 
of public agencies, to performance and quality management. However, the im-
portance, frequency, and success of such measures are very different. 
69  Croatia was the first republic of socialist Yugoslavia which established a separate Administrative 
Court in 1977, forerunning in that regard even during the socialist period. 
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One of the persistently pronounced measures is privatization. Privati-
zation and liberalization with increasing role of private sector providers, even 
multinational ones, have not been a reform measure pertaining only to the 
services of general economic interest (telecommunications, postal service, 
energy supply, transport, highway construction and management, etc.) but 
also in healthcare, eldercare, education, communal utilities, pension system, 
culture, and the similar. There is a wide variety of forms for including private 
sector subjects in the provision of services, such as concessions and delegation 
to private sector subjects, public procurement of services, outsourcing, pu-
blic-private partnerships, etc. (comp. koprić et al., 2016a). However, the 2014 
attempt to outsource supplementary and technical services in public adminis-
tration was not successful. Although the government prepared a sound plan 
of outsourcing cleaning, technical jobs, washing, ironing, preparation of food 
and drinks, transport, and protection of facilities for which there were some 
26,500 employees in state-financed public bodies and institutions, the plan 
was not successfully implemented. A large number of trade unions (17) ini-
tiated a referendum against the plan and collected 624,000 citizens’ signatures. 
Under such pressure, the government withdrew its plan. The bombastically 
announced policy of public-private partnership had a similar destiny. After 
the adoption of the guidelines for Application of Contractual Forms of Public-
Private Partnerships by both the government and the Parliament in 2006, and 
a strong political push in that direction, the number of such partnerships has 
remained rather small (18 approved and registered projects until 2015). 
Apart from the agency model at the national level, public agencies have 
also been sprouting at the county and local levels. They are mainly established 
in the development (economic, regional, and rural) and energy sectors, and 
some other sectors are represented as well. At the end of the 2000s, Musa 
found about 40 agencies at the sub-national level established during the Eu-
ropeanization process (Musa, 2014: 474−480). Along with the companies for 
delivery of utility services, local governments and counties currently own 
almost 400 companies established for different purposes (economic develo-
pment, radio broadcasting, sport infrastructure, culture, etc.) (koprić et al., 
2016a). In 2016, the number of entities called “agency” and established by the 
local governments and counties in the Registry of Public Bodies of the Public 
Information Commissioner is 56. The total number of public institutions es-
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tablished by sub-national governments in the same registry is 2,471; there are 
also 675 companies, 694 associations, and 4 foundations.      
Performance and quality management practice is not well developed, but 
there are some positive cases and trends. Although the establishment of pu-
blic agencies asks for performance management mechanisms, such practice 
is almost non-existent, and the main accountability tool is the agency report. 
An empirical research conducted in 2014 shows that when performance is 
measured what is actually measured are outputs, while impacts, quality, and 
cost-effectiveness are neglected dimensions with quality as the most neglec-
ted one. Performance measurement is rather rare but more frequent at the 
national level than at the local level (Manojlović, 2014: 250−253). Even worse 
results were shown in another research conducted in 2013 with regard to qu-
ality management as only 38 out of 128 towns (about 30%) reported usage of 
some quality improvement instrument. Their number has increased to 41 in 
2016. There is no legal obligation for public bodies to use such instruments. 
There is some evidence that simple quality improvement instruments are em-
ployed at the national level but the best instruments are almost not known – 
there are only 4 national administrative organizations and 1 town registered 
as interested for application of the Common Assessment Framework (Džinić, 
2014; Džinić & Manojlović, 2016; Musa, 2016).        
9.3.5. Future of Croatian Public Administration: Modernization,                 
Inertia, or Decline
Croatia is on the track of modernising its public administration. Moder-
nization of the Croatian public administration is knitted by doctrinal influen-
ces of new public management and good governance, and fuelled by the EU 
conditionality policy. The EU inspires the waves of administrative reform in 
doctrinally inconclusive manner, combining the elements of good governan-
ce with clear liberal policy in certain sectors and issues, and with the elements 
of public management model. The influence of the OECD-Sigma employed 
by the European Commission in assessing the capacity of public administra-
tion to effectively implement acquis communautaire is also visible in Croatia. 
The OECD-Sigma has been a proponent of moderate modernization but only 
after completion of the weberian public administration model. Despite huge 
steps in consolidating and codifying of the European administrative stan-
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dards during last two decades, it is still not completely clear what the elements 
of “European model of public administration” really are. In any case, the EU 
leaves much room for domestic political priorities. 
Post-socialist transition has coincided with spreading of the new public 
management doctrine throughout the world. The new public management 
requires more freedom in decision-making of public managers. Since many 
administrative positions have been filled with politically influenced persons, 
freer decision-making opportunities in reality mean additional space for po-
liticization of public administration, not necessarily for better management. 
That is why public management in post-socialist societies, lacking properly 
educated public managers and civil servants, very often enables further and 
deeper politicization. 
In such circumstances, the Croatian public administration reform has 
been conducted in a patchy manner, although continuously under the notion 
of Europeanization. Dominant politics has had a decisive role, while profes-
sionals and academia have been neglected. The basic principles of European 
good governance model and European Administrative Space have been wide-
ly accepted. Citizens and civil society have some influence on the processes as 
well. what may also be concluded from the previous analysis is that a major 
part of dominant concepts is connected with good governance model: de-
centralization, political legitimacy, and democratization; transparency, open-
ness, and participation; better regulation and legal protection of citizens; and 
human potential development and management. 
Despite continuous efforts of domestic business community and well-
known international organizations (world Bank, International Monetary 
Fund, etc.) hard neoliberal reform measures, such as shrinking of the public 
sector, dismantling the welfare institutions, imposing savings and budgetary 
cuts, privatization or normalization of the civil service, have not been accep-
ted by domestic political actors, at least not in their radical forms. Other ele-
ments of public management model have been widely accepted but only mo-
derately realized. Instead of building a consistent public management model, 
Croatia has experimented with public management instruments. Although 
privatization is one of the most popular concepts, Croatia has still a relative-
ly big and strong public sector. Resistance to public-private partnerships or 
outsourcing is still strong. Certain reform steps have been made, such as re-
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gulation of more flexible civil service arrangements, introduction of internal 
financial control and external review, competition and public procurements, 
charging real prices of public services, etc.  
Having in mind that Croatia is a latecomer to real democratization and 
the EU accession with a decade of delay in comparison with other post-so-
cialist countries which have joined the EU, mainly because of the war and 
consequent authoritarianism, it can be concluded that public governance si-
tuation is precarious. At least two scenarios are possible, an optimistic and a 
pessimistic one. External circumstances can be decisive. global recovery of 
the economy, smooth development of European integration, positive resolu-
tion of current conflicts can become grounds for the realization of the opti-
mistic scenario. A new economic crisis, institutional crisis of the EU, deadly 
terrorism, and massive migrations can lead to the realization of the pessimis-
tic scenario. A number of domestic circumstances, which can lead in at least 
three directions, can be added to this mixture:
 − These complex circumstances can direct the Croatian public adminis-
tration towards more conceptually straight modernization, 
 − They can leave it on the path of hesitant development, which means 
random and patchy changes dependent on accidental ideas of influ-
ential domestic actors, bureaucratic hesitations, or pressures of domi-
nant foreign organizations, or
 − They can push the country to the path of chaotic institutional decline.
while the first direction is the most desirable, the last one seems the least 
probable. However, from the Croatian standpoint, for the reform to be more 
successful it is necessary to further clarify and make a sounder professional 
basis of the reform concepts and measures.  
9.4. Conclusion
The basic components of the Croatian public administration were es-
tablished in the beginning of the 1990s in parallel with the processes of de-
mocratic transition, managing independence, and transformation of the for-
mer social ownership. Rebellion and aggression followed by the four-year war 
had many unfavorable economic, social, political, administrative, and other 
consequences. Democratization, decentralization, and Europeanization of 
the country were delayed to the beginning of the 2000s. During the Europe-
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anization phase, Croatia started to change its traditional weberian model of 
public administration by incorporating and developing the elements of good 
governance model. Then, at the end of the 2000s, the modernization phase 
started, although some signs of modernization could be found even before. 
Although the accession to the EU was a widely accepted goal, Europe-
anization of the country’s public administration, in the sense of accepting 
European standards, was patchy. Croatia defended what was proclaimed as 
the elements of its national model of public administration in many cases, 
claiming they are part of its tradition, even when it was obvious that accep-
ting the European standards would have improved situation in some relevant 
regards. In addition, the situation with administrative modernization is a bit 
disappointing, because in spite of a relatively broad and persuasive moderni-
zation narrative, the real road to modernization has been rather bumpy.
Public administration reform in Croatia has been a component of 
wider societal changes of post-socialist transition. The post-socialist transi-
tion is a complex systemic transformation – much more complex than pre-
vious democratic transitions in South western Europe (Spain, Portugal), 
Latin America, and other parts of the world, as the span of the transition 
process is wider. Previous transitions were focused on democratization, 
while the post-socialist transition tackled almost every aspect of social life. 
That makes the administrative changes and reforms of public administra-
tion even more demanding, complex, and harder to be achieved than they 
have been in other countries. Many processes have to be steered in parallel 
with public administration reform while, at the same time, many decisi-
ve circumstances are hardly controllable. In such conditions political and 
societal attention as well as the efforts of the whole community could not 
be concentrated only on the administrative problems and their resolution, 
because other urgent problems also needed to be addressed, some of them 
even before the administrative ones. Finally, the political system has not 
been stabilized which significantly undermines its ability to choose the 
agreed reform concept and its capacity to steer the public administration 
reform.
Additionally, similar to some other transitional countries, Croatia faced 
the issue of managing state independence which itself is neither an easy nor 
a simple task. On top of that, due to particularities of soft-socialism in the 
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former Yugoslavia, a radical break up with the inherited institutions was not 
seen as the prerequisite for successful transition. Such conceptual thinking 
prevented radical administrative reforms and caused bureaucratic inertia in 
many regards. New political and social elites did not intend to break up with 
the inherited public administration but only to conquer and capture it. Once 
they had succeeded, they became interested in preserving, not in reforming it. 
The size of the public sector, its history, administrative tradition, and other 
administrative particularities in combination with the existence of a number of 
relatively influential trade unions do not encourage deep administrative reforms. 
Internal bureaucratic resistance to changes is quite a normal phenomenon. 
This has to be analysed in connection with a relatively low capacity of 
society to accept the changes since tradition and normal inclination towards 
stabilization anchor societies, and allow mainly slow and incremental chan-
ges. There was additional and strong exertion of this capacity caused by the 
huge task of Europeanization. The process of Europeanization started in a 
top-down manner only a few years after the war which, in some parts, of-
ficially ended only in January 1998 when the UN Transitional Administra-
tion in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Sirmium was replaced by the 
Croatian institutions. It is not to be expected that a country whose battle for 
independence was so long, bloody, and difficult would easily and without any 
resistance accept many new compromises imposed during formal Europeani-
zation by means of the EU conditionality policy.     
All of these circumstances in the societal environment show that the 
particularities of public administration reform in post-socialist countries can 
be explained only if the theory of transition is taken into account. However, 
since the logics of big systems and institutional development have to be taken 
into account, the neo-institutional theory, system theory, and organizational 
theory also need be consulted in order to build a complex, composite the-
oretical frame for understanding, researching, and explaining public admi-
nistration reform in post-socialist countries. However, it is too ambitious to 
think that a theory of administrative reform in the post-socialist world may 
be easily developed (comp. Caiden, 1969/2009).   
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10. Public Administration Reform in Romania               
after 25 Years
Călin Emilian Hințea, Tudor Cristian Țiclău
10.1. Introduction
This chapter aims to offer an overview on the specifics of Public Admi-
nistration reform (PAR) introduced in the last 25 years in Romania. Although 
changes have been rather slow, the public administration is significantly 
different then the system inherited after the 1989 Revolution. This chapter is 
structured in 5 sections: the first section offers general information about the 
political and administrative system; the second section is focused on the main 
elements of reform – crucial factors influencing pace and impact of change, 
specifics of PAR in Romania and some considerations on where the system is 
headed; the third section discusses the specifics of the civil service, including 
the issues of autonomy, decentralization, budgeting and major problems and 
challenges; finally, the chapter ends with a set of general conclusions.  we 
have used the term public administration in a broad sense referring to both 
central and local government but we do not include stateowned companies 
here (as they are referred specifically as such). with regard to agencies, we 
refer to public authority bodies that are directly subordinated to the central 
government (executive).
10.2. General Information about Romania’s Public Administration
Romania is a semi-presidential republic,70 organized in accordance with 
the separation of the main three powers: legislative, executive, and judiciary. 
The legislative power is represented by the national Parliament (bicameral – 
Senate and Chamber of Deputies), members being elected through a list vo-
70  Semi-presidential character is given by relative power of the President who is directly elected 
and designates the Prime Minister. The President also heads external policy matters, and has 
“the power of appointment” for several high level judicial positions (but this is part of a more 
complex procedures involving other state powers). 
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te.71 The judiciary is represented by the High Court of Cassation and Justice 
and is built on a three-tier level: local courts, county courts, and courts of ap-
peal. Constitutional matters are dealt separately by the Constitutional Court 
(CC), which is the main and only authority in matters concerning the funda-
mental law. The CC is made up of 9 judges who are politically appointed by 
the Chamber of Deputies (3), Senate (3), and the President (3). The executive 
power is split between the President and the Prime Minister. The President 
is directly elected for a five-year mandate, for a period of max. two manda-
tes. Main responsibilities refer to foreign relations (foreign policy), national 
defense (head of army), ensuring Constitutional compliance and mediator 
role between state powers. The Government, headed by the Prime Minister 
(PM), is concerned with general domestic policy. The PM is nominated by 
the President, while the government is voted into office through a majority 
(confidence) vote in the Parliament, thus making it politically accountable 
to the legislative. The central public administration is made up of the central 
government (headed by the PM), executive central agencies (headed by secre-
tary of states in most cases, and directly subordinated to the central govern-
ment), and other autonomous central agencies (that are part of the central 
administration but are not directly subordinated to the government – e.g. 
Ombudsman, National Bank, Supreme Council for Defence – but are accoun-
table in most cases to the legislative and usually have regulatory powers). The 
central government is represented locally by deconcentrated public services 
which are governmental branches of each ministry organized locally along 
with a Prefect,72 and named by the Prime Minister in each of the 41 counties 
and the capital Bucharest. Local public administration is two-tier, currently 
divided into county and local (town, city), structures. Starting from 2004, the 
Prefect is part of the general body of Senior Civil Servants. Mayors are elected 
directly in a one round ballot, while for Local and County Councils, members 
71  Between 2008 and 2016, the MPs were elected through direct uninominal vote; electoral law 
has changed in 2016, reversing back to a list system, used between 1990−2008. For local public 
administration, mayors are elected through a majority system in one round winner takes all, 
while for councils (local, county) the list system is used. At the county level, Presidents of Coun-
ty Councils are elected by the members of the Council (previously were directly elected by the 
citizens). This shift increases political party control over the Council (through the use of a list 
and by indirect vote for the President of the County Council).
72  Local administration structure is mainly inspired by the French system with a Prefect representing 
the government and heading local “deconcentrated/devoluted” services of the central Ministries.
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are elected based on a party list. The members of the Council elect the presi-
dent of the County Councils. These entities have administrative and financial 
autonomy,73 but no political autonomy. The Mayor and the President of the 
County Council represent the executive power, while the Local and County 
Councils are the local legislative bodies. Starting with 2004 (Law 315/2004), 
the 41 counties and the capital of Bucharest were divided up into 8 develo-
pment regions (NUTS II level). The regions (made up of voluntary associa-
tion of counties) represent a territorial unit relevant in the framework of re-
gional development policy in Romania. The regional structures are Regional 
Development Council (consultative structures made of representative county 
authorities,74 whose main responsibility is coordinating and monitoring of 
regional policy development) and Regional Development Agencies (public, 
non-profit, non-governmental legal entities responsible for drafting regional 
development plans and implementation of regional development policies). 
Both of the two bodies do not have a legal personality.75
10.3. PAR in Romania. Challenges and Changes
In this section,76 we discuss the major reforms that the Romanian admi-
nistrative system went through in the last 25 years. The focus is on the factors 
had a substantial impact on both the pace and impact of reform (including 
specific country elements). we try to link the changes to the broader the-
oretical framework of NPM/NwS/NPg (New Public Management (NPM), 
Neo-weberian State (NwS), New Public governance (NPg)) as defined by 
Pollitt and  Bouckaert (2011).
Public administration reform in Romania should not be understood 
through a linear logic. It is comprised of a series of reform sequences that are 
intertwined and form a complex administrative framework, difficult to un-
derstand and analyze through a traditional approach. A traditional approach 
73  Law 215/2001 established 5 major principles upon which local public administration is organi-
zed and functions. 
74   Prefect, County Councils, deconcentrated public services, academic institutions, social and eco-
nomic stakeholders.
75  Source: ec.europa.eu, retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regional-and-local-deve-
lopment-romania_en.
76  Information included in this section has been previously published in Hințea, C.E. 2011. Reform 
and Management in Romania. Strategy and Structural Change, Revista de Cercetare si Interventie 
Sociala, 34, 177−196.
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to such an analysis starts from the premise that there is a clear starting point 
(objective to reach), and a measurable result (of the reform) with the effecti-
veness given by the difference between the two. Romania represents a case 
where the meaning of a ”successful reform effort” has never been clear with 
reform efforts sometimes seeming almost incoherent, contradictory, or even 
opposite from the previous ones. In this context, a key question is whether 
efforts and resources spent on reform have brought an overall positive change 
in the public administration and increased well-being of the citizens it serves. 
As reform seems to be a recurrent and never-ending effort, it is natural to 
have a certain feeling of fatigue which becomes accentuated when the expec-
ted positive results of these efforts take long to be felt. we will try to point to 
the distinctive elements of the Romanian PAR process that have shaped the 
administration into the unique profile it has today.
10.3.1. Communist Legacy
The communist legacy is probably one of the most influential and most 
enduring factors that have shaped PAR in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
transition towards a post-bureaucratic model of administration (after the fall 
of the communist regime) implied a general change regarding the concept of 
public administration as a whole, an attempt that tried to eliminate ”the com-
munist mark” at all levels: administrative structure, procedures, organizational 
culture, strategic perspective, organizational climate, attitude towards change, 
relationship with the political sphere, relation with citizens, etc. However, this 
process took place in a unique environment. At political level, Romania lacked 
a political elite with a clear direction regarding the modernization of the State, 
most leaders being either former communist bureaucrats, or former commu-
nist party members with little to no experience regarding coherent public po-
licy (Mungiu-Pipidi, Ioniță, Munteanu, 2003). At society level, lack of trust in 
public institutions and widespread corruption, a preference for informal per-
sonal networks over formal institutions (Hall, 2004), and high predisposition 
for ”rent-seeking” for those occupying official power positions (ibid., 2004) 
were also indirect effects of the former communist regime. From a cultural 
perspective, the communist legacy is (in a way) still present in the adminis-
tration with civil servants displaying high power distance in group collecti-
vism, and low future orientation and performance orientation (Țiclău, Hințea, 
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2016), which points to a body of bureaucrats with high tolerance for unequal 
power distribution, little support for excellence, focus on immediate gratifi-
cation, and high valuation of family and close friends. Thus, any attempt in un-
derstanding the evolution of PAR in Romania should consider the communist 
legacy as a major factor of influence on the overall administrative system. This 
makes Romania’s transition quite unique − a common communist background 
similar to the East European countries but with specific cultural and historical 
elements that interacted to form a particular evolution. Although the post-
communist paradigm is not the only key in which the current administrative 
framework should be understood, it is impossible to ignore it. After 25 years 
from its fall, one legitimately raises the question – how relevant it will still be 
in explaining future trends of reform. Because PAR is a continuous process, it 
is both limiting and inappropriate to use the communist legacy as the sole key 
for understanding the reform. It still has a print on Romanian society but a fa-
ding one, as demographics, technology, human mobility, migration, economic 
development are factors that gain importance. 
10.3.2. Motivation for Reform – External vs. Internal Pressures
The next question to ask ourselves when looking at PAR is: “motivation 
for reform?”, evidently with no simple answer. Is it the general need for change 
being  pushed by the political elite to keep up with a fast evolving society, or are 
the demands coming from international stakeholders or internal pressure from 
within (due to extraordinary events or accumulated discontent), maybe just 
a marketing mechanism used in political discourse to have better chances of 
occupying office? This is an essential question as the reason behind reform will 
probably have a great impact on the shape, design, and effectiveness of reform. 
If it is political marketing, then reform will be more about political dis-
course than actual policy, while an ideologically motivated reform with poli-
tical elites behind it will definitely have more success. After 1989, reform was 
a constant of political discourse (and given the ruthlessness of the previous 
regime, it is no surprise) but the motivation behind its front stage appearance 
was different. geert Bouckaert and John Halligan (2008: 13) note that in wes-
tern countries, reform movements were stimulated by two major factors: (1) 
economic factors (high public deficits, high expenditures of the state, level of 
taxation), and (2) public distrust in the government, double internal pressure 
394 Public AdministrAtion reforms in eAstern euroPeAn union member stAtes 
Post-Accession convergence And divergence
coming from both the market and citizens. Are these factors also present in the 
case of Romania? The 2006 Eurobarometer depicts an interesting picture with 
citizens showing high levels of trust in the EU (67%) but much lower trust in 
national state institutions – 27% government, 24% Parliament, 12% Political 
Parties (EC 66, 2006). A more recent national study77 from 2011 regarding 
citizens perception of local public administration shows a rather pessimistic 
picture – when asked to evaluate the level of satisfaction regarding the activity 
of the local authorities of respondents said they think civil servants follow per-
sonal interest before the public one (60.5% ), are not professional (40%), lack 
integrity (42%), authorities are not able to solve their problems fast enough 
(50%), and are not efficient in their activity (42%). This is indeed an undesira-
ble combination: a citizen that believes that the public administration decisi-
ons have a major influence on his or her life but, at the same time, feels he or 
she can do little to influence them. This lack of trust in the capacity of public 
institutions to solve community problems is maintained even at present time. 
A recent national representative survey found that less than 20% of citi-
zens trust the representatives of local public administration compared to 77% 
of citizens who had trust in firemen, or 74% in  athletes or doctors (IRES, 
2016); also more than 90% of people feel that the level of corruption is un-
bearable, and 65% feel the responsibility for this lies within the political class 
(ibid. 2016), while three major causes for the lack of trust in the Romanian 
State are according to the same study: (1) high levels of corruption, (2) inequ-
ality or privileges for certain categories of citizens, and (3) lack of fair compe-
tition. Looking at these numbers we can certainly conclude that corruption 
and lack of trust in public institutions lead citizens to believe that the admin-
istration is rather a source of problems rather then a solution.
From inside the system, change has been gradual and incremental at best 
with civil servants either not understanding the purpose of reform, classifying 
it as ambiguous, or not being familiar with its content (Tripon, Șandor, 2008; 
Andrei, Profiroiu, Turturean, 2006). Thus, internal pressures for reform were 
rather week. The main stimuli for reform, in Romania’s case, usually came from 
outside. The desire to be part of the EU and NATO has made governments, 
77   „Studiu privind corupţia din administraţia publică locală” RAPORT COMPREHENSIV, avail-
able online at: http://www.portalbn.ro/cj/Lists/Stiri/Attachments/74/RAPORT%20COMPRE-
HENSIV.pdf. For full information please consult the reference section.
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starting with 1997, very open and perceptive to reform proposals coming from 
international stakeholders. This phenomenon had two types of effects: 
•	 A positive effect: high levels of popular support regarding accession 
to the EU or NATO which gave governments little room to maneuver 
regarding adoption of reforms, especially those essential for accession. 
In many cases, the external pressures were the only ones. However, as 
in other EU countries, the leverage of international bodies reduced 
after accession, and implicitly, their potential influence (as catalyst) on 
national reforms.
•	 A negative effect: being promoted by external factors, some reforms 
were adopted just because “they had to be adopted” but were never 
fully implemented and internalized by both political leaders and the 
administrative apparatus, leading to incremental or superficial change 
with little results. One specific example for this is the creation of ins-
titutions at the explicit request of international bodies (National Ins-
titute of Administration, National Agency of Civil Servants) without 
the necessary managerial capacity and resources needed to run effec-
tivelly and serve their true purpose. 
External pressures for change also led to the onset of a “correct langua-
ge” for PAR – increasing administrative capacity, improving quality of services, 
creating a European State, or the alternative adopting European standards, pro-
fessionalization of civil servants – a language which has been used (especially 
by politicians) to mask lack of progress of reform. 
10.3.3. Reform Coherence (or Lack of It)
Beyond the language, lack of coherence or strategic approach in reform 
proposals has been a constant shortcoming. This led to a mostly incremental 
change process with small changes in different areas of the system (procedures, 
relations between central or local organizational structures, restructuring of 
central administration, creation of new institutions) but without a system-wide 
logic and a long-term perspective. Some initiatives taken recently (creation of 
an organizational structure inside the Ministry of Development and Public 
Administration responsible for government-wide strategy, and coherent public 
policy process in 2008) aim to offer such a (strategic) perspective but their im-
pact is rather minor (a series of strategic documents at best). 
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This lack of coherence has been more prominent before the EU integra-
tion (lack of a strategic approach to PAR, sectorial reforms initiated without 
a strategic vision, low administrative capacity for reform implementation – 
EC Country Reports 2000, 2001, 2002) but has remained a challenge even af-
ter the accession. Between 2007 and 2013 a number of 40 sectorial strategies 
concerning public administration have been approved by the government 
without taking into consideration other policy initiatives.
This trend is sustained even today with the existence of over 3578 ”na-
tional strategic documents” but no comprehensive country strategy79 aligned 
with the Europe 2020. This abundance of strategies is unfortunately not 
translated into actual results – evaluations of the yearly National Reform 
Plans80 indicate that only about 27% of the proposed objectives were actu-
ally achieved during the allocated time frame (2011−2013 period). Finally, 
a good proxy for lack of coherence is legislative stability and predictability, 
which has been signaled as a major shortcoming in numerous reports (CSM 
Report, 201581; Fiscal Council Report 82, 2013, 2015; EC Country Report, 
2014, 2015; CEPA, 2014) referring to different sectors but most often regar-
ding justice, fiscal legislation, environment, and energy sectors. The practice 
of using urgency ordinance as a tool for public policy decisions is a fur-
ther sign of limited strategic approach83 (see Table 1 below), although this 
practice has been steadily decreasing in the last years. This decrease in the 
number of urgency ordinances should be taken with a pinch of salt, the press 
signaling a new practice where more initiatives are put together inside one 
ordinance, so the government would avoid the critique of abuse of urgency 
78  Only the documents concerning the national level are counted in 2015 reference year.
79  As Romania had a loan agreement with the IMF and the EC between 2009−2014, the govern-
ment released yearly or bi-yearly strategic plans called National Reform Plans (2011−2013, 2014 
and 2015) but these were constructed in agreement with the IMF and the EC and had the pur-
pose to guide the government’s efforts to advance the reforms in exchange for the loan. This falls 
in the category of must do reforms discussed in the next section of the chapter. 
80  Yearly or 2-year plans developed, starting in 2013, in agreement with the EC aiming at develo-
ping public policies for the Europe 2020 country targets. 
81  Superior Magistrature Council (CSM) – Report on the State of the Justice System for year 2015, 
available online at: http://www.csm1909.ro/csm/index.php?cmd=24.
82  2013 annual Report by the Fiscal Council (FC), available online at: http://www.consiliulfiscal.ro/
ra-2013.pdf, and http://www.consiliulfiscal.ro/RA2015%20ro%203iunie2016%20c.pdf.
83  Legally, this is a measure the executive can (and should) use only in situations of utmost urgency 
but has been a practice of all political parties when getting into office to promote their agenda in 
a ”faster” tempo.
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ordinances while retaining the power of immediate appliance of its initiative 
(2015).84  
Figure 10.1: Number of Urgency Ordinances
Source: Chamber of Deputies (Parliament).
This type of approach to reform without a strategic perspective and vision 
has major drawbacks in the long term as it brings “artificial” change to the 
system that is not fully adopted and internalized – different elements of the 
system are changing without a bigger picture and a clear thought out direction 
– and contributes to the increasing feeling of ”random reform”. One solution 
would be to adopt a strategic approach to the reform process based upon the 
correct identification of key strategic factors (more on this in Hințea, 2011) that 
will have significant medium to long term impact on the system. 
One pressing question is whether such an approach (mostly focused on 
sectorial change) can have positive results, and can truly bring systemic change. 
Naturally, specific change initiatives are simpler and easier to ”sell”, imply less 
risk, and sometimes have a ”quick fix” nature that is appealing both to politi-
cians and public. However, focusing only on operational problems can lead to 
substantial long-term problems: ignoring structural problems does not make 
84  In one such situation, in 2015, the government adopted in the body of 1 urgency ordinance no less 
than 26 initiatives from the field raging from sports to state-owned companies – see OUg 2/2015. 
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them disappear but rather increases their negative impact and there is a certain 
point when tackling them becomes inevitable. This approach based on the be-
lief ”if you ignore a problem it will also ignore you” is surprisingly widespread85
10.3.4. Magnitude and Approach. Sectorial Policy vs. Structural Reforms
when talking about PAR, another relevant question is the ”nature of 
change”.  Are we talking about structural, system-wide change that implies 
major political risks, or are we referring to specific, sector or policy change 
which is focused on fixing limited or specific problems? Combining the issue 
of motivation with that of magnitude of reform, we end up with 4 cases:
•	 ”Must do”structural reforms – these refer to major changes that focus 
on the system as a whole, and mostly have come from external pressu-
res. This is the case of the major reforms that took place during the EU 
accession period (1999−2007) which implied the adoption of the Acquis 
Communautaire and changes to satisfy the conditions, and close all the 
35 chapters; the case is similar regarding the NATO accession, although 
in this case the reforms were more narrow, involving mostly the area 
of defense and intelligence. Another example of must do structural re-
forms are the major changes that took place between 2009 and 2012 
(see Boc, 2011) as a reaction to the financial crisis – their main pressure 
coming this time from the IMF and the European Union.
•	 Structural ideological reforms – this category refers to reforms that 
have an internal source, are politically motivated, and aim at changing 
and shaping the administration according to the ideology held by the 
political leaders. Unfortunately, in Romania, few reforms (if any) have 
been promoted and implemented because of ideological beliefs. One 
such attempt could be considered the Education Reform (law 1/2011) 
which was ideologically motivated (strong political support from the 
governing party for the minister who promoted it) had a comprehen-
sive character, and redefined the notion of public education. However, 
it proved to be short lived, the change of government in 2012 brought 
immediate and successive amendments to the law in the next two ye-
85  A good example of this is the government‘s main concern regarding the pension system towards 
the transfer of pensions for senior citizens on bank cards but leaving the problem of budget 
deficits which is structural (see Dragotă, Miricescu, 2010; Ciuraru-Andrica, 2013).
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ars after its introduction, suffering more than 20 changes86 which re-
versed or eliminated most of the changes (Nature, 2013).87  
•	 Specific ”policy” reforms – these are fairly common, and refer to 
sector reforms that have an ideological base or come from a positi-
ve past experience in solving similar problems. They usually focus on 
procedures, programs, or internal mechanisms of a specific part of 
the administrative apparatus; they do not have system-wide impact 
and do not imply a change of paradigm. The most obvious example is 
changes of the fiscal code which are in most cases ideologically driven 
(depending on the political orientation of the government) but do not 
imply a general change in the entire administrative system.  
•	 ”Must do” specific policy reforms – these are probably the most com-
mon types of changes, and are focused on operational issues, in most 
cases negotiated  with or solicited by external stakeholders. They appe-
al to the political leaders as they can pass the responsibility to external 
factors – the traditional discourse is they are ”EU requirements” or 
”the IMF requirement”. Unfortunately, in most cases, these changes 
have little long-term impacts and, sometimes, lack of internal support 
even from the political leaders, thus leading to poor implementation 
with little to no positive results88. The side effects of these poor results 
(dangerously) lead to a reform fatigue in public opinion.  
Another specific characteristic, regarding the actual framing of reform 
proposals, is their legalistic character. This paradigm stems from the assump-
tion that adoption of new legislation is the solution for public problems (see 
Figure 10.2).
86  For detailed information on the nature of the changes consult ”Doi ani de la intrarea in vigoare a 
legii Educatiei Nationale. Cum au modificat-o cei 6 ministri si jumatate din ultimul an” Hotnews ar-
ticle from 12 february 2013 available at: http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-14212979-doi-ani-in-
trarea-vigoare-legii-educatiei-nationale-cum-modificat-cei-6-ministri-jumatate-din-ultimul.htm.
87  Both local and international press have been highly critical of the modifications meant to reverse 
or reduce the impact of changes brought by Law 1/2011. In the next two years after its intro-
duction, it was modified more than 20 times, and it has been one of the most modified pieces of 
regulation. For more on this see Nature, 500, 22 august 2013: 388−389.
88  One such example is the reforms implemented starting with 2009 in State Owned Companies 
(SOC). External pressures for privatization from the IMF and the EC led to introduction of 
private management to SOC but with poor results as the legislation change still permitted high 
levels of political influence. For more information see Expert Forum Policy Brief No. 11, 2012; 
See also Marrez, 2015.
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Figure 10.2:  Linear Logic of New Legislation
This belief of solving policy problems through adoption of new legislation 
is not specific only to Romania (Liebert, Condrey, goncharov, 2013). It stems 
from the view that the administrative apparatus is an institutional extension 
of administrative law, thus any problems related to it can be fixed through 
new regulation. An important caveat of this approach is that its promoters 
(usually political leaders) do not consider the implications of regulation on 
the actual enactment of reform, leaving out any consideration on issues of 
administrative or managerial capacity. The consequence of this  is legislative 
instability as there is never a shortage of problems that need fixing, which 
leads to constant modifications of the legal framework that, in turn, lead to 
ambiguity and uncertainty. This is doubled by a cultural paradigm that public 
management is more a question of instinct or hobby, one does not need a spe-
cial training, and the main criteria for success is sufficient political support. 
The legalist culture, along with a general disregard concerning managerial 
professionalism inside the administration, are two important factors that 
have contributed to the reduced effectiveness of reforms in Romania. Finally, 
it is worth mentioning that, while in western countries the market has been 
a very strong source of pressure for the public sector to become more effici-
ent and cost-effective, its role in Romania has been reduced (the free private 
market is less developed, and has a history of less than 15 years in Romania)
10.3.5.  Pre-Bureaucracy towards Post-Bureaucracy 
One common problem with analyzing and understanding reforms in 
Central and Eastern Europe is the applicability of western type reform mo-
dels. Can they be imported? Do they work? Do they bring the same benefits 
as in western Europe? Evidently, there is no straightforward answer; as the 
contextual factors are immensely important for the success of such initia-
tives, the major challenge is the adoption of post-bureaucratic measures in 
a pre-bureaucratic administrative system. Post-bureaucratic reforms stem 
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from the general idea that the traditional administrative model is obsolete 
and incapable of solving the complex problems of modern society. Pollitt 
and Bouckaert (2011) classify these post-bureaucratic reform movements in 
three major categories – New Public Management (NPM), Neo-weberian 
State (NwS), and New Public governance (NPg).  Being a reform approach 
of the „1980s”, NPM is the only reform movement that has already been eva-
luated both in Europe and Romania. NMP type changes started mainly after 
Romania‘s EU accession process initiated (1997), and were mostly focused on 
public administration organization and functioning − civil service reform, 
decentralization process, cost-saving measures, reducing state apparatus, 
and more recently, reform of the education system89 (Dan, 2015). NPM type 
initiatives regarding the health system (especially regarding co-payment and 
a more prominent role of the private sector) did not find too much support 
from the public. It is difficult to evaluate the impact of these reforms90 – 
on the one hand, the most recent ones have coincided with the financial 
economic crises, thus especially cost-cutting measures and downsizing were 
inevitable, while on the issues relating to effectiveness, efficiency, quality of 
services, it seems that Romania is still falling behind – with international 
reports indicating major issues regarding poor management of state-owned 
companies, EU funds absorption, and poor public governance (EC Country 
Report, 2015; CEPA91, 2014). Referring to to the other two paradigms – Neo-
weberian State and New Public governance – they are relatively new even 
on a  theoretical level, with continuous debates regarding their form and 
content, indicating no universal model at least regarding NPg (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2011; Torfing and Triantafillou, 2013). A recent research on the 
influence of cultural antecedents on civil servants (Țiclău, Hințea, 2016) in-
dicates a higher preference for NwS structures in administration with ”fol-
lowing organization rules, guidelines, and orders” and ”conducting business 
in an impartial way” − seen as the most important elements of an ”ideal” 
89   Law 1/2011 with a clear focus on budgeting based on the results and performance, although it 
has been changed immediately after the 2012 elections and instalment of a new government.
90  Measures with the highest impact were taken during the crisis period (2009−2011) and were 
focused on reducing the public deficit through cost-cutting measures across the board, inclu-
ding a 25% reduction in salaries for public officials, along with a general downsizing of the state 
apparatus – 223 executive agencies were reduced  to 112. For more on this see Boc, 2011; Mora, 
Țiclău, 2012; Hințea, 2011.
91  Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). For full report please see reference section.
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administrative system (ibid. 145). However, further research on the topic is 
needed, and would offer a more accurate picture of which of the three mo-
dels is preferred by civil servants.
The historical evolution of Romania (including the communist period) 
has placed the administrative system in a situation where it needs to over-
come two major challenges linked  both to the ideal model of a bureaucracy 
and to the modern approaches of PAR: (1) reducing political influence and 
professionalization of the civil service, and (2) adopting specific managerial 
principles (cost standards, budgeting by objectives, performance manage-
ment, TQM, benchmarking, Program Planning Budgeting Systems) along 
with maintaining the ethos of the public sector (fairness, representation, 
equitable treatment, non-discrimination). This is a complex task with which 
the Romanian public administration struggles to both understand and im-
plement. Compared to its western counterparts, Romania did not have the 
“luxury” of organically developing its bureaucracy (because of its communist 
past), hence the challenge is much more difficult. It has to transform a pre-
bureaucratic system into a modern post-bureaucratic one while skipping the 
bureaucratic phase, and (paradoxically) retaining the positive elements of 
the weberian model (professionalization, competence, impartiality). This is 
probably the biggest challenge faced (and still facing) by the post-commu-
nist Romania (Hințea, 2011: 182).
10.3.6. Context of Reform
Finally, context is another specific factor that must be thoroughly ana-
lyzed in order to understand PAR and its chances for success. In the case of 
Romania, several elements are noteworthy:  
•	 Macroeconomic evolutions: In a certain sense of irony, the most am-
bitious reforms have been adopted in the period of economic crisis 
when resources were scarce and the sectors seemed untouchable until 
then (restructuring of central administration, financial restructuring, 
educational reform, pension system reform – see Boc 2011, Mora, 
Țiclău, 2012). On the other han, the period of economic growth has 
been marred by the lack of strategic vision regarding development – 
in 2011, Romania had over 40,000 investment projects that already 
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started but have not been finalized yet92– adoption of modern finan-
cial tools (multi-annual budgets) remains an ambition, investment 
in innovation and research to develop competitive advantage being 
reduced or stagnating at best.93 A simple explanation for such a sharp 
contrast is best described by the aphorism necessity is the mother of 
all motivation. 
•	 Socio-cultural evolutions: Understanding the cultural paradigm, 
and especially the specifics of both national and administrative cul-
ture, is essential for the reform process as this is directly linked to the 
success of the reform (March, Olsen, 1995). Trust between citizens 
and public authorities, and between the state institutions themselves 
is a cultural specific factor. In Romania, this relation is characterized 
by reduced public trust in the capacity of the state to solve citizens 
problems (IRES, 2016), while the administration does not see citizens 
as partners but rather as ”administered” beneficiaries, leading to a 
vicious circle of suspicion − a problem which cannot be resolved just 
through regulation. Lack of trust translates into poor communication 
and specific behavioral changes where bending rules, finding loopho-
les, or directly not complying with the rules becomes acceptable on a 
large scale. An example of this (Preda, grigoraș, 2011) is the establis-
hing of disability pensions – their number has exploded from 208,000 
in 1990 to 892,000 in 2008 (430%); moreover, in some counties over 
30% of pensions were granted as disability pensions while in other 
counties their percentage was much lower, i.e. between 6% and 8%. 
This indicates systemic problems regarding how these benefits (cri-
teria being too lax) are given combined with a development of fraud 
networks and tolerance of rule bending. Migration has also been an 
important influence on PAR. Positive effects range from large finan-
cial capital sent back by migrant workers94 combined with higher 
92  Declaration of Mugur Isărescu, Head of Romanian National Bank at the Cgg Economic Forum, 
Bucharest (2011). Full declaration can be found at: http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-finante_
banci-8373912-mugur-isarescu-are-nevoie-aceasta-tara-nu-bani-antreprenori.htm.
93  According to EUROSTAT, R&D financing has been decreasing in the last 3 years (2013-2015), 
reaching a meagre 0.38% of gDP, thus being in last place at the EU level, although Romania has 
enjoyed economic growth.
94  In 2014, 4,2 billion euro have been sent back to Romania by Romanian migrants working in 
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expectations regarding public service quality because of exposure to 
public services in the west, while there is a downside to increasing 
the number of children left to be cared for by other people than their 
parents. Romanians working or living abroad have had a major influ-
ence on the last two presidential elections (2009 and 2014): in 2009, 
while in country votes indicated one candidate as winner, the addi-
tional votes coming from Romanian expatriate voters changed the 
result, while in 2014, the news that people were waiting for more than 
12 hours to vote caused a public outrage regarding one of the candi-
dates, increased public participation to vote in the second round, and 
basically provided the victory for the opposition candidate.95
•	 Political factors: they are diverse and mixed. Lack of strategic pers-
pective regarding reform, with the notable exception of accession to 
NATO and the EU an objective that found support through the entire 
political spectrum (this is a reflection of high public support for a 
western direction of development in an attempt to brake away from 
the communist past). High politicization of the public sector mani-
fested throughout the entire administrative apparatus (central admi-
nistration, local administration, state-owned companies, and central 
agencies) has led to major deficiencies in management quality of pu-
blic organizations, high instability of human resource, lack of strate-
gic perspective, low motivation of civil servants (wB, 2011, 2013).
•	 Technology: Although Romania is still playing catch-up regarding 
e-government and access to online public services, its evolution has 
been dramatic. The number of Internet users has more than tripled 
between 2002 and 2013, from 1,7 million users to 6,4 million in 2013, 
and 8,8 million in 2015. Moreover, Romania ranked 6th worldwide 
in 2015 according to Techinsider96 regarding average peak Internet 
speed. A major impact is also felt in the labor market where more 
than 75,000 people work for 14,000 IT companies with revenues of 
the EU, mostly in Italy in Spain, a figure larger than total net foreign investments according to 
Romanian National Bank.
95   Public participation to the second round of the Presidential election was 57% in 2000, and 55% 
in 2004, 58% in 2009, and 64% in 2014 (source: National Electorate Bureau).
96  Ranking available online at: http://www.techinsider.io/akami-global-internet-speeds-ran-
kings-2015-9.
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over 4 billion euro in 2014 (Euractiv, 2015).97
The context analysis implies the understanding both the evolution of 
these factors and how they interact and influence reform (considered toget-
her). It is a difficult, complex but necessary analysis, in its absence, resistan-
ce to change is almost impossible to overcome.  In Romania, resistance to 
change has been strong and diverse, and the anti-reform discourse has been 
growing from two arguments:
•	 In essence, reform is desirable and positive but is not appropriate at 
present as there are more urgent issues that need resolution;
•	 Romania is a special case where western ideas and policies of reform 
should and cannot be applied.
Regarding the local context, political support and technical (or manage-
rial) capacity for reform are indispensable for ensuring success. Romania has 
had in most situations one of the two unfortunate combinations: (1) politi-
cal desire for change but without the necessary technical know-how, or (2) 
well-documented policy proposals that lack the necessary political support. 
Although most of the blame for failures or limited success of reforms is 
commonly placed on politicians, low managerial capacity for reform imple-
mentation (present at all system levels) contributes to these letdowns. Lack 
of a managerial culture inside the public sector, lack of technical expertise 
in both local and central government, low number of think-thanks able to 
offer policy expertize, low involvement of the academic sphere (universi-
ties) in providing know-how on specific policy issues are some of the causes 
for the overall low managerial (or administrative) capacity. Even though the 
administrative system does not have sufficient managerial capacity it is also 
not very open to bring in such expertize from other fields. A recent study 
(Hințea, Profiroiu, Țiclău, 2015: 37) indicates that universities are the least 
involved partners in strategic planning initiatives at the local level with less 
than 20% of local administration involving representatives from the acade-
mia in different stages of the planning process (compared to the business 
sector which goes as high as 60% individual citizens which are involved in 
almost 90% of the cases). 
97  Article available online at: http://www.euractiv.ro/economic/industria-it-din-romania-14.000-
de-companii-75.500-de-angajati-si-venituri-totale-de-4-mld.-euro-2722.
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10.4. Specifics of the Administrative System. Civil Service, 
Decentralization, Agencification, Public Funding
In this section, we analyze the evolution of the administrative system 
in the last 20 years. Special attention is given to the civil service, process of 
decentralization, agencification, and public financing of administrative appa-
ratus. Our purpose is twofold: (1) highlight the specifics of the system, and 
(2) point to the key reforms that shaped it into what it is today. 
10.4.1. Civil Service
Romania can be considered a slow starter98 regarding civil service 
reform as legal establishment of a formal civil service came through the 
adoption of the Law No. 188/1999 on the Statute of Civil Servants − a com-
prehensive law regulating most facets of the organization and functioning 
of the civil service. Coupled with the adoption of the Law No. 7/2004 on 
the Code of Conduct for Civil Servants, hereinafter referred to as: the Code 
of Conduct, focused on professional conduct and integrity criteria, they 
represent the backbone regulation for the civil service. The first piece of 
regulation, divides civil servants into three major categories (based on res-
ponsibility/hierarchic position):99   
 − Execution civil servants – lower level civil servants with execution 
positions (high school degree; − over 90% of all civil servants),
 − Managerial civil servants – middle management positions in the lo-
cal or central administration (need a undergraduate university de-
gree; − approx. 11%),
 − Senior Civil Servants (SCS) – highest ranked civil servants occupying 
highest non political positions, mostly central government (need a 
undergraduate university degree + graduation of the specific pro-
gram for SCS − approx 0.15% of civil servants, or between 240 and 
260 in absolute numbers).
98  Introduction of Civil Service Statute in other EEC: Hungary in 1992; Estonia in 1995; Poland in 
1998; Bulgaria, Lithuania, Albania in1999; Latvia in 2000).
99  Part of the information included in this section has been previously published in Hinţea, C., Ţiclău, 
T., ”Training of Senior Civil Servants In Eastern European Countries. The case of Romania”, In: 
Montgomery Van wart, Annie Hondeghem, Erwin Schwella (Eds), Leadership and Culture. Com-
parative Models of Top Civil Servant Training, Palgrave Macmillan: 103−118, 2015.
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All civil servants are appointed through a general public contest while SCS 
positions are filled through a special national contest. Likewise, all public acti-
vity of civil servants must be in accordance with the principles of legality and 
impartiality, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness, accountability, orienta-
tion towards citizens, stability and hierarchical subordination. This can be seen 
as a combination of values, like fairness and social justice (legality, impartiality, 
transparency, and accountability), orientation towards results (efficiency and 
effectiveness, orientation towards citizens), and bureaucratic values (stability 
and hierarchical subordination).
However, legality or adherence to the law seems to be the top priority of 
civil servants (of any class) as the obligation to obey the law expressed through 
policies and procedures specific to their positions supersedes other loyalties to-
wards either their institution or their superior as they can refuse to execute an 
order if that order is not according to the law (Art. 45, Law 188/1999) with the 
condition to motivate their decision in writing, and at the same time, signal the 
unlawful order to a superior. This was latter reinforced through the introduction 
of a specific model of conduct (Art. 6, Law No. 7/2004 on the Code of Conduct) 
– loyalty towards the Constitution and the Law. The responsibility regarding im-
plementation, evaluation, and general monitoring of code of conduct infringe-
ment falls in the jurisdiction of the National Agency for Civil Servants (NACS) 
which is the main institutional body responsible for the full management of the 
civil service (raging from regulation, control, and enforcement).  
The National Agency of Civil Servants (NACS) is a central agency under 
the Ministry of Public Administration, and ”is responsible for formulating the 
policies and strategies concerning the management of public positions and 
civil servants, drafts and advises normative acts concerning public positions 
and civil servants, monitors and controls the implementation of legislation 
concerning the public position and the civil servants, etc.” (government Order 
No. 1000/2006). NACS is also responsible for the annual development plan for 
public functions in the central administration, and regulates the appointment, 
promotion, and dismissal of civil servants as well as any situation of conflict 
or breach of ethics. Lastly, NACS has full responsibility regarding training and 
professional development programs for civil servants in general, including SCS. 
Management of the public function is based on a National Development (or 
Occupation) Plan which defines the maximum number of public positions for 
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each category and for each type of recruitment or employment (promotion, 
external selection, appointment, creation, etc.). 
Regarding ethics and integrity, Romania represents one of the most pro-
gressive civil law jurisdictions to attempt to regulate civil servants’ conduct re-
garding ethics and integrity (Bryane, 2008), with the main piece of legislation 
being the Code of Conduct, although some provisions are overlapping with 
other laws.100 The Code of Conduct aims at promoting ethical values within the 
civil service in order to help civil servants provide “excellent” public services 
(Art. 5), establishing a set of principles of professional conduct, loyalty of civil 
servants towards the law, their agency and public interest, regulates communi-
cation with the members of the public, and re-iterates the prohibition against 
taking gifts and bribes, similar to many of the provisions found in other EU 
ethics laws (Bryane, 2008).
Figure 10.3: Areas Regulated by the Code of Conduct for Civil Servants
Chapter I: Field of Application and General Principles
Article 1: Field of Application                                                   Article 2: Purpose
Article 3: general Principles                                                    Article 4: Terms
 
Chapter II: General Norms of Moral and Professional Conduct for Civil Servants
Article 5: To provide a high quality public service                    Article 6: Loyalty to the law
Article 7: Loyalty to public authorities and institutions              Article 8: Freedom of opinion
Article 9: Public activity                                                              Article 10: Political activity
Article 11: Use of image                                                  Article 12: Relationships
Article 13: International relations                                                Article 14: Restrictions on gifts
Article 15: Participation in decision making                                Article 16: Objectivity
Article 17: Use of political prerogatives                           Article 18: Use of public 
                                                                                                                    resources
Article 19: Restricted participation in public contracts   
 
Chapter III: Institutional Arrangements
Article 20: The public institution in charge                                 Article 21: Notification
Article 22: Settling the case                                                       Article 23: Publicity on                    
                                                                                                                    reported cases
Chapter IV: Final Provisions
Article 24: Accountability                                                           Article 25: Harmonization of 
                                                                                                                   internal rules
Article 26: Publicity                                                                  Article 27: Enforcement
Source: Bryane, 2008: 305.
100   Law No. 188/1999 on the Statute of Civil Servants or recent orders of the NACS.
409Public AdministrAtion reform in romAniA After 25 YeArs
As expected, implementation, evaluation, and general monitoring of 
ethics code infringement is mainly the responsibility of NACS. Through the 
Law No. 50/2007,101 the positions of ethics counselor was introduced, named 
by the head of the institution from the HR department, with twofold res-
ponsibilities at the institutions level: (1) offer consultancy and support to 
other civil servants regarding issues of ethics and integrity, and (2) monitor 
and report on the application and conformity with the Code of Conduct. 
whereas in western countries (the US, the Uk, Holland), the main focus 
is on counselling and offering support, in Romania the main focus (judging 
by the detailed regulation) is on monitoring and reporting.102 Though the 
NACS is mostly responsible for collecting complaints regarding ethics issues 
and following up on them, the ethics counsellors are the ones who actually 
need to constantly monitor this activity inside the institution, and report 
directly to the head of the institution who, in turn, forwards these reports to 
the NACS. A unitary way of reporting has been adopted since 2008 (Order 
No. 4500/2008 of the President of NACS). A recent change made in 2015 
offers ethics councilors the possibility to report directly to the NACS using 
an online platform. 
The National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2012−2015103 requires a self-
evaluation regarding the use and effectiveness of anti-corruption measures 
for each public institution. The NACS activity reports for 2013 and 2014 
mention that around 822 institutions (representing about 60% of civil ser-
vants) have submitted reports regarding these measures. The conclusion 
drawn from them is that ”too little attention was given to identifying the 
causes of ethics and integrity infringement”. 
Sanctions applied each year for breaching the Code of Conduct vary 
from 500 to 550, which means around 0.004% in total of approx. 130,000 civil 
servants have breached the Code of Conduct, and have thus been sanctioned. 
101 Law No. 50/2007 amending the consul of Conduct, available online at: http://lege5.ro/gratuit/
geydomjqhe/legea-nr-50-2007-pentru-modificarea-si-completarea-legii-nr-7-2004-privind-co-
dul-de-conduita-a-functionarilor-publici.
102 For a comparative analysis on the role of ethics councilers see Laura Ștefan – Scurtă analiză com-
parativă a statului și competențelor consilierilor de etică, avăilable online at: http://www.anfp.
gov.ro/R/Doc/2015/Proiecte/Incheiate/PHARE%202005%20017%20553%20010301/Scurta%20
analiza%20comparativa%20-%20consilieri%20de%20etica%20final.doc.
103 National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2012−2015, available online at: http://sna.just.ro/sna/
sna20122015.aspx.
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An important influence in this area has come from the National Anti-
Corruption Directorate (DNA) which has intensified its activity in the last years, 
leading to more then 50% of the Presidents of County Councils being investiga-
ted for corruption while the DNA’s 2015 report104 states that public acquisition 
sector is plagued by generalized corruption. Other numbers are also alarming: 
1,250 individuals indicted for high and medium corruption (from which over 
100 mayors and presidents of county councils); sums coming from bribes re-
ached 430 million euro (similar sum was allocated for the national highway 
program for 2016−2018) while the number of dignitaries sent to trial (27 in 
total) is 5 times higher in 2015 compared to 2013. Clearly, corruption is one of 
the major (if not the biggest) problem facing Romania also in 2016. 
10.4.2. Reform and Decentralization Process
Decentralization is one of the six basic principles of organization and 
functioning of thee local public administration.105  The actual meaning of de-
centralization is defined more clearly in Law No. 195/2006 which states that 
it is the transfer of administrative and financial competence from central to 
local administration or private sector. Two elements are worth noting here, 
i.e. only financial and administrative competence are transferred (not political 
ones), and they can be transferred including to the private sector. Decentra-
lization of authority should be done in respecting the following additional 
principles: principle of subsidiarity; principle of ensuring resources adequate 
to the competences transferred; principle of responsibility of local govern-
ment authorities in relation to their powers; principle of ensuring a process 
of decentralization that is stable, predictable, based on objective rules and 
criteria; principle of equity that involves ensuring access of all citizens to pu-
blic services and public utility services; principle of budgetary constraint pro-
hibiting the use of special transfers or subsidies by the central government 
to cover the final deficits of local budgets. Other aspects worth mentioning 
are: (1) introduction of cost and quality standards regarding public service 
provision (established by the central government and adopted starting from 
2009); (2) classification of exclusive, shared, and delegated competences, and 
104 Available online at: http://www.pna.ro/obiect2.jsp?id=248.
105  The 6 principles according to the Law No. 215/2001 (Art. 2) are: local authonomy, decentraliza-
tion, deconcentration, legality, eligibility, and consultation of citizens in issues of public interest.
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(3) transfer of competences based on the level of administrative capacity, and 
only after an objective and comprehensive evaluation (Carp, Sienerth, 2014). 
All these are meant to increase the quality of the process and link decentra-
lization to another essential element − administrative capacity. In this sense, 
the central government has to do a prior evaluation of the capacity the local 
authorities have before competences are transferred, and this happens only if 
local authorities have the necessary administrative capacity to actually take 
on new responsibilities. Economic efficiency regarding public services deli-
vered in a decentralized manner, and the size of territorial areas where the 
public services’ beneficiaries are located are also the criteria used in decisions 
to decentralize (Dragoș Neamțu, 2007: 645). Finally, the obligation of pilo-
ting before actually transferring competence towards local authorities (done 
by the central government in collaboration with associative structures of the 
local authorities) is meant to offer empirical evidence for sectorial decentrali-
zation proposals that they are viable. 
Although the 2006 Law brings important improvements and clarity 
regarding decentralization, it still fails to take into consideration a series of 
European principles contained in the European Charter of Local Self-go-
vernment of the Council of Europe, ratified already in 1999 by Romania (law 
No. 199/1999). A more thorough comparison between national legislation 
and the EU Charter (Carp, Sienerth, 2014, p 1221) point to the following 2 
principles not being included in national legislation: (1) consultation of local 
authorities on decisions that affect them directly, and (2) proportionality of 
administrative control and intervention from central government. In 2013, a 
new law was passed by the Parliament which intended to further decentra-
lize a series of central competences in the field of agriculture, environment, 
health, pre-universitary education, culture, sports, and specific competences 
regarding metro in Bucharest. However, the law was declared unconstitutio-
nal by the Constitutional Court (Decision No. 1/2014 of the Constitutional 
Court), whereas the most important reason being that the proposal was not 
respecting several principles imposed by the Framework Law On Decentrali-
zation No. 195/2006.  
Decentralization has been a constant topic on the PAR agenda, being set 
as a priority in all official reform initiatives in the last 15 years (see Table 10.4 
below), and started with the adoption of Law No. 215/2001 on Local Public 
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Administration, and continued with the adoption of the first Framework Law 
On Decentralization No. 339/2004 (replaced by the Law No. 195/2006).106  
Figure 10.4: Public Administration Reform Strategies in Romania
Year Reform strategy
Type of reform 
approach 
(NPM/NWS/
NPG)
Decentrali-
zation as a stra-
tegic objective
2001
government Strategy for the Accelera-
tion of Public Administration Reform, 
2001–2003
NwS mostly Yes
2004 governments Updated Strategy for Pu-blic Administration Reform 2004–2006 NwS Yes
2007
National Plan for Development 
2007–2013107 (NPD), National Strategic 
Reference Framework
Mostly NPM Not directly
2011–
2015
National Reform Program 2011–2013, 
2014, 2015 NPM mostly Partially
108
2014–
2020
Strategy for consolidation of public admi-
nistration 2014–2020
Mixed 
(NPM&NPg) Yes
109
The first PAR Strategy (2001) was focused on four major pillars: (1) 
structural reform – better regulation of central and local administration res-
ponsibilities along with regulation of interactions with citizens; (2) decen-
tralization process; (3) professional civil service and better public services 
(reduced political influence, professional development); and (4) open admi-
106 The first Framework Law On Decentralization No. 339/2004) was replaced by the Law No. 195/2006 
without even actually being put into practice (see more on this in Carp, Sienerth, 2014).
107  After the accession to the EU, Romania had to develop strategic plans in accordance to the EU 
priorities in order to access financing. Thus, although these plans, including the NPD, had refer-
ences regarding public administration, their main objective was to fulfill the EU legal require-
ment and facilitate the EU funds absorbtion by offering necessary legal framework in accessing 
these funds. This is in line with our previous evaluation regarding lack of strategic, ideologically 
driven reforms. 
108 Decentralization is not defined as a clear strategic objective but is referred to as a priority in the 
sectors of public administration (capacity development in corellation with decentralization), 
education, health care.
109 The current reform decentralization has moved from a general strategic objective to a specific 
objective, specifically focused on financial decentralization.
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nistration and citizen oriented services (NPM element). The adoption of 
the strategy also lead to institutional changes with the notable introduction 
of the Central Unit for Public Administration Reform (UCRAP) which had 
the role of coordinating and monitoring of all PAR measures which later 
introduced the Common Assessment Framework (CAF) as a pilot study in 
2005 (for more see Băcălă, Bibu, 2013).
The second PAR Strategy (2004) was a continuation of the first one but 
reformulating the priorities, such as (1) reform of the civil service (profes-
sional development), (2) reform of local public administration through de-
centralization, and (3) better public policy process (increased managerial 
capacity to implement public policy). Adopted in 2004, it offered continuity 
but actual results were mediocre with little progress made (according to the 
European Commission’s annual report in 2005).110
After the EU accession, Romania adopted the National Plan for Develo-
pment (NPD)111 and the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF)112 
which were very comprehensive strategic planning documents aimed at deve-
loping the necessary structural instruments for EU fund absorption. Although 
not PAR strategies per se, they both featured a special section on PAR with the 
main focus on development of administrative capacity. A specific Operational 
Programme was introduced with two priority axis (NSRF, 2007: 147−148): 
•	 Priority Axis 1. Structural and process improvements to the public 
policy management cycle (with the objective of developing policy 
formulation capacity, better regulation, strategic planning, and in-
ter-institutional partnership working; improving accountability and 
overall organizational effectiveness);
•	 Priority Axis 2. Improved quality and efficiency of the delivery of public 
services on a decentralized basis (with the aim of developing structural 
and process change arising for decentralization initiatives and impro-
ving the quality and efficiency of delivery of public services locally).
110 European Commision − Romania 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report, available online at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2005/sec1354_cmr_master_ro_
college_en.pdf.
111 Available online at: http://arhiva.fonduri-structurale.ro/Document_Files//PND/00000051/
txs06_PND_2007_2013.pdf.
112 Available online at: http://arhiva.fonduri-structurale.ro/Document_Files//docutile/00000049/
txp84_CSNR_final_EN.pdf.
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In short, the focus was on developing managerial capacity to manage the 
EU financial resources and improving overall effectiveness of services.
During the 2011−2014 period, the financial crisis was the major factor 
that shaped the government actions, including the measures it took in the 
field of public administration, i.e. a series of national strategic documents 
(called National Reform Programs) which had the role of guiding the central 
government throughout the crisis period. The structure of these documents 
was based on the Europe 2020 strategy, but PAR was not specifically defined 
as a priority. However, all of these documents included PAR-like measures 
as most of them focused on further developing administrative and manage-
rial capacity, better and more effective regulatory process, improved public 
policy process, increased administrative efficiency and transparency. These 
were measures taken under the pressure of international partners (European 
Commision, world Bank, IMF) in exchange for financial assistance during 
this period. Measures taken in the field of public administration were adopted 
grounded on a series of functional reviews done by the world Bank.113 Most 
of the measures can be included in the NPM category with increased transpa-
rency and accountability entering the NPg type of measures.
The last PAR Strategy, adopted in 2014 (Strategy for Consolidation of 
Public Administration 2014−2020), was developed starting from the Europe 
2020 priorities. Based on a thorough analysis of previous international re-
ports (wB, EC) but also different internal reports, six key problem areas for 
intervention were identified: (1) influence of politics in PA/politicization, 
(2) poor resource allocation from the national budget, (3) ambiguous and 
overlapping responsibilities between central and local government, (4) lack 
of transparency of governmental activity, (5) lack of trust in state institu-
tions, and (6) low professionalization of the civil service. Thus the strategic 
objectives of the strategy were:
•	 Clear institutional mandates both centrally and locally (adapted to the 
citizens’ needs);
•	 Increased managerial capacity and professionalization of the civil ser-
vice;
•	 De-bureaucratization and simplification of regulation;
•	 Increased local autonomy and decentralization of services;
113  For full information please see reference section on the wB reports.
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•	 Increased access and higher quality of public services (cost effective-
ness).
It is still early to evaluate the impact of the last strategy but there are po-
sitive signs regarding transparency and simplification of regulation with the 
new government114 (headed by a technocrat Prime Minister), adopting an 
online free public access platform115 with full disclosure and public spending 
of both central and local government. As recently as June 2016, a new set of 
measures was adopted aimed at cutting the bureaucratic burden on citizens 
by reducing the number of documents solicited for different services and pro-
viding them only once no matter what services they access (drivers licence, 
passport issueing, ID issueing, taxes payment) along with a series of measures 
that, increase the digitalization of the administration.116 The measures were 
taken based on direct citizen input through an online platform opened speci-
fically for this purpose.117 
Looking at these measures we can definitely see both NPM type changes 
(effectiveness, cost-cutting, de-bureaucratization) but also the NPg ones (in-
creased transparency, openness to citizens and partnerships with civil society 
to develop better services, digitalization).
10.4.3. Public Funding and Agencification
One important element of decentralization is the transfer of financial 
resources from central to local budgets. Fiscal decentralization means each 
local authority has its own budget, local budgetary resources being made up 
of (in descending order): VAT amounts, shares from income tax, other local 
revenues, subsidies, local taxes, and donations (gyorgy, Câmpeanu, gyorgy, 
2011). Through decentralization, local authorities have received supplemen-
tary ”financial responsibilities (the primary and secondary education, social 
assistance services, the decentralized cultural institutions, public health ser-
vices, etc.) but did not receive full financial autonomy for these assigned res-
ponsibilities as the state budget allocates amounts as quotas from the state 
114 The current technocratic government took office in December 2015 after a fire killed 64 people 
which lead to massive protests against the left-wing led government which was in office between 
2012 and 2015.
115 URL of the online  platform: www.transparenta-bugetara.gov.ro.
116 For more on these measures please consult: http://ithub.gov.ro/.
117 The platform is available online at: http://maisimplu.gov.ro/.
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budget revenues – mainly from VAT and the income tax- toward the local 
budgets” (Dincă, Dincă, 2009, p.107), this being a certain limitation regar-
ding financial autonomy, as these quotas need to be approved both by Minis-
try of Finance and Parliament (state budget law). 
Although the Local Public Finances Law (Law No. 273/2006) introduced 
clear criteria regarding budget distribution and quotas, there are still certain 
ambiguities of the legal framework that lead to unfavorable effects regarding 
budget distribution. Distribution of financial resources for local public servi-
ces (deconcentrated) is in most cases done based on subjective criteria as the 
law defines the general amount that will be offered for those services but not 
the criteria local authorities (county level) should use in order to distribute 
these resources, ending up with a system based on subjective, mostly politi-
cal distribution of financial resources (Constantinescu, 2015). Along with the 
transfers from the national budget, the other two financing sources for local 
authorities are local taxation (local authorities have a 20% up/down margin 
of change) and  credit (loans) that can go up to 30% of total local incomes. 
Overall, in 2014, local administration has contributed 25% of revenues for the 
national budget and 23.1% on budgetary expenditures.118 
Another important issue is self-financing capacity of local authorities – 
the capacity of local authorities to finance the costs of their activity through 
their own resources. Unfortunely, self-financing capacity is quite low as data 
from the Ministry of Development and Public Administration for 2014 show 
that, on average, only 43.2% of local authorities revenues (city/town halls and 
county councils) come from own generated sources while the rest of almost 
57% come from transfers from the state budget. As expected, big cities and 
in general more developed urban areas are able to contribute with own reve-
nues to their budget in a higher percentage. The biggest problems are found 
in rural areas where only in 9 counties (out of 41)119 town halls are able to 
fully generate the financial resources necessary to support basic personnel 
expenditures. This evidently drastically limits the level of autonomy that these 
local authorities have, leading to massive migration (political clientelism) of 
118 Source: National Institute of statistics.
119  A synthesis of this analysis is available online at: http://www.analizeeconomice.ro/2016/04/cat-
din-cheltuielile-de-personal-ale.html, while full data are found on the official website of the Ministry 
of Regional Development and Public Administration, online here: http://www.dpfbl.mdrap.ro/sit_ven_
si_chelt_uat.html.
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mayors towards the party that comes into power in central government.  
Surprisingly. this was intentionally encouraged by the central govern-
ment through a series of measures: an increase of funds allocated by the cen-
tral government through the Ministry of Regional Development towards local 
administration and a change in legislation120 that offered mayors the chance 
to change the party they got elected with without losing their mandate (as the 
law provisioned until then). A thorough study (EFOR Policy Brief 45, 2016) 
done for the 2012−2015 period reached the following conclusions: 
•	 Increase in funds destined to local administration121 from the Minis-
try of Regional through the National Program for Local Development 
in 2013 coupled with the possibility to change parties for mayors and 
local or county councilors led to a migration of 552 mayors (approx. 
17% out of a total of 3,181 mayors), 4,607 local councilors and 184 
county councilors;
•	 60% of the funds went to communes/town halls in rural areas;
•	 Probability to get financing doubled if mayors were in the same party 
in central government;
•	 Level of resources increased during the election years, and they were 
spent by local authorities on projects that were not urgent or remained 
unfinished after the election;
•	 Major factor leading to this is discretionary allocation of these funds 
as there are no legal criteria defined regarding how they will be allo-
cated. 
In the light of this, financial decentralization is more present formally 
through legal provisions, and has had a positive impact mainly on bigger 
communities (municipalities), the rural areas being unable to generate suffi-
cient funds to cover own personnel and basic functioning costs. Recent efforts 
made by the central government to increase transparency by launching an 
online platform where the public can access openly information about budge-
tary execution (see previous section on reform) and public expenditures of 
almost all public institutions122 is a step in the right direction.
120  The government adopted an urgency ordinance (OUg) 55/2014 that was declared later uncon-
stitutional by the Constitutional Court. 
121  This was done through a urgency ordinance (OUg 28/2013).
122  The online platform can be accessed at: http://www.transparenta-bugetara.gov.ro.
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Although decentralization in Romania played an important role in PAR 
and had a positive overall impact, several issues have troubled the process and 
minimized the potential positive effects: 
•	 Inconsistency, lack of coherence, and strategic approach of the process 
have led to major problems relating to coordination of policy at local le-
vel (Dragoș, Neamțu, 2007), overlapping competencies between different 
administrative levels, or poor transfer of competencies (new responsi-
bilities but without the necessary financial resources) (ibid., 2007: 639);
•	 Quality of services and general quality of the local governance process 
were very differentiated between local authorities, with the mediating 
variable being administrative capacity, especially decentralized finan-
cial capacity to finance public services (Bondar, 2014);
•	 Lack of coherence and strategic approach to the process has lead to 
ambiguity and misunderstanding regarding the purpose of the reform 
by civil servants (Profiroiu, et al., 2006) which in turn has seen higher 
resistance from inside the system toward PAR.
Regarding governmental agencies, Romania has approx. 125 of them, 
with their number dropping from 225 in 2009 when, amidst the fiscal crisis, 
the government promoted a bill that abolished, merged agencies or transfor-
med them into departments (Hintea, Hudrea, Balica, 2012: 313). Their formal 
inclusion as part of PAR started in 2001 with the government Strategy on 
Accelerating Public Administration (gASPA) reform which focused on cen-
tral government reform with clear elements of NPM –clear separation between 
political and administrative fields, and focus of central government on policy 
formulation and coordination (gASPA, 2001: 13). However, besides general re-
marks on the need of a more effective central government, no specific decisions 
or subsequent policies were adopted. It was not until the adoption of the Strate-
gy for Better Regulation in Central Government (2008−2013) which specifically 
targeted central agencies that the focus was on improving legislation regarding 
organization, functioning, and regulation of central government agencies.123   
The EU played an important role in the agencification in Romania, both 
through requirements during the accession process, regulations or require-
ments for specific agency type structures to manage or regulate certain policy 
areas (Hințea, Hudrea, Balica, 2012: 316). The relation between parent minis-
123  Measure 7.1 from the Strategy for Better Regulation in Central government (2008−2013).
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tries and agencies, with respect to autonomy and control, is characterized by 
(adapted from Hințea, Hudrea, Balica, 2011, 2012): 
1. Concerning autonomy − agencies have a quite high level concerning 
policy decisions on ”how” to provide goods or services, medium le-
vel of autonomy regarding personnel management (higher levels of 
autonomy on operational decision but consultation with the parent 
ministry on strategic ones), and lower levels concerning financial ma-
nagement (with some influence on setting prices of goods/services 
but only with prior consultation with the parent ministry); 
2. Concerning control − agencies tend to establish objectives with less 
control from the parent ministries as they mostly exercise ex-post 
control through evaluation of results and audits, and have a high level 
of (financial) resource dependency. 
Lack of coherence and strategic approach is also found in the case of 
agencification process, lack of strategic vision regarding their role and evolu-
tion being a clear characteristic of the process (ibid. 2012: 321). 
10.5. Conclusion
PAR in Romania is a complex and atypical process that did not follow a 
linear path with different stages that evolved at different speeds, influenced 
by quite divers factors. Our analysis points out to at least four major stages 
(Hințea, 2011: 180):
•	 Legislative reform: more prominent in the first years after the Revolu-
tion but still present today. There are two reasons for this: the real need 
for a coherent legal framework  specific for a democratic society, and a 
functioning state and a strong legalist tradition (which we documen-
ted earlier in this chapter);
•	 Reforms focused on structures and procedures (Baba, Chereches, 
Ticlau, Mora, 2009): new organizational forms, redefined adminis-
trative relations between institutions, new administrative procedu-
res. Decentralization falls into this category with continuous redefi-
nition of central-local government relations (Dragos, Neamtu, 2007), 
including mechanisms of control, level of autonomy, evaluation and 
performance measurement. Documents adopted starting from 2007 
(see section 10.4.2) and even the current PARStrategy devotes a major 
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section on structural adjustments, redefinition of institutional roles, 
responsibilities, along with better internal procedures. 
•	 Reforms focused on public policy: these include specific policies in-
troduced to resolve problems related to human resource management 
(HRM), financial allocation mechanisms, regulation reform, trans-
parency, etc. They have been the most common form of changes (as 
expected) because of the limited costs implied, quick effects, and po-
tential political capital gains for their promoters.
•	 Structural reforms: aim to bring a paradigmatic change, with a redefi-
nition of the role, organization and functioning of the state, the purpo-
se being an improved”rationalization” of state activities or actions. we 
point to the educational reform initiated in 2011, and the major chan-
ges taken between 2009−2011 mostly because of the financial crisis. 
At present, Romania finds itself at the beginning of a new (fifth) stage of 
PAR – the adoption of a managerial paradigm of western inspiration focused 
on two essential elements: quality of services and performance management. 
There are several initiatives that signal this paradigmatic shift. Although they 
still lack the ”structural” character, they are encouraging signs – one such 
example is the introduction of the city manager as a specific public position in 
the local institutional framework; introduction of mechanisms meant to sti-
mulate strategic planning efforts at the local level;  adoption of ITC in order to 
increase transparency and public access to services (see financial monitoring 
mechanisms for budgetary execution adopted in 2016).124
Concerning general state reform, Romania is facing at least three stra-
tegic problems (Hințea, 2011: 192):
 − Predictability and coherence (it is impossible to develop long-term 
strategies and policies because of frequent and unpredictable chan-
ges at the political, administrative, and legislative levels),
 − Managerial performance (low managerial culture, and implicitly 
low quality of public management in governmental institutions),
 − Rational use of public resources (linked to the first two, the is-
sue being primarily how resources are used (subjective, irrational, 
corrupt conduct) not necessarily the lack of resources).
By time-framing the PAR efforts, we can distinguish:
124  The online platform is available at: http://www.transparenta-bugetara.gov.ro.
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•	 The first strategic reform initiatives were adopted between 2000 and 
2006 (section 4.2) mostly stimulated by the external pressures co-
ming from the EC during the accession process.  
•	 A second stage between 2007 and 2012 had more structural charac-
ter, aiming a broader change (in large part due to the pressures of 
the economic crisis). This period has been characterized by a bigger 
comprehensive attempt to change key sectors of the state: education 
(new law on education), central government agency restructuring 
(reduction and re-organization of central agencies), labor market 
(adoption of a unitary public pay system to reduce inequality in pay 
inside the public sector), justice, pension system (new taxation rules 
and inclusion of social contributions also for retired citizens), fiscal 
management and budgeting (creation of Fiscal Council, attempts at 
making multi-annual budgets), and health care (which actually led 
to the fall of the government).The main drivers for these changes 
were again external (wB, IMF) in the context of the economic crisis.
•	 Finally, the third stage, starting with 2014, where a new Strategy for 
Public Administration Reform has been adopted along with a my-
riad of sectorial strategies. This is a major attempt from the govern-
ment to translate Europe 2020 objectives and guiding directions into 
national policies. The purpose is twofold: (1)this new approach pri-
marily aims to harmonize and reduce the gap between Romania and 
its western counterparts with regard to the functioning of the state, 
and (2) offer the necessary guiding framework for local administra-
tion to implement local strategies in a coherent framework.  
The examples mentioned above, (both those referring to structural re-
forms or sector specific ones) were selected because they showcase the speci-
fics of Romania’s PAR efforts in the last 25 years − a constant concern regar-
ding the legal framework or a continuous ”obsession” to professionalize the 
civil service and increase administrative efficiency. This combination (Hințea, 
2011: 193) of bureaucratic objectives (professionalization, legal framework) 
with post-bureaucratic ones (performance standards, rationing of expenditu-
res, open and transparent administration, stakeholder representation) illus-
trates very well a difficult challenge that the administration faces to create a 
system with both bureaucratic and post-bureaucratic features.
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11. Public Administration Reform in Bulgaria: 
Weberian Bureaucracy, New Public Management, 
and Good Governance at the Same Time
Tatyana Tomova, Simeon Petrov 
11.1. Introduction and Country Overview
This chapter presents and analyzes the development of public adminis-
tration reform in Bulgaria after the public transition from state socialism to 
democracy and market economy. The contribution explains the logic of the 
reform itself which began as part of the social transition but gained indepen-
dence, and gradually adopted three concepts behind which stand influential 
international organizations. The administrative reform in Bulgaria reflects 
the development of ideas of public administration that these organizations 
disseminate. The different stages of reform correspond to the change in these 
ideas. For that reason, the reform seems infinite, without its own goal and 
without significant results that society and citizens can feel.
The chapter is divided into four parts. The first three parts represent 
three stages in the development of the reform. The focus is on the measures 
taken consecutively due to the breaking with the heritage of the state soci-
alism, followed by the introduction of the model of weberian bureaucracy, 
New Public Management, and good governance. The fourth part presents 
the development of the model of decentralization in the country. The con-
clusion is that the reform is not aimed at introducing a comprehensive model 
but rather at introducing particular practices that conform to the prevailing 
knowledge of public administration.
Bulgaria is a country with a population of 7,153,784 people as of 31 De-
cember 2015. This population represents 1.4% of the total population of the 
EU. As of the same date, the number of employees in the general govern-
ment sector was 224,400125 representing 7.4% of the employed persons in the 
country. In 2008, the percent of people employed in the general government 
125  According to data from the NSI available at: http://www.nsi.bg/bg/node/14154. 
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sector was almost the same − it amounted to 7.0%. generally, the population 
of the country has decreased due to a relatively low birth rate and a high level 
of emigration. The number of employed people has also decreased − from 
3,360,700 in 2008 it dropped to 3,031,900 in 2015.    
The country’s economy after 2007126 developed in a way that is large-
ly determined by the global economic and financial processes. In 2009, the 
gDP growth has dropped significantly − the physical volume of GDP index 
compared to the previous year (gDP by production approach in the previous 
year prices, million levs) was 95.8. After 2009, GDP index stabilized at circa 
100 during the period tof 2014 (subject to some variation). In 2015, the gDP 
index reached 103.0127. Despite relatively favorable indicators of economic de-
velopment, Bulgaria is among the countries with a modest contribution to the 
gDP of the EU. In 2013, Bulgaria‘s gDP amounted to EUR 41 million, repre-
senting 0.29% of the total gDP of the EU. The gDP in PPS for 2013 was EUR 
86 million. gDP per capita for the same year in PPS was EUR 45 million, 
assuming that for the EU it is EUR 100 million. In absolute terms, this is equi-
valent to EUR 5,800 for Bulgaria versus EUR 27,300 for the EU as a whole128. 
This indicator for Bulgaria has the lowest value among the EU Member States.
The service sector has the main contribution for the economic develo-
pment. The share of employment in services (as % of total employment) is 
62.2% (the relevant share for the EU is 69.7%). The share of employment in 
agriculture is 6.4% (5.0% for the EU)129. Overall, the data shows that Bulgaria 
has a favorable development prospect at a very low-starting economic base 
and development trends which hinder the country‘s ability to overcome the 
gap with the other EU countries.
Bulgaria has a similar performance when considering social indicators. 
generally, the country is developing steadily, with positive trends, but the 
overall ranking remains relatively low, especially in comparison to other EU 
countries. According to the Human Development Index (HDI), Bulgaria 
126  In 2007, Bulgaria acceded to the EU.
127 According to data from the NSI available at: http://www.nsi.bg/en/content/5484/gdp-pro-
duction-approach-%E2%80%93-total-economy.
128 According to data from Eurostat available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/images/2/2d/gDP_at_current_market_prices%2C_2003%E2%80%9304_
and_2012%E2%80%9314_YB15.png.
129 According to data from UNDP available at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/
country-notes/BgR.pdf.
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ranks last among the EU Members States. Meanwhile, its progress is obvious. 
Bulgaria’s HDI value for 2014 is 0.782 − which placed the country in the “high 
human development” category − positioning it at 59th place out of 188 coun-
tries and territories. 
Between 1980 and 2014, Bulgaria’s HDI value increased from 0.665 to 
0.782 − an increase of 17.5%, or an average annual increase of about 0.48%. 
During the same period, Bulgaria’s life expectancy at birth increased by 3.0 
years, mean years of schooling increased by 2.6 years, and expected years of 
schooling increased by 3.2 years. Bulgaria’s gNI per capita increased to about 
117.2% between 1980 and 2014.130 The progress is stable but relatively slow, 
and does not allow the country to reach the EU average values.
In Bulgaria and in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), 
the transition period to democracy and market economy began immediately 
after the fall of the Berlin wall. The political transition is controversial, and 
the country is slowly overcoming the legacy of the past. The year 1997 is con-
sidered as the year after which radical reforms became possible. The transi-
tion to a market economy at the institutional level was developed successfully 
in the early years of transition period. However, the economic recovery is 
happening slowly, as after the exceptional drop, the level of gDP achieved in 
1989 was reached for the first time in 2005.
Bulgaria submitted its application for the EU membership in 1995, and 
in 2000, began accession negotiations with the EU. In 2007, along with Roma-
nia, the country became a full member of the EU. A specific mechanism for 
cooperation and verification was introduced, according to which the Europe-
an Commission monitors and assesses the country‘s progress in implemen-
ting reforms. The mechanism was introduced because of the agreement that 
further efforts are needed in key areas to address certain weaknesses in the 
judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organized crime.
11.2. PAR Overview: Three Stages and Concepts of Public Governance 
PAR in Bulgaria can be conditionally divided into three stages. The first 
stage developed in the early 1990’s and ended around 1993−1994. During 
this first stage, the reform as far as it was about a comprehensive reform, was 
130 According to data from UNDP available at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/
country-notes/BgR.pdf.
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strongly influenced by the agenda of the political transition. The second stage, 
which lasted until 2000, relates to the transfer of practices due to the financial 
dependence on global financial institutions and distribution of donor pro-
grams by various international organizations, including the EU. This second 
stage simultaneously introduced the reform concepts of traditional model of 
administration and New Public Management (NPM). The third stage, which 
continues to this day, is directed primarily to achieving the goal of the Euro-
pean conditionality. This stage enriches the reform with the concept of good 
governance. Each subsequent concept does not deny the previous one − on 
the contrary, they build upon such previous concepts. The emerging model 
of governance is a set of practices that meet the logic of the three concepts. 
11.2.1. First Stage of the Reform From State Socialism to Democracy 
PAR131 in Bulgaria started immediately after the beginning of the chan-
ges and initially, at least until the mid-1990’s, bears the marks of the transition 
from the state socialism to democracy and the attempt to break with the past. 
The bureaucracy inherited from the communist regime bears the scars of the 
previous social system, and is perceived more as a defender and conductor of 
the past. Its main feature is the relationship with the Communist Party. This 
relationship is expressed mainly in its selection based on political loyalty and 
affection as well as in its activities through which the will of the party is pri-
marily implemented, regardless of the existence of formal law.
The assessment of the inherited bureaucracy in Bulgarian society at this 
moment is contradictory. On the one hand, its political dependence, and espe-
cially its commitment to the Communist Party are seen more as a problem. On 
the other hand, society takes into account its professionalism, and there are 
distinct attempts to protect and preserve it. The fact that a substantial part of the 
population is directly or indirectly associated with the inherited bureaucracy, 
and lives thanks to the employment in the government sector due to the size of 
the public sector during the communist period, should not be underestimated. 
131 For the purposes of this chapter, we assume that the public administration covers all organiza-
tions at the state, regional and local levels, involved in achieving public goals and supplying of 
public services with competences and responsibilities according to the law. These are profession-
al organizations different from the representative political power, although they work together. 
Public administration is a specific concept emphasizing the openness and accountability of these 
organizations to the public and citizens.  
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The public debate on administration reform was not very strong during 
the first years of the transition, not only because of the controversial attitude 
towards the inherited administration but also because of the specific agenda 
of the transition period, which prioritized the transition to institutions and 
practices of market economy. In practice, the political programs of emerging 
parties do not resolve the problem of administration reform. At the same 
time, the need for change, including administration change, is perceived as 
something obvious. At the expert level, the position of almost all experts and 
politicians is that “almost nothing from the totalitarian period can serve the 
new structures and the new administration”. For this reason, the public admi-
nistration reform enters the priorities of almost all cabinets after 1989 (Пеев, 
2007: 1). The reasons for the change of administration mainly relate to the 
establishment of democratic institutions. 
At the expert level, the need for change in the public administration is pri-
marily associated with the need to reduce the size of the state and the redefi-
nition of its role. „During the transition period, Bulgaria has to define the role 
of the state in the emerging market environment. The state, which has had a 
monopoly over all the economic spheres, has to withdraw in order to exercise 
its sovereign functions and to create the milieu for the performance of economic 
agents. This is a continuous process, implying privatization, de-monopolization, 
creating of competitive markets, etc. Therefore, this policy, which aims at impro-
ving the performance of public administration, is to be considered within the 
context of the broader objectives of public sector reform“ (Borissova, 2001: 1).
Thus, the beginning of the public administration reform goes in two di-
rections. The first is related to the introduction of legal guarantees for political 
independence of the administration, whilst the second relates to the changing 
role of the state as a whole. The first goal was achieved very quickly and did 
not encounter any resistance or debate about what exactly should be done. 
The second goal is a matter of long transition which requires a comprehensive 
governance model.
The legislative change aiming at ensuring the political independence of 
the administration began in 1990 with the Law on Political Parties which re-
moved and prohibited the activity of all political organizations and parties 
in the state, district, and municipal institutions. The legal framework of the 
model of the new administration was introduced with the drafting and adop-
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tion of the new Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria in 1991. Notably, this 
was the time when the foundations for a change of the state government were 
placed by introducing the principle of political independence of the adminis-
tration. According to the Constitution, in the performance of their duties, pu-
blic servants shall be guided solely by the law and shall be politically neutral. 
It is envisaged that the conditions under which civil servants are appointed 
and removed from office, may become members of political parties and trade 
unions, and may exercise their right to strike are established by law. 
Although the immediate goal is the separation of administration from 
the Communist Party, the new Constitution sets a legal framework for the in-
troduction of the weberian model of bureaucracy, which applies only written 
law, and is politically independent. The new Constitution, however, „does not 
clearly define the role of public administration in the politico-administrative 
system“ (Пеев, 2007: 3). The main issues − the resolution of which could defi-
ne the model of public administration − are not resolved by the Constitution, 
and  the establishment of legal content is still not clear. In the first year after the 
change of the regime, the reform of public administration was not considered 
a strategic goal, and its role in a market economy was ignored (Пеев, 2007: 3). 
In the first years of the transition period, the reform aimed at introdu-
cing the new governance model which started very timidly. In 1991, the Local 
Self-government and Local Administration Act decreased central represen-
tation at the local level. According to the administrative-territorial division of 
the country, during this period of the reform, there were two levels of local 
administration – the regional and the district level. The region (oblast) is an 
administrative-territorial unit responsible for implementing regional policy, 
exercising state administration at the local level as well as harmonizing natio-
nal and local interests. Regions are governed by a Regional governor, and as-
sisted by a regional administration. The district (obshtina) is the basic admi-
nistrative-territorial unit in Bulgaria. It is governed by a mayor and locally 
elected council and administration. The self-government administration is 
located at the level of municipalities (kmetstvo) which are the smallest admi-
nistrative- territorial units (Borissova, 2001: 5). This legislative reform was 
aimed at redistributing of power in the state through the empowerment of 
local communities. Thus, new actors in public governance were created, and 
the environment for the development of public policies changed dramatically.
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11.2.2. Second Stage: Towards Traditional Administration and Public 
Governance through the Private Sector 
The second period of public administration reform in Bulgaria started 
with the government‘s decision to include it as one of the major priorities 
of Phare assistance in 1993−1994. This new period had two major factors 
that distinguished it from the previous one. The first factor was the birth of a 
targeted donor funding the reform. Many international organizations beca-
me the donors, and the most influential among them were the world Bank 
and the EU. The second factor was related to the content of the reform − the 
„demand“ and gradual establishment of a Bulgarian model of administration 
and governance commenced. The main actors in the reform process were, on 
the one hand, the international financial institutions (IMF and world Bank), 
and on the other, the EU and the OECD through its joint project SIgMA. In 
March 1995, the government made a policy statement in which it pledged to 
strengthen the authority of the State, rationalize the process of government, 
and increase its operational capability and efficiency. In September 1995, two 
interrelated structures were created to manage the administrative reform pro-
cess: the inter-ministerial working group on Administrative Reform, which 
was part of the EU coordination structure, and the Department of Adminis-
trative Reform at the Council of Ministers. In March 1996, the government 
adopted the “New Strategy of Administration Reform in Bulgaria” which 
focused on reforming central and local administration (Borissova, 2001: 4). 
Notably, this second stage of public administration reform in Bulgaria 
took place when the debate on NPM and the fight for its impact on public 
sector reform in the country began. Thus, the same paradox which accom-
panies the whole process of social transformation took over the public 
administration reform in Bulgaria as in other CEE countries as there was 
an attempt to develop and implement models which were considered by the 
western partners to be experimental and being in the process of develo-
pment and implementation. The reform in Bulgaria represents less a transfer 
of models than a transfer of ideas and principles. Due to the break with the 
past and the institutional traditions, the CEE countries, including Bulgaria, 
are much more open to introducing such ideas and principles when compa-
red to developed democracies. The latter transform their institutions, whilst 
the CEE countries create new institutions which fully comply with ideas dis-
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seminated as correct. “The unique problem of East European governments is 
that they cannot draw lessons from their experience of the past four decades 
because post-Communist regimes are founded on a rejection of a Soviet-
style regime” (Rose, 1993: 112).
This can also be observed with the distribution of the NPM. For over a 
century, the public administration in the west was inspired and built accor-
ding to the notions of so-called „classic paradigm of the administration.“ In 
Europe, this paradigm is strongly influenced by weber‘s ideas about bure-
aucracy, and in the USA, the ideas of w. wilson for rejecting the system of 
political patronage. The classical paradigm was functioning very successfully 
until the 1970’s, and then began a large-scale process of fundamental rethin-
king of management and attempts to distance the administration from its 
roots, leading to „endless wave of reforms“ that lead to the adoption of diffe-
rent, even opposing, models in different countries. Factors that mediated the 
creation of specific models in developed democracies were primarily inter-
nal and are related to the inherited institutions as well as the ideas of the key 
stakeholders in the reform of the public sector. In CEE countries, the factors 
were primarily external and relate to the ideas of influential international 
actors in the reform process as well as to the diffusion of ideas through the 
inclusion of internal experts in international epistemic networks.
The influence of the NPM in CEE countries was controversial mostly 
because of the position of the SIgMA − the leading international player in 
the reform process. After what was said about the power of the NPM creed, 
and seeing the frequent rule of neo-liberal governments in CEE states, some 
clarifications are needed. Firstly, while the public administration reform in 
CEE was promoted by various international organizations − SIgMA, the unit 
of the OECD to advise CEE on administrative reform and the most important 
agency dealing with the topic in the region (far more ubiquitous than the 
world Bank) − took a critical perspective towards NPM from the beginning. 
Therefore, in spite of pressure from other organizations and the understan-
dable urge coming from the consultants and those CEE people engaged in 
reform who had learned about NPM in summer schools and training semi-
nars in the “west”, and thus wanted to tout it, the classical perspective could 
usually prevail (Drechsler, 2005: 100).   
The last statement is only partly true for Bulgaria. During the second 
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stage of the reform, Bulgaria preserved its preference for the classical webe-
rian model as regards the model of public administration (organization), and 
embraced NPM as regards the model of governance and delivery of services 
(functions and tools of implementation). The Bulgarian Public administra-
tion reform fully embraced the language and principles of NPM: client focus, 
decentralization, separation of policy-making from implementation, and use 
of private partners for service delivery. 
Bulgaria‘s choices during the second stage of public administration re-
form were largely affected by the market reforms and approaches adopted 
by the global financial institutions (IMF and world Bank). The conducting 
of so-called „structural adjustment reforms“ included public administration 
reforms focused on reducing overall costs of the government mainly through 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, and reduction of the wage bill to 
bring government spending down to sustainable levels and free resources for 
other, more beneficial uses to the overall economy. 
Additionally, Bulgarian experts, as a whole, embraced the ideas of NPM. 
The practices associated with these ideas were spreading as necessary, and 
were only possible in conditions of market regulation (Pavlov & Parashkevo-
va, 2011; katzamunska, 2011; georgiev, 1999).
•	 Civil Servant Status
During this second stage, the influence of the EU strengthened gradu-
ally. This influence is not just a consequence of donor assistance through 
Europaid but the political intention to join the EU. The impact was mainly 
carried out by the European Commission’s report on Bulgaria‘s progress to-
wards its accession after December 1995, when, on the fringes of the Madrid 
European Council, the country submitted its membership application, em-
barking on the road towards negotiations with the EU. The regular report of 
the European Commission in 1998 stated that: „The main central institutions 
of the state continue to operate smoothly in general, regardless of the known 
instability caused by the fact that the administrative reform is still at an early 
stage. The process of administrative reform is launched with the aim of cre-
ating an independent, efficient, and professional civil service. A number of 
initial steps have been taken for its implementation, particularly through the 
adoption of a strategy to modernize the administrative system and the law on 
public administration. They need to be complemented by other legislation.“ 
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Regular reports drafted by the European Commission became an incentive 
for reform in Bulgaria.  
In particular, in terms of administrative reform such reports contribu-
te to the perception of classical weberian model of public administration. 
The administrative reform was introduced by a number of laws on which the 
operation of the new public administration was based. In pursuit of the cons-
titutional provision, the Administration Act has been adopted in 1998, Civil 
Servant Act and Administrative Services for Individuals and Legal Entities 
Act in 1999, and the Access to Public Information Act in 2000. In 2000, began 
the introduction of the status of civil servant by adopting the prescribed re-
gulations − Regulation on the Official Status of Civil Servants and Regulation 
of the Minister of Public Administration for the documents to hold public 
office. For the first time, the positions of state officials in the administration 
are defined in the Unified Classifier of the Positions in the Administration.
 The Administration Act regulates the structure of the administration, 
basic principles of organization of the operation thereof, positions therein, 
and principal requirements for occupation of the said positions. It regulates 
the powers of the executive authorities, structure and organization of the ope-
ration of the administration thereof. This Act applies to the administration of 
the other bodies of state power as provided by the Constitution and to the bo-
dies of local self-government. The Act was amended in 2006 by introducing 
the principles that should guide the administration’s activities: lawfulness; 
openness and accessibility; responsibility and accountability; effectiveness; 
subordination and coordination; predictability. In 2009, one principle was 
added: objectivity and impartiality. Depending on the distribution of activi-
ties, the administration is divided to general and specialized administration. 
general administration assists the relevant body of state power in the exer-
cise of the powers therein vested, and the head of the respective administra-
tion creates conditions for the implementation of the activities of the speci-
alized administration, and carries out technical activities for administrative 
servicing. Specialized administration, on the other hand, assists the relevant 
body of state power in the exercise of the powers therein vested, related to 
its competence. The activities of the administration are implemented by the 
civil servants and persons working under an employment relationship. The 
procedure for appointment and the status of civil servants are established by a 
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specific law (Civil Servant Act). Any employee working in the administration 
under an employment contract is appointed under the Labor Code. Accor-
ding to the functions executed, the positions in the administration are of the 
following type: managerial; expert; and technical. The Administration Act 
introduces the institution of political cabinet for the Prime Minister, deputy 
prime ministers, government ministers, chairpersons of state agencies, and 
regional governors. A political cabinet is an organizational structure which is 
assigned with advisory, control, information and analytical functions which 
assists the respective executive authority in the formulation and implementa-
tion of the government policy. The law defines the existence of two branches 
of the administration: central and local one, and the latter consists of regional 
and municipal administration.
The Civil Servant Act regulates the formation, content, and termination 
of a civil-service relationship between the State and a civil servant in con-
nection with the performance of civil service. According to this Act „civil ser-
vant“ means a person who, by virtue of an administrative act on appointment, 
occupies a salaried tenured position in the state administration and assists a 
body of state power in the exercise of the powers thereof. By introducing a 
specific status of „civil servant“, the law creates a secure professional position 
that is independent of political interference. 
with the adoption of these two laws Bulgaria joins the classical model of 
weberian bureaucracy at least from the legal framework standpoint. Thus, the 
country is no exception to the way and the choice of the CEE countries that, 
for various reasons, are oriented in the direction of „classic continental career 
systems“. The german model is emerging as a dominant influence in most 
states, including countries from CEE (Verheijen, 1999: 330−331). Usually, this 
orientation is explained by the influence of the EU on public administration 
reforms, despite the absence of clear Acquis Communautaire in this area.
The question that arises is whether it is a choice between the weberian 
model and the model of the NPM or linking them to a new model that cha-
racterizes the CEE countries. For developed democracies NPM appears as an 
alternative to the classical model due to the principle of orientation to the cli-
ent rather than to the law. Thus, in developed democracies where the practi-
ces of NPM are implemented (and that means everywhere but to a varying 
degrees), the model of NPM changes the classical model. For Bulgaria the 
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classic model of administration is a precondition for adoption of the NPM 
model. Only a strong, professional, and independent administration may 
transfer functions on the implementation and even formulation of policies to 
the private sector. Thus, a new model of administration emerged − a hybrid 
between the classic model and the NPM. In this case the professional admi-
nistration is oriented towards offering efficient services through partnerships 
with the private sector. Therefore, there is no „return to the continental roots 
of pre-1945“ (Verheijen, 1999: 330−331). It is more of outlining a new model 
in which the weberian principles of professionalization of the administration 
are an integral part. This explains also why the contradiction between the 
ideas of public administration reform of major international actors − global 
financial institutions and SIgMA project – is only seemingly. 
Some analyzes (Shivergueva & Nachev, 2011) explain the public admi-
nistration reform in Bulgaria as a transition from the weberian type of burea-
ucracy to the NPM. Actually, the two models merge through the accumulation 
of practices that meet the logic of one of the two concepts. Of course, the in-
troduction of the logic of the NPM changes the classical theory of weber‘s 
bureaucracy. while the NPM is aimed at the result, the classical model exists 
because of the rules. At the same time, the NPM is not possible without profes-
sional administration that has the qualities and capacity to achieve the result.  
The second stage of the public administration reform in Bulgaria which 
laid down the foundation of the new model − a hybrid between classic model 
and NPM − differs from the first stage in that, inter alia, it is not bound either 
by the issue or the language of the transition from state socialism to democra-
cy. The main issue is: „How to build a working administration?“ rather than 
„How to remove the old administration and replace it with a new one“. The 
first question is not a part of the typical agenda of transition. It is common for 
both old and new democracies, despite the identification of various problems 
in them. The old democracies must reform the classical model that does not 
meet the new challenges associated with the global processes, emergence of 
many actors in the policies, and growing influence of international organi-
zations. Bulgaria as well as other new democracies have to meet the same 
challenges, but because they do not possess the basic institutions of the wes-
tern model, they must first perceive the classical model of administration.
The introduced classic model of administration continues to evolve, and 
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on a later stage, beyond the temporal limits of the second stage of the reform 
while retaining its main characteristics. The performance appraisal of public 
servants started in 2002.  A compulsory competition was introduced in 2003 
on taking up the public service, and the appointment was made through a 
competition based on professional merits. Commitments were introduced 
for the administration for further training of the public servants, including 
financial provisions for the training. The Institute of Public Administration 
has been established, having the task to organize and carry out education and 
professional training, and retrain public servants. Amendments have been 
made in connection with the development of the system of ranks, introducing 
five degrees for the junior and senior ranks (Operational Program “good go-
vernance” 2014–2020). 
In 2006, the two main laws regulating the structure of administration 
and public service have undergone substantial amendments. The amen-
dments introduced a distinction between the political and administrative 
level of the public administration. The category of the „senior civil servant“ 
was introduced. The opportunities for delegation of powers by the executive 
authority to the other officials of the respective administration were expan-
ded. The competition arrangements were improved. The appointment of ci-
vil servants to a position under a service contract and for a part-time work 
was regulated. Centralized competition for junior experts was introduced, 
thus establishing a pool of young and highly educated people willing to work 
in the administration. Until now, 4 centralized competitions are conducted 
for junior experts and a national competition for people with disabilities for 
expert positions in the public administration. The principle of mobility for 
civil servants was introduced, regulating permanent and temporary mobility. 
The opportunities for professional training of civil servants were improved 
by increasing the eligible costs of training from 0.8% to 2% of salary funds.  
In 2012, a new pay model for civil servants was introduced. The salary 
of civil servants was restructured by deleting the bonus for length of time, 
which is already included in the amount of new basic monthly salary of the 
civil servant. A new regulation is introduced regarding the bonuses that may 
be received by the civil servants by suspending the existing practice of the 
revenue from fees collected by the administrations to be used as a source of 
civil servants bonuses. The amount of performance bonuses that any civil ser-
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vant may receive on an annual basis may not exceed 80% of the annual salary 
for the respective year. Eligible costs for performance bonuses in each admi-
nistration are also defined in an amount of not more than 30% of the costs 
for salaries, wages, and social security contributions (Operational program 
“good governance”, 2014−2020).  
•	 Corruption 
The hybrid model of public administration established in Bulgaria is 
characterized by a relatively high degree of discretion power given to the 
administrative structures. The level of discretion power could be assumed as 
an indication for adoption of the NPM model − the greater is the extent to 
which the administration can alone take a decision, the more is its ability to 
seek efficiency in the delivery of services to the citizens in accordance with 
the specific problem and situation. Quite the opposite − more regulated acti-
vities of the administration decrease its ability to maximize public benefits in 
a particular situation. Notably, the level of discretion power opens a space for 
practices of NPM that suggest solving of each case with a view to achieving 
optimal results. 
The comparative analysis of the public administrations reform in the 
CEE countries shows that Bulgaria is among the group of countries (together 
with Romania and Slovakia) where the adoption of the first civil service law is 
relatively late and happened after 1997. These countries are characterized by 
a high degree of discretion power (mostly over allocation and remuneration 
decisions). At the same time, and perhaps because of that, these countries 
have a relatively very high degree of politically induced changes in the admi-
nistration after the change of its governments (Meyer-Sahling Jan-Hinrik, 
2006: 16). Assuming that the discretion is an indicator of the perception of 
the NPM, Bulgaria is among the countries whose model of public administra-
tion is influenced by it to relatively great extent. 
As a result of the relatively high degree of discretion, the hybrid model 
of public administration incorporates the preconditions for a high degree of 
corruption. The freer in its decisions the administration is, the likelihood of 
corruption pressure on it increases. The implementation of that likelihood 
depends on many other factors, including prevailing values  and integrity of 
the administration that seem basic ones. Corruption in the administration is 
a very important problem according to the opinion of common Bulgarians 
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and the opinions of a number of international organizations (Пеев, 2007: 10). 
Objectively, the level of corruption in Bulgaria is very high. According to the 
Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International, Bulgaria is only 
at 69th place with a score of 41 (with a maximum score of 100) in 2015. It is 
the last country among the EU Member States according to this index (see 
Figure 11.1).132  
Figure 11.1: Corruption Perceptions Index
The high corruption in Bulgaria is very unfavorable indicator for which 
each activity of the administration is met by the public with doubt and di-
sapproval in advance. There are a number steps undertaken to control the 
corruption. Fighting against it is a goal in two consecutive strategic docu-
ments. Important legislative measure in 2008 is the adoption of the Conflict 
of Interest Prevention and Disclosure Act that settles principles in terms of 
prevention and disclosure of conflict of interests of persons holding public 
office. This legislative measure is extremely important and is a clear signal of 
political will to resolve the negative phenomenon. Nevertheless, the control 
of corruption has not led to significant results so far. According to the world 
Bank worldwide governance Indicators,Bulgaria has a relatively poor per-
132 According to data retrieved from Transparency International: http://www.transparency.org/
cpi2015#results-table).
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formance on the control of corruption. In 2008, immediately after the acces-
sion to the EU, Bulgaria has had a very low percentile rank. In the coming 
years, its performance has been improving, even though slightly, but after 
2012, it went down again (see Figure 11.2).133 
Figure 11.2: Control on the Corruption (world Bank)
•	 Agencitification
Along with the level of discretion power, agencitification is a process that 
reflects the impact of NPM on the model of public administration. The esta-
blishment of agencies (according to the Bulgarian legislation, they are three 
types: „executive“, „state“, and „commissions“, as the last ones are regulatory 
bodies) is regulated by the Administration Act. In Bulgaria, there are dozens 
of agencies (see Figure 11.3).134 
133 According to data retrieved from wB: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.
aspx#home.
134 State of the Administration Reports available online at: http://www.strategy.bg/Publications/
View.aspx?lang=bg-Bg&Id=81.
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Figure 11.3: Administrative Structures in Central Administration
The share of executive agencies operating within the Ministries is largest 
but has relative independence in carrying out their functions. The proportion 
of employed persons in these agencies compared to total employed persons in 
the administration is constant after 2011, and varies around 30%. In govern-
ment agencies that are completely independent institutions and subordinated 
only to the Prime Minister, the employed persons represent around 5% of 
the administration as a whole. The share of employees in regulatory bodies 
(commissions) is also constant in the period after 2011. It is rather insignifi-
cant − about 1% (see Table 11.1).135
Table 11.1: Number and Percentage of Employees in Agencies (by Type)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
ADMINISTRATION OF THE EXECUTIVE 
AUTHORITY (TOTAL) 96,269 96,026 96,343 94,087 92,180
Growth in 2011=100% 100 99.7 100 97.7 95.8
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION 54,919 55,014 54,966 53,009 51,338
Total share of the central administration in % 57.1 57.3 57.1 56.3 55.7
1. Ministries and CoM administration* 6,908 7,206 7,081 6,843 7,070
Share of the central administration in % 12.6% 13.1% 12.9% 12.9% 13.8%
135 According to data retrieved from NSI: http://www.nsi.bg/sites/default/files/files/data/time-
series/Labour_1.1.5.xls.
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2. State agencies 2,771 2,754 2,764 2,821 2,631
Share of the central administration in % 5% 5% 5% 5.3% 5.1%
3. State commissions 500 525 513 504 499
Share of the central administration in % 0.9% 1% 0.9% 1% 1%
4. Executive agencies 17,963 17,736 17,743 16,551 15,763
Share of the central administration in % 32.7 32.2 32.3 31.2 30.7%
5. Administrative structures established by 
a legislative act which have functions in the 
implementation of the executive power 
25,247 25,245 25,298 24,934 24,046
Share of the central administration in % 46 45.9 46 47.1 46.8
6. Administrative structures established by 
a legislative act reporting to the National 
Assembly 
1,059 1,063 1,099 1,074 1,058
Share of the central administration in % 1.9% 1.9% 2% 2% 2.1%
7. Structures under Art. 60 of the Law on 
the Administration 471 485 468 282 271
Share of the central administration in % 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.5
Despite the adoption of agencitification practices, they are rather not 
contributing enough to the improvement of the public governance. For their 
most part, they only imitate the British practices (Маринов, 2011: 85), and 
fail to achieve the autonomy and rationality of actions.
11.2.3. Third Stage: Towards Good Governance  
The third stage of public administration reform in Bulgaria started with 
the launch of negotiations for full EU membership. The negotiation process 
started in February 2000 since the screening the EU employed to assess the 
candidate states ranked Bulgaria in what used to be at the time „the Helsinki 
group“ of countries admitted to begin membership negotiations. The state of 
the negotiations with the EU did not only indicate the achieved progress in 
various reform areas – it also triggered the reform effort itself and defined its 
timetable. what remained somewhat astride is that the public attention was the 
very nature of the EU enlargement negotiations. As opposed to any other type 
of diplomatic search for compromise, the format and the set of rules of these 
negotiations actually left little room for maneuvering of the candidate country 
(Velichkov, 2004). The impact of EU accession on public administration reform 
is not so unambiguous because the negotiations did not directly affect the mo-
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del of public management. At the same time, at the European level, there is no 
single strategy for strengthening of the capacity of the state administration nor 
is there a unified model for its most effective functioning (Shivergueva, 2009). 
In 2000, when Bulgaria comes into a negotiation process, the link betwe-
en European integration and public administration reform seems to become 
stronger. The European Commission places great emphasis in the avis on the 
capacity of Member States’ administrations to implement the body of Eu-
ropean law (Acquis Communautaire) on schedule, although this had never 
been an issue in previous waves of accessions. Nevertheless, the link between 
the accession and the public administration reform stays an indirect one since 
there is no general body of European law in the public administration sphere. 
Just as individual Member States are free to frame their own constitution, 
they are free to organize their administration as they see fit. This is an issue 
that comes under the subsidiarity principle. 
The EU‘s influence begins to show in the previous stage of the reform as 
the transfer of practices is provided through the PHARE program. Namely, the 
donor programs rather than the transposition of EU legislation are the basis 
of the affected by the EU public administration reform. while the EU makes 
funds available for the region as a whole, it is up to the national governments 
to use these funds efficiently (Michalak, 2012: 393) In the year 2000, one of the 
key recommendations of the Commission to Bulgaria as a candidate country 
made in the PHARE 2000 review was that the country should fundamentally 
revise and reconsider its public administration reform. In the 1998−2006 pro-
gramming period, the PHARE‘s support for the reform of Bulgaria‘s state admi-
nistration and judicial system totaled about EUR 304 million. The goals and 
outcomes expected from this support for the 2004−2006 period were set out in 
the Multi-annual Programming Document of the Ministry of Finance (MF). 
The focus of support in the area of state administration reform shifted from 
assistance to amending the legislative framework towards the problems related 
to its enforcement as well as to anti-corruption measures (Shivergueva, 2009).
Regardless the way of transfer − through the donor programs or nego-
tiation process − the EU imports in public administration reform in Bulgaria 
the concept of good governance. In 2001, the EU adopted the white Paper on 
European governance which defines the basic principles of administrations 
in the European area − openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, 
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and coherence. These principles are the European interpretation of the con-
cept of good governance. The essence of them and what distinguishes them 
from the previous models associated with the traditional model and respecti-
vely NPM is the openness of the administration to society and citizens. This 
openness which is expressed in the transparency of actions, accountability to 
citizens, involvement and participation of citizens in public policies is concei-
ved as a precondition for effective achievement of public purposes. 
good governance is the third element in the public administration re-
form in Bulgaria, which upgraded the previous two − the traditional model of 
professional administration and NPM. The model of good governance brings 
new elements in the reform of public administration. It is a system of activi-
ties of the state, private, and civil institutions for cooperative formulation and 
sustainable implementation of public interest (Taнев, 2009: 2). 
The three concepts − traditional model of administration, NPM, and 
good governance –  not only do they not contradict but also complement 
each other, and together form the content of the reforms that Bulgaria held. 
It is hard to say which of these concepts prevails in the adopted model. In 
addition, it is not a mechanical connection but creation of a fundamentally 
new model that does not fit fully into any one of the three concepts, although 
complying with the logic of each of them.
After 2000, the development of public administration reform in Bulga-
ria fully follows the process of Europeanization. In this process, Bulgaria fa-
ced two interrelated challenges:  first, to develop administrative capacity in 
the areas directly related to membership obligations and second, to perform 
comprehensive modernization of the public administration (katsamunska, 
2010: 53). Thus, Bulgaria meets the European conditionality, and at the same 
time, continues the reforms in the direction of the three elements that simul-
taneously shape the model of public administration and public management:
•	 Support for introduction and development of the status and com-
petence of professional administration. This element also includes 
modernization of the administration through the introduction of 
modern approaches and technologies in its work. Bulgaria returns 
to traditional models of administration but on a different techno-
logical level: both at instrumental and social perspective. 
In the third stage of public administration reform Bulgaria improved the 
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traditional model by changing legislation and practices. In 2006, important 
amendments were made to the two basic acts in this sphere: Law on Adminis-
tration (LA) and Law on Civil Servants (LCS). The LA amendments were related 
to the implementation of the administrative reform: distinguishing the political 
from the administrative level in the state administration, regulating the policy-
making process, and creating effective internal control (Shivergueva, 2009).
The E-government Act was adopted at the end of May 2007. It lays the 
ground for a substantial reform in the administration work thanks to the in-
troduction of new information technologies and the parallel use of paper and 
electronic documents. The law envisages the automation of administrative pro-
cedures, introduction of transparency in administrative processes, and reduction 
in the opportunities for corrupt practices as well as reduction in administrative 
costs (Shivergueva, 2009: 28). Bulgaria is falling behind the EU member states in 
the process of developing e-government. Despite some significant results mos-
tly related to the expansion of the volume of e-services, the overall performan-
ce of Bulgaria in connection with the introduction of e-governance is very low. 
According to the United Nations e-government Development Index (EgDI) for 
the period 2003−2014 Bulgaria is extremely backward, from 35th rank at the be-
ginning of the period, it fell to 73rd place at the end of it. It scored 0.5421 in total 
and is ranked the last among the EU Member States (see Table 11.2).136 
Table 11.2: Index of the United Nations for the Development of e-government 
for 2013 and 2014
Country Rank 2014 EGDI 2014 Rank 2003 Rank Change
Bulgaria 73 0.5421 35 -38
The analysis of the reasons for this situation enables the identification 
of the necessary measures for its development to a level meeting the Euro-
pean requirements. Currently, three major reasons for the insufficient esta-
blishment of e-governance in Bulgaria can be advanced: lack of interopera-
bility of the administration information systems, lack of adequate electronic 
exchange between the administrations as well as unsolved issue of data unifi-
cation (see Table 11.3).137
136 Https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/en-us/Reports/UN-E-government-Survey-2014.
137 According to data retrieved from NSI: http://www.nsi.bg/en/content/6115/individuals-using-in-
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Table 11.3: E-governance
3.1. INDIVIDUALS USING THE INTERNET FOR INTERACTING WITH PUBLIC 
AUTHORITIES (LAST 12 MONTHS)
Type of purpose 2008 2011 2015% Number % Number % Number
Total 10.0 595 015 25.4 1 390 314 17.8 986 529
Male 8.8 256 183 25.1 679 083 16.6 453 537
Female 11.1 338 832 25.8 711 231 19.0 532 992
Obtaining information from public  
authorities web sites 7.9 474 070 20.3 1 112 060 16.0 886 715
Male 7.4 214 225 20.2 545 649 14.8 404 715
Female 8.5 259 845 20.5 566 411 17.2 482 000
Downloading official forms 5.9 350 768 9.4 512 773 12.9 712 248
Male 4.8 140 396 8.5 230 221 11.9 323 952
Female 6.9 210 372 10.2 282 552 13.9 388 297
Sending filled forms 4.1 245 099 10.1 553 369 9.1 503 659
Male 3.3 96 313 9.7 261 874 8.2 222 449
Female 4.9 148 786 10.6 291 495 10.0 281 211
3.2. ENTERPRISES USING INTERNET FOR INTERACTING                                                  
WITH PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
Type of 
purpose 2004 2007 2011 2015
  To-tal By size class Total By size class Total By size class
To-
tal By size class
    10-49
50-
249
250
+
10-
49
50-
249
250
+
10-
49
50-
249
250
+
10-
49
50-
249
250
+
For ob-
taining 
infor-
mation
36.5 32.7 47.7 66.4 39.7 34.6 58.9 73.6 69.1 65.5 83.9 93.4 71.0 68.0 83.8 91.1
For ob-
taining 
forms, 
e.g. tax 
declara-
tion
26.7 24.1 33.7 50.5 36.5 31.5 55.1 70.2 74.7 71.2 89.3 97.4 75.8 72.8 89.1 93.6
ternet-interacting-public-authorities and http://www.nsi.bg/en/content/6149/enterprises-using-
internet-interacting-public-authorities.
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For re-
turning 
filled in 
forms
8.7 7.2 12.3 25.4 29.5 25.1 45.0 64.6 65.8 61.1 86.1 93.8 75.7 72.8 88.7 93.4
For 
submit-
ting a 
propo-
sal in a 
public 
e-tender 
system
. . . . 6.6 5.4 10.8 16.9 7.7 7.4 9.2 10.5 . . . .
In the field of administrative services, an assessment of the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the administration has been introduced. The administrative 
service in the administrations is monitored and analyzed through the Admi-
nistrative Service Self-Assessment System, developed based on the model of 
the European Foundation for Quality Management which collects data on 
processes related to administrative services in the country and provides an 
opportunity to measure the quality of services and performance of adminis-
trative services. Queue Management Systems are introduced in the adminis-
trations servicing a large number of users in a total of 50 administrations 
throughout the country, illegal schemes at the municipal level are removed, 
and rates of state taxes administered at the central level are reduced. From 
a total of 517 administrations providing administrative services, 396 admi-
nistrations provide services on a „one-stop shop“ principle, which attains 
76.60%. An important legislative measure in 2008 has been the adoption of 
the Conflict of Interest Prevention and Disclosure Act that settles principles 
in terms of prevention and disclosure of conflict of interests of persons hol-
ding public office (Operational program “good governance” 2014–2020).
•	 Expansion and regulation of practices related to the NPM. This ele-
ment is aimed at developing the regulatory capacity of the adminis-
tration and the expansion of economic freedom. Additionally, within 
this element of the public administration reform it is foreseen such 
development of the administration (and the public sector as a whole) 
which is consistent with the logic of structural adjustment reform.
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In direction of this development, Bulgaria undertakes multiple steps. 
In 2006, with the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Code and the 
repeal of the Administrative Services to Individuals and Legal Entities Act, 
the legislation in relation to administrative services is codified. From that 
moment onwards one and the same procedure is used both for adminis-
trative services to individuals and legal entities as well as for the issuance 
of individual administrative acts. The procedure for exercise of judicial re-
view on administrative acts is unified. The administrative service rules are 
described in details with the adoption of the Regulation on Administrative 
Services (Operational program “good governance” 2014–2020).
Restricting Administrative Regulation and Administrative Control 
over Economic Activity Act has been adopted in 2004, whose aim is to fa-
cilitate and encourage the pursuit of economic activity by means of restric-
ting, to socially justified limits, the administrative regulation and adminis-
trative control exercised over the said activity by the state bodies and by the 
bodies of local self-government.
In PAR in Bulgaria a great importance is given to the creation and de-
velopment of regulatory capacity of the administration. The introduction of 
this element of capacity involves a combination of freedom for economic 
operators and ability of the administration to establish the rules for their 
operation in a way that the achievement of public purposes (including pri-
vate sector development) will be guaranteed. The world Bank worldwide 
governance Regulatory Quality Indicator captures perceptions of the abi-
lity of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and re-
gulations that permit and promote private sector development. The perfor-
mance of Bulgaria on this indicator is relatively good (see Figure 11.4). In 
fact, if there is a comparison of the performance of the country on all go-
vernance indicators of the world Bank, the result for the regulatory quality 
would be that it has the highest percentile rank. Its performance is relatively 
stable in time, as it is best in 2010, and then there is a decrease which has 
not yet been recovered.138 
138 According to data retrieved from wB: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.
aspx#home.
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Figure 11.4: Regulatory Quality according to the world Bank
For the purpose of regulation of one of the most important principles 
of the public administration − to increase its efficiency and effectiveness, 
in 2012, a prohibition on increasing the total number of executive admi-
nistration is introduced. During the reviewed period, an optimization of 
administrative structures is consistently carried out in order to ensure a 
balance between normative statutory powers of the authority, functions and 
size of organizational units, and necessary and readily available human and 
financial resources. In the period of 2005−2009, the administrative structu-
res and sub-delegations to ministers have been optimized with the total of 
17,060 number of posts representing 10.5% optimization (Operational pro-
gram “good governance” 2014−2020). 
Because of these measures, the total number of administration in the 
structures of the executive power remains stable until the end of 2013 and 
then it began to steadily decline (see Table 11.4).139
139 According to data retrieved from NSI: http://www.nsi.bg/sites/default/files/files/data/timeseries/
Labour_1.1.5.xls. The data do not include the employed persons in the Ministry of Interior and 
the Ministry of Defense.
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Table 11.4: Data for Employed Persons in the Administration
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
ADMINISTRATION OF THE EXECUTIVE 
AUTHORITY (TOTAL)* 96,269 96,026 96,343 94,087 92,180
growth in 2011=100% 100 99.7 100 97.7 95.8
І. CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION* 54,919 55,014 54,966 53,009 51,338
Total share of central administration in % 57.1 57.3 57.1 56.3 55.7
ІІ. LOCAL ADMINISTRATION 41,350 41,012 41,377 41,078 40,842
Total share of local administrationin % 42.9 42.7 42.9 43.7 44.3
•	 Expansion and regulation of practices related to the concept of 
good governance. This element of the reform is aimed at changing 
relationships between the administration and the society.
This element of the reform in Bulgaria, which is seen as a major, even 
unique, in the researches since 2000 (Tanev, 2009; katsamunska, 2010), in-
cludes a series of legislative changes, regulations of practices, measures to 
develop the capacity of both the administration and stakeholders.
In 2000, Access to Public Information Act is adopted. It is an essential 
part of the legislation, regulating openness and transparency of public in-
formation. Until Bulgaria‘s accession to the EU, this Act has been amended 
twice, in January and April 2002, in order to be consistent with the new Law 
on Personal Data Protection (effective from 1 January 2002) as well as with 
the Law on the Protection of classified information (30 April 2002).
Access to Public Information Act formulates the principles applied 
upon exercise of the right of access to public information: openness, 
truthfulness, and comprehensiveness of the information; ensuring access to 
public information on equal terms; ensuring legality in seeking and obtai-
ning public information; protection of the right to information; protection 
of personal data; safeguarding the security of society and the State.
The process of policy development has been regulated − in the imple-
mentation of the strategic goals, the executive authorities are required to set 
annual targets for the activities of the respective administration and control 
their execution. The principle of annual reporting for the administrations 
has been introduced in the implementation of the strategic objectives and 
priorities set in the program of the Council of Ministers.
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The progress in this element of the reform is perhaps one of the most 
difficult. It does not depend only, even at least, on the regulatory require-
ment. It presumes the creation of a capacity to manage the process of public 
policy, which means at least two things: ability to formulate objectives ba-
sed on rational methods, and ability to interact with stakeholders. Largely, 
the training of public administration organized under the Institute of Pu-
blic Administration addressed this challenge.
State bodies are legally bound to coordinate their activity and to con-
sult social economic partners (SEP) and civil society in order to guaran-
tee an integrated state policy. The coordination mechanisms as well as the 
process of consultations aiming at including a broad range of stakeholders 
are an important part of the process of policy-making (strategic planning, 
impact assessment), policy implementation, and assessment of the achieved 
results. All regional and almost all municipal administrations have also es-
tablished advisory and coordination mechanisms. The functioning of com-
mittees, councils, and working groups is also an operational way for the 
interaction of the central administration with the regional and municipal 
administrations with the objective of achieving the goals of local self-go-
vernment and regional policy. Common regulations are established for the 
Advisory Boards. Rules have been introduced to increase accountability, 
transparency, and interaction with stakeholders.
In Bulgaria, there is a strong fragmentation in the field of strategic 
planning and a huge number of strategic documents (see Figure 11.5).140 
There are about 550 strategic documents, including 210 at the national level. 
The large number of documents and poor coordination in their preparation 
create difficulties in achieving coherence of initiatives planned. Institutions 
have not yet established the mechanisms for joint implementation of strate-
gic goals, and often develop their individual documents, projects, and ini-
tiatives that are not always aligned with the Common Strategic Framework.
140 State of the Administration Reports available online at:http://www.strategy.bg/Publications/
View.aspx?lang=bg-Bg&Id=81.
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Figure 11.5: Strategic Documents at the National Level
All the three elements of the reform are aimed ultimately at the search 
of efficiency of achieving public goals. Practices, however, cannot be reduced 
to one single concept. It seems to be wrong to look which concept prevails. 
It is rather spontaneously outlining a model that does not exist anywhere but 
corresponds to the today’s challenges. The way to this model is a way without 
a preliminary plan. Separate practices are introduced corresponding to the 
prevailing paradigm at the time of their introduction: traditional model, 
NPM, good governance. which paradigm prevails depends mostly on the 
international and supranational commitments of the State, which are a result 
of financial dependence (IMF), donor programs (world Bank, EU), or volun-
tary inclusion in general political and normative space (EU). This does not 
mean that there is no pattern. Simply, this model has not yet been fully deli-
neated. For the moment, it is a set of practices and the public administration 
reform seeks to continuously improve them without a clear agreement on the 
stakeholders’ and experts’ perspective about what actually is the purpose of 
their perception.
Despite the lack of a clear governance model towards which the reform 
of public administration is aimed because of the demand of efficiency, it can 
be assumed that it is a general indicator of its operation and application. 
According to the methodology of the world Bank, general government 
Effectiveness Indicator captures perceptions of the quality of public services, 
quality of civil service and degree of its independence from political pressu-
455Public AdministrAtion reform in bulgAriA: WeberiAn bureAucrAcy, neW Public mAnAgement, And good governAnce At the sAme time
res, quality of policy formulation and implementation, and credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies. The indicator itself mixes charac-
teristics of the three concepts that define the content of public administration 
reform in Bulgaria. According to this indicator, the performance of the coun-
try is rather modest. It has the lowest representation in 2008, and then there 
is a positive trend of growth of percentile rank but keeping levels of about 
60 (see Figure 11.6).141 After 2013, the positive trend is interrupted, and the 
percentile rank begins to decline.
Figure 11.6: government Effectiveness world Bank
The interpretation of the above data is not unambiguous. The qualities 
of the model of public management and administrative capacity are a neces-
sary precondition but not sufficient condition for improving public services. 
As the methodology of the index includes, among other elements, an assess-
ment of the state of public schools, basic health services, drinking water and 
sanitation, electricity grid, transport infrastructure, maintenance and waste 
disposal, it is obvious that the relatively poor performance of the country is 
linked to problems in some of these sectors.
PAR, even if successful, could not lead to quick and immediate results in 
improving public services. However, this is not an explanation that satisfies 
the audience. On the contrary, the results that are not achieved are constantly 
141 According to data retrieved from wB: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home.
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undermining the confidence in PAR. The distrust of citizens makes policy-
makers to change the direction and seek for new solutions. This makes the 
reform continuous and the public governance model – elusive. This brings 
to the paradox that the reform itself is successful because it is moving in the 
right direction, and introduces practices that meet its basic principles but its 
results are unfavorable. The problem is whether this is a matter of time, or it 
is a matter of model and unsatisfactory results will recur.
It is hard to talk about generic weaknesses of the model of public go-
vernance that combines the principles of traditional bureaucracy, NPM, and 
good governance. The main reason for this is that the model is a spontaneous 
response to the adaptation of governance to modern challenges, and in this 
sense, it is constantly evolving. The main advocates and promoters of this 
model (global Financial Institutions and EU) distribute more principles, best 
practices, and assessment indicators than the models. This does not mean 
that we cannot talk about the weaknesses of the model in its implementation 
in practices. 
The model of public governance to which the public administration re-
form in Bulgaria has been targeted has one significant weakness. It is linked 
to the unresolved political dependence of public administration, which conti-
nues to exist despite the legislative framework. The political dependence is 
expressed in mass replacement of administrative staff after the change of the 
government, in taking a position in the administration because of political 
commitment and loyalty, as well as the influence of the political party in po-
wer in the exercise of discretion power.
The existence of these phenomena and determining their scope can 
hardly be supported by data. This condition is rather intuitively felt by both 
experts and citizens. There is an agreement between them that political de-
pendence of the administration is widespread. 
However, this calls into question the existence of the traditional model 
of bureaucracy which as an attempt to be proved in the current model of 
governance is a precondition, a basis for the occurrence of other elements 
of the reform − the introduction of NPM practices and good governance. If 
there is something that must immediately be reformulated in the PAR model, 
it is how political independence and professionalization of the administration 
have to be guaranteed − in law and in practice.
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11.2.4. More Centralization than Decentralization
The introduction of the territorial model for the distribution of power 
in Bulgaria starts – as it was always noticed – at the very beginning of the 
societal transition – in 1991.  According to this model that has been more 
developed than changed during the following 25 years, the vertical distri-
bution of power consists of three levels: central, regional, and local level. 
Two levels in the territorial administration – regional and local – have a 
fundamentally different nature. while the first is a territorial extension of 
the central level, the second is built on the self-governance principle.
•	 Administrative and territorial structure
Administratively, the Bulgaria’s territory is divided in 28 regions and 
265 municipalities. For approximation with the European requirements for 
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS), Bulgaria is divided 
into: 2 non-administrative-territorial units (North and South Bulgaria) at 
NUTS 1 level; and 6 planning regions at NUTS 2 level (Стефанова, М. 
Калфова, Е. 2004). The 28 regions, which are the second level in the vertical 
distribution of power, are defined as territorial units at NUTS 3 level (see 
Figure 11.7).142 
Regions (oblasti) are administrative units of the central government. 
They comprise one or several neighboring municipalities. The region admi-
nistrations are financed directly by the central government budget. At the 
regional level, the main institution is the regional governor who is one-man 
body of the executive power. He/she implements the State governance re-
gionally, and ensures the compliance between national and local interests 
on regional policy realization. Once more, he/she leads the regional admi-
nistration.
142  State of the Administration Reports available online at: http://www.strategy.bg/Publications/
View.aspx?lang=bg-Bg&Id=81.
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Figure 11.7: Administrative Structures in Local Administration
The regional governor communicates with local self-governance bodies 
in the region, executive power bodies, and other institutions that are not part 
of the executive system. His/her activity is directed to the State policy imple-
mentation, and its coordination with locally formulated policy aims.
The municipalities are the basic administrative-territorial units carrying 
out local self-government. They are established by the Council of Ministers 
according to a procedure specified in the Law on Administrative and Ter-
ritorial Structure of the Republic of Bulgaria. Mayoralties and districts are 
composite administrative-territorial units of municipalities. The municipal 
administration supports the activities of the municipal councils and the ma-
yors of municipalities, districts and mayoralties. (Data for employed persons 
in the local administration − see Table 11.5).143 The mayor is the executive 
body in the municipality. He/she manages all municipal executive activities, 
organizes the disbursement of the municipal budget and implementation of 
long-term programs, organizes the implementation of the municipal council 
acts, and participates in its sessions with the right to an advisory vote, appro-
ves the Rules of Procedure of the Municipal Administration.
143 According to data retrieved from NSI: http://www.nsi.bg/sites/default/files/files/data/time-
series/Labour_1.1.5.xls.
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Table 11.5: Data for Employed Persons in the Local Administration
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
LOCAL ADMINISTRATION 41350 41012 41377 41078 40842
Total share of local administration in % 42.9 42.7 42.9 43.7 44.3
1. Municipal and sub-municipal administrations 32,835 32,283 32,791 32,830 33,117
Share of local administration in % 79.4 78.7 79.2 79.9 81.1
2. Regional administrations 1,455 1,560 1,398 1,235 1,109
Share of local administration in % 3.5% 3.8% 3.4% 3% 2.7%
3. Specialized local administrations 7,060 7,169 7,188 7,013 6,616
Share of local administration in % 17.1% 17.5% 17.4% 17.1% 16.2%
The legal and organizational framework of local government system in 
Bulgaria is based on many legal acts. The most important one is the Constitu-
tion. According to it the municipality is the main (and so far the only) tier of 
local government in the country. The Constitution ensures the political basis 
of decentralization in Bulgaria – local government and the mayor are directly 
elected by the population of the municipality. This regulation is a precon-
dition for achieving a considerable independence of communities from the 
central government. However, municipalities do not have their own indepen-
dent powers defined in the Constitution − they receive or lose them by law, 
i.e. powers of municipalities derive from the parliament (kalchev, 2008:1−2). 
•	 Financial Decentralization 
Municipalities have their own independent budget and property, which 
can be used to serve their interests. Public services funded by municipal 
budgets are divided into two categories: activities delegated by the state and 
activities delegated by local activities. The delegated activities are financed 
by state transfers (grants, subsidies), and the local activities – by local reve-
nues (local taxes, user charges, rents of property, privatization, etc.). Local 
governments can also borrow directly from the financial market but some 
restrictions are laid down by legislation (kalchev, 2008: 1−2).
In recent years, the dynamics of the development of administrative ser-
vices lags behind. In 2013, the administration provided 2023 types of admi-
nistrative services to the citizens and businesses (see Figure 11.8).144
144 According to data retrieved from: http://www.strategy.bg/StrategicDocuments/View.aspx?lang=bg-
Bg&Id=891.
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Figure 11.8: Types of Services Provided by Central and Local Administrations
The introduction of the decentralization model is one of the first subs-
tantial institutional changes that come into the agenda of the transition from 
totalitarianism to democracy. Decentralization despite its concrete forms 
counts towards retrenchment of the state’s size and role and therefore res-
ponds as a policy tool to the main ideas used for grounding the liberal chan-
ges in the CEE countries at the begging of the 1990s. It also conforms to the 
ideas of democratization insofar as through it the governance approaches the 
citizens and their direct needs. In addition, it gives rise to new empowered 
actors – process that is also connected with the ideas of democratization for 
the sake of state monopoly over the policy-making limitation.  
Nevertheless, due to its compulsory presentation in the transition agen-
da, the decentralization model is not at all predetermined neither obvious. Its 
shaping falls at cross purposes because the main objectives of the transition 
are or can be conflicting. The first objective is related to democratic institu-
tions, building and shortening of the distance between the power and the ci-
tizens. Its achievement supposes more functional and financial detachment of 
the self-governance level – the municipalities. The second is connected with 
the financial stability and economic recovery attainment through the IMF 
receipts that include, among other things, so-called “structural adjustment 
reform”. The second objective achievement presumes a strong control over 
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the public outlays through the concentration of this function in state’s grasps. 
These two objectives – one for the democratization and one for the 
structural adjustment − are not equal in value. The first is publically suppor-
ted; the second concerns more the expert debate. Furthermore, the structural 
adjustment can be perceived as a tool for achieving the main transition aims. 
However, it has a significant importance for the choice of model. In the speci-
fic case of Bulgaria the second objective obtains more importance because of 
the international financial institutions’ influence over the transition policies. 
This influence is a consequence of the country’s financial dependence but the 
adoption of the ideas spread by them is supported and expanded by the in-
ternal experts that embrace this line of social development. As a result of the 
significant influence that the IMF receipts gain during the first years of transi-
tion, the Bulgarian choice toward decentralization is inwardly contradictive − 
the introduced model devolves functions to the municipalities, nevertheless 
it does not create financial preconditions for their fruition.  
Thus, after the initial legislative change, when in 1991 the decentrali-
zation model was enacted, until at least 1997, when an active alteration of 
the self-governance legislative framework is undertaken, the major problem 
faced by the local authorities was the discrepancy between their powers and 
functions on the one hand, and the insufficient resources at their disposal on 
the other (Shivergueva, 2009: 15). The steps to decentralization model adjus-
tment do not succeed to resolve this problem, and continue to persist while 
the changes are launched. However, the model advances in searching more 
decentralization.
As a matter of fact the decentralization model development starts be-
fore 1997 to a great extent under the influence of the EU and the accession 
process. As a rule – and this concerns the whole process of PAR – when the 
EU increases its influence over the country policies (for Bulgaria it happened 
around 1995, when the country entered the application for full membership, 
and the Commission started its work on the official position about this requ-
est development), the IMF’s role lessens. The international organizationhas 
been markedly evident since 1997 when the Currency Board practices were 
introduced, and the financial stability seemd assured.
The EU spreads in policies, including in the choice of governance model, 
with a more socially grounded view that enriches the neo-liberal project with 
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the ideas of citizens’ and local communities’ rights. At a large extent, due to 
the European influence, the decentralization process shifts in searching big-
ger financial independence of the municipalities, and in extending the autho-
rities devolution to the local bodies. The self-governance institutions increase 
their policy independence as well as their abilities to distribute the resources 
from the state budget on their own. The development of the property and 
financial grounds for the self-government and the decentralization start with 
the enactment of the Municipal Property Act in 1996. In the following two 
years, Local Taxes and Fees Act and Municipality Budget Act are passed. The 
structural adjustment aim is not abandoned. It is simply enriched with the 
idea of the governance that is close to citizens. 
Meanwhile in 1996, the National Association of Municipalities (hereinaf-
ter: Association) in Bulgaria is founded with the participation of one third of 
municipalities in the country. In 1997, the number of participating municipa-
lities increases and attains two thirds. Thus, the Association acquires the right 
to become a legitimated representative of the local power, represent and de-
fend its interest. 264 out of 265 Bulgarian municipalities belong to the Associ-
ation. Even though it is not a matter of formal law included in the institutional 
system of state policy-making, it becomes an active participant in this process.
Signed by the end of 2001, the Decentralization Agreement between the 
government of Bulgaria and the National Association of Municipalities ou-
tlines the main problems and the fields that need changes. As a result of the 
Agreement the following measures are undertaken in 2002: 
 − working group for developing the suggestions on main legal acts 
changes is created by a decision of Council of Ministers; 
 − Financial decentralization framework for the period 2002−2005 and a 
plan for its implementation are adopted;  
 − Decision for the division of activities founded through the local 
budgets by local activities and activities delegated by the state is made 
by The Council of Ministers. Standards for the number of municipa-
lity employees and for the maintenance of activities delegated by the 
state are introduced.  
During the following years, changes in the main legal acts are amended 
incrementally. These changes comprise the introduction of tax decentrali-
zation practices. The main ground for them is the need to widen financial 
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independence of the municipalities which is perceived as the essential pre-
requisite for a better economic and social development of the local commu-
nities through the self-governance tools.
Five local taxes were enacted since 1997. However, local municipali-
ties only administered these taxes, acting mostly as tax collection agencies, 
without the ability to add new taxes or determine the tax rate or the tax base 
(kalchev, 2008: 4). Since 2008, local municipalities have not only been collec-
ting these taxes but have also determined their size (tax rate). In addition to 
the already existing five local taxes, another one was added − the trade license 
tax (patent tax), which was a national tax until recently. On the other hand, 
the central government eliminated the partial transfer of personal income tax 
from the central government to the local governments. These specific steps 
towards fiscal decentralization could only be enacted through the changes 
in the Constitution. So far, the Constitution forbade determining the local 
taxation parameters by the local authorities. However, since 2008, the Consti-
tution permits the local authorities to determine the size of local taxes accor-
ding to and within the limits (ranges) provided by law. Changes in the Cons-
titution were followed by the changes in the Local Tax and Fees Act which 
empowered the local authorities to determine the effective tax rates within a 
predefined range (For municipal revenues see Table 11.6). 
In spite of these changes, the taxing power of municipalities is very li-
mited. The central government controls more than 70% of local budget reve-
nue without bearing responsibility for the quantity and quality of the public 
services provided to the local residents. Local authorities in Bulgaria do not 
enjoy real tax autonomy, cannot influence revenue from local taxes, and have, 
in fact, a limited access to capital markets (kalchev, 2008; Stoilova, 2009).145
Table 11.6: Municipal Revenues (in millions of leva)
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Municipal reve-
nues – total 2,333 2,694 3,238 4,077 5,491 4,761 4,637 4,548 4,577 4,907
Own revenues – 
share 35.2% 34.9% 37.5% 40.8% 32.4% 31.9% 32.7% 36.6% 37.1% 36.8%
145  According to data retrieved from Ministry of Finance: http://www.minfin.bg/bg/page/19.
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Despite the effectuated changes, the financial state of municipalities has 
not improved considerably. Just the other way round, because of the economic 
crisis as well as because of the exceptionally uneven economic development 
of the country, the mean share of the own municipal revenues has decreased. 
In 2010, the biggest reduction was due to the decrease in the revenue from 
the municipal property management. Nowadays, the property management 
has become one of the main challenges of the local administrations (Ботев 
Йордан, 2015).
The development of decentralization model elicits certain changes in 
proportion of the outlays for local activities in the municipal budgets. The 
trend is toward a slight increase in the expenditures of local activities’ share 
(See Table 11.7).146
Table 11.7: Expenses in Municipal Budgets (in millions of leva)
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Costs for local activities 1,058 1,371 1,727 2,381 2,862 2,566 2,365 2,297 2,287 2,449
Share 45% 51% 53% 58% 58% 54% 51% 50.5% 50.3% 50.1%
Cost of government 
activities 1,275 1,323 1,556 1,696 2,111 2,194 2,272 2,251 2,287 2,459
Share 55% 49% 47% 42% 42% 46% 49% 49.5% 49.7% 49.9%
One of the main problems, which the introduced decentralization mo-
del elicits, is the extraordinary uneven development of municipalities. Their 
indebtedness measured through the size of the debt as a share from the own 
revenue and the state subsidy range within wide limits − from 0% to 243% 
according to the data for 2013 (Ministry of Finance: http://www.minfin.
bg/bg/page/19). The same data show that a relatively small number of mu-
nicipalities have overdue charges. Just two of them have a debt which as a 
share of the revenue exceeds 100%. The uneven territorial development is 
confirmed from the data for the gDP per capita that are figured at NUTSII 
and NUTSIII level (see Table 11.8).147
146 According to data retrieved from Ministry of Finance: http://www.minfin.bg/bg/page/19.
147 According to data retrieved from NSI: http://www.nsi.bg/sites/default/files/files/data/timese-
ries/gDP_1.1.4.xls.
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Table 11.8: gDP and gVA by Economic Sector and Region (2014)
 Statistical regi-
on (NUTS II)
Oblast 
(NUTS III)
Gross Value Added by eco-
nomic sector GVA, 
Million 
BGN        
GDP, 
Million 
BGN
GDP per 
capita, 
BGNAgricul-
ture Industry Services
 BULgARIA   3 823 19 726 49 059 72 608 83 612 11 574
Severozapaden   649 1 716 2 787 5 151 5 932 7 381
  Vidin 89 77 329 495 570 6 034
  Vratsa 152 715 590 1 457 1 678 9 494
  Lovech 97 317 478 892 1 027 7 635
  Montana 140 206 460 806 929 6 611
  Pleven 171 400 929 1 501 1 728 6 710
Severen 
tsentralen   626 2 038 3 378 6 042 6 958 8 376
  V. Tarnovo 141 468 1 081 1 690 1 946 7 801
  gabrovo 46 493 460 999 1 150 9 804
  Razgrad 142 300 406 848 977 8 152
  Ruse 147 672 1 102 1 922 2 213 9 675
  Silistra 150 105 329 584 672 5 826
Severoiztochen   627 2 329 5 128 8 083 9 308 9 775
  Varna 147 1 408 3 423 4 978 5 733 12 096
  Dobrich 211 339 694 1 245 1 434 7 802
  Targoviste 116 222 386 723 833 7 113
  Shumen 153 360 624 1 137 1 309 7 376
Yugoiztochen   556 3 825 4 667 9 048 10 419 9 819
  Burgas 188 558 2 380 3 126 3 599 8 687
  Sliven 108 306 583 996 1 147 5 936
  St. Zagora 146 2 642 1 287 4 075 4 692 14 348
  Yambol 114 319 418 851 980 7 751
Yugozapaden   555 6 448 27 369 34 373 39 582 18 614
  Blagoevgrad 250 678 1 154 2 082 2 397 7 567
  kyustendil 59 264 423 746 859 6 656
  Pernik 47 200 410 657 756 5 914
  Sofia 137 1 351 912 2 401 2 765 11 544
  Sofia cap. 62 3 954 24 470 28 487 32 804 24 982
Yuzhen 
tsentralen   810 3 371 5 730 9 911 11 413 7 872
  kardzhali 140 219 434 794 914 6 041
  Pazardzhik 162 637 793 1 592 1 833 6 842
  Plovdiv 259 1 913 3 276 5 448 6 273 9 268
  Smolyan 93 282 380 755 869 7 554
  Haskovo 156 319 847 1 323 1 523 6 386
•	 Regional level
Decentralization model in Bulgaria gives important functions to the re-
gional level, i.e. a deconcentrated state power. It does not formulate its own 
policies while it should coordinate local policies (formulated at the munici-
pality level) in region framework. The coordination depends more on abili-
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ties, skills, and leadership than on legally bound commitments. The legislative 
changes are easier than the development of abilities and shaping of leadership. 
For this reason, there are many problems that question nowadays the capa-
city of regional level for the policy coordination implementation (Живле, 
К. Джилджов, А. Нодингс, П. 2009). The existing regional administration 
capacity is not perceived as a specific issue that should be resolved for the 
sake of the current decentralization model improvement in the current PAR 
reform. Insofar the fact that some steps have been undertaken is related to the 
European regional and cohesion policy implementation. These steps change 
slightly the practices; however, they have not the opportunity to significantly 
influence the territorial governance.   
The regional level deficits related to the policy coordination are not defi-
cits of structure. They derive from a limited capacity of the public administra-
tion as a whole to implement and follow the good governance logic when it 
acts (Т. Танев, 2011). This logic presumes that different governance levels are 
involved in a common, horizontal process of policy aims formulation. Thin-
king through the formal hierarchy turns back the process to the weberian 
bureaucracy. For this logic, the existence of a great number of empowered, 
independent actors is counter-evident. In the practices this thinking widens 
the role of the center despite the formally build decentralization.  
In the public debate, the opportunity for a self-governance principle in-
troduction at the regional level is discussed. The newly developed Decentra-
lization Strategy for 2016−2025 and its Implementation Plan embrace this 
opportunity. The intended decentralization, and especially its regional level is 
not clear yet. what will happen depends on the state’s will to lose, or at least, 
to share the control over the policy formulation and public finances. For the 
moment, this seems to prevail.
11.3. Conclusion: Setting of Administrative Practices instead of 
Governance Model
Since 1989, the PAR in Bulgaria advances as three interrelated proces-
ses. They differ in the concept they introduce in the practices; their start up 
time, and the actors through whom the relevant practices are transfered.
The first process introduces the traditional model of administration 
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concept and the practices that have shaped the statute and the capacity of 
professional and politically independent administration. This part of the re-
form is relevant, to a great extent, for the agenda of transition from totalita-
rianism to democracy because it contains the opportunity to substitute the 
old administration and break with the past. The orientation to the classical 
model of public administration is additionally supported by the Europe-
an process for the sake of the relevant practices spread in a few influential 
member states.  
The second process of the PAR in Bulgaria introduces the NPM con-
cept in the governance model. It leads to the devolution of public services 
delivery to the private sector; orientation of public administration activities 
to the results and to the client; creation and development of public authori-
ties’ regulatory capacity, and decrease in the administrative burden on the 
businesses. Specific aspect of this process is the decrease in the administra-
tion size and its optimization in relation to the functions. The international 
financial institutions are the main actors for spreading of this concept. The 
EU cannot be perceived as the main actor while it supports the NPM ideas 
for the sake of prevailing liberal paradigm of the common market building. 
The third process has started last and it is grounded on the European 
integration and requisiteness to respond to the European conditionality. It 
has enlarged the reform by bringing the concept of good governance and 
the practices, which have opened the administration to the society and in-
volved the society in its activities.  
The PAR is often explained as a shift from the first concept to the 
second, and next to the third concept. As a matter of fact, the reform agenda 
looks in this way. However, as the reform content mixes the three concepts 
and creates administrative structure relevant to the classical model, it has 
introduced practices and regulations over the policy implementation in re-
levance to the NPM and over the policy formulation – in relevance to good 
governance. “Does this reform lead to a new governance model shaping?”, is 
the research question that rises. For the moment, the PAR result is nothing 
than a setting of administrative practices. It is only the future of the PAR 
that can respond whether one of these concepts will prevail or whether a 
new governance model will emerge from the incremental process of the 
administrative practices introduction.     
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12. Conclusion: Main Themes of 
Public Administration Reforms in the                                       
Eastern EU Member States
Mantas Bileišis, Polonca Kovač 
12.1. Convergence, Divergence, and Administrative Spaces
In this book we present overviews of public administration reforms of 9 
of 11 post-communist EU Member States: Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slova-
kia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria written by the public 
administration researchers from respective countries. One characteristic of 
the region with regard to comparative public administration is that a large 
body of research is published in national languages, and there are a few ou-
tlets for its dissemination internationally. From the broader perspective of 
public administration research, the term coined in the wake of the collapse 
of communism in Europe which refers to the region as Central and Eastern 
Europe (or CEE) is still very persistent, although the intervening quarter of a 
century has resulted in countries taking wildly different developmental paths. 
And while that is self-evident when looking at, say, Slovenia as opposed to 
Tajikistan, the differences between the 11 countries on which we focus in this 
book are often much harder to identify at first glance. 
So, what are the themes that allow defining this region as precisely that – 
a region? To begin with we found that there is a considerable variation betwe-
en the paths the countries are taking in terms of the development of reforms. 
And this, we believe, means that the topic of administrative convergence in 
the EU is of key relevance and will remain such into the future. A common 
administrative space may become the institutional “glue” that keeps the EU 
together in times of political disagreement but we are very far from having 
national administrations, the sum of which could be defined as “space”.
The specificity of the region of 11 new (Eastern) EU member states is 
usually explained by two features of its history: post-communist148 transfor-
148 This is often called post-socialist transformation in countries which were affected by the Soviet 
Union to a lesser extent.
472 Public AdministrAtion reforms in eAstern euroPeAn union member stAtes 
Post-Accession convergence And divergence
mation and European integration. Both of which occurred simultaneously. 
And both of which describe a decades old phenomena. There is evidence 
that these concepts can no longer sufficiently explain developments in public 
administrations of these countries. But that is not to say that the idea of “the 
west and the rest” does not still hold true between western and Eastern EU 
member states. Although the EU is the most prominent institutional pro-
ject of the west, there is still a long way before differences between western 
and Eastern member states will no longer be pronounced. And this needs to 
be kept in mind when making comparative analyses. Eastern and western 
member states of the EU differ in several critical respects: Eastern member 
states have lower citizens’ trust in governments and their accountability, the-
re remains a stark difference in economic prosperity, and most of the regi-
on’s administrations have significantly more politicized civil services, which 
affects their capacity.
In the wake of ‘Brexit’ referendum greater institutional integration is 
becoming an important topic in the EU. But closer integration, which implies 
convergence in governance practices, is a deeply contentious issue. Indeed, 
there is much to be said about divergence. E.g. the Eurozone crisis has dis-
proportionately affected the southern EU member states to a point, in fact, at 
which their economic prosperity has nearly equaled that of the eastern mem-
ber states. Therefore, going forward with the discussions on future prospects 
of greater EU integration a better understanding of actual trajectories of con-
vergence or divergence, and key factors driving them is important. As Pollitt 
(2001) points out convergence in terms of public administration reform can 
be misguiding. At least four consecutive levels of convergence can be iden-
tified: (i) convergence of reform debates, (ii) decisions, (iii) practices, and 
(iv) results. Concepts of convergence and divergence in public administration 
originated when theorizing the move from traditional bureaucracy to New 
Public Management in the western countries (Pollitt, 2001; cf. Pollitt, van 
Thiel & Homburg, 2007). The problem with Eastern EU member states with 
regard to the convergence/divergence debate is that a move towards post-bu-
reaucratic governance coincided with post-communist/socialist transforma-
tion. This means that although the transformation took different paths it does 
not automatically mean that divergence of administration is taking place. 
The convergence/divergence debate in this sense can be enhanced by con-
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sidering the public administration traditions approach (e.g. Pierre & Painter, 
2010). Regions with largely uninterrupted centuries old political institutions 
significantly limit possibilities to implement formal theories of governance. 
E.g. the NPM with its origins in the Anglo-Saxon tradition proved to be a 
tough sell in countries like France or germany. But the eastern EU member 
states were considered a tabula rasa in the early 1990s – starting reforms from 
similar positions, and as Pollitt (2007) puts it, countries in the region were 
‘imposed’ with or ‘strongly urged’ for NPM reforms. But we believe the tabula 
rasa argument not to be accurate. Important differences among the coun-
tries did exist already at the outset. The Baltic States, Slovakia, Slovenia, and 
Croatia needed to develop tools of sovereign government, and Slovenia and 
Croatia had to fight wars of independence. Also pre-communist traditions of 
governance became the benchmark against which new developments were 
measured domestically. As a result, the rhetoric of adopting ‘European stan-
dards’149 that pervaded the discourse of public administration reforms (PAR) 
before the EU accession had different meanings in different countries. Being 
aware of this complex interaction of a search for administrative tradition, and 
the impetus for convergence make this region of particular interest for public 
administration research. 
Despite the shortcoming of reforms, the region’s countries are poster-
children for benefits of Europeanization. In 2004, two countries, Czech Re-
public and Slovenia had a Human Development Index value of 0.800 (very 
high). In the intervening decade 7 more regional countries have joined this 
list, and this is despite a particularly hard impact of the 2008−2009 that hit 
most of the regions. 
In this contribution we will leave out the discussion what was the role, 
positive or negative, of NPM of region’s success (Randma-Liiv, 2008; Drechsler 
and Randma-Liiv, 2014). Ours is a more empirically focused question: Do pu-
blic administration reforms in the region follow a pattern that would amount to 
an administrative tradition as outlined by Peters and Painter (2010)? 
In recent years Hungary and Poland conducted reforms that, as Drechsler 
and Randma-Liiv (2014) put it, are driven by endogenous factors. These reforms 
are severely challenging the assumption that this region can be defined by a sin-
149 we use the term synonymously to Europeanization (more in Nemec & al., 2015; cf. Trondal & 
Peters, 2013).
474 Public AdministrAtion reforms in eAstern euroPeAn union member stAtes 
Post-Accession convergence And divergence
gle reform trend. Finding concepts that explain common and differing gover-
nance developments could shed light more broadly on public administration 
theory with regard to the western public administration and be a good test 
for the validity of New Public governance (NPg), and other formal public 
administration theories, most of which make universal claims and pay little 
attention to particular social and institutional contexts of nation-states. The 
NPg, similarly as the NPM, are formal theories, which cannot be adopted in 
practice in corpore; while weber’s ideal-type bureaucracy is a result of gene-
ralization and seems to retain important explanatory power for the behavior 
of public administrations, and even enjoys a comeback as Neo-weberianism 
(Dunn & Miller, 2007; kovač & gajduschek, 2015). we kept in mind these 
four formal governance theories, and we tried to utilize them as heuristic and 
analytic guidelines to try to frame generalizable observations. 
12.2. Call them EEU-11 
Before addressing the subject matter of this contribution, we believe a 
discussion on identification (i.e. naming) of the region in question is necessa-
ry. Membership of the EU in many respects was a rite of passage of statehood 
for many of the post-communist/socialist countries. The 11 post-communist/
socialist countries joined the EU in 3 consecutively smaller enlargements: 8 
in 2004 (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hun-
gary, Slovenia), further 2 in 2007 (Romania, Bulgaria), and finally, 1 in 2013 
(Croatia). Moreover, it is becoming obvious that the EU’s Eastern expansion 
is likely to experience a long break150. The fact that in 2016 in our region of 
interest three countries were in the Schengen zone and six (all of them largest 
by population) are not in the Eurozone shows a slowing integration processes. 
with the ‘Brexit’ vote and consecutive economic, and migration crises the 
‘enlargement fatigue’ is finding forms of political expression in many of the 
most economically powerful member states, and this is not likely to change. 
Thus, the eastern borders of the EU have split the once-communist Europe at 
least into two areas, which tackle profoundly different administrative issues. 
Hence, the region of 11 countries, we believe, needs a set term of reference. 
150 Four western Balkan states of Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia were recognized 
candidates in 2016, but only two, Montenegro and Serbia, were conducting negotiations; these 
were in the opening stages, and their pace was slower than for the countries that acceded earlier. 
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It is still the case that differences among Eastern EU member states are 
smaller as compared to other EU regions. Nonetheless, they have become 
more pronounced over time. As years go by, attributing generalized reform 
trends to the region as a whole deserves due contention. At the outset of wri-
ting this book we had hoped to arrive at a something resembling a model 
of Eastern EU governance. And on these terms we do see several persistent 
factors which ensure similar governance outcomes in most of the regional 
countries. However, this is caused not so much by the processes of convergen-
ce but rather institutional limitations for reforms that do not allow divergence 
to occur at greater scale or pace. However, more time is needed before we can 
tell for sure if this extended period of lingering close together will result in a 
public administration tradition in the full sense of this term.
Much of the body of literature on post-communist transformation and 
later on Europeanization agrees that the policies towards the post-communist 
EU candidate countries were similar and had a strong homogenizing effect 
(Jacoby, 2006). with regard to Europeanization, this literature was primarily 
concerned with how the EU accession conditionality affected public admi-
nistration and other reforms in candidate countries. Some studies on the to-
pic have suggested that Europeanization has been in this respect understood 
mainly as the impact of common values and trends as well as formalised prin-
ciples, norms, and case law within or as an impact of the EU on drafting and 
implementation of regulations in individual countries as pursued particularly 
by the SIgMA. Yet, Europeanization is much more difficult to demonstrate as 
a factor of reforms after the accession (Sedelmeier, 2011). Such admissions al-
low revisiting both studies of post-communist transformation, and reach furt-
her back in history to seek out reform factors that shape different states and 
societies. Broadly, we claim, that Huntington’s thesis (1997), that in a ‘post-ide-
ological’ world of free market democracy versus communism the nation states 
will turn to their long standing cultural (or civilizational) identities to build 
political legitimacy. with 9 of the 11 countries included in the Huntingtonian 
map of the west, and with Bulgaria and Romania having powerful European 
nation-state narratives that overshadow their eastern Christians historical affi-
liations, Huntington’s thesis might serve as an explanation for these countries’ 
compliance to the EU requirements without having to cope with challenges of 
state building per se as it happened in much of the rest of the region. 
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After all, although dramatic, communism in historical terms was only a 
short period, and in the the early 1990s, there was still a living memory of the 
previous period. Because of its totalitarian, centrally planned, and brutally 
enforced policies it brought certain uniformity to the eastern part of Europe. 
The concept of Central and Eastern Europe (or CEE) was coined after the 
collapse of communism, and is still often used to refer to post-communist or 
post-socialist countries. However, this concept includes countries as different 
as the Czech Republic and Tajikistan (cf. Vintar & al., 2013; analyzing PARs 
under the scope of the NISPAcee region). As years and decades go by, diffe-
rences between sub-regions of CEE become ever more accentuated. In sum, 
four distinct regions can be identified from the European perspective within 
CEE. 11 EU member states (of which 5 are members of the Eurozone), west-
Balkan states in the current EU enlargement agenda with likely members-
hip at an indeterminate point in the future, six post-Soviet states within the 
Eastern Partnership (EaP), and the remaining six of Russia and Central Asia 
which, in effect, are beyond the European governance debates altogether. At 
the outset of the discussion, we propose referring to the 11 countries of the 
region as Eastern Members of the EU, new Members of the EU, Central and 
Eastern European EU Members,  and to avoid any confusion, the concept of 
EEU-11 (Eastern European Union). Because the term used for new mem-
ber states as proposed by Drechsler and Radmaa-Liiv (2014) is not specific 
enough, e.g. Malta and Cyprus also qualify, as to some extent do Sweden, 
Finland, and Austria which already had to comply to the Copenhagen criteria 
for joining. Moreover, while Sedelmeiers’ (2009), although specific but rat-
her clumsy, post-communist new member states, and while the Central and 
Eastern European countries (CEEC; with a relevant number; as in Lippert & 
Umbach, 2005) raise questions about where to exactly draw the line between 
central and eastern Europe, the UN’s classification of Baltic States as Norther 
Europe makes things even more complicated. 
The notion of EEU-11 is hence suggested to simultaneously identify 
and differentiate the area. Firstly, we wish to emphasize key similarities and 
convergences characteristic for respective countries, resulting from common 
societal legacies (primarily post-communist one), up to date administrative 
structures (above all based on the EU membership), and economic processes 
(crisis and rationalizations). Secondly, we feel that there is an increasing need to 
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differ this region from other countries of Eastern and/or Southern Europe that 
express other or additional issues, which are not relevant for our scope. Namely, 
such a concept of EEU-11 can serve as a theoretical if not practical ground for 
further PAR developments, both at the European (in terms of pursuing joint 
interests of these 11 member states within the EU) and national levels. 
12.3. EU, EEU-11, or Case-by-case?
Is there any sense for intra-regional comparisons of national public 
administrations within the EU? Do, by limiting ourselves geographically, we 
also risk overlooking important things? Both are the questions we cannot 
fully answer here but we do believe that several reasons deserve to be men-
tioned in defense of EEU-11 as a meaningful region for comparison. what 
we discovered in the process of reviewing the national contribution was that 
generalizations become more difficult, not easier, when we were trying to des-
cribe more particular topics, such as the civil service. This increase of com-
plexity as we look closer into the cases is, of course, to be expected. Similarly 
as, e.g. a generalization of modernity maybe useful when discussing profound 
technological change, such as the Internet, but is next to useless in a discus-
sion on whether next years’ national budget of a small country will go up or 
down by 2%. Nevertheless, what we found was that a difficulty to generali-
ze lies in the fact that comprehensive reforms which have a clearly spelt-out 
ideology (or a paradigm if you will) is present only in the case of Hungary’s 
strong state narrative (Fodor, 2012). Furthermore, formal theories such as 
neo-weberianism or New Public governance are not part of public debates 
on public administration reform. Instead, narrow and most often contingen-
cy driven changes are the main type of reforms in EEU-11. Although changes 
are happening continuously − for the most part they are incremental and do 
not amount to a formation of a specific public administration model. Finding 
ourselves in a situation where by trying to look closely at each case we en-
counter a torrent of events which are of limited consequence, while trying to 
find a meta-trend we do not seem to find a single structuring factor of public 
administration reforms that would apply to the entire EEU-11 we opted for 
a middle road, of describing the several most prominent themes in public 
administration that are of concern, and that are likely to remain of concern 
throughout the EEU-11. And as e.g. Jreisat (2005) points out, comparative 
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research in public administration may arrive closer to describing emergent 
features of governance into a coherent theory by aggregating data from diffe-
rent governance systems. 
In addition, our work is not conducted on barren soil. There are several 
recent publications focusing specifically on the region and raising similar qu-
estions (kovač & gajduschek, 2015; Vintar & al., 2013). These publications go 
some way in pointing out the PAR trends in the EU. But what we set out to do in 
this conclusion is to stress that in all EEU-11 there are  raging debates on how 
to achieve convergence to the EU ‘average’, and beyond on any metric. Moreo-
ver, what we find these debates result in themes that do overlap throughout the 
region. EEU-11 is differently experiencing fluctuations of global economy, and 
it is mostly on the sidelines of third country immigration. These new social 
and economic disparities are bound to impact public governance.  
Before we begin outlining the themes we deem most prominent we ask 
you to keep in mind the research question we asked the contributors to answer: 
“What are the concepts and their content of PAR or administrative and/or gover-
nance changes that frame research debates in your country?”. This question was 
elaborated to encourage contributors to cover: (i) national governance setups 
and governance mode(s); (ii) organization of public administration, including 
decentralization and agencification, and main resources, e.g. public funding; 
(iii) development of civil service; (iv) administrative procedures and transpa-
rency issues. This was also complimented with and followed up by additional 
questions to the contributors to elaborate on: (i) “Can a ‘native-to-the-region’ 
EEU-11 theory of PAR (administrative/governance change) be constructed 
to replace the Post-Communist/Socialist transition narrative?”; (ii) “Does the 
post-communist transition narrative still play a role in understanding PAR in 
the regional countries?”; (iii) “How is the concept of Europeanization cons-
tructed with regard to PAR (administrative/governance change)?”; (iv) “what 
are the key arguments for explaining ‘implementation gaps’ in the PAR process 
in the country/region? Are there differences in policy areas?” 
A decision to collect data this way resulted in highly varied inputs which 
presented us with a challenge of trying to generalize the regions experience. 
However, public administration research in EEU-11 mostly goes by imported 
theories and terminologies. In addition, to gain relevance in our domestic 
public administration reform discourses as well as provide international pers-
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pectives, we need our national academic communities to begin constructing 
narratives both closely related to local realities, and at the same time, having 
a high level of sophistication. In this regard, this book still leaves a lot to be 
done. Nevertheless, we find that there is meaning in learning from each ot-
her’s experience, rather than implementing further ideas that originated from 
the west in very different settings. At the same time, we believe this book will 
contribute its small part to the debates on European Administrative Space 
(EAS). Protection of the four freedoms is something we believe in strongly. 
Moreover, in Europe where policy is becoming more erratic, a strong insti-
tutional backbone of public administration may very well come in handy. In 
the long run, greater convergence not only in areas which the EU directly 
affects but in key aspects of administration, such as administrative culture, 
ethics, procedures, and civil service are key institutional prerequisites which 
will become a focus of contention between political forces of integration and 
otherwise. Here, the story of EEU-11 is a cautionary one. Convergence is a 
particularly tall order, and will not be achieved by itself.
we believe five public administration reform themes in EEU-11 are cle-
arly discernable, and are the following: (i) near unchangeable ‘paradigm’ set-
ting role of institutional setups of the early 1990s, (ii) tension between pressu-
res to reform between international and local considerations, (iii) lack of a 
‘strategic visions’ for the outcomes of reforms, (iv) persistence of legalism, 
and (v) tension between centralizations and decentralization.
12.4. Initial Institutional Steps
with regard to the observation that initial institutional setups are nearly 
immovable, one particular feature of EEU-11 is apparent: existing political 
institutions at the national level have, in most of EEU-11, hardly changed 
since the early 1990s. The path-dependence on initial conditions of any insti-
tutional setup is the cornerstone of the historic institutionalist theory (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996). Europeanization is, in this respect, primarily reflected in hori-
zontal governance (Nemec & al., 2015). Moreover, there is no denying that 
post-communist transformation was the period of setting governance models 
that have not experienced a major reshuffle. In EEU-11, post-communist re-
forms were already initially well on the path of Europeanization, and favora-
bly set for the later enlargements. Although the basic institutional setups have 
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not changed substantially in EEU-11, there is a notable exception of Hungary. 
This might also be the case for Poland in the wake of 2015 elections.
An important feature of the context of public administration reforms in 
the EEU-11 is that these countries are parliamentary democracies with only 
Romania considered semi-presidential. Nevertheless, even in its case the pre-
sidential power with regard to public administration is severely limited. No-
netheless, eight states with the exception of Estonia, Latvia, and Hungary do 
have direct presidential elections. Having two national institutions which hold 
popular mandates means that most EEU-11 have created a large number of 
veto players at the very top national executives means that difficulties of both 
initiating and following through with reforms occur more often than not. In 
EEU-11, achieving consensus for reforms among the elites is that much harder 
(Talat-kelpša, 2004). This enhanced system of checks and balances is a na-
tural result of totalitarian experience in the region, and is a means of guarding 
against risks of authoritarianism. Hungary is particularly interesting in this re-
gard as it allows us to draw an important lesson: there, differently from Estonia 
and Latvia, a highly ethnically homogenous society with the absence of a po-
pular presidential election could create the conditions for radical reform. And 
it is the only case of reforms that not only focus on narrow public management 
areas but reshuffle the entire institutional system based on a locally developed 
‘strong state’ concept. In Poland, conditions for a debate about comprehensive 
national governance reforms became only possible when the president and 
the prime minister were closely politically aligned and coordinated by a cha-
rismatic leader who did not hold an official position. In this regard, the Polish 
arrangement for a reform agenda is much more fragile. 
Another important observation with regard to the political context of 
PAR is that the post-communist transformation was largely peaceful (or, 
especially the war in Croatia, have not been a direct impact of this origin but 
national or other tensions). The lustration process, if it occurred at all, did not 
bar the participation of former communists in the political process, or public 
administration (welsh, 1996). This meant that, in most cases, the staff of go-
vernment agencies was not replaced, and many of the practices of communist 
administrations persisted well into the 1990s. All these factors play into the 
fact that most of the public administration reforms since the EU accession 
were moderate and narrow in their focus. In addition, the nature of post-
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communist transformation means that reform is more often called for by the 
political parties that identify themselves as right-wing, whereas the left-wing 
governments tend to favor incremental change, if not status quo.  
with the exception of Hungary, and possibly Poland, EEU-11 seems to 
have settled on an institutional setup which is unfavorable for comprehen-
sive reforms because for those to go ahead a great number of political and 
social factors need to coincide. This is in stark contrast to the institutional 
arrangements of the Anglo-Saxon tradition where strong executives can im-
plement reforms of public management with little resistance. However, this 
is not to say that under the conditions of recent authoritarian and totalitarian 
experiences, low trust and lower rankings in corruption perception an An-
glo-Saxon institutional reform in the EEU-11 would be a good idea. History 
of non-EEU-11 post-communist regimes, which are often presidential, bears 
witness. As Pollitt (2013) points out, the ease with which reforms can be star-
ted and a lack of accountability for the results of such reforms raises questions 
about the merits of the institutional system.
12.5. Non-Alignment of Domestic and International                                  
Drivers for Reforms
Due to the relationship between external (international) and internal 
(domestic) factors of PAR, the opinions of contributing authors have diver-
ged significantly. Here, the countries with long and uninterrupted periods of 
statehood (Poland, Hungary) seem to have been least affected by the external 
pressures. Nonetheless, two institutions enjoyed significant influence over re-
forms in EEU-11 in the decade preceding the EU accession: the IMF and the 
EU. These organizations have managed to drive a lot of governance change in 
the entire region. Primarily, this was because the elites and population were 
aligned in the support of EU integration − a situation that occurs in excee-
dingly few areas of reform. In addition, in the 1990s, all countries, with the 
exception of Slovenia, had entered some sort of IMF program (Roaf & al., 
2014). At the time, the IMF did espouse the principles of NPM and encoura-
ged its program among the participant countries to adopt relevant reforms. 
But these reforms often focused on narrow sectors of fiscal governance and 
economic policy, similarly as the Europeanization process produced ‘islands’ 
of ‘Europeanized’ administrative practices (goetz, 2001). And it appears that 
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it still remains to be the case that in narrowly defined (i.e. receive little public 
or political attention) policy areas, where the EU-level regulation is of high 
importance, reforms continue to be implemented and new practices taken up 
through various peer-to-peer networks. However, due to their ad hoc nature 
and lack of research, it is difficult to say whether this is a case across the entire 
EEU-11 and across all policy areas. On the other hand, we can claim that due 
to the narrow focus of such reforms, the proliferation of modern methods of 
public governance seep through the entire public sector, and does not spur 
broader public and political debate over PAR. Rather, the caricatures of public 
administration as a corrupt and inefficient are drawn in the public discourse; 
and fatalistically imply a need to deregulate and reduce the scope of PA, rat-
her than reform it.  
A typology explicitly presented by the contributor with the Romanian 
country profile (see Table 1) of PAR appears to apply to the entire EEU-11. 
The two criteria for the four main types of reform are: (i) conditionality (i.e. 
imposed, or presented by the reformers as imposed by international obliga-
tions) versus/or ideology-driven (espoused by the reformers), and (ii) secto-
rial versus structural (affecting all, or most of government agencies). 
Table 12.1: PAR Types in EEU-11
Conditional Ideology-driven
Sectorial Most common (adoption of new EU regulation)
Fairly common, initiated by the 
ministers with narrow focuses
Structural
Very rare, mostly a historic legacy of 
the EU integration, and IMF funding 
programs
Very rare (e.g. Hungary’s constitutio-
nal reform)
Source: see Romanian profile by Calin Hintea et al.
Countries in EEU-11 are almost entirely all similar in terms of initia-
ting and conducting structural reforms because their institutional setups al-
low few possibilities to conduct such reforms. However, the region is highly 
divergent in terms of ideological sectorial reforms. whereas with the EU-
driven (conditional sectorial) reforms, similarities are very clear, and only 
the adoption speed and the breadth of impact on change of administrative 
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practices differs. Smaller countries, such as Slovenia, Latvia and Lithuania, 
diligently implement conditional sectorial reforms. Is some sense, it is a form 
of outsourcing much of the administrative procedures to the EU institutions 
with the national institutions not devoting many recourses on reviewing the-
se. Contrary, others, such as Slovakia and Hungary, tend to adopt the ‘box 
ticking’ logic, formally adopting needed reforms without following up with 
substantive change in public management.  
Roughly, the same geographic divide can be identified when speaking 
of ministerial level ideology-driven reforms. These are more common in 
countries where ministerial autonomy is large and reforms (or their rheto-
ric) are often used as a means of postponing accountability of tenure in of-
fice. In countries, such as Slovakia, reform is an organic part of the political 
rhetoric, often without a substantial strategic concept of what the reform is 
trying to achieve. The EEU-11 states have also underwent a process of inten-
sive agencification with many agencies tasked with coordinating standards of 
administrative practices, such as central civil service agencies, or governance 
agencies. However, the monitoring tools that would enable such agencies to 
effectively compare other institutions performance are, in most part, not in 
place, and therefore, their capacity to mobilize public and political support 
for PAR is difficult. Nevertheless, the variety and number of these reforms 
is staggering, and an inventory would need to be made in order to definiti-
vely claim that these are more often used as a means of political communi-
cation, rather than attempts to genuinely modernize processes. Albeit there 
is some evidence that in cases when technocrats are appointed as ministers, 
substantial sectorial reforms do occur. In sum, although generally speaking 
but obvious, is also that EEU-11 are still often dealing with rather basic PA 
restructuring issues instead of upgrading good administration principles as 
identified in the west. This is indicated, among others, by many reported im-
plementation gaps, and consequently, mainly formal PA modernization and 
internationalization. The exchanges of best practices are fragmented and un-
derdeveloped, especially beyond small Baltic or western Balkans countries. 
This is evident at almost all levels: nationally among sector specific policies, 
regionally, in the EU and broader.
On the other hand, we can claim that a divergence between countries 
of the region may be drawn along two lines of this typology: the presence 
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of structural reforms (Hungary, possibly Poland) versus no such presence; 
and within the latter group of countries – differences between quick versus 
sluggish uptake of new EU regulation. we believe this line, with the exception 
of Slovakia (and having in mind lacking information from Estonia and Czech 
Republic), may be drawn between the Eurozone participants and non-Euro-
zone participants.
12.6. What Are the Visions for Reform?
Lack of ‘strategic visions’ is directly linked to the lack of strategic 
(structural) reforms in EEU-11. The legacy of the communist period pla-
gues the public sector in a sense that there are very low trust levels in the 
society (both political and social). Therefore, populations are persuaded to 
undergo reforms by charismatic leadership, rather than rational public deba-
tes. Throughout the region, the two strategic policy goals of EEU-11, which 
evoked comprehensive reforms, were the memberships of EU and NATO. 
However, once these goals were achieved the institutional arrangements do 
not allow building national (or to that matter regional) consensus on futu-
re visions of public governance which societies would espouse. In addition, 
when reforms do happen after all, as they did in Hungary, they are focused 
on strengthening the national level institutions at the expense of other levels 
of governance, which goes against the grain of much of the thinking in public 
administration theory over the past decades. The EEU-11-level reform ini-
tiatives were predicted by some, claiming that this region might become an 
international policy actor of the likes of germany, France, or the great Britain 
under the leadership of Poland (Friedman, 2010); however, this is yet to ma-
terialize. The international regionalism, which could give rise to meaningful 
debates on common administrative standards, does not seem to have much 
influence across the EEU-11. Thus, the EEU-11 countries are engaged in a 
‘catch-up’ competition measuring their practices not amongst themselves but 
against the likes of germany. However, imitation is a very limited form of in-
novation, and for EEU-11, the ‘catch-up’ with the countries that are different 
in size, history, and structure of economies resigns EEU-11 to a peripheral 
status in the EU. This, of course, is not necessarily a bad thing, as adopting 
only reforms that were tested elsewhere allows avoiding mistakes, but equally 
the elites in the EEU-11 cannot in all honesty promise their societies that 
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convergence in economic output and incomes with the leading innovative 
economies of the EU is possible in the near future.
Two other closely related elements of PAR in EEU-11 are the persistence 
of legalism, and the continuous debates on pros and cons of centralization or 
decentralization. Persistence of legalism tells a story of heritage of weberian 
bureaucracy of the interbellum period and even before. Administrations of 
the Visegrad group and Slovenia, and to some extent Croatia, have a clear 
heritage of Austrian-german administrative tradition where formalization 
of procedures under the Rechtsstaat principle is seen as a crucial element of 
“good administration” (as a sub-concept of good governance, Venice, 2011). 
Moreover, the European Administrative Space also pursues especially con-
vergent development of national systems based on common principles of 
administrative law and good administration (Trondal and Peters, 2013, who 
see phases of national Pas as follows: (i) independence, (ii) integration, and 
(iii) co-optation). Consequently, this field, striving for PA beyond formality 
and actual effectiveness, should be addressed in most of EEU-11 in future as 
well, in line with others, such as civil service system or regionalism. On the 
other hand, looking over past 25 years, even the likes of the Baltic States and 
Romania, did not avoid the fate of creating highly bureaucratized administra-
tive systems. This is a paradoxical feature of PAR of EEU-11; post-communist 
transformation, and in cases of six out of the eleven countries, creation of so-
vereign states took place at a time of high noon of New Public Management. 
Therefore, creation of bureaucratic governance tools went in parallel with the 
NPM debates. It needs to be admitted that the communist bureaucracies were 
anything but weberian; they were highly politicized, acted arbitrarily, and 
were corrupt. Therefore, in a sense the region had to leapfrog from pre-bure-
aucracy to a post-bureaucracy. 
In EEU-11, the result in most cases of EU-driven PARs was the creation 
of highly bureaucratized public administrations, declaratory to create effecti-
ve tools to enforce free market rules and incorporate the European acquis 
(Hille & knill, 2006). The body of European regulation implied the creation 
of bureaucratized procedures while the EU and the IMF in parallel promoted 
the NPM as a solution to inefficiencies that occurred due to lingering practi-
ces of communist administration era. The result of this process was that the 
EEU-11 countries created bureaucratized procedures to regulate for NPM. 
486 Public AdministrAtion reforms in eAstern euroPeAn union member stAtes 
Post-Accession convergence And divergence
This is a fundamental paradox which limits the NPM’s impact on governance, 
as bureaucratic procedures created in parallel to the NPM reforms became 
interwoven with the NPM. These procedures undermine the NPM-promoted 
practices; also regulating for NPM is simply incompatible with the notion of 
flexibility as any managerial innovation or exercise of administrative discre-
tion raise questions of revisiting existing legislation. Moreover, there is very 
little appetite for such reviews among the political elites as reforms of this 
type are very risky, and have little political rewards. 
Centralization versus decentralization theme was set off in the 1990s as a 
wave of decentralization which, after a totalitarian period, could only be such 
by definition. This process has created a great variety of multi-level local and 
regional governance modes; and the EEU-11 does not seem to have a clear 
pattern of decentralization. Moreover, in many instances decentralization has 
proven a fiscal hazard as national budget allocations are too small for the 
service delivery standards that are expected by the residents, and with many 
municipalities having problems raising sufficient funds themselves. The oc-
curring regional disparities due to decentralization are causing a rethink in 
some countries about how to balance national cohesion with the expanded 
rights of local self-government. However, once set, the intra-state multi-le-
vel governance arrangements prove to be just as hard to reform as any ot-
her area of public administration. Of all the themes we identify, this is the 
most structured in the texts of the contributors. Its prominence in all of the 
contributions allows us to claim that the disequilibrium and the need to find 
workable governance solutions in terms of decentralization will be a litmus 
test of the capacities of EEU-11 to conduct reforms that result in increases of 
efficiency and ensures greater citizen satisfaction and empowerment.
To sum up, we can generally identify the main groups of EEU-11 coun-
tries and the main PAR focuses, which have been followed within them (Table 
2). However, simplified but to reveal the main differences, we apply three-le-
vel intensity of focus, i.e., lacking or highly inconsistent (), present but par-
tially or rather formally implemented (), and relatively consistently execu-
ted (). The analysis reveals that the EEU-11 has conducted mainly formal 
reforms regarding PA organization and (de)centralization and management 
of public finances.  
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Table 12.2: Focuses of PAR in (groups) of EEU-11 (nine countries included)
 Countries:
Focuses:
Baltic 
(Latvia, 
Lithuania)
Visegrad 
(Poland, 
Hungary, 
Slovakia)
Western 
Balkans 
(Slovenia, 
Croatia)
Eastern 
Balkans 
(Romania, 
Bulgaria)
key PA legacies Soviet- Scandinavian Soviet
Austrian-
Yugoslavian
French-
Soviet
Type of PARs: top-down & 
radical    
Europeanization    
Managerial reforms    
Organization of PA, 
de/centralization    
Public funding, rationalization    
Civil service system, ethics    
Procedures, transparency    
general/systemic governance 
model 

 (partially 
Hungary)
 
Source: own research.
Although there are evident differences among the above groups of EEU-
11, we believe that joint characteristics, e.g. formal institutionalism and spe-
cific policies implementation but lack of systemic, i.e. holistic and consistent 
reforms, are (still) a common identification of the region as a whole. Not sur-
prisingly, one can claim systemic governance model and good governance 
practices are − due to its lacking consistency and often only formal imple-
mentation − still in the nascent state in the region (Vintar & al., 2013; kovač 
& gajduschek, 2015). Especially, more ambitious good governance and good 
administration principles, such as the rule of law and protection of human 
rights, transparency and participation, good administration with e-govern-
ment, modernization of administrative procedures, and efficient and effective 
management of human and other resources in PA and Total Quality Manage-
ment are still ahead of us.
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The five PAR themes we identified in the EEU-11 region spur us to belie-
ve that the reason why economic developmental outcomes in these countries 
are similar is the fact that their relationship with the rest of the EU is one of 
center to periphery, with the EEU-11 being firmly in the periphery. As time 
goes by, it is likely that divergence between countries will increase. Especially, 
if and when comprehensive reforms will occur because these are not likely 
to be focused on intragovernmental cooperation to create synergies through 
common governance arrangements. However, this divergence is likely to take 
many decades as the institutional setups in the region are generally unfavo-
rable towards ambitious PAR initiatives, and are often confined to narrow 
policy sectors. At the sectorial level, this creates an incredible variety of pu-
blic management practices, and before we can speak of an EEU-11 as an area 
having a particular tradition of public administration, we need to draw atten-
tion that even at the national level government agencies are seldom compa-
red between themselves with regard to various modes of public management. 
The one hurdle, which is particularly strong at the administrative level in this 
case, is the high level of formalism in EEU-11 which, in essence, creates per-
formance evaluation paradoxes (as in van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002). In EEU-11, 
the only reliable benchmark for organizational performance remains their 
compliance to regulation.
12.7. Where Is EEU-11 in the Broader PAR Debate?
with respect to origins and ambitions for PARs, the region is firm-
ly peripheral to the more economically prosperous countries to its west. 
Here, the discourse is one of ‘catching-up’; and some similarities between 
the region’s countries occur because all of them are trying to catch up with 
the same lot. As a result, one outstanding issue in which all the region’s 
countries should share an interest is that the lack of native-to-the-region 
reform initiatives resign it to mostly adopting imitation-type innovations. 
Moreover, this condemns the region to an unending process of ‘catching-
up’. when comprehensive reforms do occur, as in the case of Hungary, they 
are not benchmarked against international practices, but rather are based 
on national exceptionalism, and this inevitably creates divergences in admi-
nistrative practices. Nonetheless, the achievements of region’s governments 
cannot be overlooked. All things considered, we propose a term of EEU-11 
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to refer to this region, as its reforms do not amount to a tradition in the 
Peters’ and Painter’s sense (2010) but also cannot be grouped with other 
post-communist/socialist countries due to very large differences in policy 
outcomes. At the national levels, reform are concentrated at the ministerial 
levels mostly to not challenge or change the overarching institutional ‘pa-
radigms’. In addition, they can be likened to an administrative à la carte?
Nine of the EEU-11 countries fall into the cultural category of the west 
as defined by Huntington (1997), and mark its outer boundary. In EEU-11, 
the communism is broadly perceived not only as a type of governance but 
as something imposed by a foreign power. Therefore, accepting and adop-
ting recommendations from the west was a natural instinct of catching-
up on what has been missing over half a century. That narrative remains a 
powerful force to date, but on the other hand, it also impairs the ability of 
these countries to engage each other and learn from best practices of one 
another. Ultimately, the metrics that drive much of the political debate show 
that the regional countries still have a lot in common. Economic and social 
outcomes of EEU-11 show that best performers (e.g. Slovenia and Czech 
Republic) are roughly half way to the EU averages from the regional worst 
performers. On the other hand, the EEU-11 are closing the economic gap 
between the South European member states. This catch-up is as much a re-
sult of the prolonged South European slump in the wake of the global finan-
cial crisis of 2008−2009 as it is of post-communist member states advances. 
when contrasting the region with other post-communist or post-socialist 
countries (e.g. western Balkans, EU’s Eastern Partnership members), the 
picture suggests that economic growth is not guaranteed by the members-
hip, rather the differences in economic performance were in place prior to 
the EU accession. After all, the EEU-11 had much less trouble in the way 
of challenges to their sovereignty, while many other post-communist coun-
tries continuing to do so. 
The EEU-11’s preoccupation with trying to close the gap to the EU 
average in terms of gDP has caused most of the regional countries to su-
bordinate public administration to that goal by introducing short-term po-
litically contingent reforms, and the political elites seized (if they ever) to 
see public administration as enablers of economic prosperity. As a result, 
the direct impact of formal public administration theories on actual PARs 
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should not be overstated. 
The relationship of formal theories of public administration, such as 
the traditional bureaucracy, NPM, or New governance with the reforms 
and practices they refer to are very complex. Hood’s NPM’s description 
(1991) is one of generalizations but the NPM does have a normative agenda, 
and the same applies to New governance theory with some claim it to be a 
descriptive category, while others consider it a normative theory.   
However, although the terminology of New governance is not directly 
adopted, the democratization and citizen empowerment narrative is now 
on a par with that of NPM’s efficiency. In addition, in many countries, fun-
ding is becoming available and experiments are being conducted with new 
modes of citizen engagement. Nevertheless, these do not amount to a con-
solidated reform agenda yet. Efficiency and participation are not necessarily 
complimentary; and the elites and societies in the EEU-11 remain naïve to 
this aspect of PAR. Another very important observation is also that simi-
larities between the EEU-11 countries do not seem to be a result of a new 
administrative tradition, but rather all of these countries have built politi-
cal institutions that limit their ability to introduce comprehensive admi-
nistrative reforms, and an incremental process of new practice adoption is 
taking place which creates increasing differences among these countries. 
what we see is that the administrative isomorphism is not occurring within 
the EEU-11 below the nation-state level. Moreover, with the crisis of EU 
institutions popular legitimacy the process or creation of a European admi-
nistrative space (Trondal & Peters, 2013) is resigned to a slow and poorly 
reflected process changing attitudes among public administration profes-
sionals due to their engagement with EU decision-making processes (Me-
yer-Sahling, Lowe & van Stolk, 2015). EU’s membership and the Europea-
nization process that led up to it indeed requires a rethink when looking at 
the region. The current EU border probably too narrowly defines the part of 
post-communist/socialist Europe that share common developmental pers-
pectives. while to the west, convergence is difficult, as there is no single 
model of PA to converge to. This ‘catching-up’ with abstract averages results 
in poorly reflected reforms. Ultimately, the reason why we think it matters 
to continue to talk about EEU-11, is that reform agendas of early 1990s 
to mid-2000s have created new political and economic elites that used the 
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window of opportunity to gain dominant socio-economic positions, but by 
no means they ensures long-term sustainability. The regions fortunes are 
inextricably linked with the fortunes of EU, and some take it home, that 
instead of contributing to EU’s success energy and recourses need to be 
devoted to reducing that dependency. 
To conclude, let us emphasize our belief that public administration and 
its reforms need to be addressed interdisciplinary to be successful in resol-
ving cross-sectional and cross-border problems that face the EU as a whole. 
we feel that the EEU-11 needs to join up its capacities to learn from each 
other in this respect in order to develop democracies that deliver to their 
citizens. 
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